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**BUDDHIST SYSTEMS OF TRANSFORMATION: ASRAYA-PARIVRTTI/-
PARAVRTTI AMONG THE YOGACARA**

University of California, Berkeley

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Buddhist Systems of Transformation:
Āśraya-parivṛtti/-parāvṛtti Among the Yogācāra

By

Ronald Mark Davidson

A.B. (University of California) 1971

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Āśraya-parivṛtti/-parāvṛtti Among the Yogācāra

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ABBREVIATIONS

<u>AA</u>	<u>Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā</u>
<u>Āloka</u>	<u>Abhisamayālaṅkāra-Āloka</u>
<u>AMV</u>	<u>Abhidharmamahāvibhāsā-śāstra</u> (T.1545)
<u>ASam</u>	<u>Abhidharmasaṃuccaya</u>
<u>ASamBh</u>	<u>Abhidharmasaṃuccayabhāṣya</u>
<u>BEFEO</u>	<u>Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient</u>
<u>BHSD</u>	<u>Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary</u>
<u>BoBh</u>	<u>Bodhisattvabhūmi</u>
<u>BoBhVy</u>	<u>Bodhisattvabhūmivyākhyā</u>
<u>BSOAS</u>	<u>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</u>
<u>BuBh</u>	<u>Buddhabhūmiśūtra</u>
<u>BuBhU</u>	<u>Buddhabhūmyupadeśaśāstra</u>
<u>BuBhVy</u>	<u>Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna</u>
<u>Ch.</u>	Chinese translation
<u>DaBh</u>	<u>Daśabhūmikasūtra</u>
<u>DhDhV</u>	<u>Dharmadharmaśāstrāvibhāga</u>
<u>DhDhVV</u>	<u>Dharmadharmaśāstrāvibhāgavṛtti</u>
<u>JA</u>	<u>Journal Asiatique</u>
<u>Kośa</u>	<u>Abhidharmakośa</u>
<u>KośaBh</u>	<u>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</u>
<u>KośaVy</u>	<u>Abhidharmakośavyākhyā-Sphuṭārtha</u>
<u>Laṅk</u>	<u>Laṅkāvatārasūtra</u>
<u>MABŚ</u>	<u>Mahāvāna-abhidharma-sūtra</u>
<u>MadHr</u>	<u>Madhyamakahrdaya</u>

<u>MAV</u>	<u>Madhyāntavibhāga</u>
<u>MAVBh</u>	<u>Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya</u>
<u>MAVT</u>	<u>Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā</u>
<u>MCB</u>	<u>Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques</u>
<u>MSA</u>	<u>Mahāvānasūtrālaṃkāra</u>
<u>MSABh</u>	<u>Mahāvānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya</u>
<u>MSAT</u>	<u>Mahāvānasūtrālaṃkāraṭīkā</u>
<u>MSam</u>	<u>Mahāvānasamgraha</u>
<u>MSamBh</u>	<u>Mahāvānasamgrahabhāṣya</u>
<u>MSamU</u>	<u>Mahāvānasamgrahopanibandhana</u>
<u>PaSk</u>	<u>Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa</u>
<u>PaSkVai</u>	<u>Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇavaibhāṣya</u>
<u>Pek.</u>	<u>The Tibetan Tripitaka: Peking Edition</u>
<u>RGV</u>	<u>Ratnagotravibhāga</u>
<u>RGVV</u>	<u>Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyāna</u>
<u>Sandh</u>	<u>Sandhinirmocanasūtra</u>
<u>SandhBh</u>	<u>Sandhinirmocanasūtrabhāṣya (Yüan-tse)</u>
<u>SandVy</u>	<u>Sandhinirmocanasūtravyākhyāna</u>
<u>SAVBh</u>	<u>(Mahāvāna-)Sūtrālaṃkāravṛttibhāṣya</u>
<u>Siddhi</u>	<u>Viññaptimātratāsiddhi (T.1585)</u>
<u>ŚrBh</u>	<u>Śrāvakabhūmi</u>
<u>T.</u>	<u>Taisho Daizokho (Ch. Tripitaka)</u>
<u>Tark</u>	<u>Tarkajvālā (To.3856)</u>
<u>Tib.</u>	<u>Tibetan translation</u>
<u>To.</u>	<u>Tohoku Catalogue (A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon)</u>
<u>Trim</u>	<u>Trisāikā Viññaptimātratāsiddhi</u>

<u>TriṃBh</u>	<u>Triṃśikābhāṣya</u>
<u>TSN</u>	<u>Triśvabhāvanirdeśa</u>
* <u>Vikhy</u>	* <u>Āryadeśanāvikhyāpanasāstra</u> (T. 1603)
* <u>VikhyBh</u>	* <u>Āryadeśanāvikhyāpsana-Bhāṣya</u> (T. 1602)
<u>Viṃ</u>	<u>Viṃśikā Viññaptimātratāsiddhi</u>
<u>VinSq</u>	<u>Viniścayasamgrahaṇī</u>
<u>YoBh</u>	<u>Yogācārabhūmi</u>
<u>WZKS(O)</u>	<u>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd(- und Ost)asiens</u>

GENERAL INTRODUCTION:

The 'Problem' of Transformation

In the course of the life of any religious tradition, certain of its initial doctrinal assumptions or axioms naturally become called into question. Without a doubt, the central doctrinal issue for the Buddhist tradition has been its adherence to the axiom of selflessness, thus its acquisition of the epithet of anātmavāda, the persuasion which presumes a lack of abiding personal identity. The early church doctors were often at odds on the definitions of personality which would somehow encompass all of the factors necessary to satisfy the traditional, doctrinal, and commonsense needs of those undertaking the monastic life with its goal of liberation from undesirable states of being. The apostasy of those postulating a quasi-substantial person, the Vātsīputrīyanikāya, has been well documented for some time, and the problems of the Buddhist descriptions of the individual have been pursued with vigor.¹ This investigation has mostly revolved around the difficulty of the traditional Ābhidharmika view in explaining the organization of personal continuity--particularly that of the maturation of previous action--and

the storage locus of residual defilements. Modern inquiry was further piqued by the existence of a large body of Indic materials, particularly those written by doxographers representing dissenting opinions, which challenge the Buddhist tradition specifically on this point.

Certainly, one of the reasons for this perceived problem must have been the unwillingness of Indian thinkers to accept the imputation of stability without formulating a specific element which would be responsible for the maintenance of that function. Stability over time is one of the conceptual problematiks for Indian culture. Chaos was an accepted mode of being, and if there was the postulation of stability, then some provision must have been made for the warding off of the natural condition of imminent chaos. Given these concerns, we can certainly comprehend that the definitions of personality offered by the Abhidharma masters would come under fire. If the assumption of impending chaos was accepted, descriptions of the individual as a mere locus of efficient events or as a stream of consciousness could not in the least account for any of the central questions of the maturation of previous action and the locus of storage of residual defilements. Such descriptions did identify the potential outbreaks of defilements in the emotional life of the individual but did not come to terms with the relationship of the outbreaks to their sources. The presence, though, of all these affective phenomena in the life of a person was incontestable by Buddhist standards. Concomitant

with these phenomena were also questions of causality, particularly in the environment of the riddance of the residual defilements, otherwise known as the obtaining of enlightenment. Questions of causality also lead to questions of potential, of class, of structure, of relations, and so forth. In the Indian intellectual environment, all of these appeared to demand a substantial element for the requirements of continuity.

One Buddhist tradition in particular became involved in addressing many of these questions and attempting to develop answers which satisfied the peculiar requirements of the Indian Buddhist intellectual and spiritual milieu. This was the tradition which is now usually referred to as the Yogācāra, Vijñānavāda, or Vijñaptimātravāda, dating from about the fourth century, A.D. Representing primarily a meditative tradition, the Yogācāra masters wished to describe the manner in which the individual undergoes certain experiences on the path. Their descriptions, though, rested on their successful solution of certain complex problems which dogged the best efforts of their Ābhidharmika predecessors. In general terms, we may rephrase these problems into certain questions which they confronted, either explicitly or tacitly: What was the relationship of general notions of causality, as found in the world, to the specific type of serial relations found in the process of enlightenment? What was the basis for the potential of this soteriological process? Was it restricted

to certain individuals, or was there a more general class or classes of people who obtained the fruits of the Buddhist path? If path-related experiences were as intense as they were felt to be subjectively, how was it that the individual somehow survived this series of transformative insights? How was it that he exhibited at the same time the survival of many of the same personality traits which had been part and parcel of his behavior before these experiences? Conversely, what exactly had been altered, and what were the criteria by which one could identify the alteration of negative traits in finality, so that these could no longer disturb the psycho-physical system?

Utilizing methods which were more disciplined and formalized, yet distinctly similar to the introspective technique developed by Wilhelm Wundt at Leipzig in the late nineteenth century, this Buddhist tradition brought to light a remarkable series of discoveries, ultimately causing them to reformat the entire edifice of Indian Buddhist thought.² By the end of the fourth century A.D., the Yogācāra masters had described the Oedipus and Electra complexes and identified the existence of the unconscious. They delineated a system of multiple levels of consciousness operating and interacting simultaneously, yet always evolving. They attempted to examine rigorously the mind-body problem and define the precise manner of their interaction while one passed through the intensive training which a meditator must undergo. They were deeply concerned

with both the ontology of the meditative object as well as the gnoseology of the subject undergoing the individual experience. Consequently, they became interested in developmental structures, both in terms of the soteriological process and multiple lifetime development, if not of the child per se. Furthermore, at least one author developed a theoretical method of addressing the problem of the interrelation of language and concepts, attempting to distinguish the ontology of the referential object from that of the process of referring which may supply ontological status in error.

While all of the problems examined by the Yogācāra masters are pertinent in some way to the present discussion, the proper object of our investigation is perhaps the key to many of the conceptual structures utilized by the doctors of this Mahāyāna tradition--the doctrine of 'basic' or 'fundamental transformation'. Known generally by its Sanskrit form of āśrayaparāvṛtti, this doctrine addressed the form of transformation perceived to occur within the individual during his ascendancy along the Buddhist path. The Sanskrit compound, whose final member has been alternatively given as -parivṛtti, -parāvṛtti, -parivarta, etc., denotes the transformation, alteration, replacement, or manipulation of a basic model of reality generated within the early Mahāyāna. The doctrine of fundamental transformation, since it depends on the exact nature of the model to be manipulated, could be, and was, attached to the

most interesting reality models of the period. Each of these systems delineated its own version of the 'basis' or 'fundament' which was to be altered. Because the Buddhists of the period could not imagine a more all-embracing change than the acquisition of enlightenment, the transformation of the fundament was seen to alter the entire nature of reality for the individual, however the nature of reality was described within the system. The alteration was specifically that of the soteriological process, so that the fundament of being underwent the transformation from the condition of bondage to that of liberation. Perhaps the most interesting element of 'fundamental transformation' was that it necessitated the manipulation of different systems or models of reality throughout their entire range. Thus the condition of the ordinary individual, his entering the Buddhist path, his ridding himself of undesirable traits, and his final emancipation, were all pertinent to the manipulation of the system under discussion by the particular author.

Five specific systems were employed by Mahāyāna authors as designated 'fundaments'. The first of these, that of the psycho-physical model, was primarily based on the standard Ābhidharmika representations of reality. Psycho-physical transformation was the first context in which fundamental transformation was generated and had an interesting offshoot when applied to sex-change by one author. The second system, that of underlying consciousness (ālayavijñāna),

became a much more fruitful model of reality. As the basis or fundament which was transformed, or in which transformation took place, it supplied the principal locus of activity for the developmental doctrines elucidated by the Mahāyāna. The third system, that of the three 'natures' (trisvabhāva), represented a foray by Buddhist doctors into ontological grounds. As competing models of reality, both the model of consciousness and that of the three natures became the stock-in-trade of the later Yogācāra scholastics. The fourth system, that of absolutistic transformation--involving transformation with respect to the absolute, usually identified as 'thusness' (tathatā)--was in many ways different from the foregoing three systems. It is, of course, difficult to generate techniques of discussing transformation with regard to an entity such as 'thusness', which instead was considered more the locus or ground of transformation. Accordingly, different ways of approaching the problem of technical terms became required, particularly with respect to the compound 'fundamental transformation'. Finally, there was the system of the 'embryo of the Tathāgata' (tathāgatagarbha), with its source in the earlier descriptions of the lineage or gens (gotra) of the individual. This latter system, while soteriological in origin, shared many of the terminological difficulties of the absolutistic model.

Our investigation into these systems and their transformations will be divided into four parts: Part I will

consist of an inquiry into the traditional assumptions surrounding the term 'Yogācāra' and how these assumptions have contributed to the obfuscation of Buddhist intellectual history. Included will be examinations of the roles of mythology, of doxography, of literature, and of imputations of synonymy in the obacuration of these systems' development. This last will also entail an investigation of these systems' sources in specific abhidharma problems. The alteration of intellectual milieux within Buddhism will additionally be addressed, and a historical sketch of the Yogācāra will be presented in which the Mahāyāna sources for the doctrine of fundamental transformation will be outlined. Part II will consist of the specific inquiry into the doctrine of fundamental transformation as it pertains to each of these systems. A thumbnail sketch of each individual Yogācāra system and the textual descriptions of fundamental transformation relating to each of the systems will be found. Part III will consist of delineating the elaboration of the doctrine of transformation within the syncretic texts which arose within the Yogācāra. Part IV will consist of an examination into the soteriological structure associated with fundamental transformation. Competing versions of the paths of the disciples (Śrāvaka) and the Bodhisattvas will be noted along with the differing opinions concerning the onset of fundamental transformation. Finally, the association of transformation with the 'bodies' obtained as the ultimate fruit will be explored.³

Notes to the General Introduction

1. The bibliography of the problem of anātma is now vast. Representative and especially pertinent to our study are Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, "Ātmavāda in the Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga," Dr. C. Kunhan Raja Presentation Volume, Madras, 1946, pp. 27-37; T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955; Theodore Stcherbatsky, The Soul Theory of the Buddhists, Vārāṇasī: Bhāratīya Vidyā Prakāśan, 1970; Étienne Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien, Bibliothèque du Muséon, vol. 43, Louvain, 1958.
2. Concerning Wundt's contribution, cf. Raymond E. Fencner, Pioneers of Psychology, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979, pp. 126-149; Marc de Mey, The Cognitive Paradigm, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1982, pp. 142-43.
3. Please note that the proper range of this investigation is that of the Mahāyāna before it fully developed the integral system known as Vajrayāna or Mantrayāna. The doctrine of fundamental transformation was to play an extremely important position in the intellectual life of Vajrayāna, but limitations of space make it impossible to explore the extensive material relating to this fascinating development.

PART I:
HISTORICAL MATERIALS

CHAPTER ONE:

The Hiatorical Problem

Comprehending these early Mahāyāna systems of thought and their relations to the various texts of the Buddhist tradition is difficult, as is the case with almost all Indian religious formulations. Most of the systems have generally been encompassed under the rubric of Yogācāra, often identified as a school or philosophical position. The conventional Buddhist view of the Yogācāra tradition, which has largely dominated the perspective of Buddhologists, is that the 'school' represents a relatively systematic, unified approach to the problems of ontology, epistemology, and soteriology. It is described as idealistic or mentalistic in its ontology, nominalist in its epistemology, and path-oriented in its soteriology, though the latter topic is rarely discussed in detail with respect to the Yogācāra, even by traditional scholars in Tibet, China, and Japan. Also in the method developed by the traditional representatives, modern Buddhologists have focused on the figures of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, in order to delineate the system as a whole. This approach has generated a tremendous amount of excellent scholarship while leaving certain basic questions of development largely

unanswered. In its most naive form, the focus on the personalities and the assumption of their exposition of a unified system has had the unfortunate effect of masking much of the intellectual origins, diversity, and development of the systems of thought and spirituality embedded in this difficult complex.

The peculiar historiographical orientation of the sources at our disposal make it necessary to examine in some detail the various milieu in which these systems of thought originated, since the authors of the texts involved have been the subjects of an inordinate amount of folkloric activity. This is certainly not to trivialize the examination of authorship or the specific contributions of the individuals involved, but merely to recognize that the contradictions and confusions found in traditional ascriptions make it difficult to assign authorship definitively until the axioms and presuppositions of the folkloric activity have been mapped. It is also to recognize that the texts themselves, in the form that we possess them, tell us more about the contextual milieu from which they arose than they do of the specific attributes of the person(s) who worked on them. In the case under discussion, it also turns out to be the key to understanding the systems or models of reality developed by Mahāyāna masters and employed in the Yogācāra tradition. It also turns out to be the key for understanding the transition of 'Yogācāra' from a visionary-based, intellectual milieu to

that of a fully developed school with branches and disputes. We must, in any case, engage in this examination to discover the outlines of development of fundamental transformation.

The procedure to come to grips with the generation and maturation of the systems utilized in fundamental transformation will therefore be multiple: In the present chapter an extensive discussion will be undertaken of the seminal milieu of the time of Asaṅga, including the development of folkloric activity surrounding him and the composition of the works ascribed to him. Chapter Two will investigate the traditional descriptions of the Yogācāra system by doxographers and the problems encountered by this approach to the origin and development of the Yogācāra systems. In Chapter Three, the systems approach will be examined through an inquiry into the origins of the models of reality actually employed in fundamental transformation. Chapter Four will discuss the difficulties generated by the traditional imputations of the systems' synonymy, and will investigate the imputations' contribution to systems masking. Finally, in Chapter Five, there will be a short historical sketch of the Yogācāra according to our results, including a discussion of the textual sources of the doctrine of fundamental transformation. Where applicable, an examination of the literature, including scripture (āgama), technical treatises (śāstra), and commentaries on these (bhāṣya, vṛtti, tīkā), will be undertaken, with

suggestions of authorship if these can be reasonably determined.

Milieu and Mythology

The generation of self-consciousness within a tradition is certainly not an immediate occurrence. Often we find that there is a gap or lapse in time before an organic development, which in hind-sight may be considered a social entity, comes to be understood as the initial thrust of an evolving system. This is certainly the case for the rise of the Mahāyāna systems generally, and specific social and intellectual factors play their parts in influencing the speed and direction of such an evolution.¹

One of the most important factors in the generation of this self-consciousness is the elaboration of a mythology whereby the intellectual thrust of the movement receives celestial sanction for its specific views. Elsewhere I have shown the importance of such mythological elaborations for the Abhidharma, early Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna traditions in general.² Celestial mythology was just as important for the Yogācāra and allied developments within the Mahāyāna; it arose from specific traditions localized within the contemplative monastic society found in Kashmīr and Gandhāra during the early centuries of the Christian period. Therefore, to put the Yogācāra mythology in proper perspective, we must, following M. Paul Demiéville's

excellent lead, introduce some prior developments occurring within the Mahāyāna and among the contemplatives of the valley of Kāshmir.³

Meditative practice, according to many of the early Mahāyānasūtras, should properly include the practice of 'recollection of the Buddha' (buddhānusemṛti). Its fruit, as recognized in this literature, is often identified as obtaining the vision of Śākyamuni.⁴ The quality of this vision was one of the hallmarks of success in the practice; if the Buddha appeared before the meditator as vividly as an ambālikā fruit in the palm of his hand, he had obtained the vision of Śākyamuni. Apparently that quality was the basis for some consternation among those practicing this activity. Given that this vision appears as real as ordinary phenomena, it was concluded that it must, in some sense, be as real.⁵ Moreover, since the Buddha had already passed into parinirvāṇa and was therefore inaccessible, how was it that he appeared before the meditator? Finally, what would be the basis of belief for beginners if they could not be convinced that the Buddha could appear?⁶ The answers to these questions developed along at least two lines. First, as is found in Chapter 15 of the Saddharmapundarīka, the Sage of the Śākyas is depicted as never really passing out of the world. His real lifetime is endless and he is always accessible to those who meditate on him. Second, the practice of buddhānusemṛti was extended to other Buddhas, as in the case of Amitāyus in the Pratyutpannabuddhāvasthita-

samādhisūtra, and to the fast-growing cultus surrounding the Bodhisattvas of the Mahāyāna, particularly the Buddha of the future, Maitreya.⁷

In the valley of Kāshmir, as least as early as the second century A.D., the process of recollection had centered on Maitreya, who was considered resident in Tuṣita, a heaven which was not a pure land but located in the realm of desire (kāmadhātu).⁸ One of the early Kāshmiri masters, Saṅgharakṣa, a practitioner of meditative discipline (yoqācāra) and the author of a "Stages on the meditator's path" (Yoqācārabhūmi), was traditionally associated with the court of Kaniṣka.⁹ Legends concerning Saṅgharakṣa received in China towards the end of the fourth century A.D. maintained that, upon his death, he had ascended to Tuṣita to live in proximity with Maitreya, eventually to become the eighth Buddha of the bhadrakalpa.¹⁰ Ultimately there came about legends surrounding four of the Kāshmiri Sarvāstivādin masters--Vasumitra, Maitreyaśrī, Saṅgharakṣa, and Dharmatrāta--who were to have proceeded to Tuṣita to take their places as various Buddhas of the future. They were declared to be Bodhisattvas who were awaiting their opportunity.

A yoqācāra's perception of Maitreya, though, was not just limited to the time of death. In the middle of the fourth century, Buddhasena, one of the leading yoqācāras--masters of meditative discipline according to the Kāshmiri

Sarvāstivāda system--wrote another Yogācārabhūmi.¹¹ One of his disciples, Buddhabhadra (b. 356 A.D.), ultimately traveled to China, where he translated Buddhasena's Yogācārabhūmi in conjunction with Tao-an (道安). Buddhabhadra was said to have often visited Tuṣita during his lifetime and to have obtained the stage of 'non-returner' (anāgāmin). Tao-an, perhaps under influence from Buddhabhadra, was said to have satisfied himself about points of doctrine by praying to Maitreya. Another of Buddhasena's disciples, the Chinese monk Chih-yen (智嚴), on his second trip to India in 427 A.D., was said to have satisfied himself about a point of doctrine similarly. Having come back to India because he was uncertain if he had received ordination (upasaṃpadā) correctly, Chih-yen asked of an Arhat the answer to his problem. The Arhat traveled to Tuṣita in saṃādhi and in turn inquired of Maitreya the same point. Maitreya answered in the affirmative, and Chih-yen passed away in Kashmīr at the age of 79 satisfied with his ordination. The Chinese pilgrim, Fa-hsien (法顯), during his trip to India (399-414 A.D.) saw in Dardistan a tall statue of Maitreya which the local legends maintained was carved in an unusual manner. The artist was taken physically to Tuṣita by an Arhat, where the sculptor could examine for himself the proper height, coloring, and so forth, of Maitreya.¹² Another Chinese monk, Hui-lan (慧覽) who died between 457-464 A.D., also practiced contemplation (dhyāna) in Kashmīr and obtained instruction under a

Kāśhmīri yogācāra named either Dharma or Dharmadatta. This Kāśhmīri master had proceeded to Tuṣita and obtained Mahāyāna ordination from Maitreya, which he then passed on to his disciples, including Hui-lan.¹³ These excursions were usually considered to be the result of obtaining the 'limbs of power' (ṛddhi-pāda), commonly thought to be one of the fruits of meditative exercise.¹⁴ Demiéville has shown, by means of this data, that there was in the fourth century in Kāśhmīr a very strong tradition of Maitreya as the object of buddhānusaṃti and of yogācāra masters having traveled, either physically or psychically, to the heaven of Tuṣita to view the next Buddha.

Undoubtedly the earliest mention of Maitreya in normative Yogācāra literature is that of the eighth chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (Saṃd), first translated by Guṇabhadra between 435-443 A.D., but certainly much older.¹⁵ In the chapter on śamatha-vipaśyanā (Ch.VIII), Maitreya is depicted as the questioner, and his association with what was to become the locus classicus of Mahāyāna meditation is understandable in light of Demiéville's data and the background of other Mahāyānasūtras.¹⁶ While this sūtra is the undoubted basis for many of the systems associated with the Yogācāra, it does not actually bear on the mythology to arise in connection with the putative, doctrinal transmission from Maitreya to Asaṅga to Vasubandhu. To map the rise of this mythology we must address the data concerning the authorship identification of texts which were

associated, in one capacity or another, with the members of the legend, as well as the development of the legend itself. To do this, we must have recourse to the translations being made into Chinese at the critical period. This is not to declare that the Chinese translations are unimpeachable, but they do, I believe, provide a very nice format to understand the way these mythological associations developed.

The earliest translation of a work to be associated with the Maitreya/Asaṅga connection was that of the Bodhisattvabhūmi (BoBh), Ch. 15 of the YoBh. This translation was made between 414-418 A.D. by Dharmarakṣa, but without ascription of authorship, in the same manner as the received Sanskrit text.¹⁷ If we assume that the YoBh is a compilation of one individual, then the record of another section of the YoBh becomes pertinent.¹⁸ The Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī (VinSq), an internal commentary on the YoBh, mentions as laudable the Mahāvānasūtrālaṃkāra (MSA), but without any authorship notation.¹⁹ This is perhaps the earliest reference to the MSA in Indian literature.

The first work to ascribe one of the standard Yogācāra treatises to a certain author is the *Mahāvānāvatāra (T. 1634), written by one Chien-i (堅意) and translated by Tao-t'ai probably between 427-37 A.D. Chien-i is possibly equivalent to Chien-hui as a rendering of the name *Sāramati, the latter equivalence being recorded by Fa-tsang from a tradition brought by the Khotanese monk Devaprajña

(689-91 A.D.) to China. *Sāramati is the reputed author of the Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV) and the *Dharmadhātuvaiśeṣa-śāstra, but the evidence is that the author of these two is different from the author of the *Mahāyānāvataṛa.²⁰ The *Mahāyānāvataṛa quotes from a work called the "Mi-le chuang-yen-ching," and Ui has identified this as the "Sūtrālaṃkāra of Maitreya."²¹ However, Hirakawa, in his Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, has suggested that this important first reference to Maitreya and the MSA is fallacious; in fact the reference is to a sūtra which perhaps could be a *Maitreya-ālaṃkāra-sūtra.²² As evidence for this he maintains that the quotation in the *Mahāyānāvataṛa, which he slightly misquotes, discusses the setting up (發), the understanding of (解), and abiding in (住) the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta). Hirakawa maintains that the MSA never discusses understanding of and abiding in bodhicitta.

Hirakawa's argument against the title is unwarranted, since Chuan-yen-ching is exactly the translation of 'Sūtrālaṃkāra' as found in T.1604 and was commonly used in India without the Mahāyāna- prefixed, as evinced by the title to Sthiramati's commentary, the Sūtrālaṃkāravṛtti-bhāṣya. The quote, furthermore, has been slightly misunderstood by Hirakawa, and it appears to be a mildly garbled, but otherwise recognizable, paraphrase of MSA IV.2.²³ There the generation of bodhicitta (cittotpāda) is of four varieties, the first two, ādhimokṣika and ādhyāśayika, corresponding to the two phrases suspected by

Hirakawa. Chieh (解), which both Hirakawa and Ui have taken to mean 'understand' is commonly used in the translation of mokṣa, muktatva, vimokṣa, adhimokṣa, etc.²⁴ Chu (住), to reside in, is more difficult since it usually refers to variations on the Sanskrit root √sthā or words of similar meaning such as vihāra. If, however, we apply the knowledge that this early translation methodology employed nonstandard terms, often amounting to glosses and quite different from those employed by Prabhākaramitra in his later translation, then this rendering is understandable.²⁵ We find, for example, that the later discussions of bodhi-citta divide it into pranidhicitta and bodhiprasthānacitta, roughly corresponding to the above two varieties.²⁶ If we accept one as a conceptual gloss on another, then adhyāśaya was later conceptually glossed in India with a modification of the root √sthā. The early translator no doubt relied on these kinds of glosses for his comprehension of the terminology, if not the specific gloss suggested here. Thus, if we can accept that the referent of the quote in the *Mahāvānāvatāra is MSA IV.2, and if the former work has actually been translated at that time, then it is the earliest datable ascription of a standard Yogācāra text to any author.

While the BoBh was again translated in 431 A.D., this time by Guṇavarman (T.1582), as before no ascription of authorship was given. The translator, though, cast the treatise in the form of a sūtra, borrowing the introductory

chapter of the Upāli-pariprocchā for that purpose.²⁷ It was not until the big movement towards translation in the sixth century in China that we see a proliferation of ascriptions. It is clear that there was a hiatus of approximately sixty years in translating Yogācāra-related materials in China. Certainly there was no lack of support for the Buddhist clergy in the south with the Liu Sung and Ch'i dynasties and the Wei in the north, even given the intense, but short-lived suppression of 446 A.D. The most probable cause for this hiatus was the unrest which was occurring in Central Asia during this period. It was then that the Turko-Mongol peoples were moving across the steppe. The Epthalite Huns (Ye-tai) in particular were moving into the region approaching the subcontinent and by about 440 A.D. they had occupied Sogdiana.²⁸ Their movement south was finally brought up short by the military prowess of the Gupta dynasty. They did, however, create a great deal of damage to Gandhāra, where they set up a vassal in power. The region had barely calmed down when the Chinese traveler Sung-yun visited it in 519 A.D. on his way to India.²⁹ The hiatus in translation information is one of the greatest obstacles to a clear understanding of the development of Yogācāra in Northern India at this time.

When translation activity resumed, it did so in earnest. The earliest and perhaps most important, for our purposes, of these sixth century works is the translation of the *Vajrasūtra (T.1512). This work is said to be a

commentary on the *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra-śāstra (T.1511) written by one *Vajrarāsi, an Indian monk in the tradition of Asaṅga, and translated by Bodhiruci in 535 A.D. At the end of this subcommentary, there is a lineage list which maintains that the Bhagavat Maitreya composed both a prose commentary on the Vajracchedikā and the BoBh. He handed them to Asaṅga, who in turn handed them on to Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu wrote the verse commentary in eighty verses which he transmitted to *Vajrarāsi and others. *Vajrarāsi transmitted it to Akṣayanati (無盡意), who gave it to Sheng-chi (聖濟), who in turn transmitted it to Bodhiruci.³⁰ The original prose commentary of Maitreya has not, to my knowledge, been identified with any extant text. Takakusu has attempted to refute the validity of the *Vajrarāsi-śāstra, but both Peri and Frauwallner have given excellent reasons for concluding that it is indeed authentic; even though it does not occur in the earliest catalogues, the text enjoys frequent citations in Chinese literature immediately subsequent to its translation.³¹ The ascription of the BoBh to Bhagavan-Maitreya is the earliest, to my knowledge, ascription of authorship to any portion of the YoBh in any datable work.³²

The middle of the sixth century represents a definite water-shed in the development of the legendary foundations of this literature.³³ Three individuals stand out for what they report: Paramārtha, Sthiramati, and Dharmapāla. The former of these was, of course, the famous translator who

was first responsible for rendering systematically into Chinese the major treatises of the Yogācāra.³⁴

Three texts translated by Paramārtha are of special concern to us: the biography of Asaṅga, the Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya (MAVBh), and the Mahāyānasamgraha-bhāṣya (MSamBh). The former of these occurs within the larger Biography of Vasubandhu.³⁵ Here, for the first time, we encounter the full-fledged story of Asaṅga's involvement with Maitreya. Asaṅga, penetrating the emptiness of the Hīnayāna, obtains supernormal powers (abhiññā) and travels to Tuṣita to inquire of Maitreya Bodhisattva the significance of emptiness according to the Mahāyāna.³⁶ Learning this, Asaṅga returns to India, obtains insight, and the earth quakes in six ways. After this, he returns to Tuṣita and receives teaching in the Mahāyāna-sūtras. Maitreya is persuaded to come to Jambudvīpa to teach, and he teaches the Sapta-daśa-bhūmi-śāstra at night over the course of four months. But only Asaṅga can see Maitreya, while the others can hear him. Asaṅga comments on the text during the day and also learns from Maitreya the concentration known as 'sunlight' (*sūrya-prabhā-tejah-samādhi). Finally, Asaṅga applies what he has learned and writes commentaries (upadeśa) on the Mahāyāna-sūtras.

Frauwallner has presented evidence that the Life of Vasubandhu is a piecemeal compilation by one of Paramārtha's students.³⁷ This may explain, for example, why the YoBh

(Saptadaśa-bhūmi-śāstra) is here referred to as a sūtra. The BoBh had already been referred to as a sūtra in both its early translations (T. 1581-82), the second actually being formally cast as one, and we may assume that these were the translations with which the author was familiar. We must notice again the ascription of the YoBh, which we saw before in the case of the BoBh, to Maitreya. Asaṅga, however, is merely delegated the authorship of unspecified explanatory treatises which elaborate the message of Maitreya.

During the same period, 557-69 A.D., Paramārtha was also translating the MAVBh (T.1599). Peri and Ruegg have called attention to the introductory verse of this work which pays homage to both the author (pranetr) of the MAV--described as a Bodhisattva--and the speaker (vaktr), thus differentiating between them.³⁸ Sthiramati (ca. 510-570 A.D.), commenting on this verse at about the same time as Paramārtha was translating the MAVBh, identified the author as Ārya Maitreya, while the speaker was Āryāsaṅga, and the author of the commentary was Ācāryabhadanta-Vasubandhu, who heard the treatise from Asaṅga.³⁹ Sthiramati made no reference to the travels of Asaṅga to Tuṣita, but it is clear that he considered Maitreya as the Buddha of the future (eka-jātīpratibaddha). On the other hand, his commentary to the MSA, the Sūtrālamkāravṛttibhāṣya (SAVBh), does not refer to the authors of either the verse text or of the commentary. Nonetheless, the mention by Sthiramati in the Tīkā to the MAV is apparently the earliest direct

reference to the Maitreya/Asaṅga relationship in surviving Sanskrit literature.

Paramārtha also translated the commentary to the MSam ascribed to Vasubandhu (MSamBh). The root text of the MSam had already been translated in 531 A.D. by Buddhasānta (T.1592), who apparently had ascribed the authorship of the text to Asaṅga. The introductory verses of the MSamBh give what is perhaps the earliest version of the legend in Indian literature surviving in translation. After a short homage to the Buddha and Āryas, the author discusses Asaṅga:

3. Being proud of his learning, he was confused about scripture (āgama) and realization (adhiḡama) since he relied on his own understanding. Confused as he was towards the perfect holy Dharma, he met with the Ārya Maitreya by means of a transworldly, unshakable concentration, the 'illumination of the Dharma'. Thus he came to the master who teaches the holy doctrine not taught before.

4. In the same way that the sun diffuses its net of rays in every direction, he who has spread the stainless rays of renowned treatises, deep, of great meaning, entirely good in word and arisen from the sūtras of explicit sense, he brings in the learned and humorless, making them supple and happy.

5. His intellect (matī) is unimpeded (asaṅga) towards the Dharma, extremely difficult to comprehend. He is never attached (asaṅga) to acquisition, fame, praise, or bliss. Certainly his name, endowed with qualities, is always spoken of by the learned, for that is Asaṅga, whose qualities are renowned among gods and men.

6. Having heard from Akṣayamatī merely part of the downpour of nectar of the topics of Dharma, like a little bird--according to my ability--I grasp and summarize and define, so that a little of the vast teaching is to be explained. Still, one might [otherwise] be afraid of the ocean of this vast text.⁴⁰

Verse six of this introduction is intriguing. The Tibetan, translated here because it often supplies a more literal rendering of the Sanskrit text, seems to indicate that the author of the Bhasya heard the text from one Akṣayamati (mi-zad-blo). We may recall that the name Akṣayamati occurs in the lineage list given by Bodhiruci and on the basis of this could speculate that the author did not obtain the teaching of the MSam directly from Asaṅga. However, it is not quite that clear. Neither the translations of Paramārtha nor of Hsüan-tsang concur with the Tibetan, nor do they agree with each other. Paramārtha merely has Akṣaya as an epithet of Asaṅga, being what all the Gods and men call him, while Hsüan-tsang refers to someone of 'inexhaustible explanation' undoubtedly meaning Asaṅga.⁴¹ Moreover, in Dharmagupta's translation of the commentary (T. 1596), there is no introductory material whatsoever. Again it is possible, even in the case of the Tibetan, to understand Akṣayamati to refer to Asaṅga, since the previous verses had been making plays on his name. Thus it seems likely that, even should we accept the eleventh century Tibetan as closer to the original, there is no guaranty that the introduction was not a later addition to the text, a question which will surface again in the case of other texts below. Nor need we consider these verses conclusive proof concerning the authorship of the MSamBh. What is significant, though, is that by the time the author of the introductory verses was writing, Asaṅga was attributed with the authorship of a

great number of treatises, the MSaṃ included among them. This latter work, as we shall see, is central to many questions of development within the Yogācāra.

The seventh century saw the first actual translation of the MSA, together with its prose commentary. They were translated by Prabhākaramitra into Chinese in 630 A.D. at Sheng Kuan monastery (T.1604). According to the preface of this work, written after the fact by Li-pai-yao, the entire work is to be ascribed to Asaṅga, and Ui considered that this statement was based on the opinion of Prabhākaramitra himself.⁴² The translation, in the editions utilized by the Taisho editors, has at the very beginning ascribed the text to Asaṅga.⁴³ However, in the colophon to the MSABh, the Chinese, the received Sanskrit, and the Tibetan translation have all maintained that the MSA was spoken (bhāṣita) by the Bodhisattva Vyavadātasamaya.⁴⁴ Ruegg has noticed this in the Sanskrit and Tibetan materials, but maintained that the name appears to be a simple epithet.⁴⁵

Hsüan-tsang also returned from India during the seventh century and began the largest single series of Yogācāra-related translations undertaken to date. Three groups of texts hold information of authorship: the translations themselves, his Records of his trip through the subcontinent, and the commentaries to the texts which he brought to China. Collectively, they demonstrated the continued association of Maitreya with the authorship of the

śāstras Hsüan-tsang considered basic to his school. In the Ch'eng wei shih lun (Siddhi), Hsüan-tsang's editing of Dharmapāla's commentary on the Triṃśikā, Maitreya was mentioned as the author of MSA I.7, a verse which attempted to prove that the Mahāyāna is the word of the Buddha.⁴⁶ Commenting on this passage, K'uei-chi (632-682) clarified the tradition by claiming that the verse portion of the MSA was spoken by Maitreya while the commentary was by Vasubandhu and the ascription by former scholars of both parts to Vasubandhu was erroneous.⁴⁷ Yüan-ts'ue (613-696), another of Hsüan-tsang's students, maintained the same identification in his commentary to the Samdhinirmocana, that the work was by Maitreya and the commentary by Vasubandhu. Yüan-ts'ue, though, added that prior ascriptions of both parts to Asaṅga were incorrect.⁴⁸ A pupil of K'uei-chi's, Hui-chao (d. 714), agreed in his subcommentary to K'uei-chi, but elsewhere he ascribed the verses of the MSA together with the *Āryadeśanā-vikhyāpana-śāstra (*Vikhy) to Asaṅga.⁴⁹ Hsüan-tsang's Record of his travels to India identified Ayodhyā as the region where Asaṅga was living when he went to visit Maitreya, presumably following a tradition which the Chinese pilgrim received in India. He described the content of Asaṅga's instruction in Tuṣṭita as the YoBh, the MSA, and the MAV.⁵⁰

In his translations of the MSam and the ASam, Hsüan-tsang follows the standard tradition in ascribing authorship to Asaṅga.⁵¹ Besides these, Hsüan-tsang translated, for

the first time, the verses and commentary of the *Vikhy, now preserved neither in the original nor in any other translated version. The introduction to the *Vikhy, ascribed to Asaṅga in the translation, consists of four verses, the first three of which describe the homage and hearing of the YoBh from Maitreya, while the last verse gives the contents of the entire text in the common summary verse (uddāna) utilized throughout the entire YoBh.⁵² It appears that the first three of these verses are apocryphal, purporting that the text was written as a summary of the YoBh, whereas the contents of the two words are structured quite differently, the *Vikhy being closer in content to the VinSq and the ASam than to seventeen sections of the YoBh. If the *Vikhy is by the author of the YoBh, it is unlikely that he would have strayed from this familiar form, particularly to make the misleading statement given therein.

The end of the eighth century saw further modifications to the authorship ascriptions. According to Ui, I-ching (635-713), in an appendix to his translation of the Vajracchedikā-sūtra-śāstra (T. 1513), maintains that Asaṅga received the Kārikā-saptati in Tuṣita and then transmitted it to Vasubandhu, who wrote a prose commentary.⁵³ If this is so, it contradicts the tradition described by Bodhiruci, as we have seen, wherein Maitreya composed a prose commentary on the Vajracchedikā, Asaṅga the verses, and Vasubandhu a prose commentary on the verses. At the beginning of I-ching's translation to the Vajracchedikā-

sūtra-śāstra, though, we read that Asaṅga composed the verses and Vasubandhu the commentary.⁵⁴ I-ching's note at the end of his enumeration of Asaṅga's eight 'branches' (aṅga) lends a clue as to what is going on here. I-ching identifies eight works which are to be ascribed to Asaṅga, including the MSam, the ASam, the MSA, the MAV, and three works usually ascribed to Vasubandhu: the Vim, the Trim, and the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa.⁵⁵ I-ching notes that, even if some of the eight belong to Vasubandhu, because the achievement is clearly Asaṅga's, it is transferred back to him, and so these texts are included under his name.⁵⁶

By the end of the eighth century two other texts had been ascribed to Maitreya as author: the Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV) and the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (AA). Evidence for the first of these comes from a manuscript fragment of the RGV written in Brāhmī characters with Khotanese Śaka annotations. It ascribes the opening verses and authorship of the RGV to the Bodhisattva Maitreya.⁵⁷ As was mentioned before, the noted Hwa-yen author, Fa-tsang (643-712), in his commentary to the Dharmadhātva-viśeṣa-śāstra, repeats a tradition he ostensibly received from the Khotanese monk Devaprajña, that the author of the RGV and the text he comments on was a certain *Sāramati.⁵⁸ The two Khotanese traditions must be juxtaposed to the silence of Ratnamati's translation of the RGV, and of the Chinese canonic catalogues, about its author.⁵⁹

Haribhadra appears to be the first author to attach the legend of Maitreya and Asaṅga to the AA. In the opening verses of the Āloka, he maintains that the kārikā text of the AA was composed by Maitreya and the commentary (bhāṣya) by Asaṅga.⁶⁰ He further declares that there was another commentary, a Paddhati, written by Vasubandhu. Under the commentary to I:36, discussing the attributes of the spiritual friend (kalyāṇamitra), Haribhadra poses the question: what did Asaṅga, and so on, really have to do with the exposition of the AA? In answer he says that it is traditionally declared (śrūyate) that Maitreya, noticing Asaṅga despondent over his inability to comprehend the Prañāpāramitā-sūtra, interpreted for him the sūtra (i.e., the Pañcaviṃśati) and wrote the text of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra-kārikā.⁶¹ Haribhadra does not provide us with more information about the putative commentaries of Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, while the earlier commentators appear to make no reference to them. Thus Haribhadra seems the earliest to record this 'traditional statement', which was later generally accepted, sometimes with modifications.⁶²

Abhayākaragupta (11th cen.?), for example, is recorded as having maintained that the AA was composed by Maitreya after the convocation of the Mahāyāna council for the sake of those who could not comprehend the Prañāpāramitā.⁶³ This would purport to indicate that the AA stemmed from the time of the Buddha's demise.

Tun-lun, the T'ang dynasty commentator on the YoBh, records the apparently first usage of the "five śāstras of Maitreya," which was to become a standard number attached to the ostensible works of Maitreya in the Tibetan tradition. The specific titles, though, are somewhat different from those enumerated by the Tibetan masters, and include the YoBh, the *Yoga-vibhaṅga-śāstra, the MSA, the MAV, and the Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra-śāstra.⁶⁴ Despite the opinion of some authors, I have found no concrete evidence of an Indic basis for the classification of 'five works of Maitreya' (Tib. Byams chos [adel lnga]). The classification was unknown among the Indic śāstras with which I am familiar and was also apparently unknown or unemployed by the early Tibetan doxographers, such as Ye-she sde (9th cen.), Rong-zom chos-bzang (11th cen.), Rog Ban-de shes-rab-'od (?11th cent.).⁶⁵ Indeed it would be strange if there had been accepted such a systematization during the Royal dynastic and the snqa-'gyur period, since the lDan-kar-ma catalogue gives no sign that either the DhDhV or the RGV had been yet translated.⁶⁶ The earliest Tibetan mention of the 'five works of Maitreya' of which I am aware is in the hagiography of Sa-chen dKun-dga' snying-po, written by rJe-btsun Grags-pa rgyal-mtshan (1147-1216).⁶⁷ The source for this enumeration utilized by Grags-pa rgyal-mtshan is unclear, but it is possible that the tradition came through the rNgog-lugs, originating from rNgog blo-ldan shes-rab.⁶⁸ The problem is whether this represents a Kāśhmīri tradition, a

codification of rNgog himself, or of one of his followers. These five are also mentioned in the celebrated History of the Dharma of Bu-ston, but even this great savant can cite no Indic source for accepting that Indian authors agreed on a standard five.⁶⁹ In fact, the evidence cited by Bu-ston demonstrates that there was little consensus on the extent of Maitreya's compositions. For example, he cites a tradition that Ratnākaraśānti accepted the ASam as a work of Maitreya's, an ascription which does not appear to have been previously held. Furthermore, there was no unanimity about the DhDhV. The only Indic author I have yet seen cite this important, but quite short, work was Jñānaśrīmitra of Gauḍa. He cites what is apparently a corrupt section of the commentary to DhDhV sec. V under the name of Dharma-dharmatā-pravibhāga, and ascribes what he evidently considers the entire text to Vasubandhu.⁷⁰ The manuscript of the DhDhV was found by Rahula Saṅkṛtyāyana at sPos-khang in 1938, and in the colophon both the terms vibhāga and pravibhāga are listed as names of the sūtra text, with the authorship ascribed to Maitreyapāda.⁷¹

Thus Bu-ston, to be sure following earlier authors, is reporting a 'well-known' (yongs su grags pa) tradition for which we have only Tibetan and Chinese evidence. In lieu of any concrete Indic statement, there remains the possibility that the tradition worked its way into Tibet from China, since the major concern of the principal translator from Chinese into Tibetan during the early

period, Chos-grub (法成), was the Yogācāra textual tradition.⁷² This possibility is reinforced by the circumstantial fact that in the same place as Bu-ston discusses the 'five treatises of Maitreya', he mentions that Asaṅga heard the YoBh from Maitreya in Tuṣita, a tradition which may be unknown elsewhere in Tibetan historiography and which parallels the Chinese materials. We do know that Chinese historical information was coming into Tibet at various times, and Tshal-pa Kun-dga' rdo-rje, in his Red-Annals (Deb-ther dmar-po), had provided short biographical sketches of Kumārajīva and Hsüan-tsang.⁷³ Thus it is possible that the numbering system of 'the five treatises' without the specifics was taken from Chinese sources tracing back to the T'ang author Tun-lun. Perhaps only further research into the traditions and works of rNgog lo-tsaḥ-ba, should they become available, will settle the question.

Even a cursory analysis of our data shows that we have seen at least three thrusts working together in this development of the legend and authorship identification: movements back in time, towards a divine locale, and towards persons of greater authority. These sorts of hermeneutical thrusts are relatively well established in other areas of Indian Buddhism, such as the preaching of all of the seven books of the Theravāda Abhidharma by the Buddha to his mother in Tuṣita, and it is not surprising that they should appear in the Yogācāra context as well. Works initially associated with Asaṅga, such as the Kārikāsaptati or the

ASam, end up being associated with Maitreya, since the initial inspiration is believed to have come from the Bodhisattva. Works commonly ascribed to Vasubandhu, such as the Vim and the Trim, become associated with Asaṅga, as in I-ching's enumeration of the eight 'branches' of Asaṅga's literature. The final limit of this movement was reached in Tibet when, as we are informed by dPa'-bo gTsug-lag phreng-ba in his mKhas-pa'i dga'-ston, some earlier Tibetan scholars had decided that all twenty works normally identified with the Yogācāra by Tibetans--including those of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu--should be credited to Maitreya-nātha.⁷⁴

These movements are expressions of the 'inspiration' of great individuals towards their followers. Great authors in India were the objects of the projection that any striking idea eventually developed by their group, or even concurrently developed by some lesser known individual, must have been thought of by the great man, because of his necessarily advanced spirituality.⁷⁵ The basic supposition for this projection is that one obtaining popular recognition, and therefore greatness, must have obtained this popularity by means of spiritual strength (tapas). The ultimate source of strength, certainly, was the celestial figure, in this case Maitreya, to whom the real credit belongs. There are definite exceptions to this movement, notably the YoBh which, as we have seen, was initially ascribed to Maitreya in Bodhiruci's work of 506 A.D. but

which was later accepted by the normative Tibetan tradition as being the work of Asaṅga. Possibly the reason for this counter-movement was the quite prosaic nature of the work and that it was not really seen as delineating Mahāyāna in the same way as the 'five treatises'.

Notes to Part I: Chapter One

1. Unfortunately, we are quite far from knowing the precise economic circumstances which accompany the generation of any new system within the Indian Buddhist monastic environment. It is, moreover, quite unlikely that our knowledge on this topic will be significantly expanded in the near future.

2. See my "An Introduction to the Standards of Scriptural Authenticity in Indian Buddhism," forthcoming in Robert Buswell, ed., Buddhist Apocrypha in East Asia and Tibet, Berkeley Buddhist Series, Berkeley: U.C. Press.

3. Paul Demiéville, "La Yogācārabhūmi de Sangharakṣa," Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient 44/2 (1954): 339-436.

4. Cf. Chapter 16 passim of the Saddharmapundarīka, ed. Nalīkākṣha Dutt, Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1953, pp. 215-32, esp. p. 221-22; Demiéville, "La Yogācārabhūmi," pp. 356-61, 357 n. 8; Étienne Lamotte, La Concentration de la Marche Heroïque (Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra), Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques Vol. XIII, Brussels: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1965, p. 163 n. 121.

5. Among modern contemplative informants of the Tibetan tradition, it is usually maintained that the vision is more real than ordinary reality.

6. This question is asked in Ch. 14 of the Saddharma-pundarīka; note that Maitreya is here, too, associated with the practice of contemplation and contemplatives; Dutt, p. 204, v. 53.

7. See Paul M. Harrison, "Buddhānusmṛti in the Pratyutpanna-Buddha-Saṃmukhavasthita-Samādhi-sūtra," Journal of Indian Philosophy 6(1978):35-57.

8. Demiéville, "La Yogācārabhūmi " pp. 341, 390-95.

9. Demiéville, p.364.

10. Note Tao-an's preface written in 384 A.D., and found in T.2145, containing a tradition which he apparently obtained from the monk Sanghabhadra of Kashmīr. Demiéville, "La Yogācārabhūmi," p. 364-5.

11. T. 618, which is usually ascribed to Dharmatrāta; cf. Demiéville, pp. 362, 378-87.

12. James Legge, A Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms, New York: Dover & Paragon, 1965, pp. 24-25; Demiéville, p. 370 n.4.
13. This type of ordination, although probably not the specific one in question, is found in the Bodhisattva-pratimokṣasūtra, edited by Nalinakha Dutt, "Bodhisattva Pratimokṣa Sūtra," Indian Historical Quarterly 7 (1931): 259-286; cf. Pierre Python, Vinaya-Viniścaya-Upāli-Pariprocchā: Enquête d'Upāli pour une Exégèse de la Discipline, Collection Jean Przyluski Tome V, Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1973.
14. Demiéville, p. 379.
15. See Demiéville's review of Lamotte's Sand, JA 228 (1936): 645-656.
16. Note the importance of this chapter, the commentary thereon, its influence on the bKa'.gdams-pa tradition in Tibet and on the Bhāvanākrama; the Mahāyānasūtras cited by Demiéville which utilize Maitreya; and Saddharmapundarīka Ch. 14.
17. T.1581; Hakuju Ui, "Maitreya as an Historical Personage," in Indian Studies In Honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929, pp. 95-102, esp. 96-97; Paul Demiéville, "Le chapitre de la Bodhisattvabhūmi sur la Perfection du Dhyāna," Rocznik Orientalistyczny 21 (1957): 109-28, esp. pp. 110-111.
18. Unrai Wogihara, "Allgemeines über die Bodhisattvabhūmi," in idem ed., Bodhisattvabhūmi, Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1971, p. 11; Lambert Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa-Abchnitt in der Viniścayasamgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmi, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften Philosophisch-Historische Klasse Sitzungsberichte, 264, Band 2, Vienna: Hermann Böhlau, 1969, pp. 17-18, which delineates some of the many internal cross-references found in the YoBh, make such an assumption plausible.
19. Wayman, Analysis of the Śrāvakaabhūmi Manuscript, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961, p. 30; VinSq, sDe-dge edition, sems-tsam zhi, f. 198a4-7.
20. Fa-tsang's cy. to RGV, T.1838, vol. 44, p.63c; Hakuju Ui, "On the Author of the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra," Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik 6 (1928):218-19; Erich Frauwallner, On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu, Serie Orientale Roma III, Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1951, p. 62; Ruegg, La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra: Étude sur la Sotériologie et la Gnoséologie du Bouddhisme, Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient vol. 70,

Paris: E.F.E.O., 1969, pp. 41-42; Noël Peri, "A Propos de la Date de Vasubandhu," BEFEO 11 (1911): 348-355; Jikido Takasaki, A Study on the Ratnagotravibhaga, S.O.R. XXXIII, Rome: I.S.M.E.O., 1966, p. 9; the identification of the different authors was suggested by V.H.W. Bailey and E.H. Johnston, "A Fragment of the Uttaratantra in Sanskrit," BSOAS 8 (1935): 77-83, but this identification partly rests on the ascription of the commentary on the Kāśyapaparivarta to Sthiramati. Y. Kajiyama has suggested ("Bhavaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla," WZKSQ 12-13:195-97) that the Tibetan translators were in error with this ascription. In fact, the name of the author is retained in the pariṇāmana-gāthā at the end of the treatise, which is by one Jinamati (rgyal ba'i blo gros: yung-i 勇 基), Baron A. von Staël-Holstein, A Commentary to the Kāśyapaparivarta, Peking: The National Library of Peking and the National Tsinghua University, 1933, p. 324:

rgyal ba'i blo gros kyis ni byed bcug ste /
dkon mchog brtsegs pa bshad pa byas pa yis /
baod nama bdag gis thob pa gang yin pa /
des ni 'gro ba rgyal ba thob gyur cig.

21. U1, "On the Author," ZII 6:218; idem, "Maitreya as an Historical Personage," p. 101; T.1634, vol. 32, p.49b12.

22. Akira Hirakawa, Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kabushikikaisha, 1973, p. IX.

23. Sylvain Lévi, ed., Mahāvāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra--Exposé de la Doctrine du Grand Véhicule, Tome I, Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, 1907, p. 14.5-9.

24. Cf. Gadgin M.Nagao, Index to the Mahāvāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra, Tokyo: Nippon Gakujutsu Shinkokai, 1958, vol. 1, pp. 9, 198-200, 224-225; note, though, that we have no exact equivalent of chieh=ādhimokṣika.

25. Cf. T.1604.31.613c12-24 for Prabhākaramitra's rendering of the same verse.

26. Eg. Bodhicaryāvatāra, I.15; P.L.Vaidya, ed., Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 12, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960, pp. 11-12.

27. Demiéville, "Le chapitre," pp. 110-111; Python, Upāli-pariprcchā, pp. 3-4.

28. William McGovern, The Early Empires of Central Asia, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939, pp. 404 ff., 485 ff.

29. See René Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, trans. Naomi Walford, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1970, pp. 67-71; Samuel

Beal, Si-Yu-Ki Buddhist Records of the Western World, New York: Paragon, 1968, pp. xc-cvi.

30. T.1512.25.874c9ff.

31. Frauwallner, Buddhist Master, pp. 42-46; Noël Peri, "A Propos de la Date de Vasubandhu," BEFEO 11 (1911):341-44; Ui, "Author of MSA," p. 216 n.8; Jyan Takakusu, "The Date of Vasubandhu, The Great Buddhist Philosopher," Indian Studies in Honor of Lanman, pp. 83-84.

32. Frauwallner's attempt (Buddhist Master, p. 42) to read into the Chinese the name Maitreya-nātha is unwarranted. The Chinese reads mi-le-shih-tsun (彌勒世尊), the latter two characters being standard equivalents for bhagavat; see Demiéville, p. 384 n.7 for reference to the *Vikhy invocation and Hirakawa's Index, pp. 274, 206 for standard equivalents of these two different terms; MSA XII.2 translates bhagavat with shih-tsun also.

33. Gautamaprajñāruci's translation in the early sixth century of the commentary--T. 1565, ascribed to Asaṅga--on the first chapter of the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikās does not directly pertain to the development of the legends surrounding Asaṅga and Maitreya or the literature involved in these legends. The introduction to this commentary does not mention Asaṅga in any other context than as a master of the Mahāyāna and provides no mention of Maitreya or Vasubandhu (T.1565.30.39c). It is unclear that the author of this commentary should be identified with the Yogācāra doctor Asaṅga.

34. The only work to date which discusses extensively Paramārtha's life and contribution is Diana Y. Paul, Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984.

35. T. 2049, vol. 50, pp. 188a-191a; translated in J. Takakusu, "The Life of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha," T'oung Pao ser. 2, vol.5 (1904): 269-96.

36. See Peri, "A Propos," p. 379, n.3.

37. Frauwallner, Buddhist Master, p. 18.

38. Gadjin M. Nagao, Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya, Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964, p. 17:

śāstrasyāṣya prañetāram abhyarhya sugatātmaṃ |
vaktāraṃ cāmad-ādibhyo yatiṣye 'rtha-vivecane ||

39. Ramachandra Pandeya, ed., Madhyānta-Vibhāga-Śāstra, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971, pp. 3-4.

40. MSamBh, To. 4050; Pek. 5551, vol. 112.273.1.3-2.1, sama-tsam li, fol. 142a3-b1: mkhas par rlom pa rang gi rtog la brten pas lung dang rtogs pa dkrugs gyur cing | de ltar yang dag dam choa tahul dkruga pa la choa kyia rab tu anang mdzad pa'i | ting 'dzin mi g.yo 'jig rten 'das la brtan nas 'phags pa byams pa la brnyes pas | angon chad ma byung ba yi dam chos ston par mdzad pa'i slob dpon la yod do | ji ltar nyi ma phyogs rnama thams cad kun tu 'od zer dra ba 'gyed pa ltar | gang gis legs pa'i grags pa gzhung gi 'od zer dri med rnam par apro byed de | zab cing don che bzang la sna tshogs tshig bzang nges pa'i don gyi mdo las byung | gang zhig akye bo mkhas pa dang dga' med pa drang ba mnyen zhing gus par byed | shin tu rtogs par dka' ba'i chos de nyid la'an gang gi blo ni thogs med la | rnyed dang grags pa dang ni bstod dang bde ba rnams la'an chags pa rtag med pa'i | gang gi ming yang yon tan rjes mthun nges par mkhas pa dag gi rtag brjod de | gang zhig thogs med ces ni mi dang lha yia grags pa'i yon tan rjod byed pa | mi zad blo las dam chos tshig don bdud rtsi'i char 'beb pa las phyogs gcig nyid | thos te byi'u lta bur rang gi nus pas cung zhig gang yang ci gzung dang | bsdu pa gtan la dbab par shin tu rgyas par batan las cung zhig brjod par bya | dea kyang la la shin tu rgyas pa'i gzhung gi rgya mtshos skrag pa'i don byed arid |.

41. Cf. T. 1595.31.154a9, T. 1597.31.321b17.

42. Ui. "On the Author," ZII 6:216; T. 1604.31.589c21.

43. T.1604.31.590b2.

44. Lévi, ed., Mahāvāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 189.3; T.1604.31.661c20; aDe-dge, sama-tsam, phi, fol. 260a.

45. Ruegg, La Théorie, p. 40.

46. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Viññaptimātratāsiddhi--La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang, Buddhica Tome I & V, Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928, vol. 1, p. 176; Ui, "On the Author," p. 218; T.1585.31.14c25; for a complete discussion of the arguments utilized in this verse of MSA, see my forthcoming "An Introduction to the Standards of Scriptural Authenticity."

47. Ui, "On the Author," p. 220.

48. Ui, "On the Author," p. 220-21.

49. Ui, p. 221. T.1603-2. This text will be further discussed in Part I, Chapter 5 and Part II, Chapter 4.

50. T. 2087.51.896b22-23; Samuel Beal, Si-Yu-Ki--Buddhist Records of the Western World, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1906, vol. 1, p. 226; Thomas Watters, On Yuan

Chwang's Travels in India, Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, vol. XIV, London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1904, pp. 355-58.

51. T. 1594.31.132c17; T. 1605.31.663a3.

52. T. 1603 (verses), 1602 (verses and commentary); vol. 31, pp. 480b16-23, 583b25-583c3; these verses have been translated by Demiéville, "Yogaśāstra," p. 384.

53. U1, "On the Author," p. 216; I have been unable to locate this appendix.

54. T. 1513.25.875a4.

55. T. 2125.54.230a4-6; Junjiro Takakusu, A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practiced in India and the Malay Archipelago by I-Tsing, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896, p. 186; the inclusion of a certain Nidāna-śāstra appears odd in this list. The K'ai yuan shih chiao lu (T. 2154.55.569a19) records I-ching's Record as having been composed between 700-710 A.D., but I-ching's memoirs in the Biographies of Monks maintains that he sent it to another monk in China in 692 A.D.; see Takakusu, A Record, p. xxxvi.

56. Takakusu, A Record, p. 186, T. 2125.54.230a5-6.

57. V.H.W. Bailey and E.H. Johnston, "A Fragment of the Uttaratantra in Sanskrit," BSOAS 8 (1935): 77-83; note that the ms. also included verses from the MSA and the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā, and Bailey and Johnston maintained that the scribe had transposed the authors' names on these two, but they do not give in their article which these names were. Presumably they were of Maitreya and Nāgārjuna.

58. T. 1838.44.63c5-21; Takasaki, A Study, p. 9.

59. Takasaki, A Study, p. 9; Ruegg, La Théorie, pp. 44-47.

60. P.L.Vaidya, Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā (with AA-Aloka), Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 4, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, p. 267.13-24, vv. 1-3. These identifications have been discussed by Ruegg, La Théorie, pp. 41-45, and his "Ārya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena on the Gotra-Theory of the Prajñāpāramitā," WZKSQ 12-13 [Frauwallner Festschrift] (1968-69):303-317, esp. p. 304.

61. Vaidya, Aṣṭa, p. 306.14-18; Ruegg, La Théorie, p. 43.

62. D.Seyfort Ruegg, "Ārya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena," pp. 303-17; idem, La Théorie, p. 43.

63. Ruegg, La Théorie, p. 44.

64. T. 1828.42.311b6-10; Ui, "On the Author," p. 221; Peri, "A Propos," p. 240; Lambert Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt, p. 19. The Yogavibhāga or Yogavibhāgaśāstra is cited in the Siddhi, p. 581, and in the MSam T. 1594.31.143c5-9; Étienne Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga (Mahāvānasamgraha), Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain Vol. 8, Louvain-La-Neuve, 1973, Tome I, p. 56, Tome II, pp. 175-76, sec. III.17.

65. Cf. Ruegg, La Théorie, pp. 39-41; Daishun Ueyama, "Lta bahi khyad par written by Tibetan Translator yes shes sde," Bukkyogaku kenkyu (Studies in Buddhism) 32/3 (1977): 19-38, esp. pp. 34 ff.; Rong-zom Chos kyi bzang-po, Selected Writings (qSung-thor-bu), Leh: 'Khor-gdong Gter-aprul 'Chi-med-rig-'dzin, 1974, pp. 339-41; Rog Ban-de Shes-rab-'od, Grub mtha' so so'i qzhed qzhung gaal bar ston pa chos 'byung grub mtha' chen po bstan pa'i sgron me, Leh: Tshul Khrims 'Jam dbyanga, 1977, p. 57.3.

66. Marcelle Lalou, "Les Textes Bouddhiques au Temps du Roi Khri-srong-lde-bcan," Journal Asiatique 241 (1953): 313-53.

67. dPal sa skya pa chen po kun dga' anying po'i rnam thar, in The sLob bShad Tradition of the Sa-skye Lam-'bras, Rajpur, U.P.: The Sakya Center, 1984, vol. ka, p.28.1.

68. The best, and virtually only, material on the rNgog-lugs is that of Leonard W.J. van der Kuijp, Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology, Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 26, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1983, pp. 29-58. Van der Kuijp has listed (Appendix 1, p. 57) all the names of the works ascribed to rNgog lo-tsaṅ-ba and we noticed that he was said to have written commentaries on all of the 'five works of Maitreya'. Unfortunately none of his works have actually come down to us.

69. Lokesh Chandra, ed., The Collected Works of Bu-aton, New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1971, vol. 24, p. 840.2.

70. In the Sākāraiddhiśāstra, in Anantalal Thakur, ed., Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Vol. V, Patna: K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, 1959, p. 432.

71. Rahula Saṅkrītyāyana, "Search for Sanskrit Mss. in Tibet," Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24 (1938): 137-163, esp. p. 163 n. 1.

72. See Shōju Inaba, "On Chos-grub's Translation of the Chieh-shen-mi-ching-shu," in Leslie Kawamura and Keith Scott, eds., Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization [Festschrift H.V.Guenther], Emeryville, California: Dharma

Publishing, 1977, pp. 105-113.

73. Kun-dga' rdo-rje, Deb ther dmar po--The Red Annals, Gangtok: Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, 1961, pp. 13.3-16.7. A.I. Vostrikov, Tibetan Historical Literature, trans. Harish Chandra Gupta, Soviet Indology Series No. 4, Calcutta: Indian Studies Past & Present, 1970, p. 81, maintains that the Red Annals were written in 1346.

74. Ruegg, La Théorie, p. 44.

75. This approach may be likened to a similar method present within the Annales group of the histoire des mentalités wherein great authors represent the "maximum possible consciousness of the social group they represent." see Roger Chartier, "Intellectual History or Sociocultural History? The French Trajectories," in Dominick LaCapra and Steven L.Kaplan, eds., Modern European Intellectual History. Reappraisals and New Perspectives, Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1982, pp. 13-46, esp. p. 28.

CHAPTER TWO:

The Doxographical Problem

Now that the legendary material has been addressed, the other factor in the formation of the normative conceptual field surrounding the rubric 'Yogācāra' must be considered. Specifically the perception of a philosophical or doctrinal 'system' which has come to be considered the specific domain of the Yogācāra 'school' must be questioned in terms of its development. That the doctrines have arisen within the normal development of a school has almost always been assumed, and often the standard doxographical classification of the Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda has been imputed to the literature associated with the 'founders' of the tradition.¹ While it cannot be doubted that there was ultimately something in India which perceived itself as a separate Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda doctrinal entity, at what point was there this awareness among either the proponents or opponents of the various doctrines? Moreover, can this classificatory system provide insight into the way in which the 'Yogācāra' doctrines developed, or does it rather mask their history behind a wall of scholia terminology?

Certainly by the sixth century, there existed a body of doctrine which was considered to belong to the Yogācāra viewpoint, and there were masters who described themselves

as Yogācāras, Vijñānavādins, or even perhaps Cittamātravādins.² This appears to be the minimal definition of a 'school', although we shall note that this material was not treated by these scholars in identical ways. We must here observe that the term 'Yogācārin', so often used in Buddhological literature to describe the masters of the tradition, appears unattested in the texts of this tradition that we have at our disposal.³ The term 'yogācāra', which occurs frequently in the Śrāvaka-bhūmi (ŚrBh), is identified as 'one for whom there is the practice of meditation', being an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound.

Bhavaviveka (ca. 500-570 A.D.) is, to my knowledge, the first doxographer to delineate an extensive philosophical outline under the rubric of Yogācāra. In his Madhyamaka-hrdaya (MadHr) and its autocommentary, the Tarkaṣvālā (Tark), Bhavaviveka has given perhaps the earliest systematic description of the doctrines attached to that name.⁴ Verses one through seven of Chapter Five (yogācāratattvaviniścaya-pariccheda) are dedicated to the delineation (pūrvapakṣa) of the Yogācāra position, while the rest of the chapter is dedicated to the refutation of their position.⁵ The refutation is a relatively straightforward application of the Madhyamaka procedures and does not add appreciably to his interpretation of the system, so we will only be concerned with the initial verses of the chapter:

1. Others, proud of their tradition and inflated with their own learning, declare as follows:

Yogacara correctly delineates entrance into the nectar of thatness (tattvāmṛta).

2. Because both [internal and external] existents are unreal, the existence of that unreality of dualism, when it is the object of an existent mentality, is to be accepted as ultimately real (paramārthasat), so they claim.

3. This unreal existent (asatbhāva) is to be known as selflessness, thusness (tathatā), the stability of dharma (dharmaasthititā), and the object of the nonmentational mind (*avikalpikamatigrāhya).

4. Based on apprehension, nonapprehension occurs; based on nonapprehension, nonapprehension occurs.

5. Not apprehending the conceptual (kalpita), through not grasping after the dependent (paratantra) there is the perception of the perfected nature (pariniṣpannasvabhāva), which is the vision of thusness (tathatādarśana).

6. We accept the existence of the dependent because it occurs with the conceptual object, because it is otherwise nondual, and because it apprehends the defilements.

7. This method of the prajñāpāramitā was obtained by the Omniscient and not the extreme refutation of arising and suppression [found within the Nāgārjuna].⁶

From the outset, it is obvious that Bhavaviveka has relied heavily on the MAV for the material found in the verses, even if some of the terminology is untracable to that particular text.⁷ For example, while verse four is an exact duplicate of MAV I.6, I have not been able to trace the term 'nectar of thatness' (v.1) to any Yogācāra text. Still, his reliance on the MAV and the MSA for basic doctrines in the verse text is not reflected in the Terk, where he introduces much doctrine and terminology which must have come from the MSam and the Trim.

At the beginning of his commentary, Bhavaviveka identifies Ācārya Asaṅga and Vasubandhu as the founders of the tradition, as was foretold by the Buddha.⁸ They, though, have not comprehended the Mahāyāna in the same way as it was thoroughly realized by Nāgārjuna. The first three verses are primarily oriented towards the perception of reality, with verse three giving its cognitive synonyms (parvāya), a common practice among the Yogācāra which will be discussed later. One would then expect Bhavaviveka to paraphrase MAVBh to I.6, since MadHr V.4 is an exact copy of the MAV statement. This is not the case, though, and Bhavaviveka takes the opportunity to expound at length about the underlying consciousness (ālayavijñāna), most of the material apparently being taken from the MSaṃ statements found in Chapter Two of that work. He also uses the opportunity to delineate the doctrine of fundamental transformation, but only with reference to the ālayavijñāna. Under his commentary to verse five, Bhavaviveka appears to make an error--he maintains that all three of the 'natures' of the Yogācāra are subsumed (saṃgrhīta) under the ālayavijñāna, a doctrine which runs counter to the standard Yogācāra statements. Nonetheless, the commentary continues on with an otherwise well-informed discussion of the three natures. We must note, though, that he includes some of the newer epistemological (pramāṇa) doctrines in his examination (siddhānta) of the 'Yogācāra' doctrines, and anyāpoha is discussed at the end of Tarka Chapter V.⁹ Thus, even at

this time, the statements of the pramāṇavādin--so different in approach and terminology from the early Yogācāra works--were being identified as 'Yogācāra'.

Following in the footsteps of Bhavaviveka, Candrakīrti, around the turn of the seventh century, has also spent some time refuting the doctrines which he attributed to this tradition, named by him the Vijñānavāda.¹⁰ He, too, discussed the same topics as Bhavaviveka, even if his precise sources are more difficult to trace. After the time of the Mādhyamika apologists, later Indian Buddhist doxographers may have divided the Vijñānavāda into two thrusts, those who follow the scripture (āgamanusārin) and those who follow the epistemological trends established by Dignāga (yuktyanusārin).¹¹ The normative method, though, maintained the division of the tradition along the lines of a dispute which came about very late in the history of the Yogācāra, but which purports to trace back to the MSa, that of the division between those who maintained that the awareness of the Buddha did or did not contain an element of cognition (jñānākāra).¹² Still, these later Indian Buddhist doxographers often utilized the same sources--the MSa, the MAV, and the Tri--when describing the school known as the Vijñānavāda.

Obviously, these later developments, to which the name Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda was attached, had little to do with the main thrusts of the initial literature associated with

the earlier strata of the Yogācāra. The definitions and divisions identified with the Vijñānavāda in later Indian texts were nonetheless translated and scrutinized with great diligence by their Tibetan inheritors, who had much interest in trying to precisely specify just what was 'Yogācāra' or 'Vijñānavāda', particularly with reference to the śāstras associated with the Bodhisattva Maitreya.

Classificatory difficulties

The problem of the interface between this very early literature and the purported doctrines of the Yogācāra according to the doxographers caused some consternation within the Buddhist community. The traditional method of dealing with this kind of problem had been the utilization of hermeneutics. For example, in response to internal criticism about the claim that the Abhidharma was the word of the Buddha, the Ābhidharmikas maintained that their texts were actually of greater authority. The Sūtrapitaka was intentional (ābhiprayika) in nature since Sakyamuni had delivered these sermons to a congregation for a specific purpose, whereas the Abhidharma was definitive (lākṣaṇika) since its purpose was to come to a final definition of reality without consideration of the mentality of the recipients.¹³ Serving much the same purpose for the Yogācāra, the Saṃd had introduced for sūtra literature the distinction between those which are in need of hermeneutic

elaboration (neyārtha), such as the early Āgamas and the Prajñāpāramitā, and those which are of definitive meaning (nītārtha), such as the Saṃd itself.¹⁴

These latter methods, in particular, could be directly applied to the texts purported to come from Maitreya. Perhaps the primary reason was that these were considered to be elaborations of the doctrines which Śākyamuni intended to teach, but which were not so clearly expressed for one reason or another.¹⁵ Thus, they were traditionally considered appendices, or 'ornaments' (ālaṃkāra) to sūtras though not, strictly speaking, the word of the Buddha, even if Maitreya was to be the next Buddha. It is ironic that these appendices received more attention during the later term of Buddhism in India and in Tibet than did the sūtras themselves. Given, though, the doxographers' assumption that there were only a finite number of standard categories within which all Buddhist literature must fall, it became a hermeneutical necessity to take the works ascribed to Maitreya and attempt fitting them into one of these categories of Buddhist doctrine. It was not clear, however, whether all of the works of Maitreya should be considered together, or separately. Moreover, each of the categories of viewpoint (darśana) was considered differently by different authors. Some would consider that of the Yogācāra definitive (nītārtha), while the more standard view in later Indian śāstra was to assume the Madhyamaka as the definitive standpoint.

The Tibetan commentators, in particular, attempted to find the order in which the 'five treatises of Maitreya' had been expounded to Asaṅga and the viewpoint which each of them was supposed to espouse. Mi-pham 'Jam-dbyang rnam-rgyal rgya-mtsho (1846-1912), the celebrated rNying-ma scholar, well sums up more than eight hundred years of Tibetan scholasticists' arguments:

The Jinaputra [Maitreya], having shown his face to Āryāsaṅga after the latter had performed Maitreya-sādhana for twelve years, lead Asaṅga to Tuṣita. There he explained to Asaṅga the five 'dharmaas' which are the treatises unlocking the intention (samdhinirmocana) of all the Victor's sayings: the two Vibhāga (MAV & DhDhV), the two Āleṅkāra (MSA & AA), and the Uttaratantra (=RGV). Now some of the learned have maintained that all five treatises are of the nature of one long work. Others have refuted the theory of a unified work by pointing out that the final goals are dissimilar in the various treatises--for example, if a work maintains as definitive the goal either of the triple vehicle or of the unified vehicle. Instead, these other scholars accept that the treatises delineate the intention of the sayings [of Maitreya] each in their own way. So some declare the first and the last (taken respectively to be the AA and the RGV) to be Mādhyamika, while the middle three are Cittamātra.¹⁶ Others maintain that only the MSA is Cittamātra while the others are Mādhyamika. Another opinion is that the AA is Mādhyamika while the other four are Cittamātra. Still others maintain that all five either have the intention of Cittamātra or of Mādhyamika. Now in reality, while it has been demonstrated without argument that the AA unlocks the middle turning of the wheel which is the Prajñāpāramitā, and the Uttaratantra unlocks the intention of the sūtras of the final turning of the wheel which explains the definitive reality of the embryo of the Tathāgata, [p.4] both agree in their Madhyamaka orientation--both accept a unified vehicle (ekayāna) or a unified lineage (ekagotra) in the final goal. The MSA, however, unilaterally unlocks the intentional significance of the Avatamsaka-sūtra, a collection different from the sūtras to be explained by the previous two treatises. While in it, the unitary lineage

(gotra) and vehicle (yāna) are not definitively discussed, it is clear that it is principally a commentary on the intention of the sūtrāntas of the general Cittamātra. The two Vibhāga teach the deep and extensive facets of the general path. And even though within them the three natures (trisvabhāva) and the disproof of an external object are taught, it is not certain that just this constitutes sufficient criteria for the exclusive classification of them as Cittamātra texts. There is no contradiction in assigning a Madhyamaka position even with this kind of technical language:

The five dharmas, proper nature, and the eight consciousnesses, the two forms of selflessness; let these be the entire summary of the Mahāyāna.
Laṅkāvatārasūtra VI.517

Not only is it thus said that this technical terminology is in the general outline of the entire Mahāyāna, but in fact clearly appears in the explanation of the technical language of the three natures in the Maitreyapariprcchā-sūtra which clarifies the intention of the Mother (Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra).¹⁸ But since there does not appear here [in the two Vibhāga], as there does in Cittamātra texts, phraseology and reasoning which perforce accepts the proof of the knowledge of duality's emptiness as veridical, there is no fault in explaining them as elaborations of the intention of the general vehicle without falling into partiality [towards Cittamātra]. Moreover, because the condition of these texts may be regarded in that way, the MAV is a work teaching the layout of the extensive path of the triple vehicle. The DhDhV, on the other hand, since it is in accord with the method of the Yogācāra-mādhyamikas in unifying the two truths, is a work which defines nonmentational gnosis (avikalpañāna), the essential topic of all the deep sūtrāntas.¹⁹

Mi-pham's remarks are extraordinarily interesting and are definitely worth closer examination. First it is obvious, both from his remarks as well as from the general comments given by other Tibetan commentators on the topic of Maitreya's treatises, that no one agrees totally on the

classification of these works.²⁰ Part of the problem is the definition of the classificatory system, and Mi-pham offers three criteria by which Yogacara (cittamātra) texts are to be known: a. they maintain a triple vehicle, b. they develop the thought patterns of the 'final turning of the wheel' as it is known in the Samd, and c. they identify as veridical the cognition of duality's emptiness.

While the former two are found often in the early texts we have been concerned with, the latter criterion (c.) is more difficult. It consists of two parts, the subject, which is the cognition of duality's emptiness (qnyis stong qi shes pa: *dvayaśūnya[tā]ñāna), and the predicate, which identifies the subject as veridical (bden grub). In this case the subject is a formulation which is often applied to the Yogācāra in later doxographical literature. The Jñāna-sārasamuccaya, for example, in its description of the Yogācāra defines its soteriology in ontological terms:

Conscious (viññāna), liberated from subject and object (grāhyagrāhakamukta) exists absolutely (paramārthesat).²¹

Now the subject of this curious statement is a fairly adequate description of the doctrine of perception (pratyakṣa) found within the works of the Pramāṇavādins.²² The descriptions of perception in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti discuss the perceptual cognition (buddhi/ñāna) in terms of self-referential (svasamvitti/svasamvedana) cognition devoid of true subject and object. The self-

characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), which is nothing more than the act of perception (prameya=pramiti=pramāṇaphala), is considered to be absolutely real (paramārthasat) by Dharmakīrti.²³ While such a statement is in keeping with the orientation of these authors towards the problems of perception, when transferred to the larger field of Yogācāra doctrinal problems, it appears to indicate ontological statements concerning soteriology. The reason is the unfortunate use of the term 'liberated' (mukta/nirmukta) to describe self-referential cognition whereas Dharmakīrti utilized the neutral term 'absence' (vaidhurya).²⁴ Thus, as in the Jñānasarasamuccaya, when statements concerning ontology are juxtaposed to statements concerning defilement (kleśa), the former appear to be concerned themselves with problems of liberation. When they are taken as indicative of all of Yogācāra literature, grave misconception results.

We have noticed that the Tibetan usage of the term 'veridical' (bden grub) here echoes the Indian descriptions of existence. This peculiar term, bden-grub, which Tibetan doxographers love to employ, seems to have some of the same connotation as 'existing substantially' (dravyasaat) on one hand and 'existing absolutely' (paramārthasat) on the other. Moreover, some Tibetan authors have not sufficiently considered what this term's relation to Indian literature might be. For example, rGyal-tshab Dharma rin-chen (1364-1432) has maintained that the reason the Samd upholds a three-fold scheme of vehicle is that it declares the

dependent nature and the perfected nature to be veridical (bden-grub).²⁵ This latter term never occurs in the Samd, and Ch. VII.4-6 specifically define all three natures as the three kinds of 'selflessness' (niḥsvabhāvatā).²⁶

Returning to Mi-pham, we notice that he specifically rejects language pertaining to the three natures and disproof of an external object as necessarily entailing the classification of any text as Yogācāra. The topic of the underlying consciousness (ālayaviññāna) was noticeable in its total absence of mention. Thus, Mi-pham is attempting to withdraw the works attributed to Maitreya from the classificatory system itself, and maintain that they, like the Avatamsaka-sūtra, can be considered and commented upon either outside the classificatory system, or at least within a different and more acceptable classification, that of the *Yogācāra-mādhyamikas.²⁷ He does this by saying that these texts are not like Cittamātra texts, a variety of literature he does not then define, and we have seen that the criteria he gives are based on entirely different varieties of literature. Mi-pham is admitting to us that the classificatory system as understood in Tibet is not functioning with the very literature from which and for which it was developed. There are several reasons in the Tibetan milieu which contributed to this state of affairs--not the least of which being monastic politics and lay patronage--but the notion of abandoning the classificatory system in the same way he abandoned application of that

system apparently never occurred to Mi-pham. Yet this is precisely what the quote from the Lāṅkā suggests.

We should not leave this appraisal of the Tibetan doxographers' view without qualification. They were, by and large, utilizing categories which Indian authors had invented and were trying their best to make sense of the obviously dissatisfactory state of affairs. By the time of the later Indian doxographers, such as Bodhibhadra (11th cen.), the description of 'Yogācāra' covered such a vast and disparate body of literature that it would almost seem to indicate more a distinction between other Mahāyāna śāstra/Mādhyamika than between Yogācāra/Mādhyamika.²⁸ As we have seen, this is something like the statement found in Bhāvaviveka's MadHr, that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu represented an understanding of Mahāyāna different from that comprehended by Nāgārjuna.²⁹

One way out of this traditional muddle of categories and subcategories is to examine the development of the 'systems' of reality employed within and without the Yogācāra. After we understand the generation and deployment of these systems, the stages of development within the Yogācāra proper will be clearer, and we will be in a better position to assess the manipulation of each of these systems in the environment of fundamental transformation.

Notes to Part I: Chapter Two

1. We must note the particular exception of Lambert Schmithausen, who has suggested that the earlier literature has little to do with the 'school' as we understand it. See his "The Definition of Pratyakṣaṃ in the Abhidharma-samuccayaḥ," WZKS 16 (1972): 153-63.

2. Sthiramati (510-570 A.D.) in his TriṃBh refers to "other viññānavādins," Sylvain Lévi, ed., Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Bibliothèque de L'École des Hautes Études, Tome 245, Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1925, p.19.23; in his commentary to the MSA, Sthiramati also ascribes an opinion to 'some cittamātravādins': sams tsam du smra ba kha cig, SAVBh, sDe-dge sams-tsam ni, fol. 184a2.

3. The only instance of 'yogācārin' of which I am aware is in the Śikṣāsamuccaya where the Ratnaraśisūtra is quoted with the term bhikṣur yogācārī; see P.L.Vaidya, ed., Śikṣāsamuccaya of Śāntideva, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 11, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1961, p. 35.6-9; cf. Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972, vol. II (Dictionary, hereafter BHSD), p. 448b.

4. The verses of MadHr are from sDe-dge, dbu-ma, vol. dza, fol. 20a3-7, and the commentary Tarkavālā fols. 199a6-202b4.

5. Actually the pūrvapakṣa continues through verse nine (fol. 20a7-20b1), but these last two verses of the Yogācāra position consist merely in setting them up as arrogant fools.

6. MadHr, dbu-ma dza, fol. 20.3-7:

rang gi lugs kyi nga rgyal gyis |
 mkhas par rlom gzhan 'di skad smra |
 de nyid bdud rtsir 'jug pa dang |
 rnal 'byor spyod pas legs batan zer || 1.
 dngos po gnyis po med pa'i phyir |
 gnyis dngos med pa'i yod pa ni |
 yod la sogs pa'i blo yi yul |
 dam pa'i don du 'dod do lo || 2.
 med pa'i dngos po bdag med pa |
 de bzhin nyid dang chos gnas dang |
 rnam par mi rtog blo'i gzung ste |
 de shes par ni bya ba yang || 3.
 dmigs pa la ni brten byas nas |
 mi dmigs pa ni rab tu sbye |
 mi dmigs pa la brten byas nas |
 mi dmigs pa ni rab tu sbye || 4.

(=upalabdhiṃ samāśritya nopalabdhiṃ prajāyate |

nopalabdhim samāśritya nopalabdhīḥ prajāyate | MAV I.6)
 brtags pa nye bar mi dmigs shing |
 gzhan gyi dbang yang gzung med pas |
 de nyid mthong ba yongs grub pa'i |
 ngo bo nyid la blta ba yin || 5.
 brtags pa rgyu mtshan bcas phyir dang |
 gzhan du gnyis po med phyir dang |
 kun nas nyon mongs dmigs pa'i phyir |
 gzhan dbang yod pa nyid du 'dod || 6.
 shes rab pha rol phyin tshul 'di |
 thams ca mkhyen nyid thob pa yin |
 sbye dang 'gag la sogs pa dag |
 dgag pa lhur len ma yin no || 7.

7. Verse 2: cf. MAV I.13, III.5,7 (Nagao, MAV, pp. 22-23, 38-39). Verse 3: cf. MAV I.14, III.7ab; MSA VI.10 (Nagao, MAV, pp. 23, 29; Lévi, MSA, p. 24.21-22). Verse 4 = MAV I.6 (Nagao, MAV, p. 20), and cf. DhDhV IX.6.c translated with references in Part III, Chapter Three below (Josho Nozawa, "The Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga and the Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga-Vṛtti," in Gadgin M. Nagao and Josho Nozawa, eds., Studies in Indology and Buddhism [Yamaguchi Festschrift], Kyoto: Hozokan, 1955, pp. 9-49, esp. pp. 15.8-10, 34.18-35.4, 48.21-49.2). Verse 5: cf. MAV I.5, III.4, II.2c (Nagao, MAV, pp. 19, 28, 38). Verse 6: cf. MAV I.1-4,8, III.7cd-8a, 13ab (Nagao, MAV, pp. 17-20, 39, 42).

8. Tark, sDe-dge dbu-ma dza, fol. 199a7.

9. Tark, dbu-ma dza, fols. 217b1ff.

10. Madhyamakāvatāra VI.34-119 is the primary refutation of the Vijñānavādina; Louis de la Vallée Poussin, ed., Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti, Bibliotheca Buddhica IX, St. Petersburg: L'Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1912, pp. 117.3-233.13; cf. idem, "Madhyamakāvatāra: Introduction au Traité de Milieu," Le Muséon, n.s. VIII (1907):249-317, XI (1910):270-358, esp. pp. 311-358, XII (1911):235-328, esp. pp. 236-282.

11. I am not sure if there is to be found an Indic prototype of this distinction. The Tibetans maintained such a distinction; see Kataumi Mimaki, "Le Grub mtha' rnam bzhaq rin chen phrenq ba de dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po", Zinbun 14 (1977):55-112, esp. p. 95.

12. Cf. Bodhibhadra's cy.to Āryadeva's Jñānasārasanuccaya in Kataumi Mimaki, La Réfutation Bouddhique de la Permanence des Choses (Sthirasiddhidūṣana) et La Preuve de la Monentanéité des Choses (Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi), Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, serie in-8* Fascicule 41, Paris:Institut de Civilisation Indienne, 1976, p.203; Yuichi Kajiyama, "An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy," Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, No. 10

(1966):1-173, esp. pp. 148, 154-58; H.R.Rangaswami Iyengar, ed., Tarkabhāṣā and Vādaśhāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda, Mysore: The Hindusthan Press, 1952, p. 69.11-19; Advayavajra's Tattvaratnāvali, in Haraprasad Shastri, ed., Advayavajrasaṃgraha, Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. LX, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1927, pp. 17.23-19.18. For the best description of the problems of categories to date, especially those of 'Yogācāra-Mādhyaṃika', see Kataumi Mimaki, Blo Gsal Grub Mtha', Kyoto: Universite de Kyoto, 1982, esp. pp. 1-54.

13. See Padmanabh S.Jaini. Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣā-prabhāvṛtti, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Vol. IV, Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1977, pp. 22-68, and my forthcoming "Standards" article for a discussion of the justification of the Abhidharmapiṭaka.

14. Étienne Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana Sūtra-L'Explication des Mystères, Université de Louvain, Recueil de travaux publiés par les membres des Conférences d'Histoire et de Philologie 2^e Serie, 34^e Fascicule, Louvain: Bibliothèque de l'Université, 1935, VII.30, pp. 85, 206-07.

15. This is the way the MSA is described in VinSq, fol. 198a4-7.

16. Mi-pham's argument only becomes clear when information from other Tibetan authors is utilized. From a similar discussion in the works of gSer-mdog Pan-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan (1428-1507) it is obvious that many Tibetan scholars considered the AA to be spoken first because of its initial invocation (mchod brjod) and the RGV to be last because it ends with an expression of the transfer of merit (bangs ba); see his Byams chos lnga'i nges don rab tu gsal ba and his Byams chos lnga'i lam gyi rim pa gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos rin chen sgron gyi sqo 'byed, in The Complete Works (Gaung 'bum) of Gser-mdog Pan-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan, Thimphu, Bhutan: Kunzang Tobgey, 1975, vol 11, pp. 1-155. See also the typical dGe-lugs-pa treatment in Ferdinand D.Lessing and Alex Wayman, mKhas Grub rJe's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras, Indo-Iranian Monographs Vol. VIII, The Hague: Mouton, 1968, pp. 94-99.

17. Bunyiu Nanjio, ed., The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Bibliotheca Otaniensis Vol. 1, Kyoto: Otani University Press, p. 229.6-7:

pañca dharmāḥ avabhāvaś ca vijñānāny aṣṭa eva ca |
dve nairātmye bhavet kṛtāṇo mahāyānaparigrahaḥ ||

18. Mi-pham is referring to the material edited and discussed by Edward Conze and Iida Shotaro, "'Maitreya's Questions' in the Prajñāpāramitā," in Mélanges d'Indianisme à la Memoire de Louis Renou, L'Institut de Civilisation Indienne No. 28, Paris: Institut de Civilisation Indienne,

1968, pp. 229-242.

19. 'Jam-dbyang Mi-pham rnam-rgyal rgya-mtsho, Chos dang chos nyid rnam par 'byed pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa ye shes anang ba rnam 'byed (cy. to the DhDhV), Vārāṇasī: Tarthang Tulku, 1967, pp. 2.3-4.6: de yang rgyal ba'i sras po 'phags pa thogs med kyis mi lo bcu gnyis au rje btsun byams pa bsgrub pa'i mthar zhal mngon sum du batan nas dga' lden lha'i gnas au khrid de | rgyal ba'i bka' thams cad kyi dgongs pa 'grel ba'i batan bcos rgyan gnyis 'byed gnyis rgyud bla ma ste chos lnga batan pa 'di la | mkhas pa kha cig gis lnga ka batan bcos dkyus gcig gi tshul du bzhed la | yang kha cig gis theg gaum dang theg gcig ngea don du bshad pa sogs mthar thug gi batan bya mi mthun pas batan bcos kyi lus gcig tu 'dod pa de bkag nas | rang lugs bka' so so'i dgongs 'grel du bzhed la | de la yang thog mtha' gnyis dbu ma dang | bar ma gsum sams tsam gyi dgongs 'grel du bzhed pa dang | mdo rgyan kho na sams tsam gyi gzhung dang | gzhan bzhi dbu mar bzhed pa dang | mngon rtogs rgyan dbu ma dang | gzhan bzhi sams tsam bzhed pa dang | yang kha cig gis lnga ka sams tsam gyi dgongs par gnas pa dang | yang lnga ka dbu ma'i dgongs par gnas par gzhed pa sogs yod kyang | don la mngon rtogs rgyan ni bka' bar pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i dgongs 'grel dang | rgyud bla ma 'khor lo tha ma'i ngea don bde gahega anying po batan pa'i mdo rname kyi dgongs 'grel du rtsod pa med par grub cing | de gnyis kas mthar thug gi riga gcig dang theg pa gcig tu 'dod la dbu ma'i don du dgongs pa mthun pa nyid do | mdo sde rgyan ni anga ma de gnyis kyis bahad bya'i mdo las gzhan pa'i mdo ade phal mo che'i don phyogs gcig bsdebs pa'i dgongs 'grel yin la | der riga dang theg pa gcig tu ma ngea par batan pa sogs phal cher sams tsam gyi mdo sde'i dgongs pa gtso bor 'grel par gaal lo | 'byed gnyis po 'di ni theg pa spyi'i rgya che ba dang zab mo'i phyogs ston par byed pa ste | 'di dag tu rang bzhin gaum dang phyi don ma grub pa'i tshul rgya cher ston kyang de tsam zhig gis sams tsam pa'i gzhung kho nar 'gyur ba'i ngea pa med de | dbu ma'i dgongs pa yang chos skad de dag gi tshul gyis bzhas pa tsam la 'gal ba med pa ni | lang gahega las | chos lnga rang bzhin gaum dang ni | rnam par shes pa'i tshogs brgyad dang | bdag med don gyi rnam gnyid por | theg chen mtha' dag badus pa yin | zhes chos skad 'di dag theg chen mtha' dag gi spyi adom du gaunga pa dang | yum gyi dgongs pa gaal bar byed pa'i mdo byams zhus na yang ngo bo nyid gaum gyi chos skad 'di dag batan pa sogs kyi dngos au gaal la | sams tsam pa'i 'dod gzhung bzhin gnyis stong gi shes pa bden grub tu mi 'dod 'os med kyi tshig zin dang riga pa gang yang mi snang bas na | phyogs su ma lung bar theg pa spyi yi dgongs 'grel du bshad pa la nyes pa ci yang med par ma zad gzhung gi bab de ltar gnas pas na | dbus mtha' rnam 'byed 'di theg pa gaum gyi lam rgya che ba'i rnam bzhas ston pa'i gzhung dang | chos nyid rnam 'byed 'di bden gnyis zung 'jug dbu ma rnal 'byor spyod pa'i tshul dang mthun par | zab mo'i mdo sde kun gyi brjod bya'i anying po rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes gtan la

'bab pa'i gzhung yin la l.

20. See the sections in the works identified in note 16 above.

21. Mimaki, La Réfutation, pp. 188-89, 200-201:

gzung dang 'dzin pa las grol ba'i l
rnam shes dam pa'i don du yod l l

Cf. the statement found in the Tarkabhāṣā: grāhyagrāhaka-nirmuktaṃ vijñānaṃ paramārthasat l, Iyengar, p. 69.4, Kajiyama, An Introduction, p. 147. Kajiyama points out (p. 147, n. 412) that a similar statement is found in Thakur, Jñānaśrīmitrenibandhāvali, p. 435.9: grāhyagrāhakaivaidhuryād vijñānaṃ paramārthasat, ekānekaviyogena vijñānaśyāpi śūnyatā.

22. We should note that Bhavaviveka identified the object of cognition (gocara) of the nonmentational intellect as paramārthasat in MadHr I.2c above, not the intellect itself.

23. See Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., Pramāṇavārttika, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968, pp. 98-100, 196-210, II.1-3, 320-373; Mimaki, La Réfutation, pp. 286-88, n. 308; Masaaki Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception, Harvard Oriental Series Vol. 47, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 23-31, 107-08.

24. Pramāṇaviniścaya I.38:

nānyo 'nubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo 'parah l
grāhyagrāhakaivaidhuryāt svayaṃ saiva prakāśate l l

quoted in Mimaki, La Réfutation, p. 287, n. 308. Cf. Pramāṇavārttika II.327, Shastri, p. 198.

25. Ruegg, La Théorie, pp. 165, 222.

26. Lamotte, Samd, pp. 67-69, 194-95.

27. Katsumi Mimaki has found that these subclassificatory terms applied by Tibetan authors to the Mādhyamika school does not derive from an Indic usage, but appears to be the invention of Tibetan doxographers. See Katsumi Mimaki, Blo gsal grub mtha', pp. 1, 27-54.

28. His commentary to the Jñānasārasamuccaya, Mimaki, La Réfutation, pp. 198-207, quotes the Vim on as representing the Yogācāra.

29. Tark, dbu-ma dza, fol. 199a7-b1.

CHAPTER THREE:

Systems of Reality

Integral to human experience is the ability to formulate and employ conceptual models.¹ These models may be concrete and 'plastic' in their spatial orientation, such as a model of the universe. Or they might be more abstract and rarefied in their formulation, such as the abstruse mathematical models of the relation between gravity and electromagnetic energy. Nonetheless, all of these partake of certain basic psychological environments and directions. For example, they can be learned or modified. Some of the less sophisticated can be passed from one generation to the other without full and explicit articulation, perhaps in the form of values or rudimentary concepts about 'life'.

Within the environment of the intellectuals of a culture, or subculture in the case of Buddhism, the models employed in the dominant intellectual and emotional framework of the subculture at times become called into question. Perhaps the specific model under examination does not support the phenomena it is intended to explain, or perhaps there are certain minor exceptions which somehow do not quite fit into the schema offered in the model. Sometimes, too, certain models merely outlive their usefulness and collapse under their own weight.

The method developed by an intellectual environment to deal with the problem of dissimilarity between the model and its referent depends to some degree on the specific attributes of the culture and its values.² Often, of course, the chosen response is no response at all. The difficulties are merely glossed over and the contradiction collapsed in favor of group unanimity. Sometimes, though, when the model is perceived as only slightly in disarray, an ad hoc solution may be found to support the single case or few cases which the basic model does not support. Such ad hoc solutions, however, are perilous since they have been known to consume the entire system which they were intended to support.

It is one of the classic ironies of Buddhist history in India that some of the ad hoc solutions developed by the intellectuals of the early scholastic tradition should have entirely overtaken the dominant framework of the earlier systems. Some of these ad hoc models were merely extensions of normative systems into a specific area. Some were specific solutions to cases which had generated sufficient angst to develop more than one solution. In this latter case, the culture-bearers of the Buddhist tradition were faced with more than one possibility and had to come to a decision between competing models. Not all of the models were developed at the same time; indeed, most were not. All the models, though, found their final expression in that curiously Buddhist, intellectual discipline of soteriology.

In their final form, these models, having outgrown their ad hoc origins, competed with each other. Rather than sustain such intense competition, however, the Mahāyāna masters concerned with these models finally organized their material utilizing the very Indian method of 'cognitive synonymy' (pariyāya). In this chapter we will address the origin and development of the systems which form the basis for fundamental transformation. Chapter Four will address the Indic masters' imputations of 'cognitive synonymy'. Chapter Five will attempt organizing the material we have accrued into a sketchy history of the early Yogācāra through its scholastic phase.

Systems of Reality

The utilization of systems or models in the explanation of certain facts about reality was not generated within the any part of the Mahāyāna. Certainly the early traditions developed their own systems, or paradigms, of the psycho-physical organism. The most commonly utilized of these were those which involved the reduction of the entity into component parts, a standard tool of analysis (vibhaṅgavāda), which both the early tradition and the Yogācāra claimed to represent. Among the systems identified as paramount in the treatises of the Ābhidharmikas, the foremost are those of the aggregates (skandha), the elements (dhātu), the doors of perception (āyatana), dependent origination (pratītya-

samutpāda), and the delineation of the doctrines association with the 'mental stream' (cittasaṃtāna). All of these descriptive systems of reality were relatively self-referential; they purported to identify most of the elements of life which confronted the meditating monk; moreover, they elaborated conceptual representations which were different from each other, yet elements of each were variously identified with elements of the other. They were thus competing in their classifications of reality. While some addressed the same problem in different ways--as in the case of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas--others addressed different problems, but with solutions which naturally conformed to the requirements of other models, such as the interrelation between the skandha and pratītyasamutpāda systems.

Certainly the early Mahāyāna masters did not abandon these representations; the first four, for example, were considered indispensable to learning the proper skill in the path of the Bodhisattva.³ Two, at least--the senses and aggregates--were utilized in the doctrines of fundamental transformation. At the same time, it became increasingly obvious that the existing representations were not entirely satisfactory. We are specifically concerned with five developments within the Mahāyāna which denote new systems and which were generated from preexisting abhidharma problematic structures. Most of these five systems have several common factors which make them of special interest.

First, and most importantly for the discussion at hand, they employed the terminology of fundamental transformation in their soteriological descriptions. Thus all five have been, within differing sources, described as the fundament or basis to which this transformation relates.

Second, some, particularly ālayaviññāna, have been identified as necessary through a description of the problems (doṣa/ādīnava) which would arise if they were not postulated, or through the benefits (anuśaṃsa) of their postulation. This is one traditional Indic method of justification. Not postulating the element entails certain undesirable consequences (doṣa), and therefore the element must be postulated. Alternatively, the system was justified as having a certain purpose (prayojana), usually understood as the central point of a text or teaching. Finally, in the rarer instance, justification for an element is made through the delineation of philosophical or doctrinal benefits which are accrued (anuśaṃsa). Nonpostulation disallows these benefits. For our purposes, we can read such statements of purpose as historical traces of necessity. Rather than accepting the traditional reading of "the nonpostulation of system x entails faults y,z" we can rearrange the syntax, reading, "the systemic faults y,z necessitated the postulation of x." In some cases, adjustment must be made for the climate of argumentation which existed in classical India. The mere postulation of a system, say that of the underlying consciousness, did not necessarily come about

through all the 'faults' later associated with its delineation in technical treatises. Rather, the system was found, after postulation, to solve other problems. Such an extension of a specific solution to many other environments served as the means for that solution to become a more complete model.

Third, either operating independently or backing up these imperatives were the similes (upamā) which were developed to describe and identify in a semivisual manner the way in which these systems operated. These were really heuristic models and could only be pushed so far without entirely collapsing. They were, however, extremely influential in India generally, and tended to affect the scholastic perception of whatever systems they were asked to describe. Moreover the specific similes developed for the systems of fundamental transformation were sometimes transferred from one to the other. Thus, we will pay particular attention to these heuristic devices throughout our study.

Fourth, all of the systems are, in one text or another, identified (pariyāya) with each other, either in parts or wholly. This process of identification, in fact, serves to mask the differing systems found within the scholastic Vijñānavāda and their generation within the earlier, unscholastic traditions. So important is this process to the scholastic system that the specific imputations of

synonymy between systems and their historical ramifications will be explored in the next chapter.

Finally, in one form or another, all these systems have been identified as having their scriptural basis in the now lost Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra (MAbS). While some of the imputations arise quite late within the commentarial tradition--we have no other evidence for this seminal Yogācāra text--nonetheless, the perception of this basis within the scholastic tradition tells us something about how the systems might be historically related. Let us now address each of the systems and discuss the doctrinal imperatives for their generation. Their final forms of development will not now be thoroughly explored, though, and even in Part II, only their specific associations with fundamental transformation will be thoroughly detailed. Problems of space necessitate this approach.

a. Psychophysical systems

First and foremost, we should address the original basis utilized in fundamental transformation--the psychophysical entity. This was not, by any means, a new model developed within the Mahāyāna. Indeed, its use within the environment of fundamental transformation securely places the early Yogācāra milieu in the Abhidharma context. There can be little doubt that the early Yogācāra texts did not

participate in the idealism which was to later develop in the context of the three natures, to be discussed in c. below.⁴ Early delineations of the 'fundament' transformed identified it with the six senses (ṣaḍāyatana), and even later the MSam developed the doctrines of the transformation of the five aggregates (pañcaskandhaparāvṛtti).⁵ Thus, while the new systems generated within the Mahāyāna are important to the mature doctrine of fundamental transformation, it is essential that its contextual origin be kept in perspective. However, since virtually all of the modern scholarship on early Buddhism has already thoroughly discussed these models, there is little point in returning to them here. We should note, though, that, in the context of the transformation of the five aggregates, these psychophysical systems were to have an enormous impact on the final phase of Buddhism in India, the Vajrayāna.⁶

b. Ālayaviññāna

Perhaps the circumstances which generated the doctrines of the underlying consciousness seem almost trivial in comparison to the soteriological matrix of some of the other systems. The basic problem was the relatively sound doctrine of the stream of consciousness (cittasantāna) which was the stock in trade of virtually all the Abhidharma systems. This model of the personality was primarily perceptual in nature, as many Indian models are. The underlying

assumption was the momentary character of consciousness, which, like the river of Heraclitus, was never the same for any two moments in a row. The stream had another property: it could sustain only one variety of consciousness at one time, although the past moments of consciousness made up the basis for the subsequent moments of perception, which was the principal function of consciousness. So far so good, but then problems arose in three specific areas: moments of unconsciousness, the time between death and rebirth, and the problems of karmic maturation.

Periods of the lack of consciousness were most significant and perplexing to the Ābhidharmikas. Certainly sleep was one of the first which must have drawn their attention. A sleeping monk has very little active awareness of the fact that he is a monk, so there arose the Vinaya problem: What was the theoretical guarantee that our sleeping monk's basic vows were maintained throughout his period of unconsciousness? Moreover, there were three physical members of the path--correct actions (samyakkarmānta), correct effort (samyagvyāyāma), and correct livelihood (samyagājīva)--which had to be maintained by this sleeping fellow since his physical form was still present. At other times, too, the monk was not aware in the ordinary sense of the word. Specifically, when he had entered the contemplation of the formless realms, or those associated with cessation (nirodhasamāpatti), with thoughtlessness (asamññisamāpatti), and so forth, this

bhikṣu could not demonstrate any conscious connection between the previous moment of consciousness and the subsequent. Yet his vows were somehow maintained throughout this awkward period.

The Sarvāstivādin school was additionally known for its development of the doctrine of the intermediate state (antarābhava) between death and subsequent rebirth. In this they were joined with their off-shoots of the Mahīśāsikas, and perhaps others, but were formally opposed by the Mahāsāṃghikas.⁷ The primary difficulty was that the karmic propensities (samskāra) of the previous life must be carried over from the moment of death to the period of rebirth. Now the generally accepted formula for this transfer was that of the pratītyasamutpāda, wherein the consciousness of the newly formed individual in the womb was based on these samskāra-dharmas. However, since these dharmas were largely mental events (caitta), they required the presence of a consciousness which operated at the same time, but which was not one of the six sense consciousnesses.

Finally, there was the problem of the maturation of previous wholesome or unwholesome activity. If such and such an activity occurred in the past, it required the storage of that potential for retribution from one life to the next, since only rarely did karma mature in the present life. Furthermore, even just during the present life, the potentialities had to be maintained, either for the

succeeding existences or for the present one.

In the specific case of the Vaibhāṣikas, it is well-known that they offered several provocative solutions to these problems of storage and maturation. For the first set of problems they posited an incognizable type of matter, referred to as aviṇṇapti-rūpa.⁸ It was the ostensible carrier for the physical impressions of the monkhood (pratimokṣa-saṃvara). It operated on the higher levels of meditation either for the ordinary, accomplished meditator (dhyāna-saṃvara) or for the saint (anāsrava-saṃvara). For the other problems, they relied on their primary doctrine: the substantial existence (dravyasat) of all dharmas of the past, present, and the future. The various theories about how these dharmas operated throughout the three times have been very well documented and need not be discussed here. Suffice to say, a doctrinal structure which posited an immaterial matter and the substantial existence of the past and future was not widely accepted.

Other Nikāyas posited different structures to accomplish the same thing. The Mahīśāsikas, for example, seem to have identified an aggregate which survived as long as there existed any defiled condition for the individual (āśamsārika-skandha).⁹ The Mahāsāṃghikas were reputed to have delineated a basic consciousness (mūla-viññāna) while the Sautrāntikas posited an aggregate having one taste (ekarasa-skandha) which was supposed to survive the duration of the time in samsāra, rather like that of the

Mahīśāsikas.¹⁰ The Tāṃraparṇinikāya also appeared to have developed their theory of bhavaṅga by the time of Asaṅga, although it is problematic whether it was known in India before then.¹¹

The earliest use of a psychological substrate within the scriptural base of the Yogācāras appears to be that of the underlying consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) which supports the sense consciousness, the mental base which supports all the seeds (sarvabījakacitta), and the appropriating consciousness (ādāna-vijñāna) which is the element responsible for the transfer of potentialities from one existence to the next.¹² These are the usages which are found in the MABS, in the Samd, and are reflected in the conscientious way in which the YoBh treats the relationship between the various vijñānas and ālayavijñāna, ultimately concentrating on the problem of rebirth (pratisaṃdhi).¹³

Equally important are the faults implied by the nonpostulation of the underlying consciousness in some form. There are two surviving strata of these: one with eight members and one with five. The eight-membered form is found within the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī division of the YoBh, within the *Vikhy, is quoted verbatim in the ASamBh, and constitutes the older formulation.¹⁴ The discussion relies on one of Asaṅga's uddānas:

Appropriation, onset, clarity, seed, action, physical sensation, incognizant concentration, and death--these could not obtain.¹⁵

The first of these is treated the most extensively and subdivided into five parts. Appropriation of the physical form by the consciousness is dependent on the existence of the underlying consciousness since a) the underlying consciousness is generated by previous formations (pūrvā-samskāra-hetuka) while the sense consciousnesses arise from present formations, b) the sense consciousnesses are apprehended as wholesome or not (kuśalākuśala), c) they cannot apprehend a class of elements which is of indeterminate maturation (avyākṛtavipāka), d) they are definite with respect to their organs, and e) they would have to appropriate their sense organs time and time again.

Unfortunately, I have not located a discussion of this list of five anywhere in the relevant literature. All of these are concerned with the appropriation of the sense organs during the periods of sense functioning. The first restricts the sense consciousnesses to causation occurring in the present moment and therefore cannot sustain elements developed from a prior causal nexus, such as the physical organ. The second is carried over from a fascinating series of statements first found in the YoBh which discuss a mental series, the final members of which indicate that the sense consciousnesses obtain a condition either wholesome or unwholesome.¹⁶ The exact purport of the series remains uncertain, though, and the various translators have accordingly rendered this reason in their several ways.¹⁷ Apparently following from the second reason, the ālaya-

viññāna consists of indeterminate maturation (avyākṛtaviṣaṅgrhīta) and is therefore able to apprehend elements of its own class.¹⁸ The final two reasons require the simultaneous operation of the ālayaviññāna and the sense consciousness. Asaṅga finds it incongruous that consciousness should at differing times be associated with differing senses without an underlying consciousness.

Using this basis of the simultaneity of levels of consciousness, Asaṅga goes on to define the rest of the eight reasons in those terms. 'Onset', in this context, then indicates a situation in which an individual is faced with a dilemma. If he wishes to cognize two different sense fields, then, without the assumption of an underlying consciousness, the initial reciprocal interaction of consciousness could not be possible (ādita itaretaraviññāna-pravṛttir na yujyate). For Asaṅga, this would occur because there could not be any distinction between the object, organ, and attention requisite for sensation. Again his reasoning is obscure, but it appears that the impressions and seeds residing in the underlying consciousness are necessary to sort out the act of sensation.

Likewise, for the clarity of memory, the intellectual consciousness (manoviññāna) requires the underlying consciousness to store the seeds. Similarly, with the succession of one wholesome dharma by an unwholesome one, or vice versa, there needs to be a storage of prior elements to

be called up at will, since no Abhidharma system will admit that a wholesome virtue can be immediately followed by its antithesis. Karma also requires its diverse perceptions, and Asaṅga's system requires that multiple types of action--including self-awareness, cognition of the physical frame, of the object, and the world at large--all may occur at the same time.¹⁹ Thus multiple activities require multiple perceptions to be completed. So too, physical experience is multiple in nature and necessitates the multiplicity of awareness to cope with its vicissitudes. The two kinds of concentration which are unconscious (nirodhasamāpatti, asamjñīsamāpatti) really need some level of operating viññāna in order to return to the physical form, since its maintenance is dependent on all the aggregates being present. This consciousness can be subliminal, but it must be present. Finally, because this function of the underlying consciousness is to appropriate the physical form, whether in the case of the sense consciousnesses or at the time of birth, the individual cannot die until the ālayaviññāna abandons the physical frame. Thus for death and rebirth, the underlying consciousness is the deciding factor.

While the above reasons for the necessity of the underlying consciousness are almost entirely related to the specific Abhidharma system on which the Yogācāra texts are based, the general concerns are clear. The problems of perception, rebirth, karmic storage, the maturation of

previous wholesome and unwholesome activity, all of these are the primary orientations of the author. There is, as far as I know, no systematic defense of the 'idealism' of the underlying consciousness in Yogācāra literature prior to the Vim of Vasubandhu, though statements of an idealistic bent are found and will be discussed in the following section. Thus we can assume that the concerns of the earliest strata of Buddhism--karma, and its associated mental phenomena--represent the environment in which the underlying consciousness developed.

c. Trisvabhāva and Tathatā

If the models under discussion competed with one another in the mature Mahāyāna intellectual forum, it does not follow that their generative matrices were dissimilar. Indeed there are two pairs of models which were derived from respectively similar circumstances: the three natures (trisvabhāva) with thusness (tathatā), and the soteriological lineage (gotra) with the embryo of the Tathāgata (tathāgatagarbha). Here the former pair will be discussed together because of their similar origins but will be detailed separately in Part II, since their developed forms were so different and fruitful for the doctrines of fundamental transformation. The latter pair will, on the contrary, be delineated together in both places since both members were similar in final form.

The extraordinary importance of the complex causal formulation known as pratītyasamutpāda to the early Buddhist traditions has been well documented.²⁰ The similar, if not greater, value placed on this system within the early Mahāyāna has not been quite so well acknowledged. With reference to the cases under discussion, the specific concerns of the development of this doctrinal complex lead the early Mahāyāna masters to formulate an entire series of new models directly from the various ideas embedded within this extraordinarily fruitful matrix.

Within the early Abhidharma systems, it is usually acknowledged that the chain of dependent relations was a formulation specifically generated to destroy the notion of an agent (kāraka) performing the activity (kriyā) throughout palingenesis.²¹ We have already seen that the problems of the transport of impressions from the previous existence to the following one was instrumental to the formulation of the appropriating consciousness (ādānavijñāna), one of the doctrinal sources for the fully developed ālayavijñāna descriptions. Other considerations, particularly those of causation and universality, came into play during the evolution of the early Yogācāra system.

Perhaps the most significant starting point would be the Śālistambasūtra, a work which was influential within both the Ābhidharmika and Mahāyāna traditions, and initially translated into Chinese by Chih-ch'ien between 222-29 A.D.²²

In this sūtra, three vicissitudes of pratītyasamutpāda are discussed. The first of these constitutes a universal order which the Tathāgata has identified, but which remains whether or not the Tathāgata comes into the world:

Whether or not there is the arising of Tathāgatas within the world, this elementality of the elements of existence persists: the elementality, the stability of elements, their transformation, the progression of dependent origination, thusness, noncontrariety, nonotherness, reality, truth, thatness, noncontraposition, nonopposition.²³

The Mahīśāsaka-nikāya evidently took statements such as these to identify the veridical nature of pratītyasamutpāda and they maintained that dependent origination was an uncompounded element (asamskr̥tadharma).²⁴ In this position, they were in accord with sūtras such as the Śālistamba which declared that the proper method of seeing or meditating on the fact of dependent origination was to see it as non-referential (anālambana), as uncompounded (asamskr̥ta), etc.; in other words, to see interrelatedness as an absolute.²⁵

The Mahīśāsakas in particular developed the terminology surrounding the thusness (tathatā) of all elements of existence, and, all told, nine types of uncompounded elements have been preserved in the polemical treatises which purport to give the views of the Mahīśāsakas.²⁶ This basic list was to pass into the Yogācāra tradition, and the ASam preserves a list of eight uncompounded elements which is very close to that given by Vasumitra in his San̥gha-bhedoparacanacakra.²⁷

The Śālistamba also delineates two other varieties of dependent origination: internal (ādhyātmika), and external (bāhya). The former denotes the twelve-membered causal nexus (nidāna) beginning with ignorance, while the latter indicates the more general formulaic relation of all causation--this being, that occurs, with the arising of this there is the arising of that, and so forth. This extension of dependent origination to the external world indicates that the same purpose (selflessness) in the identification of pratītyasamutpāda should also be extended to the external world. Particularly with the rise of the Mahāyāna, the emphasis on the lack of self (nairātmya), with respect to both individuals (pudgala) and elements (dharmas), became proportionally more significant. Pratītyasamutpāda became one of the logical vehicles to develop this doctrine and its ramifications. However, the normative formulation of this Buddhist doctrine was oriented towards the internal selflessness and its realization. Thus it became at some point convenient to postulate another representation or system whereby the same purpose could be served, but without the several hundred years of accumulated polemics associated with pratītyasamutpāda. This new formulation was that of the three natures.

Apparently the earliest delineation of the three natures (trisvabhāva) which survives is that found in Chapters VI and VII of the Saṃd.²⁸ There the relationship with the earlier doctrines of pratītyasamutpāda is explicit.

In Ch. VI.5, the dependent nature (paratantra) is defined as dependent origination and in Ch. VII.6 the same definition is given to the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna). The former of these definitions is entirely traceable. Since the application of pratītyasamutpāda to the external world denote selflessness, it also connotes mutual interrelationship and dependence. In some of the earliest materials preserved in the ŚrBh and the YoBh, we find two terms used to describe pratītyasamutpāda--nonindependent (asvatantra) and 'other-dependent' (paratantra).²⁹ These two are used as synonyms and it is obvious from context that these strata in the YoBh represent material older than the full formulation of the trisvabhāva.

The identification of pariniṣpanna with dependent origination is not so tracable, but is certain nonetheless.³⁰ It stems from the ascertainment (avabodha) of thusness (tathatā) as the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna); this is the lack of essence of all dharmas (niḥsvabhāvatā). The imagined characteristic (parikalpita) is the establishment of names and designations (nāmasaṃketa) as the essentiality or distinctiveness of dharmas for the sake of the identification (prajñapti) in conventional expression (anuvyavahāra).³¹ These names are bound to their objects in the imagined characteristic, and the fascination (abhini-veśa) with that characteristic gives rise to the dependent characteristic; the lack of fascination gives rise to the perfected characteristic.³² Asaṅga, in the VinSg, maintains

that this statement of the Bhagavān was intended to provide a basis for the obtainment of purity; the noncomprehension of these incurs the fault of the inexplicability of the fascination with conventional expression (vyavahāra).³³ The obtainment of a four-fold purity is also the object of the teaching of the three natures according to a quote from the MABs given by Sthiramati.³⁴

An example (upamā) is given for the three natures within the Samd.³⁵ The dependent nature is like a clear crystal in back of which is placed some patch of blue (= parikalpita); thus the crystal comes to resemble blue gems. When the blue is removed the lack of blue essence (niḥsvabhāvatā) is its perfected nature. The significance of the three natures was so bound up with the declaration of lack of essence, in fact, that Samd Ch. VII.3-13 delineates three types of niḥsvabhāvatā which describe pratītyasamutpāda in just those terms.³⁶

It is also in the Samd that the term 'mere cognition' or 'mere manifestation' (viññaptimātra) makes its appearance. This term viññapti, which was to have such a fruitful application among the later scholastic authors, by this time had been through several transformations of its own. The term viññapti is specifically utilized in the Abhidharma systems as more or less a synonym of visible karma or movement. In the capacity of the action of consciousness, it found its way into the YoBh and is the

primary use of the term in that voluminous text.³⁷ In the Samd the term is used in three capacities, one reminiscent of the Ābhidharmika usage in the term 'thusness of manifestation' (viññaptitathatā), one integrating the various forms of consciousness and mental events with perception, and finally as mere cognition (viññaptimātra) which is given as the ontological nature of the object of contemplation, connected in context with thusness.³⁸ "What is the one-pointedness of mind (cittaikāgratā)? It is the realization that the image appearing as the object of meditation is mere cognition. Realizing that is 'attention to thusness'."³⁹ This parallels the usage of terms such as praññaptimātra, found in VinSq and the BoBh, tathatāmātra in the BoBh, and jñānamātra, darśanamātra, and smṛtimātra found in the *Revatasūtra and the ŚrBh.⁴⁰ Divesting the meditative object from its objective reality is then extended to the appearance of beings' form (sattvarūpādy-avabhāsa) which is said to be no different from the mind and is 'mere cognition'.⁴¹

Similar statements were being made in other Mahāyāna sūtras about the ontological nature of objects in connection to pratītyasamutpāda and extended to the world at large. In the famous passage in the sixth chapter of the DaBh, after reviewing the various combinations and permutations of dependent origination, the Bodhisattva observes that there is no agent there. And where no agent is found, from the absolute point of view (paramārthatas), there is also found

no action (kriyā). Thus the Bodhisattva observes, "This is mere mind, that which is the triple world."⁴² As Bhava-viveka notes in his Tark, there is no necessity for assuming, as do the authors of the MSam and the Vim, that this need imply the nonexistence of an external object.⁴³ In fact, these sorts of statements demonstrate similarity with the Abhidharma dictum that all of the variety found in the world is the result of karma, understanding the preeminent nature of mental karma (cetanā).⁴⁴

Now the stage was set for full-fledged idealism to arise, and perhaps its earliest surviving expression appears in MSA XI, the chapter in which there is the investigation of the Dharma (dharmaparyeṣṭhi).⁴⁵ In this extremely important chapter, several elements were brought together. The nonexistence of the meditative object was extended to all objects of existence. The demonstration of the lack of agent through the pratītyasamutpāda was also extended to the object of the agent. In fact, both the sūtra passages that we have considered--from the Samd (viññaptimātra) and the Daśabhūmika (cittamātra)--were later to be used by the author of the MSam as the canonical bases for his justification of the idealism found in the MSA XI.⁴⁶

Furthermore, the term 'incorrect conceptualization' (abhūtaparikalpa) was applied to the trisvabhāva doctrine, as it had not been in the Samd. With this application came the elimination of all forms of duality, including that of

the subject/object. We have already noted that the usage of the trisvabhāva in the Sam parallels that of the YoBh and refers to deconstruction of the linguistic and conceptual imputations of essence within existence. In the MSA the deconstruction was extended to existence itself and parikalpitasvabhāva redefined as conceptions of duality rather than as conceptions of svabhāva, although the linguistic overtones maintained and the author of the MSABh glosses viññaptimātra in context as 'mere name' (nāmanātra).⁴⁷

It also appears that some sort of illusionist doctrine (māyāvāda) delivered some impetus to the burgeoning idealist formulation, and the simile of the magically created elephant became the stock symbol for the trisvabhāva from that time on, supplanting the crystal.⁴⁸ An image of a magician and his magic forms was utilized in early material gathered into the ŚrBh, but there it merely indicated the way that the nonsaints (anāryas) operate their magical power (ṛddhi).⁴⁹ Thus it was that idealism was observed within the framework of trisvabhāva through the application of other doctrines and some ontological deconstruction by the author of the MSA. The full extension of idealism to the ālayaviññāna had to wait for the Viñ and the Trim since even the MSam primarily restricted idealism to the context of the trisvabhāva.⁵⁰

d. Tathāgatagarbha and Gotra

While these two systems developed in quite different ways during the chronological period with which we will be ultimately concerned (4th-7th cen. A.D.), the imperatives which generated them and the values which contributed to their developments are similar. Thus they will be considered here together as we have considered the trīsvabhāva and tathatā together above.

There is an amusing story preserved in Yaśomitra's Kośa which is presented at the expense of Arhats in general and Śāriputra in particular. An individual has approached Śāriputra in order to renounce the world. Śāriputra, overlooking his 'seed of liberation', rebuffs his attempt to become a monk. The Buddha, though, steps in and proceeds to give the fellow the ordination which he has asked for. When questioned by the other monks, the Buddha replies by enumerating the good deeds performed by him in the past which would allow him to ultimately become an arhat. In elaboration, the Buddha speaks this verse:

I see in him the very subtle seed of liberation,
Like gold hidden within a vein of ore.⁵¹

While neither Vasubandhu nor Yaśomitra utilize this story to delineate or justify their theories of the 'root of good' (kuśalamūla) or of 'seed' (bīja), it is instructive in understanding the imperative which caused the doctrines of lineage (gotra) and the embryo of the Tathāgata (tathāgata-

garbha) to become so valued within the Mahāyāna treatises. Briefly stated the problem was this: Is there some element within the individual which will indicate his soteriological tendencies, even when those are not apparent? The answer in the forms of the gotra and tathāgatagarbha were closely related to two earlier ābhidharma interests--speculation concerning the roots of goodness (kuśalamūla) and the varieties of the individual (pudgala).

Within the early canonical tradition, the term root of goodness is most often taken as descriptive of three basic virtues of nonignorance (amoha), nonhatred (adveṣa) and noncraving (alobha). It is most likely that the entire notion of a root (mūla) of goodness was just derived from the conceptual framework surrounding these three. They were considered the most basic and necessary of the virtues, being essentially antidotes to their corresponding negative qualities--ignorance, hatred, and craving. But within at least one of the later canonical suttas of the Aṅguttara-nikāya, the kuśalamūla was referred to as a seed of the wholesome qualities.⁵² Its use in the singular for a source of multiple items may be significant.

The Sarvāstivādins and their related traditions definitely expanded the scope of the kuśalamūla, particularly in the area of path doctrine. Within the AMV, the types and circumstances of kuśalamūla are discussed at length.⁵³ Perhaps the most thoroughgoing distinction made

in the AMV is between three kinds of kuśalamūla: that which pertains to merit (punjabhāgīya), that which pertains to liberation (mokṣabhāgīya), and that which pertains to penetration (nirvedhabhāgīya).⁵⁴ The first of these produces a seed which results in rebirth in celestial realms or as a Cakravartin.⁵⁵

Soteriological necessity, though, is involved in the kuśalamūla which pertains to liberation. In this case the seed of liberation (mokṣabīja) is sown by one possessing this kuśalamūla.⁵⁶ Here the term 'seed of liberation' has become specifically associated with a type of kuśalamūla, whereas, in the verse quoted above, the seed of liberation was seen within the individual without a specific doctrinal framework. The essential nature (svabhāva) of this form of kuśalamūla is the activity of body, speech, and mind, while it is ruled by mental actions.⁵⁷ It resides in the intellectual base (manobhūmika), which is the Vaibhāṣikas' way of maintaining that it is supported by the previous moments of consciousness and not by the current moments of consciousness (pañcaviṃśānakāya).

The connection of the kuśalamūlas with the developing notion of lineage (gotra) becomes clear in the enumeration of subtypes of this root of goodness which leads to liberation (mokṣabhāgīya). Six varieties of gotra are enumerated in the AMV: the kind of root associated with those who may fall back (parihāṇa-dharma-gotra), the root

associated with those who are liable to self-destruct (cetanādharmagotra), the root of those capable of penetration (prativedhanabhāvyagotra), the root of those who are immovable (akopyadharmagotra), root of those who are Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, and the root of those who are Buddhas.⁵⁸

Moving on to the root of goodness which pertains to penetration, it is on the path of application (prayogamārga) that the four aids to penetration (nirvedhabhāgiya) are traversed. The AMV delineates a structure wherein the four aids to penetration--heat (ūṣman), summit (mūrdhan), patience (kṣānti), and the highest worldly qualities (laukikāgra-dharma)--are considered kuśalamūlas.⁵⁹ The obtainment of the specific gotra, or soteriological lineage, is acquired on the level of heat.⁶⁰ The entire system of the path is then divided according to type of gotra to which one belongs.

There were three principal gotras recognized in the nirvedhabhāgiya context by the Vaibhāṣika masters: that of the disciples, the Śrāvakas, that of the self-enlightened, the Pratyekabuddhas, and that of the Bodhisattvas.⁶¹ The two levels of the heat and summit were also the only levels wherein one could actually change gotra, and that only under certain circumstances. For example, the Śrāvaka could change to a Bodhisattva gotra, while the Pratyekabuddha was generally thought to be not able to. The reason for

subsequent nonchangeability was that at the level of patience, the third of the nirvedhabhāgīyas, the door to the lower realms became closed, and a Bodhisattva would need to enter hell from time to time to assist other beings.

Many of the elements given above come together in Vasubandhu's grand scheme concerning the level of the 'nonlearner' (aśaikṣa). Kośa VI.62 maintains that there are in all nine types of aśaikṣa--the two types of Buddha, and the seven kinds of Śrāvaka--which are different individuals (pudgala) according to their capacities.⁶² The two types of Buddha are obviously that of the Pratyekabuddha and Saṃyak-sambuddha. The seven varieties of Śrāvaka are an expansion of the list which we have seen above in the AMV concerning the moksabhāgīya-kuśalamūla and are derived from a sūtra quoted in the KośaBh VI.56 which mentions the six varieties of Arhat.⁶³ In the sūtra, though, they are not specifically identified as gotras. Vasubandhu, however, makes this identification and utilizes the framework of the six to elucidate many of the later Vaibhāṣika doctrines concerning Arhats. The six are: those who are capable of falling (parihānadharman), those who are capable of causing their own death (cetanādharmān),⁶⁴ those who are capable of protecting their own realization (anurakṣanā-dharman), those who are stable but are not capable of either falling back or further penetration without extreme effort (sthitākopya), those who are capable of penetration into the next stage (prativēdhanabhāvyā), and those who are unshakable in their

realization (akopya-dharmā).⁶⁵ The first five, according to the normative definition, are not required to enact their capabilities but certainly are susceptible to them. These five are also the kind of Arhat based on faith (śraddhā-adhimuktaja), while the final variety, the unshakable Arhat, is based on vision (dratiprāptānvaya). This latter is also not temporal, while the others are.

Vasubandhu, though, is loath to restrict these gotra types merely to the stage of no more learning. In Kośa IV.58, he extends the gotras also to the lower levels of learning and even to ordinary beings. In the middle of all this discussion, though, Yaśomitra would like a definition of gotra and offers three.⁶⁶ Some say, he reports, that gotra is merely the roots of goodness. Others maintain that it is a distinction of faculty which begins even in the state of the ordinary person.⁶⁷ Finally, the Sautrāntikas declare it to be the seed of significant capacity within the mind.⁶⁸ This seed is obtained at the time of the ordinary person or at the time of the path of training (śaikṣamāṇrqa), and reaches fruition in one of the varieties of Arhat. Certainly the second of these is very close to the definitions utilized by the Mahāyāna masters.

Before we can proceed with the discussion of the early Mahāyāna sources, though, we must identify some of the doctrines surrounding one more classification of the kuśala-mūlas found within the Vaibhāṣika school. There is a

distinction, found within the AMV and the Kośa, between those kuśalamūlas which are the result of sustained application (prāyogika) and those which are congenital (upapattilābhika).⁶⁹ In broad terms they refer to kuśalamūlas which are developed through activity, presumably in this life, and kuśalamūlas derived from the wholesome activity in previous existences, although the specific referent of both of these terms is far from clear in the AMV.

As with every major topic which the Vaibhāṣikas treated, there are many opinions about the nature of these two in the AMV. For example, while the roots of good associated with liberation are generally considered to be obtained through sustained application, some thought them to be congenital as well.⁷⁰ The seeds of the three major gotras were also considered to be obtained through sustained application, for sixty aeons in the case of the Śrāvaka, one hundred in the case of the Pratyekabuddha, and for three immeasurable aeons (asaṃkhyeyakalpa) in the case of the Samyaksambuddha.⁷¹ But the real utilization of this terminology came about in the discussion surrounding the state of one whose root of good had been cut off (samucchinna-kuśalamūla). The AMV poses the question: is it the congenital kuśalamūlas which are cut off when the individual obtains this state, or is it the kuśalamūlas derived from sustained application which suffer? The answer which the AMV offers is that the congenital kuśalamūlas are

the ones uprooted, since the roots of sustained application must have been eliminated long before.⁷² Others, though, differ, maintaining that both are uprooted together; the congenital kuśalamūlas are the cause (hetu-pratyaya) and the real root (maulya) of those developed through application. Therefore, when the congenital kuśalamūlas are uprooted, so too are those obtained through application.⁷³ The idea of the Sautrāntikas, as represented by Vasubandhu, is quite different, however. In KośaBh II.36, he puts forth the theory that the congenital kuśalamūlas are never really cut off, only those which are obtained through application.⁷⁴ Thus, the Sautrāntikas maintained that the condition of 'permanent damnation' was not acceptable, for there always was present in some measure a basic wholesomeness.

Before moving on to the Mahāyāna doctrines concerning gotra and tathāgatagarbha, let us review the thrust of the above data. The conception of roots of good derive directly from the negative application of their antitheses, the three unwholesome roots. Initially they were merely basic virtues, but eventually became interpreted as latent virtues when their active counterparts were not obvious. As latent virtues, they became associated with the soteriology of the individual (pudgala), which, in its earlier phases, was also associated with the unwholesome roots. The kuśalamūlas, then, became part and parcel of a sustaining mechanism for first the path in its various levels, and then for the result of the path, which, in the terminology of the

Vaibhāṣikas, was merely the path of no further learning (aśaikṣa-mārga). Thus came the association with gotras, the lineage of one or another kinds of enlightened individual which would be appropriated by the monk. With the differentiation, too, of the roots of good into latent or congenital (upapattilābhika) and active or obtained through application (prāyogika), the latent mode of the roots of good became, by some, to be seen as the real (maula) kuśalamūla, and the active one derived from it. This real kuśalamūla extended back in time and was the causal basis for the obtaining of the fruit of the path. Finally, with the Sautrāntikas, the kuśalamūla became inseparable from the human condition, with its beginning unspecified and its end necessarily in one of the three varieties of enlightenment: those of the Śrāvaka, the Pratyekabuddha, and the Saṃyaksambuddha.

Within those texts which constituted the most basic stratum of the Yogācāra doctrines, the definition of gotra often encompasses a division between that which is inherent or natural to the individual (prakṛtistha) and that which is obtained through the prior practice of the kuśalamūla-s (samudānīta).⁷⁵ The similarity between this definition and the distinction of congenital and developed kuśalamūlas made in the Vaibhāṣika system is striking and has been noted by Ruegg.⁷⁶

The first probable Mahāyāna utilization of the term gotra reflects some of the concerns ultimately to mature into the type of gotra referred to in the Yogācāra literature as natural or innate (prakṛtistha). The Kāśyapa-parivarta-sūtra, first translated into Chinese by Lokṣema in 179 A.D., contains the earliest definition of gotra preserved in a Mahāyāna sūtra:

[102] Wherein there is neither progress nor regress, neither death nor birth, therein is found no compounded elements. Wherein there are no compounded elements, that is uncompounded; that is the gotra of the saints.⁷⁷

Further descriptions in the same sūtra show that the gotra was considered the same as space, and not different from the single taste of the all dharmas (sarvadharmā-ekarasa). It is identified as separate (vivikta) from body and mind, conducive (anuloma) to nirvāṇa, stainless (vimala), indistinct (avisama) from the sameness of the correct and incorrect, truth (satya), permanent (nitya), both wholesome and unwholesome (śubhāśubha), nonself, pure (viśuddha), and internal (adhyātmika).⁷⁸ It is possible, though, that this fine list of adjectives and equivalent nouns did not initially describe gotra within the Kāśyapa-parivarta. We notice that in Lokakṣema's translation, the term gotra does not appear in this section, but instead the Chinese reads as if arhatnirodha (lo-han-mieh). Given, however, that this was one of the earliest translations, it is understandable that certain terms would be given in gloss, even though it

is equally clear that the text as translated by Lokakṣema is not the version which we have today.

In any event, the absolutization of gotra in the Kāśyapaparivarta is relatively certain at an early period and seems to be in concordance with the doctrinal activity surrounding a personality factor which is inherent whether in bondage or in liberation. The extremely popular verse from the now-lost MAB^S displays the nature of this activity:

The beginningless element is the basis of all dharmas;
When it occurs so do all the path of existence,
As well as the realization of nirvāṇa.⁷⁹

This verse undoubtedly became the most important single statement in the early period of Mahāyāna doctrinal formulation. It ultimately became one of the two verses often quoted as scriptural verification of the doctrine of the underlying consciousness.⁸⁰ It was also quoted as the scriptural basis for the tathāgatagarbha doctrines.⁸¹ The irony is that, in all likelihood, the author of this verse had neither in mind, but merely wished to delineate a rudimentary form of an imperishable element which was soteriological in nature, yet acted as the basis for the stream of consciousness of an individual in bondage.⁸² Since the verse is always quoted out of context and since the text in question appears irrevocably lost, the real purport of the author may never come to light. However, if the MSA is of any assistance, one of the most important topics of Mahāyāna authors during the first few centuries of

the Christian era was that of the gotra. We notice that the entire range of employment, from the basis of total bondage to that of total liberation, has been utilized. There is no question here that personal or karmic continuity was one of the foremost ideas generated in the environment surrounding this verse. The seeds of samsāra had their basis in an element which also brought about nirvāṇa. The element was individual and also inherent. Whether the element was momentary or not, whether it was otherwise changeable or not, and the mechanism of its passing between the two normative conditions of spiritual life, all remained unspecified. In some sense, this was also the strength of the verse: it offered significance without precision. As such it could be, and was, interpreted without compunction.

This verse brings us fully into the purview of the doctrines surrounding the tathāgata-garbha as well as those surrounding the gotra. The other early scriptural evidence of the tathāgata-garbha and its various similes have been covered extensively in secondary literature, so that I have little to add.⁸³ Certainly the standard formulation of the tathāgata-garbha utilized most if not all of the terminology surrounding the early doctrines of bīja within the Mahāyāna. It was referred to as element (dhātu), lineage (gotra), seed (bīja), etc., within all beings.⁸⁴ Such identifications should not, however, blind us to the differences surrounding the actual utilizations of the terms gotra and tathāgata-garbha. The gotra was primarily an entity grounded in the

psycho-physical system, as were the bījas. Tathāgatagarbha, on the other hand, could scarcely be defined in normative psycho-physical terms. Although such definitions were occasionally given, they were usually taken from sources which purport to discuss gotra rather than tathāgatagarbha directly.⁸⁵ The more transcendental nature of the tathāgatagarbha, certainly, was one of the primary reasons it could not support the triple vehicle theories spawned in the early Mahāyāna and adopted by the Yogācāra masters. Conversely, the definition of gotra was that specific soteriological necessity of identifying the element which bore the doctrinal brunt of the differing careers. Tathāgatagarbha was indelibly wedded to the postulation of a unique vehicle, as we see in perhaps its earliest sūtra, the Śrīmālā-devī-siṃhanāda-sūtra, as well as in its śāstric form, the RGV. So while the two soteriological units enjoy the same line of descent, they ultimately performed their doctrinal functions in very different manners.

* * *

Thus the models of reality which we will show manipulated in Part II had their origins in very different problems but were eventually equated with each other. In retrospect, perhaps the most surprising development was the rise of a true idealism in the context of the trisvabhāva and its eventual success in all the Yogācāra contexts. Perhaps this was one of the reasons for the eventual

abandonment of the gotra model by the Yogācāras, since its restriction to the soteriological environment disallowed its extension to such an extreme ontological formulation. Further research, though, would have to decide this question.

NOTES TO PART I: CHAPTER THREE

1. Much of my focus on model formation is stimulated by Marx W.Wartofsky, Models: Representation and the Scientific Understanding, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. XLVIII, Dordrecht: D.Reidel Publishing Company, 1979; also Marc de Mey, The Cognitive Paradigm, Dordrecht: D.Reidel Publishing Co, 1982.
2. Cf. Kuhn's discussion of scientific revolutions, Thomas S.Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Foundations of the Unity of Science, Vol. II, No. 2, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. Dissenting opinion by Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47 (1973-74):5-20.
3. The standard list of the five skills (pañcakauśalya) includes the skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, pratītyasamutpāda, and āthānāsthāna; cf. Nalinaksha Dutt, ed., BoBh, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Vol. 7, Patna: K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, 1966, p. 22.20-21; VikhyBh T. 1602.31.560a4-5; Karunesha Shukla, ed., ŚrāvakaBhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Vol. 14, Patna, 1973, pp. 194.2-4, 237.6-249.11; Pradhan, Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asaṅga, Viśva-Bhāratī Studies Vol. 12, Sāntiniketan: Viśva-Bhāratī, 1950, p. 81.6-11; ASam Tib. Pek. sems-tsam li, fol. 122a2-3. This list appears expanded to include indriya in VinSq zhi, fol. 46a6, while the standard names are listed at the ends of the sections, fols. 77b7, 82a3 (read khaṃ for kha zas), 82b7, 86b6, and 89b2, this being not stated in the case of indriya, which shows no final conclusion as the others. In the Pratyekabuddhabhūmi, the list gives satyakuśala as the sixth member instead of indriya; Alex Wayman, "The Sācittikā and Acittikā Bhūmi and the Pratyekabuddhabhūmi (Sanskrit texts)," Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyū 8 (1960): 379-375, esp. pp. 376-75. In the MAVBh III.15-22, the list has been expanded to ten to also include time (adhvan), the truths (satyacatuṣṭayaṃ), the three vehicles (yānatraya), and the classifications of compounded and uncompounded (samskr̥tāsamskr̥ta); Nagao, MAVBh, pp. 44-49.
4. See, for example, the virtual denial of subjective idealism in VinSq, sDe-dge sems-tsam zhi, fols. 39a3-6, and particularly 75a6-7; cf. Dutt, BoBh, p. 32.17-20 which could be construed as denying the possibility of idealism. As is the case with most topics, the Abhidharmasamuccaya (ASam) section on the description of rūpa is an oversummarization of the YoBh material; cf. Pradhan, ASam, pp. 2-3, and VinSq, sems-tsam zhi, fols. 47b2-57b6. While the quotation of a verse extolling the nonexistence of subject and object (grāhyaagrāhakābhāva) is quoted in the ASam (Pradhan, p.

82.20-23), Asaṅga interprets the 'nonexistence' as indicating 'nonapprehension' (anupalabdhī).

5. See Part II, Chapter Three, and Part III, Chapter Four, below.

6. Cf. Giuseppe Tucci, "Ratnākaraśānti on Āśraya-Parāvṛtti," in Opera Minora, Rome: Rome University, 1971, vol. 2, pp. 529-532.

7. See Jiryo Masuda, "Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools: A Translation of the Hsuan-Chwang Version of Vasumitra's Treatise," Asia Major 2 (1925):1-78, esp. pp. 31,48,59,62; André Bareau, Les Sects Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, Publications de L'École Française d'Extrême-Orient Vol. 38, Saigon: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, pp. 68, 142-43, 188; and Sthiramati's SAVBh, To. 4034, sDe-dge sems-tsam mi, fols. 22a3-23a6.

8. See Kośa and Bhāṣya I.11, IV.7,13,15,17,26,38,40,41; Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Āchārya Vasubandhu with Sphutārtha Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra, Bauddha Bhāratī Series-5, Varanasi: Bauddha Bhāratī, 1970, pp. 38-39, 593-595, 605, 608-9, 611, 618-620, 643, 647-649. Genjun H. Sasaki, "Avijñapti-A Buddhist Moral Concept," Actes du XXIX^e Congrès international des Orientalistes (Paris) 1973: 87-98.

9. Lamotte, La Somme, MSam I.12, vol. 1, p. 8, vol. 2, p. 27; MCB 3 (1934-35): 208; cf. Masuda, "Origin and Doctrines," p. 63; La Vallée Poussin, La Siddhi, p. 173. We note that the term āśamsarika-skandha is not specified by Vasumitra.

10. Again we notice discrepancies between the identifications found in Vasumitra's treatise (Masuda, "Origin and Doctrines," pp. 18-34), where the Mahāśāṅghika have no doctrine of the mūlavijñāna, and MSam I.11.2, where this doctrine is identified with their Nikāya (Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, p. 7, vol. 2, p. 27); Hsüan-tsang, T. 1594.31.134a22-26.

11. MSam I.11, Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, p. 8, vol. 2, pp. 27, 8*; cf. Wayman's Analysis, p. 174, Commentary line 10 where bhavaṅga denotes pratītyasamutpāda, the standard useage, see also VinSq, zhi, fol. 83a5; O.H.de A. Wijesekera, "Canonical References to Bhavaṅga," in idem ed., Malalasekera Commemoration Volume, Columbo, 1976, pp. 348-52.

12. See Samd Ch. V (Lamotte, pp. 54-58, 183-187) which is dedicated to the āśaya and the quote from the MAbhS found in MAVT, Pandey, p. 27.11-13 and in MSam I.27, Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, p. 13, vol. 2, p. 47. We should also note

the use of ālaya found in the canon and referred to in MSam I.11, which discusses the attachment to ālaya by creatures' [Aṅguttaranikāya II.131; Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, p. 7, vol. 2, pp. 26-27] and the elimination mentioned in the Suttanipāṭa [ālayasamudghāṭa; SN 209, 749, 1074; Walpola Rahula, "Psychology of Buddhist Meditation," in Indianisme et Bouddhisme--Mélanges offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte, Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, Vol. 23, Louvain-La-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1980, pp. 267-79]. While it is tempting to follow Asaṅga's (and Rahula's) identification of the early formulation with the specific development within Gandhāra and Kashmīr, it is not possible to do so at this time. The Aṅguttara version, for example, makes no reference to ālaya being viññāna.

13. Samd. Ch. V, Lamotte, pp. 54-59, 183-87; MSam I.4, Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, pp. 4-5, vol. 2, pp. 14, 3*-4* and to Lamotte's references concerning the gāthā in Samd V.7, add PSVai, sDe-dge, sems-tsam shi, fol. 233b1-2. The reciprocal nature of the various viññānas is the subject of the MABs gāthā quoted in MAVT, Pandey, p. 27, cited in MSam I.27, Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, p. 13, vol. 2, pp. 46-48. See also the definitions given in Nathmal Tathia, ed., ASamBh, sec. 9A, p. 11.

14. Cf. Nathmal Tathia, ASamBh, pp. 11-13; ASamBh Tib., Peking 5554, vol. 113, p. 89.1.1-4.6; ASamVy, Peking 5555, vol. 113, p. 149.3.3-150.1.7; YoBh, T.1579.30.579a8-c22; *VikhyBh, T.1602.31.565a19-c23; ASamVy, T.1606.31.701b4-702a6; VinSq, To. 4038 sDe-dge sems-tsam zhi, fols. 2a2ff.

15. The Sanskrit for this occurs in Tathia, ASamBh, p. 11: upāttam ādi apaṭṭatvan bījaṃ karma na yujyate | kāyiko 'nubhāvo 'citte samapāttī cyutis tathā ||.

16. Unfortunately, I have found no commentary on this provocative series which appears to parallel that of the cittavitti of the Sthaviravādanikāya; see Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, ed., The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga, (YoBh) Calcutta: University of Calcutta, p. 10.1-5; this material is translated in Part II, Chapter Four.

17. The Sanskrit: kuśalākūśalāḥ sadviññānakāyā upalabhyante ASamBh p. 12.4-5; cf. the translation of Hsüan-tsang, T.1579.30.579a29-b1: yu liu shih shen yu shan pu shan teng hsing k'o te, 久六識身有善不善等性可得); Derge zhi fol. 2a5-b1: gzhan yang rnam par shes pa'i tshogs drug po dag ni | dge ba dang mi dge bar snang ste |; Pe. 5554, p. 89.1.7-8: yang rnam par shes pa'i tshogs drug ni dge ba dang mi dge bar dmigs pa ste |.

18. An expansion on this epithet (āśrayopādātṛvipāka-samgrhīta) is often used for the ālaya in Bhattacharya, YoBh, pp. 4.7, 4.11-12, 11.4-5; the problem of ālaya and

avyākṛta is further delineated in YoBh p. 109.15.

19. Other enumerations of the series of psychological karma are to be noted in Bhattacharya, YoBh: 5.3-5, 12.1-4.

20. Representative are Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Bouddhisme, Études et Matériaux: Théorie des Douze Causes, Université de Gand, Recueil de Travaux par la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres 40^{me} Fascicule (London: Luzac & Co., 1913); David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1975; Nyanatiloka Mahathera, Guide Through the Abhidhamma-Pitaka, Kandy, Ceylon: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971.

21. Pratītyasamutpāda is defined as niḥsaattvārtha in Bhattacharya, YoBh, p. 203.13-20; VinSq, sDe-dge sema-tsam zhi, fol. 82b7; cf. Kośa III.18a and Bhāṣya, Shastri, p. 432.

22. All citations will be from the edition of La Vallée Poussin, Bouddhisme, pp. 68-90; see also N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Arya Śālistamba Sūtra, Adyar Library Series No. 76 (Madras: Adyar Library, 1950); its use by Vasubandhu, noted by Yaśomitra, KośaBh 28ab, Shastri, p. 452.1-7, 14. Chih-ch'ien's translation is T.708; three other translations into Ch. were later undertaken, T. 709-711.

23. La Vallée Poussin, Śālistamba, p. 73.4-9; similar statement in Bhattacharya, YoBh, p. 229.3-4: tatra pratītyasamutpādalakṣaṇaṃ saṃksepata uktaṃ bhagavatā: idaṃpratyayatāphalam, utpādād vā tathāgatānāṃ anutpādād vā sthitaivaigā dharmānāṃ dharmatā [iti yāvad yad idaṃ] dharmatā dharmasthitā [dharmaparipñāmatā] pratītyasamutpādanulomatā tathatā avitathatā ananyatathatā bhūtātā satyatā tattvam aviparītātā aviparyastatēti.

24. KośaBh and Yaśomitra, Shastri, p. 452.9-11, 29.

25. Śālistamba, La Vallée Poussin, p. 72.9-17.

26. Bareau, Les Sects, p. 185.

27. ASam, Pradhan, pp. 15-16; Masuda, "Origin and Doctrines," p. 61.

28. Lamotte, Samd, pp. 59-87, 188-208; there is also a verse from the MabS, quoted MAVT, Pandey, p. 85, which Sthiramati claims gives the canonical basis of the trisvabhāva and which does seem to do so.

29. VinSq, sema-tsam zhi, fol. 82b7; Shukla, ŚrBh, pp. 228.7, 383.2; Bhattacharya, YoBh, p. 203.15.

30. Samd VI.6, 10, VII.6; Lamotte, pp. 61, 63, 70-71, 189-190, 196; cf. MAV I.14; I have not traced the antecedent

usages of the term parinispanna, but it appears to have played a role in some of the early schools, particularly the Andhaka; see Bareau, Les Sectes, Andhaka 44-45 (p. 95) where dharmaṣṭhititā is parinispanna; cf. Theravadin 216 (p. 240), Uttarapathika 45 (p. 253), Hetuvadin 10 (p. 246), and chart pp. 284, 287.

31. Samd VI.5, Lamotte, pp. 60, 188-189.

32. Samd VI.10, Lamotte, pp. 63, 190.

33. VinSq, sams-taam zi, fols. 18b5-7, 22a3-5; note that in the former of these two, Asaṅga directly refers to Samd VI.10.

34. Pandey, MAVT, p. 85.3-13.

35. Samd VI.8-9, Lamotte, pp. 61-63, 189-190; cf. also VI.7, Lamotte pp. 61, 189, where the example of one suffering from ocular disease (taimirikapurusa) is alternatively given as an example; this example is also employed in VimBh to Vim 1, Lévi, Viññaptimātratāsiddhi, p. 3.12.

36. Samd VII.3-13, Lamotte, pp. 67-73, 193-198.

37. Cf. Bhattacharya, YoBu, pp. 4.17-18, 5.3-5, 5.16-6.2, etc.; other than in quotes from the Samd preserved in the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī, I have found no reference to viññaptimātra in the YoBh, cf. T.1579.30.724a6 & 726c25; cf. Kośa Ch. IV passim.

38. Samd VIII.7-9 (Lamotte, pp. 90-92, 212-213), VIII.22 (Lamotte, pp. 104, 221-222), VIII.29.8 (Lamotte pp. 108, 225), VIII.36.2-37.1 (Lamotte, pp. 115-117, 230-233).

39. Samd VIII.9; Lamotte, pp. 92, 213: sams rtse gcig pa nyid gang laga | ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan de la 'di ni rnam par rig pa tsam yin no zhes bya bar rtogs te | de rtogs nas de bzhin nyid du yid la byed pa gang yin pa'o | and cf. VIII.7, the earlier statement, Lamotte p. 91, 212.

40. See VinSq, sams-taam zhi, fols. 41a4-42a1, 77a1-77b6, 265b4; BoBh, Dutt, pp. 26.11-14, 28.10-13, 30.1-32.22, 34.15, 271.23-274.12; SrBh, Shukla, pp. 199, 367.13 (Wayman, Analysis, pp. 110-111), and the related useage of vastumātra and other compounds ending in -mātra, SrBh p. 210.3-6.

41. Samd VIII.8, Lamotte, pp. 91, 212-213.

42. cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ treidhātukam, Ryuko Kondo, ed., Daśabhūmīśvaro nāma Mahāyānasūtram, Rinsen Buddhist Text Series II, Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1983, p. 98.8-9.

43. Lévi, Vim, p. 3.2-3, Lamotte, MSam II.7, La Somme, vol. 1, p. 26, vol. 2, p. 93; Tark, aDe-dge dbu-ma dza, fols. 207b1-208b1. So far as I know, no one has noticed the utilization of paramārthatas in this DaBh syllogism prior to its usage by Bhavaviveka; see Y. Kajiyama, "Bhavaviveka and the Prāsaṅgika School," in The Nava-Nālandā-Mahāvihāra Research Publication Vol. I, Nālandā, Biḥār: Navanālandā Mahāvihāra, n.d., pp. 289-331.
44. Kośa IV.1: karmaṇaṃ lokavaicitryaṃ cetanā tatkr̥taṃ ca tat 1; Shastri, p. 567.
45. MSA XI.13-78, Lévi, pp. 58-76 and note that the initial occurrence directly follows five verses on manasikāra (XI.8-12), thus following the environment of viññaptimātra in the Samd. The term parveṣṭhi is glossed by pravacinoti in ŚrBh p. 382.5, but we must understand that these chapter titles were bestowed by the author of the MSABh. Full-fledged idealism also occurs in MAV, eg. I.3,5,13,20, III.3-5,7, and esp. V.13-26, Nagao, pp. 17-18, 23, 26, 38-39, 65-73; the ordering of these texts will be discussed in Chapter Five below.
46. Lamotte, MSam II.7, vol. 1, pp. 26-27, vol. 2, pp. 93-95; we should note that the MSA is the single most important source for the MSam, being quoted more than a dozen times.
47. Lévi, MSABh, p. 67.7; this gloss is based on the occurrence of nāmaṃātra in MSA XI.48bc, and it appears a viable gloss.
48. MSA XI.15,25 and cf. other images used in MSA XI.29-30, Lévi, pp. 59, 61-2; cf. MAVBh to V.17, Nagao, p. 66.14; DhDhV and DhDhVV V, Joṣho Nozawa, "The Dharmadharmatā-vibhaṅga and the Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga-vrtti," in Gadgin M. Nagao and Joṣho Nozawa, eds., Studies in Indology and Buddhology, Kyoto: Hozokan, 1955, [= DhDhV and DhDhVV] pp. 9-49, esp. pp. 11, 23.
49. Shukla, ŚrBh, p. 468; Wayman, Analysis, p. 129-30.
50. Lamotte, MSam II.3,6,11, etc., La Somme, vol. 1, pp. 25 ff., vol. 2, pp. 90 ff.
51. This verse is quoted twice in the KośaVy, Shastri, pp. 7, 1088:
 mokṣabījaṃ ahaṃ hy asya susūkṣmaṃ upalaksaye |
 dhātupāṣānavivare nilīnaṃ iva kāñcanaṃ ||
 In this latter place is found the full story, already referred to in KośaBh to VII.30, but with the verse variant of avasūkama for line one. Jaini ["The Sautrāntika Theory of Bīja," BSOAS 22 (1959):236-49, 248, n.1] has noted this verse and located parallels to the story in the Mahāvagga [Vinayapitaka, I.55], and in the Dhammapada-atthakathā

[III.105]. The Pāli version, though, is somewhat different.

52. Aṅguttaranikāya, III.404-409, noted by Jaini, p. 245.

53. Virtually all the references to the problem of kuśalamūla in the AMV have been kindly conveyed to me by Robert Buswell, with whom I have had many instructive discussions concerning the text and its doctrines.

54. Robert Buswell's unpublished paper, "The Kuśalamūla-s and their Role in Buddhist Soteriology: with Special Reference to the Vaibhāṣika School," pp. 6 ff. AMV, pp. 34c27-35a7.

55. AMV, T.1545.27.159b, 426a.

56. AMV, T.1545.27.35a4-5; it appears that the original read niyatamokaśābīja or mokaśāniyamabīja.

57. Buswell, pp. 12-15; AMV, T.1545.27.35a7-b18.

58. We notice that in fact seven gotras are mentioned, and the text is unclear in the discussion of the last three; for the meaning of cetanādharmān, see note 64 below; AMV, T.1545.27.35b19-24.

59. AMV, T.1545.27.22c22-24, 29c24-30a4, 157c32-34, 172c23-24, 232c18-233a9, 351c26-27; Buswell pp. 65-108 for a more complete discussion of the entire nirvedhabhāqīya problem. The Kośa, too, mentions the nirvedhabhāqīyas as kuśalamūla, KośaBh to VI.20a, Shastri, p. 914. The Bahūśrutīyas, too, in the compendium of their doctrine, the Satyasiddhi, elaborated the nirvedhabhāqīyas as kuśala-mūla; T. 1646.32.250c12-17; Skt. translation in N. Aiyaswami Sastri, The Satyasiddhi-śāstra of Harivarman, Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 159, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1975, Vol. 1, p. 51. For the relationship between the Satyasiddhi and the Bahūśrutīya, see Bareau, Les Sectes, p. 82.

60. AMV, T.1545.27.31b13-15; Buswell, p. 90.

61. KośaBh to VI.23cd, Shastri, p. 919-20.

62. Kośa, Shastri, p. 1007.

63. Nine varieties, including these six, are to be found in the Madhyamāgama, T. 26.1.616a17-20. See also Puggalapāṇṇatti, p. 12; La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, p. 251, n.2.

64. The term cetanādharmā is glossed by Yaśomitra as ātmamāraṇadharmān (p. 988.18), while Vasubandhu utilizes the gloss yaś cetayitum bhāvyaḥ (p.990.9). Hsüan-tsang has utilized the straight lexical translation of (ssu-fa 思法) while Paramārtha has translated according to the same sense

as Yasomitra's gloss 'capable of his own destruction' (tzu hai fa 自害法); the Tibetan translation of Jinamitra and dPal-brtsegs rakṣita also follows this same line using 'chi bar sams pa'i chos can, "having the characteristic of the consideration of death." See Hirakawa, Index, p. 160, La Vallée Poussain, vol. IV, p. 253, n. 4.

65. This and the following material are taken from KośaBh, Shastri, pp. 988-994.

66. KośaVy, Shastri, p. 990. This section has been noted by Ruegg, La Théorie, pp. 461-2. Compare also the definitions of gotra given by Sthiramati in his MAVT to 4.13, Pandey, pp. 151-2, which are almost the same and were perhaps drawn from the same source as Yasomitra's definitions.

67. KośaVy, Shastri, p. 990.21: anye punar āhuḥ prthagjanāvasthām ārabhyēndriyabhedo gotram iti; correct quotation from Ruegg, La Théorie, p. 461, and found in MAVT p. 141.26.

68. KośaVy, Shastri, p. 990.22: sautrāntikāḥ punar varṇayanti bījaṃ sāmāthyam cetaso gotram iti.

69. I am indebted to Robert Buswell for these translations of these key Vaibhāṣika terms, pp. 12-14, 43-45.

70. AMV, T.1545.27.35a7-b18; Buswell, p. 12.

71. AMV, T.1545.27.428b18-28; Buswell, p. 14.

72. AMV, T.1545.27.183b5-12; Buswell, p. 43, n. 57; see also Kośa and Bhāṣya to IV.79b where this same doctrine is maintained; Shastri, pp. 697-698.

73. AMV, T.1545.27.183b5-12.

74. See Jaini, "Bīja Theory," p. 246, n. 3; Kośa, Shastri, pp. 216-17.

75. Dutt, Bobh, p. 2.4.

76. Ruegg, La Théorie, pp. 476-77. In the following exposition of the origins of gotra and tathāgataqarbha, I will primarily follow the exemplary exposition found in Prof. Ruegg's several books and articles, particularly the above mentioned La Théorie; idem, Le Traité du Tathāgataqarbha de Bu Ston Rin Chen Grub, Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême-orient Vol. 88, Paris: École Française d'Extrême-orient, 1973; idem, "Pāli Gotta/gotra and the Term Gotrabhu in Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit," in L.Cousins et al., eds., Buddhist Studies in Honour of I.B.Horner, Dordrecht-Holland: D.Reidel Publishing Co., 1974, pp. 199-210; idem, "Ārya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena on

the Gotra-Theory of the Prajñāpāramitā," WZKS 12-13 (1968-69) [Festschrift Erich Frauwallner]: 303-317. For a thoughtful review of La Théorie, see Lambert Schmithausen, "Zu D. Seyfort Rueggs Buch 'La Théorie du Tathāgataqarbha et du Gotra'," WZKS 17 (1973): 124-60. For other discussions of the problem of tathāgataqarbha and gotra, see Étienne Lamotte, L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti, Bibliothèque du Muséon Vol. 51, Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1962, pp. 425-430; Alex Wayman, The Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā, New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1974.

77. A. von Staël-Holstein, The Kācyaparivarta--A Mahāvānasūtra of the Ratnakūṭa Class, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926, pp. 149-150: yatra na gatir āgatir na cyutir nopapattiḥ tatra na kecit saṃskārāḥ yatra na kecit saṃskārāḥ tad asaṃskṛtam | tad āryānāṃ gotra |.

78. Von Staël-Holstein, Kācyaparivarta, pp. 151-155. This is a summary of the various qualities given.

79. TrimBh to 19, Lévi, Viññaptimātratāsiddhi, p. 37.12-13; MSam I.1, Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, p. 4, vol. 2, p. 12, MCB 3 (1934-35): 171; RGV to I.149-52, E.H. Johnston, The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāvānottaratantrasāstra, Patna: Bihar Research Society Museum Buildings, 1950, p. 72.13-14; PaSkVai, ade-dge sams-tsam shi, fol. 233a7-b1; La Vallée Poussin, La Siddhi, vol. 1, pp. 169-72:

anādikālikadhātuḥ sarvadharmasamāśrayaḥ |

tasmin sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvāṇādhigamo 'pi ca ||

TrimBh reads the last word as va instead of ca.

80. See the preceding note.

81. Johnston, Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV), p. 72.13-14; Takasaki, A Study, p. 290.

82. To this statement must be appended the note that the doctrine of ālayaviññāna was definitely known to the MABs, even if there is no indication that tathāgataqarbha was. Sthiramati quotes a verse in the MAVT, Pandey, p. 27 which indicates this; also quoted in MSam I.27, Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, p. 13, vol. 2, pp. 46-48.

83. See above note 76.

84. RGV and Vṛtti, I.24-34; Johnston, pp. 21-30.

85. Johnston, RGV p. 55.16-17; Takasaki, A Study, p. 260; Wayman, Lion's Roar, pp. 42-55; Wayman (p. 42) wishes to associate the origins of tathāgataqarbha with mūlavijñāna, but I find his reasoning unconvincing since the matrix of mūlavijñāna is perceptual and karmic, whereas tathāgataqarbha is soteriological. The association of the tathāgataqarbha

garbha with the Mahāsāṃghikas may be considered after the fact of its prior development in the gotra milieu.

CHAPTER FOUR:
Problems of Synonymy

Aside from the problems posed by the sheer wealth of material, perhaps the greatest single difficulty in comprehending the history and doctrines of the Yogācāra is the conceptual ordering of the imputations of synonymy. By this I mean developing a methodology to critically handle the equations of one element with another in models which, at first glance, have little to do with one another. It is this confusion of the elements of various models which has served to obfuscate the problems of the generation and articulation of the individual models. Inter-system identification has, in a more creative manner, been one of the major forces behind the application of one model's environment to another model. To adequately address the problems presented by one of these crossover elements--fundamental transformation--we need to identify the significance of the basic term (pariyāya) and method of equivalence within the Yogācāra literature.

Lambert Schmithausen has, in more than one of his excellent topical examinations of Yogācāra material, appeared to maintain that the terminology and methodology of 'pariyāya' should be taken as indicative of synonymy.¹ He has, for example, argued that the Vim, in maintaining that

the terms citta, viññāna, and viññapti are all 'parvāya', is following a Sautrāntika point of view different from that found in such Yogācāra works as the MSaṃ. Elsewhere, he has utilized the equals sign (=) to indicate that the terms thueness (tathatā) and thatness (tattva) are identical as they have been equated in some measure by the author of the MAVBh.² These are excellent example of the two primary methods found in Yogācāra texts--and elsewhere in Sanskrit literature--to link or join two terms. Does this, however, allow us to maintain that these terms are identical or that they are interchangeable, the normal criteria for synonyms?

In the examples given by Schmithausen, it is apparent that the authors in question consider that the terms involved have a common referent. Thus, according to some, the referents of viññāna, viññapti, and citta are all the same.³ Likewise, tattva and tathatā, as we have seen in the enumeration of terms for dharmatā, have been offered in the Śālistamba-sūtra as functional equivalents.⁴ I use this term 'enumeration' as that is the way in which the Tibetan translators have usually translated parvāya (rnam-grangs). Indeed, I assume that the prototype for such enumerations are just lists of two or more terms for which the copula is understood, and therefore an author has the option of ending these lists with 'thus these are parvāya' (iti parvāya) but it is not required for the understanding of his point.⁵

So what is the author's point; do Indian authors understand pariyāya in the same way that synonym is comprehended in English? The latter is possible but not likely. In the first place, it is not often the case that the terms identified as pariyāya are semantically interchangeable. Thus, while tathatā and tattva are enumerated as pariyāya in several places in Yogācāra texts, this has to be understood on very general terms, since it is rare that one can fulfill the range of association which is usually attached to the other. One of these very rare instances is the enumeration of seven tattva by the author of MAV III.14, a list which is standardly attached to the term tathatā.⁶ On the other hand there are multiple usages of tathatā wherein tattva has not been employed, not the least of which is MAV I.14, where the pariyāya of śūnyatā have been given without mention of tattva. Sthiramati's note, short but interesting, maintains that all of these terms have the same object. He defines pariyāya as follows:

The further expression of the object of the enumeration is what we mean by pariyāya, since it proposes multiple terms for a single object. These expressions [in MAV I.14] have been taught in other sūtras as being just emptiness.⁷

Sthiramati's definition shows that the entire utilization of pariyāya hinges on common referents, and that the terms are primarily drawn from sūtras. Asaṅga, in the Pariyāyavastu section of the YoBh, makes the same allusion to his definitions being culled from sūtras, although he does not

give a nice definition of paryāya itself as does Sthiramati.⁸

Perhaps an enumeration of epithets of the absolute does not do justice to the normative utilization of the expression paryāya, and so we should examine further usages. In the Manobhūmi section of the YoBh, there is given a series of paryaya for the term seed (bīja):

Names (paryāya) for 'seed' include element (dhātu), lineage (gotra), the innate (prakṛti), cause (hetu), whole (satkāya), diffusion (prapñca), substratum (ālaya), appropriation (upādāna), suffering (duḥkha), the basis for imputations of wholeness (satkāyadṛṣṭy-adhisthāna), the basis for egotism (asminānādhīsthāna), and these kinds of terms (evambhāgīyāḥ paryāyaḥ).⁹

Now it is quite obvious from this list that the meaning and extension of the terms employed are quite different. Yes, there is a definite overlapping of the terminology, but, for example, if we maintain the strict identification of all of these terms, and we assume that $A = B$ & $A = C$ therefore $B = C$, we get into some real difficulties. Gotra, the seed or lineage of liberation, therefore equals suffering and is the basis for egotism. It is apparent that this statement in the Yogācārabhūmi cannot be taken to mean that these elements are synonymous in any usual sense of the word. What it does give us is a good basis for understanding what paryāya might mean. All of the above terms, I believe, can be construed to be members of a class whose extension includes but is not limited to any one of them. Thus, the extreme members, such as suffering and the lineage of

enlightenment are specific kinds of seeds, whereas grasping appears to stem from seeds and the understratum is the repository of seeds, or can be perhaps considered a seed itself. In any event, we could possibly understand the compound bīṣaparyāya as meaning 'members of the same class as seed include:'.⁹

While examples of paryāya as representing a class of elements could be extended indefinitely, one more example, of a slightly aberrant usage, should suffice. In MSam II.17, the question arises whether the three natures should be distinguished from each other or not. The answer given is that they are neither the same nor different, an interesting usage of a Buddhist 'neither the same nor different' (bhedābheda) formulation. The reason is that in one case (paryāyena) the dependent nature may be considered dependent, in another it may be considered conceptual, and in another it may be considered perfected. The first is the case when it arises from the seed of impressions of the dependent nature (gzhan gyi dbang gi bag chags kyi sa bon las 'byung ba'i gzhan gyi dbang gi phyir ro); the second is the case when it is the precipitant object (nimitta) of conceptualization and subsequently imagined by the conceptualization; the third is the case when it is imagined and is therefore entirely nonexistent (atyantābhāva).¹⁰ Thus the various natures are in different capacities considered to belong to the same class.

The entire conception of class, however, appears overly sophisticated to apply directly to the Yogacara material. It is true that they distinguished universals (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) from particular elements (avalakṣaṇa), but this does not in itself indicate that class-related formulations should necessarily apply. The semantic value of 'synonym', too, is problematic, since it implies a narrowly restricted case of intensional equivalence. Analytic philosophy, though, has preceded us in its examination of the problem of synonymy in a lively series of interchanges surrounding the problem of the definitions of analytic judgements and synthetic judgements.¹¹ Fortunately, we do not have to review the arguments or literature involved, but we may introduce here one of the more fruitful results of this discussion--the identification of the term 'cognitive synonymy' by Quine.

Quine has found that the distinction between synthetic and analytical judgements, held since the time of Kant, is artificial and impossible to maintain without some reference to objects, thereby making the entire theory of analyticity problematic.¹² His primary tool was the examination of synonymy, and he developed a form of synonymy which he referred to as 'cognitive'. By this he appears to mean that the cognitive references to situations alike in relevant respects denotes their synonymy.¹³ In the discussion in question, the term cognitive synonymy is particularly apt, since theories described as 'cognitive' by cognitive science

are primarily model-oriented, as are the authors we are discussing.¹⁴ These authors were attempting definitions of synonymy with respect to models, models which they derived from scriptural reference. The verification which they required for the assignment of synonymy was merely that of scriptural reference, rather than objective reference, as Sthiramati's discussion of parvāya clearly shows.¹⁵

There are other considerations in the definition of cognitive synonymy which bear consideration. We have seen that the historical methodology employed by the writers was primarily folkloric. Part and parcel of that was collapsing contradictions in texts which have very different statements. This collapsing of contradiction was also applied to the discussions of cognitive synonymy, as is evident from the material. For example, while attempting the uniform integration of the underlying consciousness with 'incorrect conceptualization' (abhūtaparikalpa) and the dependent nature, the author of the MSABh postulates the identification of bīja in MSA XI.44 and svadhātu in XI.32, with the underlying consciousness. On the other hand, dhātu in XI.44 and XI.33 are glossed by him as stainless element (anāśravadhātu) and thueness (tathatā) in the commentaries to these respective sections. Bīja, dhātu, and gotra are used relatively interchangeably in the MSA.¹⁶

Sometimes the collapsing of this contradiction was not so easy, and the author of the Lañk, when identifying the

underlying consciousness with the tathāgatagarbha, had to redefine both ālayavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha sufficiently. The underlying consciousness was absolutized and the tathāgatagarbha was relativized.¹⁷ Since the relationship between tathāgatagarbha and sense consciousness had already been established in the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra and since the doctrine ultimately derives from gotra, we can suppose that the ground-work had already been laid.¹⁸

This leads us to the use of pariyāya as a methodological tool. The confusion generated through the Yogācāra propensity for identifying reality models as cognitive synonyms is in fact a ready tool for the unpacking of the individual systems themselves. Let us attempt a good rigorous definition of the circumstances when this tool would apply: If two or more self-sufficient representations of reality are identified as cognitive synonyms, if their technical environments are entirely dissimilar, if their earliest occurrences are within separate and autonomous texts or parts of texts, and if the imputations of synonymy require hermeneutics which do violence to the earlier forms of the systems, then we may assume that these systems arose within different intellectual matrices. Such a definition must sustain an additional caveat--once identified as cognitive synonyms, doctrinal cross-pollination between systems was a normative expression of hermeneutical skill.

Notes to Part I: Chapter Four

1. Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt, pp. 106, n.b., 205; idem, "Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in Viṃśatikā und Triṃśikā," WZKSQ 11 (1967): 109-136, esp. pp. 119-21.
2. Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt, p. 205, 106 n.b.
3. See Schmithausen, "Sautrāntika," pp. 119-21 for references and MSam I.6,13, Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1 pp.5,8, vol. 2, pp. 15-17,29-30, for arguments.
4. Please see the section on the Śālistamba in Chapter Four c. above.
5. We note, that paryāya may be used for other meanings, such as 'division' or list; eg., dharmaparyāya for sūtra.
6. Nagao, MAVBh, p. 43; Pandey, MAVT, pp. 101-03; the problem of the seven tathatā will be discussed in Part II, Chapter Six.
7. MAVT: paryāyo nāmaikasyārthaśya bhinnasābdatvaṃ pratyāyayati paryāyārthābhīdhānam iti paryāya ucyate | tāny abhīdhānāni sūtrāntareṣu āśūnyatāiva nirdiśyante |; Pandey, p. 38.25-26, I follow Yamaguchi's reading given in footnote 1.
8. Paryāyavastu, aDe-dge sams-tsam hi, fol. 47b7.
9. Bhattacharya, YoBh, p. 26.18-19.
10. Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, pp. 32-33, vol. 2, p. 110; MSamBh, Peking, vol. 112, p. 287.3.8-4.7 and note the use of the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya to support a Yogācāra argument; MSamU, Peking, vol. 113, p.19.2.6-3.7.
11. See J.F. Staal, "Analyticity," Foundations of Language 2 (1966):67-93 for a full bibliography of the series of interchanges.
12. Willard van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View, New York: Harper, 1963, pp. 20-46.
13. Quine, Logical Point, p. 60.
14. See Marc de May, The Cognitive Paradigm, Sociology of the Sciences Monographs No. 1, Dordrecht: D.Reidel, 1982, esp. pp. 19-37, 82-107.
15. See also the colophon to the paryāya-saṃgrahaṇī of YoBh, in which Asaṅga maintains that all these were culled from

scripture, sams-tsam, hi, fol, 47b6.

16. Ruegg has considered this passage in La Théorie, pp. 85-6; cf. Part II, Chapter Four below.

17. Please see the Appendix to Part III for an examination of the usages in the Lañk.

18. See Alex Wayman, "The Mahāsāṃghika and the Tathāgata-garbha," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 1 (1978): 35-50, esp. p. 38; Śrīmālā, p. 104. There appears to be the relationship in this early tathāgatagarbha text of ādāna between the tathāgatagarbha and the various sense consciousnesses. It is not clear, though, that Wayman's other reasoning is correct.

CHAPTER FIVE:

Historical Scenario

Now it appears that we are in a position to appreciate the means by which these systems were developed and the milieu in which they evolved. We will first review the early usages of the term *Yogācāra*, then show the basic intellectual environments contributing to the *Yogācāra*'s development, and finally attempt to write a short history of the tradition, particularly with reference to the material which bears on the problem of fundamental transformation. Certain of the texts normally associated with the *Yogācāra* will not be discussed, since they have little to do with the systems under scrutiny. Finally we will observe that there is a strong case for dissociating the term *Yogācāra* or *Vijñānavāda* from the strict definition of a 'school' and establishing it in the context of an ever-changing tradition, a much looser formulation.

Probably the earliest use of the term '*Yogācāra*', which is where our investigation properly lies, indicates simply a 'yogin' and should be considered identical with that term. In the *Mahāvastu*, for example, the Bodhisattva is enjoined to stay away from *yogācāras*, since one entering the Buddha's persuasion (*anūsāsana*) does not associate with them. Doing so results in falling back from the sixth stage of the

Bodhisattva to the fifth.¹ From this use we see the graduation to the usage of yogācāra indicating a Buddhist yogin, specifically a monk. The *Revatasūtra, for example, makes use of the phrase bhikṣur yogī yogācārah.² This is the employment we find in the two Yogācārabhūmi of the Sarvāstivāda, in the early Mahāyāna-sūtras--including the Aṣṭasāhasrikā and the Kāśyapaparivarta--and in the Yogācārabhūmi of Asaṅga.³ There is also the obvious parallel with the Pali usage 'yogavacāra' to describe one involved in samatha/vipassana. Within the Sanskrit-based literature, though, the majority of citations of 'Yogācāra' involve the bhikṣu's utilization of categories derived from the abhidharma of the Vaibhāṣikas. The roots of the identification of Yogācāra with any particular doctrinal system probably lie at this stage.

We have seen from the material brought together by Demiéville that from the second to the fourth centuries A.D., in the valley of Kāśmīr, there could be identified a loose tradition associated with the title Yogācāra. There, Yogācāras were deeply involved in contemplative practices. They utilized the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivāda and its off-shoots such as those of the Mahīśāsakas and the Sautrāntikas. They were involved in the cultus of Maitreya, which was popular in that area, and they were associated with specific locals even within the valley. An example of the latter was their attachment to the figure of Revata, the interlocutor of the *Revata-sūtra, legendary constructor of

a stūpa containing the hair and nail relics of the Buddha, and the reputed founder of a mountain monastery (śaila-vihāra) which was a popular residence of monks.⁴ This frequent description of Yogācāras as monks is in accord with the fact that the missionaries introducing this material into China, their disciples, and the legendary meditators remaining in Kāshāmr at the time were exclusively described as bhikṣus.⁵

Against this material culled from the sūtras of the period must be set the record found within the Vaibhāṣika literature of Kāshāmr, particularly that of the AMV. Of the more than sixty occurrences of the term Yogācāra in the text as translated by Hsüan-tsang, all but three relate to Yogācāra as a term for master meditators.⁶ Thus, Yogācāras practice the meditations on the repulsive (aśubha-bhāvanā); they live on mountains, they enter the noble path, see the truths, etc. This usage is in accord with the single reference to Yogācāras in the Saṅgītiparyāya and is mentioned in the Kośa as well as the VinSū.⁷ The three exceptional references in the AMV are introduced differently. There the statements are "the Yogācāras claim..." and three specific doctrinal formulations are ascribed to them, all unacceptable to the Vaibhāṣikaśāstrins: a) the Yogācāras propound a doctrine of four 'higher' concentrations (uttarādhyāna), b) they maintain that there is not immediate contiguity between the moments of sense consciousness, since each of these moments is followed by a

moment of intellectual consciousness (manovijñāna), and c) they maintain that the element pride (māna) is of an indeterminate base (avyākṛtamūla).⁸ The first reflects a concern for the contemplations which one would expect of a meditative tradition, and the second appears to be an early formulation of the concern for the process of intellection which was to reach fruition in the doctrines surrounding manas. The third of these doctrines is perhaps the most interesting for what it claims by association. This doctrine is ascribed, both in the AMV and the KośaVy, to the Gandhāra-Vaibhāṣikas (Bāhirdeśikas), who maintained that there were four indeterminate roots, not three as delineated by the Kāśhmīri-Vaibhāṣikas.⁹ Thus, the earliest ascription of specifically doctrinal, as opposed to meditative, statements to the Yogācāra was in the context of the Gandhāra-Vaibhāṣika school. This supports the traditional statements, found in Paramārtha's biography, that Aśaṅga came from Gandhāra and was initially involved in the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya tradition.¹⁰

Aśaṅga, preceded by such illustrious Kāśhmīri monks as Vasumitra, Saṅgharakṣa, Maitreyaśrī, Dharmatrāta, etc., was the first great literary figure among the Yogācāras. He was active the latter half of the fourth century, and his BoBh was translated twice into Chinese during the first third of the following century. As we have seen, the second of these translations, that of Guṇavarman (T.1582), was cast in scriptural form. An inheritor of an enormous corpus of

Abhidharma from various traditions, it is most likely that he was closely allied to the Mahīśāsaka Abhidharma, particularly in his early years.

We recall that the traditional hagiographies identify alternatively the Sarvāstivāda and the Mahīśāsaka as Asaṅga's Vinaya tradition, and the Abhidharma material preserved in the literature associated with Asaṅga demonstrates these affiliations also.¹¹ Some of the more telling examples may be given. First, the ASam utilizes a list of eight uncompounded dharmas which is very similar to one found in Vasumitra's Samayabhedoparacanacakra under the Mahīśāsaka section.¹² The YoBh, furthermore, accepts the existence of an intermediate state (antarābhava) which is rejected by the Mahāśāṃghika as well as by Vasubandhu the Sautrāntika and is most closely associated with the Vaibhāṣikas.¹³ Another central Vaibhāṣika doctrine, though, the well-known tenet that the elements of existence are substantially existent throughout the three times (traikālyavāda), is firmly rejected in the YoBh.¹⁴ Finally, the analysis of causative patterns found in the YoBh is close to that of the Sarvāstivāda. Five results (phala) and four conditions (pratyaya) are accepted by Asaṅga, but his list of ten causes (hetu) is entirely different from the five associated with the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma.¹⁵ The breakdown of the elements of existence, particularly the formations known as 'disjunct' (viprayukta), show much similarity with the Vaibhāṣika system, the specifics in the

ASam being evidently expanded from their list.¹⁶ That Asaṅga should have ultimately drawn from a variety of Abhidharma systems should not be surprising since the entire north-west region of India was a meeting ground of Abhidharma traditions, Vinaya traditions, Mahāyāna traditions, and influences from central Asian religiosity.¹⁷

The ŚrBh probably represents the oldest stratum of material he received. We find, for example, that the ŚrBh contains but one passing reference to the darśana-mārga, and it is likely that the earliest stratum of Abhidharma traditions which he represents had no such structure.¹⁸ It also contains quotes from the *Revata-sūtra, and this latter is probably the earliest sūtra base for the doctrine of āśraya-parivṛtti under the guise of āśraya-viśuddhi. If he quotes extensively from the āgamas, he also was the inheritor of many of the Mahāyānasūtras, although the earlier sections of the Yogācārabhūmi do not demonstrate much influence from those. Most of the Mahāyāna considerations he reserved for the BoBh and the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī. The former is extensively concerned with the method of the prajñāpāramitā, which sūtras he alludes to in the latter. It is likely that he originally conceived the YoBh as just the seventeen sections mentioned in the beginning uddāna, without the following four sections of the VinSq, the *Vivaraṇa-saṃgrahaṇī, the Paryāya-saṃgrahaṇī, and the Vastu-saṃgrahaṇī.¹⁹ The VinSq, in particular, shows an advanced exposure to the Mahayana, and it was probably the

final work in the YoBh corpus, although the entire opus was probably edited by him after it was completely finished, and it contains numerous cross-references.²⁰ While the Samd played little part in the doctrines associated with the earlier sections of the YoBh, virtually its entire text is reproduced in the BoBh commentarial section of the VinSq.

It is impossible to tell just who Asaṅga's teachers were. In Paramārtha's hagiography, the Arhat Piṇḍola is mentioned, but he was a legendary figure by this time. Demiéville's data preclude our taking seriously Ui's hypothesis that Maitreya was human, and we must admit that Maitreya was the center of the cultus of buddhānusmṛti found in contemporaneous Kashmir. Frauwallner's hypothesis, followed by Schmithausen, that Maitreya-nātha was the human teacher of Asaṅga and the author of the MSA, the MAV, the DhDhV, and the AA is possible, but not likely. While Ruegg's objection that no authors with the name Maitreya- are found in the early period is in error--there being the Vaibhāṣika yogācāra master Maitreyaśrī--the name Maitreya-nātha does not seem to occur in any of the sources for the legend before the eighth century. Our sources list Bhagavad-Maitreya as the legendary figure.

The composition of the MSA is one factor. Nagao has maintained that all 797 verses were composed at the same time.²¹ I find this an unlikely proposition. Many of the verses appear to be explanatory to others which they follow.

While the detailed textual history of the MSA is outside the scope of this work and awaits thorough investigation, a fruitful avenue of approach would be to start with the anustubh verses.²² For the most part, these 472 verses of the MSA give a clean reading all to themselves and are certainly more homogenous than the verses taken as a whole.²³ Difficulties certainly remain, particularly in the first chapter where the anustubh verses begin abruptly. Should these verses prove to be or to contain the earlier stratum of the MSA, we are still at a loss as to their authorship. In the MSABh, as we have seen above, the name of the author of the MSA is given as Vyavadātasamaya-bodhisattva. Demiéville has shown that Yogācāras (meditation masters) who were associated with the cultus of Maitreya have received the posthumous epithet of Bodhisattva.²⁴ It is entirely likely that this was the case here and Vyavadātasamaya was a monk in northern India similarly involved in the Maitreya cult. I take Vyavadātasamaya to be the compiler of all the verses of the received text and the author of the later ones.

I find it difficult to assume that the authors of the MSA and the MAV were one and the same person. The MSA is a compilation of material, and it shows, in its final form, the use of multiple verse forms and literary devices (upamā, etc.). The MAV is a relatively straightforward versified śāstra, obsessed with the doctrines surrounding abhūtapari-kalpa, the trivabhāva, and the path, with similes occurring

in only three verses.²⁵ Conversely, for the MSA, the cardinal system is that of the gotra, a term occurring once in an insignificant context in MAV I.19a. The longest chapter of the MAV is the final one, concerned with the anuttarayāna, a term which does not occur in the MSA. Furthermore, the relative discussions of path structure are ordered quite differently. Examples could, of course, be extended ad infinitum, but this should be sufficient. The author of the MAV must remain anonymous, and he was probably unknown to the early Yogācāra authors, his śāstra being subsumed into the growing mythology of Maitreya as the visionary inspiration of texts. The DhDhV, as we have seen, was evidently unknown to Hsüan-tsang, Dharmapāla, Sthiramati, or any other great master of the tradition. Its formulation of āśraya-parivṛtti, moreover, is quite advanced and was probably composed after the MSA and contiguous with the MSaṃ, but from a different hand. The AA does not concern us, but due to the fact that it also was apparently unknown and, like the DhDhV, attached to the Maitreya legend quite late, it is unlikely that it arose in the same milieu as any of the other Yogācāra texts.

Asaṅga knew the MSA and refers to it in the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī as an example of a well-constructed śāstra, but he gives no author's name. In addition it is likely that he knew of the MAV by the time he wrote the BoBh-viniścaya section of the of the VinSg. The chapter of the BoBh entitled tattvārtha does not discuss in any way the

doctrines of the three natures, which is the method of the third chapter of the MAV.²⁶ In the corresponding section of the VinSq, though, after commenting on the substance of the BoBh chapter, he has connected the terminology of tattvārtha with the trisvabhāva, elaborating greatly on the definitions of the three natures as given in the Samd.²⁷ In any event, it is evidently the case that as his compositions progressed, so did the effect which the developing Mahāyāna doctrines had on him.

Following the completion of the entire YoBh, Asaṅga probably wrote the *Vikhy, first the verses and then his own commentary.²⁸ At this point it appears that a summary of the Abhidharma material was required and the result was the Abhidharmasamuccaya. However, the order of these latter two works is by no means certain. The *Vikhy and the VinSq, though, show much common ground, particularly in their approaches to the such Mahāyāna topics as acintya and trisvabhāva. The ASam, on the other hand, includes a full-blown darśana-mārga, which I have not found in any other early work by Asaṅga. Schmithausen has recently shown, as is obvious to the reader, that many of the definitions found in the ASam are virtually meaningless without reference to the YoBh.²⁹ Whichever of the two works was composed before the other, they can be comfortably assigned to Asaṅga's middle period.

This brings us to the MSam, a problematic work at best. Besides the citations of the Ekottarāgama and the sectarian āgamas, the MSam cites the MSA, the MAV, the Mahāvāna-abhidharma-sūtra, the Samd, and the BoBh. The citations from the MSA are the most important, and Lamotte has identified more than thirty-eight verses from the MSA cited either by name or anonymously.³⁰ The single quotation from the MAV is cited by name and identifies the pratyaya-vijñāna of I.10 with the ālaya-vijñāna, as does the author of the MAVBh.³¹ This text is also a great source of quotations from the MabS, and at least five direct quotations are cited, with many more possible but not identified.³² We can profitably contrast this kind of quotation with that seen in the YoBh, where the Samd is the most important Mahāvāna canonical work and the MSA is not cited at all, only once mentioned by name.

Equally telling is the arrangement of the systems involved. The entire MSam is outlined around the underlying consciousness, although much time is spent delineating the three natures in accordance with Ch. XI of the MSA. The MSam, too, follows the MSA in establishing a fully developed idealism with the total denial of an external object. Gotra, however, except for a quote from MSA IX.77, is remarkable in its absence. While a case could be made that the shift from gotra to ālayavijñāna was already evident in the VinSq--to be discussed in Part II--still the wholesale abandonment of the terminological environment must arouse our suspicions.

Moreover, many of the categories standard to Asaṅga's previous works have been altered in the MSaṃ. The eight reasons for the ālayavijñāna have been changed to five, though it is true that these five embody most of the prior eight. The ten stages of the Bodhisattva have been taken from the Daśabhūmika-sūtra, abandoning the elaborate scheme of the BoBh. It is also the case, though, that this latter was in the process of amalgamation with the ten stages. Thus, while it is obvious that there was a model and methodology shift from the YoBh and allied works, it is equally obvious that there exists some degree of continuity.

Much closer, though, in spirit and approach are the two commentaries to the MSA and MAV ascribed to Asaṅga's brother, Vasubandhu. The author of these two works, which I believe were by the same hand, is ready to subsume other models under the general aegis of ālayavijñāna. Thus, MAV I.10, as we have seen, refers to a certain pratyayavijñāna which the Bhāṣya author defines as ālaya-vijñāna. It is far from clear that such an identification is warranted from the verses, and I have not seen ālayavijñāna identified by this name elsewhere. So too, in the Bhāṣya to MSA XI.33, the Bhāṣyakāra argues that the 'one's own element' (svadhātu) is to be understood as ālaya-vijñāna. It is most likely that this term refers to the nonstandard cittadhātu utilized in the surrounding verses.³³ Indeed, the term ālayavijñāna never occurs in the verses of the MSA. Moreover, an obscure

verse from an unidentified work is quoted by the commentator to the MSA and by the author of the MSam.³⁴

These apparent similarities between the different works present us with two relatively equal propositions: First, that the author of the MSABh, the MAVBh, and the MSam, are the same person. Second, that the MSam was such a milestone in the change of course for those associated with the Yogācāra that the author of the two commentaries merely followed suit. At this point, due partly to a lack of Sanskrit original for the MSam, it would be difficult to decide. In the face of such systemic and stylistic ruminations, though, we must address the unified traditional ascription of the MSam to Asaṅga. If this text is truly by Asaṅga, as it might be, then it must represent a mature product of his later years.

Since Asaṅga must have been active in the latter half of the fourth century, as his BoBh was translated into Chinese in the early fifth, his brother Vasubandhu, the author of the MAVBh and the MSABh, must have followed him closely, perhaps surviving into the early fifth century. At this point the stage was set for this intellectual-meditative tradition to develop into a school. The primary models of ālayaviññāna and trisvabhāva had been amalgamated, the scriptural base for all of the principal doctrines had been identified, an enormous corpus of śāstric texts had

been written, and the primary teachers enjoyed an popularity unprecedented among Mahāyāna authors.

Two elements, however, were incomplete: the mythology of divine certification, and a true scholastic syllabus. The former was to be supplied from the visions of Yogācāras like Asaṅga. As a certified Yogācāra he undoubtedly obtained some visionary experience, some of which may have been regarding Maitreya. We have already seen how the religious climate of Kāśmīr during this period utilized visionary accomplishment to satisfy doctrinal demands. The ascription of Bodhisattva-ordination rituals to the Bhagavad-Maitreya is not far removed from the ascription of entire treatises, particularly for an orally-based religious environment, as India is and was. As time went on, the ascription of texts was extended from the BoBh to the YoBh to the entire early corpus of texts. Vasubandhu may have had something to do with this. He doubtless was sufficiently in awe of his visionary brother to identify all the texts he received from him as coming directly from Maitreya, thereby not only enhancing the perception of the doctrines but also Asaṅga's image. Perhaps from this mechanism stems the introductory verse of the MAVBh which maintains that the reciter received the text from the author, a Bodhisattva. Whatever the psychological mechanism involved, the historical result was the continuing ascription of these works to the celestial Bodhisattva. It

is at this stage that Bodhiruci's ascription in the early sixth century occurs.

It is indeed unfortunate that the Epthalite Huns occupied the northern passes during the latter half of the fifth century since all of our information concerning the progress of the Yogācāra is cut off during that period. It is especially unfortunate since a finer gradation of the Chinese sources would perhaps have brought more information to the problem of Frauwallner's two Vasubandhu proposition. In the course of my research, I have become convinced that the author of the Viṃ and Triṃ was later than the author of the MAVBh and the MSABh. The two former works were indeed the scholastic manuals which were required to turn the Yogācāra into the Vijñānavāda and we have no indication that there was any perception of such a school before the end of the fifth century.

Certainly in the face of Frauwallner's data, especially as augmented by Schmithausen's examinations of the Triṃ and Viṃ, the 'two Vasubandhu' hypothesis appears on firm ground. Frauwallner has shown that his material can easily support the new data offered by Jaini from the Abhidharmadīpa, and the Sautrāntika basis of the Viṃ, along with the traces in the Triṃ, has been convincingly demonstrated by Schmithausen.³⁵ The data we have on the formation of the Vijñānavāda as a school--requiring the development of a systematic mythology and a scholastic manual--also

circumstantially supports Frauwallner's conclusions. It is not until the sixth century that clear references to Viññānavāda or Cittamātravāda as a school are found, and the earliest references within the tradition itself are found in the work of Sthiramati. At the same time the tradition was being identified by Bhavaviveka and Dharmapāla, followed at the turn of the seventh century by Candrakīrti. Paramārtha in the sixth century gives us the first systematic account of the mythology, and its primary elements were to remain stable thereafter. We could thus conclude that school-formation, in the sense it has been used by traditional and modern doxographers, was a product of the late fifth century and that our knowledge of it is masked by the Epthalite occupation of central Asia at this time. We could further conclude that the 'school' itself was a product of the genius of Vasubandhu II--the author of the Triṃ, the Viṃ, the Kośa, the TSN, and the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa. He delineated in a scholastic manner the primary doctrines of the tradition, following closely the topical outline of the MSaṃ. Once established, the Triṃ and the Viṃ became the hallmarks of the scholastic tradition, and by the time Hsüan-tsang augmented Dharmapāla's commentary, there were reputedly ten influential commentaries written on the Triṃ.

We note, of course, that with time there was an entire milieu alteration from the hermitages of Kashmīr and Gandhāra to the great Buddhist universities of the Gangetic plain. The function of the Yogācāra in the sixth and

seventh centuries was to establish the scholastic position of the Mahāyāna, a task which the Mādhyamikas had failed to perform. Yogācāra robbed the Abhidharma of its power by being even more detailed and having the credentials of a meditative tradition and the Buddha of the future behind it. It enjoyed the prestige of having converted the greatest of the Ābhidharmikas, Vasubandhu. It, in many ways, became the intellectual playground of later Mahāyāna, and, if anything, failed its initial promise by trying to do too many things. One of the results was that it laid the intellectual foundations of the Vajrayāna and simultaneously lost those interested in meditative discipline. It was not entirely satisfactory in its intellectual analysis and subsequently gave rise to the epistemology (pramāṇavāda) of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Finally, it must be said that the scholasticisation of the Yogācāra meant it lost its creativity. Starting out with some of the most original insights into the personality process, through their development of academic credentials, the Yogācāra masters merely marked time defending the prior contributions of previous masters.

The three principal Yogācāra masters of the scholastic phase were Sthiramati, Dharmapāla, and Niḥsvabhāva, in order of importance.³⁶ Sthiramati (ca. 510-570 A.D.) was certainly the most prolific of the authors as well as the most conservative. His apparent goal, in which he succeeded, was to master all of the literature preceding

him. His commentaries and subcommentaries on the MAV, the MSA, the Trīṃ, the PaSk, and the Kośa are monuments to the careful compilation of opposing views and the defense of orthodoxy.³⁷ Sthiramati was in residence at Valabhī in modern Gujarat, and the Sino-Japanese tradition puts Sthiramati in opposition to Dharmapāla, one of the leading lights of Nālandā during the middle of the sixth century.³⁸ Dharmapāla (ca. 530-561 A.D.), whose school made significant contributions to the problems of gnoseology, in fact followed much of Dignāga's contributions to epistemology and the model of perception. There were doubtless other scholars working to establish the Yogācāra on a scholastic footing at the time, but the record of these two scholars alone comes down to us intact to any significant degree. It was not until the late sixth or early seventh centuries that another scholar of similar attainments arose, Niḥsvabhāva, destined to be the last of the great scholars of Yogācāra in India. He was probably a junior contemporary to Dharmakīrti (ca. 530-600), whose Nyāyabindu he refers to.³⁹ Hsüan-tsang later translated his magnum opus, the MSamU, into Chinese. The translation, though, suffers, as do many of Hsüan-tsang's, from excessive liberty and this fact has misled some scholars into assigning Niḥsvabhāva a date earlier than Dharmapāla.⁴⁰

Following Niḥsvabhāva, the fate of the Yogācāra as a truly significant tradition was sealed by Śāntarakṣita's composition of the Madhyamakālamkāra, a treatise which

amalgamates the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra viewpoints together into a unified whole, relegating the latter to the description of functional truth (saṃvṛtisatya). No other great Viṣṇānavādin was to follow, although the works of Ratnākaraśānti are sometimes considered such by the doxographers and cataloguers of the Tibetan canon.

Notes to Part I: Chapter Five

1. E. Senart, Le Mahavastu, Société Asiatique--Collection d'Ouvrages Orientaux 2^{me} Série, Paris: l'Imprimerie Nationale, 1892, vol. I, p. 120.9.
2. Quoted in Shukla, ŚrBh, pp. 198.1,7,13,17-18, 199.8,18,20, 200.1,2,13-14.
3. Vaidya, Asta, p. 46.12; Von Staël-Holstein, Kāṣyapa-parivarta 108, p. 159.1; Shukla, ŚrBh, pp. 284.4-285.10; VinSq, aDe-dge, zi, fol. 16b7.
4. Material from the *Revatasūtra will be considered in Part II.2; see Shukla, ŚrBh, pp. 197.17-200.20, which constitutes the only quote, to my knowledge, from the *Revatasūtra. Revata's legend is most extensively discussed in the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivāda and references to him are found scattered in Sanskrit literature. See Étienne Lamotte, Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, Bibliothèque du Muséeon Vol. 18, Louvain: Bureaux du Muséeon, 1944, pp. 550-551 n. ; idem, La concentration de la marche héroïque (Śūramga-samādhisūtra), MCB XIII (1965), p. 259, n.
5. Demiéville, "La Yogācārabhūmi," pp. 339-97.
6. AMV, T.1545.27.38b25-27, 47a22, 205b11, 223c14, 237a27, 238c19-21, 276a10, 316c-318a passim, 338b-339a passim, 341a15-16, 422b6, 423b1, 433a3, 433b2, 439b11-12, 512c28, 527c16-20, 528a14, 529b1-6, 533a29-b8, 534a20, 536a29, 537b6, 704c1-705b11, 766b2-24, 816c1-3, 832a22, 834c11, 840a1-13, 842b4, 879c23-26, 880b14, 898a7, 899b8, 905b10-18, 938b14-22, 939a27-28, 940a3.
7. Saṅgītiparyāya, T.1536.26.446a1; cf. KośaBh, Shastri, pp. 895.15-898.2; La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. IV, pp. 150-152; cf. AMV, T.1545.27.205b11; VinSq, sema-tsam zi, fol. 16b7.
8. T.1545.27.815c11 [proposition a)], 682b2 [proposition b)], and 795c9-12 [proposition c)].
9. AMV, T.1545.27.795c9-11; KośaVy to V.20, Shastri, p. 795.25.
10. T.2049.50.188a10, 188c1; Takakusu, "Life of Vasubandhu," pp. 269-273.
11. T.2087.51.896b26-29; Beal, Si-Yu-Ki, p. 226.

12. Masuda, "Origin and Doctrines," p. 61; ASam, pp. 15-16.
13. YoBh, pp. 18 ff.; Kośa, pp. 402-32; La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. 2, pp. 36-56; SAVBh, fols 22a3-23a6.
14. Bhattacharya, YoBh, pp. 122-129.
15. Bhattacharya, YoBh, pp. 106.10-112.6; Dutt, BoBh, pp. 68.22-69.3; and cf. the five phala given in MAV V.16cd-17ab, Nagao p. 57, which offer a schema in some ways similar to the Sarvāstivāda system; note that the author of the MAVBh wishes to identify the two systems, Nagao, p. 57.14-15.
16. Pradhan, ASam, pp. 5.14-17, 10.15-11.24.
17. Bareau, Les Sects, pp. 35-41; for the special nature of this area see John Brough, "Comments on third-century Shan-shan and the history of Buddhism," BSOAS XXVIII (1965): 582-612.
18. Shukla, ŚrBh, p. 330.13; note that where the darśanamārga should be found between the laukikāgradharma and the bhāvanāmārga (p. 502) there is no break. This problem will be discussed below in Part IV.
19. Bhattacharya, YoBh, p. 1.
20. The first seventeen bhūmi-s of the YoBh do not, to my knowledge, refer to the VinSq, though they refer to most of the other sections. However, the BoBh does refer to the Parvāya-saṃgrahaṇī (W.p. 392.19; see Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa Abschnitt, p. 18.n.7), and it in turn refers to the VinSq, sDe-dge sams-tsam, vol. 'i, fol. 47a6.
21. Gadjin M. Nagao, Index to the Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra, Tokyo: Nippon Gakujutsu Shinko-kai, 1958, part 1, p. v.
22. The earliest reference to the MSA is, as we have said, in the Mahāyānāvātāra, where IV.2 is addressed; this is one of the anuṣṭubh verses.
23. The anuṣṭubh verses are as follows: MSA I.8-13; III.1-10; IV.1-6; IX.1-2, 7-8, 11, 16-48, 56-81; X.4-9, 11-13; XI.5-12, 15-29, 31-33, 35-46, 50-51, 53-59, 61-73; XII.7, 16-18; XIII.1-13, 16, 20-21, 24-28; XIV.1-36, 42-46; XV.1, 16-28, 42, 52-57, 72-78; XVII.1-7, 9, 19, 29-30, 63-64; XVIII.16-104; XIX.1-63, 73-74; XX-XXI.1-14, 17-24, 26-28, 31-61.
24. Demiéville, "La Yogācārabhūmi," pp. 369 ff.
25. MAV vv. I.16cd, II.5cd, V.17ab, Nagao, pp. 24, 30, 66.
26. Lévi, in his introduction to the translation of the MSA, (Tome II, Traduction, pp. *10-*11) has speculated that the

BoBh was ordered on the model of the chapter divisions of the MSA. I find it likely that the divisions of chapters of the MSA was done by the author of the MSABh and was in fact based on the arrangement of chapters in the BoBh. For example, the tattvārtha chapter of the MSA makes no mention in the verse text of the term tattva; this is only identified in the MSABh. The chapters of the MSA are very uneven and within the longer ones, other chapters could be entirely divided. Ch. XI of the MSA, for example, begins with a discussion of the definitions of the tripitaka, and then goes onto a discussion of the triśvabhāva, all under the rubric of 'investigations of the dharma' (dharma-parveṣṭhi). Many other examples could be given, but suffice to say that the three chapters entitled tattva(artha) in the BoBh, the MSA, and the MAV have little in common.

27. sDe-dge, vol. zi, fols. 18b1-27a7; cf. Samd Ch. VI.3-7, Lamotte, pp. 60-61.

28. The *Āryadeśanāvikhyāpana-śāstra (T.1603) and Bhāṣya (T.1602) have been occasionally noticed by Buddhologists, such as Demiéville and Schmithausen, but they have not provided a summary of contents for Indologists not reading Chinese. There is no translation into Tibetan. In the Chinese translations of Hsüan-tsang, the text consists of eleven chapters, which follow the uddana found at the beginning of the verse text. The eleven chapter titles are: 1. vastusaṃgraha, 25 verses; 2. *viśuddhārthasaṃgraha, 21 verses; 3. *kauśālasiddhi, 25 verses; 4. *anityasiddhi, 23 verses (1 ṣaḍpada); 5. *duḥkhasiddhi, 20 verses; 6. *śūnyatāsiddhi, 23 verses; 7. *niḥsvabhāvasiddhi, 24 verses; 8. *abhisamayāsiddhi, 25 verses; 9. *yogasiddhi, 4 verses; 10. *acintyasiddhi, 10 verses; and 11. viśiṣṭaviniścaya-saṃgraha, 47 verses. Paramārtha's commentary, the *Tri-niḥsvabhāva-śāstra (T.1617), in which is also included some indigenous Chinese subcommentary, only addresses Ch. 7, *niḥsvabhāva, and is a vehicle for Paramārtha's discussion of the amalaviññāna in the context of triśvabhāva, the real topic of the chapter. This commentary appears to be lecture notes more than anything else, and it is doubtful that Paramārtha translated the entire work. His commentary, interestingly, does not address the verses but quotes the Bhāṣya in full, indicating that probably he had only the text of the Bhāṣya in front of him in Skt. ms. Neither does he identify the author. The sections of the *Vikhy and Paramārtha's commentary which discuss fundamental transformation will be addressed in Part II.

29. Lambert Schmithausen, "The Daśanāmārga section of the Abhidarmasamuccaya and its interpretation by Tibetan commentators," in Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Tauscher, eds., Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde Heft 11, Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische

und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 1983, vol. 2, pp. 259-274, esp. pp. 262-63.

30. In order of quotation, MSA XI.24 [MSam II.9, Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, p. 28, vol. 2, p. 98]; MSA XIII.16 [MSam II.24, 1.36-37, 2.119]; MSA XI.50-51 [MSam II.30, 1.40-41, 2.128]; MSA XI.11 [MSam III.5, 1.50, 2.158]; MSA XIX.50 [MSam III.6, 1.51, 2.160]; MSA XIX.47 [MSam III.16, 1.55, 2.147]; MSA VI.6-10 [MSam III.18, 1.56, 2.176-79]; MSA XVI.1 [MSam IV.3, 1.58, 2.183]; MSA XIX.53-54 [MSam IX.3, 1.82-83, 2.264-65]; MSA IX.77 [MSam X.3, 1.85, 2.272-73]; MSA XIX.46-61 [MSam X.13-27, 1.88-90, 2.292-306]; MSA XI.53-54 [MSam X.32ab, 1.96, 2.326-28]; indirectly MSA XII.16,18 [MSam II.31, 1.41, 2.128-31]; indirectly MSA XX-XXI.41 [MSam V.3, 1.66, 2.203-04]; indirectly MSA XX-XXI.31 [MSam V.4, 1.66-67, 2.205-06]; indirectly MSA XIX.63 [MSam V.6 1.67-68, 2.209-10]; possibly MSA X.7-8 [MSam IX.16-17, cf. Lamotte, vol. 2, pp. 310-11].

31. MSam I.26, Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, p. 13, vol. 2, p. 46.

32. MSam I.1 [Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, p. 4, vol. 2, p. 12]; MSam I.2 [Lamotte, 1.4, 2.13]; MSam I.27 [Lamotte, 1.13, 2.47]; MSam II.26, Lamotte, 1.38, 2.122]; MSam II.29 [Lamotte, 1.39, 2.125].

33. Cf. also MSABh to XI.44, Lévi, p. 66.3-7; For a discussion of these problems see below, Part II, Chapter Four, Part III, Chapter One.

34. Lévi, MSABh, p. 82.20-21; Lamotte, MSam, II.31, vol. 1, p. 42, vol. 2, p. 132.

35. Padmanabh S.Jaini's material was presented in his "On the Theory of Two Vasubandhus," BSOAS 21 (1958): 48-53; Erich Frauwallner's reply was given in his "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic," WZKSQ 5 (1961): 125-148, esp. pp. 131-32; Lambert Schmithausen's augmentation of Frauwallner's material was presented in his "Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in Viṃśatikā und Trīṃśikā," WZKSQ 11 (1967): 109-136.

36. Perhaps Vinītadeva should be considered a Yogācāra author, but his total Vijñānavāda-related output was his commentaries on the Trim (T. 4070) and the Vim (T. 4065). Jinaputra, might also be considered but his commentary on the ASam, the ASamBh, is significant primarily because it survives in Sanskrit.

37. Schmithausen has already shown that the ASamBh is not by Sthiramati, although his reasoning is based on very slim grounds, the use of -parivṛtti instead of -parāvṛtti as the preferred form. More cogent would be showing the differences in definitions; the PaSkVai and the TrimBh

agreeing on their definitions of the various dharmas, as opposed to the ASamBh, which is very different. Furthermore, it is one of Sthiramati's trademarks that he begins a commentary with a long introduction, an element missing in the ASamBh.

38. Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhavaviveka, Sthiramati, and Dharmapāla," WZKS 12-13 [Frauwallner Festschrift] (1968-69): 193-203; Yoshifumi Ueda, "Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogācāra Philosophy," Philosophy East and West 17: 155-166; see also D. Shimaji, and Paul Demiéville, "Historique du Système Viññaptimātra," in Sylvain Lévi, Matériaux pour l'Étude du Système Viññaptimātra, Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études vol. 260, Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1932, pp. 15-42. See also below Part III, Chapter Four.

39. MSamU, Pek. 5552, vol. 113.6.3.1, sema-tsam 11, fol. 246a1; the new date of Dharmakīrti has been proposed by Christian Lindtner, for good reason, in his "Apropos Dharmakīrti--Two New Works and a New Date," Acta Orientalia XLI (1980): 27-37; see also idem, "Marginalia to Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya I-II," WZKS XXVIII (1984): 149-175.

40. Masaaki Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception, Harvard Oriental Series vol. 47, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 5, n. 26.

PART II:

SYSTEMS IN TRANSFORMATION

CHAPTER ONE:

Introduction to Systems Transformation

So far we have paid but lipservice to the proper object of this study, fundamental transformation (āśrayaparivṛtti/-parāvṛtti). In Part II, the discussion will swing to a rigorous investigation of the doctrine of transformation and the various kinds of fundaments or bases with which it is concerned. First, let us embark on a etymological discussion of the basic terminology. Āśraya is the term which I have chosen to translate as 'fundament'. It comes from the Sanskrit root √śri coupled with the prefix (upasarga) ā and the primary suffix (kṛtpratyaya) a to render the meaning of 'that to which something is closely connected or reliant on'. It sometimes means a seat, shelter, dwelling, or may indicate an agent. In Buddhist usage it is often paired with its complement āśrita, that which is based on or in the āśraya, the basis. Normatively, these two indicate the sense organs as the bases (āśraya) of experience and the sense consciousnesses which are based (āśrita) on them. In its capacity as the object, subject, locus or operational base for the transformation, it was most often translated into Tibetan as gnas (place, residence) and into Chinese as 依 (依, to depend on, to follow--normally a verb).

The second member of the compound, -parivṛtti/-parāvṛtti indicates the verbal action with respect to this transformation. -Parivṛtti is a verbal noun formed from the prefix (upasarga) pari- coupled with the root √vṛt and the feminine primary suffix -ti. -Parāvṛtti utilizes the same root and suffix, but with the prefix para-. The primary meaning of the former term is to revolve or turn about like a wheel; the primary meaning of the latter is to turn about or away from. Depending on its context, the sense of alteration, cleansing, halting, and many other connotations may be observed by these verbal nouns. The contextual nature of this odd compound was certainly recognized by Buddhist authors, and Vyavadātasamaya, the author of the MSA, included in his most influential work a verse on the various meanings of the term -parivṛtti:

IX.14 Operation, ascendance, nonoperation, the
fundament, abandonment, drawing towards, dual and
nondual, equivalent yet superior and all-
embracing; thus the transformation of the
Tathagatas is understood.

pravṛttir udvṛttir avṛttir āśraya
nivṛttir āvṛttir atho dvayādvayā !
śāśā viśiṣṭā api sarvagāṭmikā
tathāgatānāṃ parivṛttir iṣyate ||

Most commonly, the translators of this verbal term into European languages have suggested that a strict application of the concept of 'turning about' or 'revolution' should be employed in the rendering of these terms. La Vallée Poussin has pointed out in the context of Hsüan-tsang's exegesis of the Nālandā school, that there are the senses of

'revolution-destruction', 'revolution-expulsion', 'revolution-acquisition', and 'revolution-realization'.¹ Schmithausen has also suggested that 'exchange' or 'replacement' could be utilized as one equivalent of -parivṛtti, and some environments require the conception of the replacement of the basis with a new one.² The translators into Chinese have most often rendered this term by chüan (轉) meaning to revolve or turn around and the same term is commonly utilized in the translation of Cakravartin (轉輪王), the universal ruler whose wheel turns everywhere. Instances of differentiation between -parivṛtti and -parāvṛtti have been rare with the Chinese translators. The Tibetans, on the other hand, have occasionally differentiated between the two, translating -parivṛtti by yongs su gyur pa and -parāvṛtti by gzhan du 'gyur pa. This differentiation, though, is by no means strictly observed. Sometimes the verbal unit was translated by other terms, and Schmithausen has located the equivalents shin tu gyur, rab tu gyur, and shin tu 'phos ba for -parāvṛtti.³ Quite often the translators have simply rendered the entire compound as gnas-gyur in Tibetan and chüan-i in Chinese, neither of which discriminates -parivṛtti from -parāvṛtti.

The whole compound āśraya-parivṛtti/parāvṛtti belongs to that class of compounds known among Sanskrit grammarians as 'tatpuruṣa'. Now the relation between the various members of tatpuruṣa compounds in Sanskrit is required to belong to an oblique case. Thus the compound, depending on

how it is defined in the commentarial tradition, could be interpreted in a number of ways. For example it could be read transformation of the fundament (āśrayasya), within the fundament (āśraye), or by means of the fundament (āśrayena). In fact, while the genitive is dominant, all of these have been suggested in the tradition and will be indicated in the translations at the appropriate places. The only oblique cases not attested, to my knowledge, are the dative, transformation for or towards the fundament, and the ablative, transformation away from the fundament.

I have chosen to render the compound principally with the terms 'fundamental transformation', the 'fundament' being the āśraya and 'transformation' denoting the operation of either -parivṛtti/-parāvṛtti. Āśraya could also be effectively translated by such English words as base, basis, ground, substratum, and so forth. -Parivṛtti/-parāvṛtti could also be rendered by metamorphose, transmute, convert, transmogrify, and so forth.⁴ Obviously, in the case of contextual usages which do not conform to the primary meanings of this rendering, other forms of translation will be employed, but the basic sense of the compound is that of the alteration of the nature of the specific model of reality with which the individual author is concerned. If we understand that many of these models of reality are considered momentary, their transformation must incorporate the ideas of destruction, acquisition, and replacement of the old form of the model with its later condition.

Unlike some other Indo-European languages, English does not compound easily and appears brutish and unfelicitous when it does. Fortunately, though, the language makes up in some measure for this deficiency with the nominal adjective which indicates a loose connection between it and the noun to which it is subordinated. In the case of 'fundamental', because it must reflect many different possible case relations between the fundament and its transformation--as the tatpuruṣa compound does--the -al adjectival ending is a pleasant way to keep the relation relatively obscure while indicating in certain terms that there is a relation. Other words, especially 'basic', could also fulfill this need. In this capacity, the English comes closer to the sense of the original Sanskrit than Tibetan or Chinese can, these latter locking the 'āśraya' (gnas, ལྟན) into either a transitive (chüan) or intransitive ('gyur, གཏུག, chüan) relation with the verbal noun.

* * *

As will become obvious from the following pages, the primary sense of fundamental transformation is the metamorphosis of the model of reality at the time of enlightenment. Now, to prevent some degree of confusion from our presentation, let us issue a three-fold caveat. First, an examination of the terminological usages of āśraya-parivṛtti and its various vicissitudes would seem to indicate that the transformation of models of reality at the

time of enlightenment was an advance on the part of authors classed into the Yogācāra tradition. Nothing could be further from the truth. The earlier traditions certainly considered the impact that such an experience would bring about in the psycho-physical system. However, the advent of the terminological environment of fundamental transformation and its subsequent expanded usage reflect the concentration of the Yogācāra authors on the paradox of the transmutation of samsāra into nirvāṇa by means of skills and devices developed within conditioned existence.

Second, in Part II before us, I have attempted to consider the utilization of āśraya-parivṛtti in the context of isolated systemic transformation. While I have shown in the previous part that these systems arose with some degree of independence because of certain needs in the Indian Buddhist community, I have not shown that fundamental transformation was applied to each of them before their amalgamation with other models. In virtually all the examples before us this was not the case. Indeed, the application of āśraya-parivṛtti to an individual model was often the result of the same creative force which would motivate an author to identify two or more models of reality. However, in some cases the fusion was separated into individual chapters, and the language of transformation was applied to specific systems in some chapters and synthetic systems in others. For example, in this part we will consider the statements found in Chapter XI of the MSA

and Chapter I of the MSam since these chapters discuss, respectively, the transformation of the three natures and the underlying consciousness with little systemic cross-pollination. On the other hand, Chapter IX of the MSA and Chapter IX of the MSam are syncretic in tone and in their employment of the language of transformation, so that they will be discussed in Part III. Still, in many ways this is more a matter of degree than of kind, and all chapters of the MSA exhibit some elements of syncretism. Thus, the disparate usages which occur within the same text are still closely related, and we must retain some sense that our methodology not obscure the specific contributions of the authors.

Finally, we must again emphasize that, while delineating the systems employed in fundamental transformation, we are putting the cart before the horse. As will become quickly clear, the usage is soteriological in origin and context. Virtually every passage examined will discuss the path-based associations of fundamental transformation, but the actual path structures will await examination until Part IV. The major reason for this decision is that the topic of enlightenment, nirvāṇa, Buddhabhūmi, etc., is extraordinarily fraught with difficulties in interpretation, whereas that of the defiled state is, perhaps, easier to comprehend. Therefore, if we can approach the goal through the axioms of defilement, then

we shall have a solid basis to limit the variables when approaching the topics of illumination.

Notes to Part I: Chapter One

1. La Vallée Poussin, La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsanq, pp. 609-11.
2. Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa, pp. 96 ff; cf. also Schmithausen's criticisms (pp. 92-94) of Takasaki's attempted identification of the verbal usages of -parivṛtti/-parāvṛtti (A Study, pp. 41-45).
3. For much material on the specific translation equivalents in specific locations, see Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa, pp. 91-2, n.f.
4. For the distinctions of meanings of these verbs, please see Webster's Third New International Dictionary, New York: G. & C. Merriam Co, 1966, p. 2427c, 'transform'.

CHAPTER TWO:

The Vaibhāṣika / Sautrāntika Sources

Having determined in Part I, Chapter Five, that the Yogācāra was grounded in the various forms of Abhidharma, it is proper to attempt location of fundamental transformation in this milieu also. It may be the case that the earliest record of the term āśrayaparivṛtti occurs in one textually obscure and difficult place in the AMV. There, in a discussion of aviṇṇapti-rūpa, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins maintain that aviṇṇapti-rūpa functions as a dual basis. First, it is chüan-i, defined by the śāstra as that which operates as the basis for the transformation of the present basic elements (mahābhūta). Second, it is tsao-i, defined as that basis which causes the past basic elements to be produced.¹ Given the context and the definitions, though, it is doubtful that chüan-i here represents the translations of āśrayaparivṛtti, as it does in Hsüan-tsang's other translations. More likely, it renders some other compound, such as *parivartanāśraya. Tsao-i would then indicate some other compound such as *kāryāśraya, the basis for the formation of the past mahābhūtas. Both of these compounds would then be considered simple tatpuruṣa compounds agreeing with aviṇṇaptirūpa.

More understandable is the occurrence of chüan-i as āśrayaparivṛtti in a list found in the Samyukta-abhidharma-hrdaya-śāstra of Dharmatrāta (T.1552). The list enumerates five things which would bring about the elimination of the defilements (kleśas):

1. The cause is eternally extinguished.
2. The obtaining (prāpti) of this cutting off.
3. Chüan-i (āśrayaparivṛtti).
4. Knowledge of the conditions (pratya).
5. Obtaining their antidotes (pratipakṣa).²

The occurrence of āśraya-parivṛtti in this list appears to be a later intrusion since a seemingly earlier form of the list has only four members, lacking Number 3 above.³ Still, the incidence of āśrayaparivṛtti in the context of the elimination of defilements is in keeping with the predominant orientation of this term in other textual environments.

Far and away the most elaborate of the Vaibhāṣika statements on āśrayaparivṛtti, using this form of the term, occurs under Kośa IV.56. There Vasubandhu declares that in all positive or negative acts performed towards those newly arisen from the states of nirodha(samāpatti), of araṇā(samāpatti), of contemplation on maitrī, of the darśanamārga, and of arhatphala, such acts will yield their fruit in this life.

ye nirodhāraṇāmaitrīdarśanārhatphalotthitāḥ /
tesu kārāpakārānām phalam sadyo 'nubhūyate //

The proposition is made in response to one's questioning if there are any who experience fully the maturation of action performed in this life. Vasubandhu's answer is meant to indicate that only those who perform wholesome actions for, or inflict unwholesome actions on, these five types of individuals experience in this life the full maturation of all these acts. Fortunately, the issue of āśrayaparivṛtti does not come into play with all of the circumstances listed, but only for those arisen from obtaining the darśana-mārga and arhat-phala. The inclusion of transformation within the darśana-mārga is justified in KośaBh:

There being the elimination of that which is to be eliminated through the vision of the truths by one just arisen from entrance into the darśanamārga, his santati becomes pure (nirmalā) through the transformation (parivṛtti) of his new fundament (pratyagrāśraya).⁴

Similarly, Kośa IV.56 is true for the Arhat because:

There being the total elimination of that which is to be eliminated through cultivation (bhāvanā) for one just arisen from obtaining the fruit of an Arhat, his santati becomes pure (śuddhā) through the transformation of his new fundament.⁵

Yaśomitra, in the KośaVy, defines the pratyagrāśraya as abhinavaśarīra, a fresh, new body.⁶ It is fresh because it has not been long since it has obtained the path.

Fundamental transformation, then, encompasses two of the four phala according to the Vaibhāṣikas: the 'stream-winner' (śrotaāpannaphala) and the saint (arhatphala). The

other two, the once-returner (sakrdāgāmin) and the nonreturner (anāgāmin) do not entail this transformation. Vasubandhu explains this seeming anomaly by maintaining that because both the nature (avabhāva) and the fruit of the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga) are not complete (aparipūrṇa), the mental stream (āśayasantati) of one just arisen from this mārga is not pure (śuddhā) by means of the transformation of the new fundament. Thus they have not become fields of merit (punyaakṣetra).⁷ Yaśomitra interjects here that the path of cultivation is incomplete in nature since only those who are beyond learning (āśaikṣa) have this quality and therefore are fit to become fields of merit.⁸

If we consider this passage, certain difficulties are evident. Shorn of technical language, the KośaBh indicates that a yogin undergoes two experiences which totally transform his being, including his relation to others. What, though, is the nature of this transformation; what is the exact character of the locus or fundament transformed; and what is the relationship between them?

As we have seen, Yaśomitra defines the āśraya as the body (śarīra). This is the standard Buddhist scholastic usage and appears in harmony with its employment found elsewhere in the Kośa: the physical component of being. In his Bhāṣya to Kośa III.41, Vasubandhu defines it in just this manner:

The basis is the body with all of its sense faculties; those based in it are the mind

and mental events. (āśrayo hi sēndriyaḥ kāyaḥ ..
āśritāś cittacaittāḥ).⁹

Similar definitions of āśraya occur elsewhere in the Kośa, and this is certainly the predominant technical definition of āśraya in that text. It is doubtful, though, that this passage can sustain such a definition. The specific referent appears to be the purification of the stream of being (santati) which would indicate also the mind and mental events, these comprising four of the five aggregates.

Elsewhere, though, is another definition of āśraya. Kośa I.20 declares that element (dhātu) has the meaning of gens (gotra). The Bhāṣya comments that this is to be understood by analogy. In one mountain there may be many families (gotra) of ores such as iron, copper, silver, gold, and so forth. In the same way that we identify these as elements (dhātu), we also call the eighteen families of the senses, objects, and forms of consciousness, the eighteen elements (dhātu) when they occur in one basis (āśraya) or in one stream (santāna). Yaśomitra evidently understands these latter two terms as cognitive synonyms describing different ways of approaching an individual's dynamics. The term āśraya here identifies the body characterized by the whole (saṃudāya-lakṣaṇa-śarīra)--in this case the 'whole' meaning all of the eighteen elements.¹⁰ Āśraya used in this sense is certainly a more flexible term, and a transformation in the totality of the eighteen dhātus would be able to carry

the sense of purification occurring at the point of obtaining arhat-phala.

Such an interpretation, though, would appear in contradiction with the ontology of the objects of refuge given in Kośa IV.32. There Vasubandhu maintains that, when taking refuge in the Buddha, the actual object of refuge is the stream of āśaṅka-dharmas which make up the individual designated 'Buddha'. One does not take refuge in the form of the Buddha, since there is not any special quality in the Buddha's physical body (rūpakāya) which distinguishes 'before enlightenment' from 'after enlightenment'.¹¹ The AMV furthers this statement by maintaining that the real object of refuge is the dharmakāya, rather than the rūpakāya which is born from the womb, etc., and consists of defiled elements (sāsravadharma).¹² In Kośa VII.34, the dharmakāya is employed in the context of one of the three factors identical for all Buddhas: the accumulation of merit and knowledge, the accomplishment for himself and others, and the completion of the dharmakāya (dharmakāya-parinispatti). Yaśomitra, in his comment on this latter factor, identifies the dharmakāya in a manner similar to the AMV, maintaining that it is the stream of being wherein there is the accumulation of nondefiled dharmas.¹³

Passing for the moment from the problem of āśraya, the difficulty of its acquisition remains--how is it that such a transformation is obtained on the paths of vision and

nonlearning but not on the path of cultivation? The primary reason given by Vasubandhu is that this latter is not complete in either its proper nature or its fruit (aparipūrṇa-svabhāva-phalatvāt). Yaśomitra's comment that the śāikṣas are the only ones that are complete in proper nature is problematic since the path of vision is not śāikṣa. Both darśana and śāikṣa-mārgas, though, are totally anāsrava, whereas the bhāvanā-mārga may be approached through worldly methods as well as transworldly methods.¹⁴ As we have seen in the discussion on dharma-kāya, Yaśomitra appears to assume the equivalence of 'nondefiled' (anāsrava) and 'nonlearning' (śāikṣa), and perhaps this is the solution to the peculiar statement about the darśana-mārga.

We are still left with the problematic statement that the bhāvanā-mārga is incomplete in its fruit (aparipūrṇa-phala) as opposed to the other two paths. The entire subject of completion of fruit is discussed in detail in Kośa VI.64-65. In direct contradiction to the statements which we have just considered, the kārikā mentions that there are three kinds of completion for those still in training: completion of concentration (samāpatti), of faculty (indriya), and of fruit (phala). The Bhāṣya goes on to explain that these refer primarily to the anāgāmin precisely because he will no longer transmigrate, and that he may complete the fruit in one of four ways: by itself, in conjunction with either faculty (indriya) or concentration

(samāpatti), or with both of these so that all three are completed together. The śrotaāpanna-phala, though, is not mentioned as complete. Further, in Kośa VI.65a, the śāikṣa is not mentioned as complete in phala. Vasubandhu explains that, although we certainly cannot ascribe incompleteness of fruit to the śāikṣa, when discussing an Arhat, any statement about completeness of fruit or lack of it is meaningless.

Thus caught up in the web of their doctrines, the Vaibhāṣikas have evidently not concentrated on the environment of fundamental transformation enough to convince us that its origin needs to be ascribed to them. On the contrary, such a doctrine would have been elaborated in a technical environment more significant than a minor footnote to a specialized problem of karmic maturation. Moreover, the contradictions in their path statements, the lack of definitive discussions concerning the āśraya, the ad hoc character of the doctrine, and the lack of information concerning the nature of the transformation (-parivṛtti), all certify that the origin of 'fundamental transformation' can not be placed within the Vaibhāṣika fold.

The only other mention of āśraya and its transformation in the Kośa is that by the Sautrāntikas. In the Bhāṣya to Kośa II.36c, the Vaibhāṣika asks the Sautrāntika that, if there is no dharma called nonobtainment (aprāpti), then how has it been ascertained that the defilements (kleśa) have

been abandoned?¹⁵ The Sautrāntika answers that it is known for the noble ones (ārya) through the capacities of the paths of vision and cultivation to eliminate the further sprouting forth (praroḥa) of the defilements, so that the āśrayas of the noble ones are transformed (parāvṛtta). Here there can be no doubt for the Sautrāntika that the āśraya in question is the santāna of the entire person since this fundament becomes devoid of the seeds (bīja) of the defilements involved (abībhūta), like rice that has been burned by fire (agnidagdhavrīhivat). This is determined by the Sautrāntika definition of bīja as a specific transformation within the stream of being (santānapariṇāma-viśeṣa). Yaśomitra glosses āśraya here by ātma-bhāva, the entire collection of psycho-physical factors (pañcaskandha) which make up the person.

It is possible that the Sautrāntikas utilized the form parāvṛtta for a specific reason. Apparently they saw the transformation as an alteration of the nature of the santāna into something very different, and Yaśomitra glosses parāvṛtta in context as anyathābhūta, having become otherwise than it originally was. Such a transformation was seen as complete and total in its ability to alter the character of the stream of the individual. Furthermore, it seems that the language was guided by the Sautrāntika formulation of the state of nirvāṇa. For them, nirvāṇa is defined as obtaining, by means of the antidotes (pratipakṣa), a 'basis' (āśraya) which totally negates the

possibility of the further arising of new defilements or of rebirth.¹⁶ Evidently, this new āśraya is the fruit of the transformation. Their formulation, moreover, is quite in keeping with the requirements of momentariness, since any transformation, even temporal, would result in something different.

So it appears that the doctrine of fundamental transformation originated outside of the system of the Vaibhāṣika masters, perhaps within the Abhidharma systems of the splinter traditions of the Mahīśāsakas or the Sautrāntikas, or in the Mahāyānized version of the former. There are too many conflicts with the basic Vaibhāṣika system to consider that it was formed with the rest of the Sarvāstivāda as a whole. It is entirely absent from the earliest stratum of the Sarvāstivādin texts. The possibility of a Sautrāntika origin, though, is difficult since we possess no distinct Sautrāntika texts, let alone any of an early period. Far and away the earliest material stems from the Yogācāra usage in the Samd and the ŚrBh, and we will consider the ŚrBh statements in the following section, reserving the Samd for Part IV.

Notes to Part I: Chapter Two

1. T.1545.27.688c26-689a3. I wish to thank Robert Buswell for bringing this section to my attention.
2. T.1552.28.906a18-20. For the context of this work, see Lin Li-Kouang, L'Aide-Mémoire de la Vraie Loi (Saddharma-Smṛtyupasthāna-Sūtra)--Recherches sur un Sūtra Développé du Petit Véhicule, Musée Guimet Bibliothèque d'Études, Tome 54^{me}, Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1949, pp. 314-351; Charles Willemen, The Essence of Metaphysics: Abhidharmahrdaya, Publications de l'Institut Belge des Hautes Études Bouddhiques, Série "Études et Textes" No. 4, Brussels, 1975, xv-xviii.
3. The earlier list is reproduced just before the five-membered one; T.1552.28.906a15.
4. Shastri, Kośa, p. 663; Ruegg has discussed some of this material in La Théorie, pp. 472-82: darśanamārga-vyutthitasyāśeṣadarśanaprahātavyaprahāṇāt pratyagrāśraya-parivṛttir nirmalā santatir vartate ।.
5. Kośa, Shastri, p. 663: arhatphalavyutthitasyāśeṣabhāvanā-prahātavyaprahāṇāt pratyagrāśrayaparivṛttiśuddhā santatir vartate ।.
6. KośaVy, Shastri, p. 663.
7. KośaVy, Shastri, p. 664.
8. KośaVy, Shastri, p. 664.
9. KośaBh, Shastri, p. 496.18-19.
10. KośaVy, Shastri, p. 59.
11. KośaBh, Shastri, p. 628.
12. La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, Vol. III, p. 76, n. 3.
13. KośaVy, Shastri, p. 1096.15-16: anāśravadharmasambhāra-santāno dharmakāyaḥ ।.
14. Kośa and Bhāṣya to VI.1, Shastri, p. 871.
15. KośaBh, Shastri, p. 215.

16. KosaBh, p. 326.4-5: pratipakṣalābhena
kleśapunarbhāvotpādāntaviruddhāśrayalābhāt prāptam
nirvāṇam ity ucyate ।.

CHAPTER THREE:

Psycho-physical Transformation

If the Abhidharma origins of fundamental transformation remain obscure, its initial function within the literature of the Yogācāra is also shrouded in obscurity. Étienne Lamotte has suggested that the first occurrence of āśraya-parivṛtti in Buddhist writings should be tied to the interesting doctrine of sex-change within Buddhist literature, and that it was only extended to the philosophical realm following its literary introduction.¹ In its most fundamental form, the change of sex within Buddhist literature usually involves the transformation of a woman into a man following her disenchantment with the nature of womanhood.² This transformation is often brought about through a 'statement of truth' (satvavacana), in some cases being really a laudatory exclamation concerning the nature of the Buddha. The possibility is also maintained for the transformation of a man into a woman and of a eunuch into a man.³

Such possibilities were taken seriously by the doctors of the Vinaya and they developed various rules regarding ordination. For example, the Vinayasūtra of Guṇaprabha maintains that ordination is forbidden for one who has changed sex three or more times but is allowable for those

changing sex once or twice.⁴ There are also a number of rules which govern the case of one changing sex during or subsequent to the process of ordination, for example, changing from a bhikṣu into a bhikṣuṇī.⁵ While the Vinaya specialists were developing special case rules regarding sex-change, the doctors of the Abhidharma developed rules regarding the maturation of action in the present life to cover the case of sex-change as a result of a vocal act or a strong mental expression.⁶ Since the action of the present life was to mature in the future life, the awkward canonical recognition of instant maturation through the expression of truth presented its own hermeneutical difficulties.

Lamotte, in his assessment of fundamental transformation, has relied on the single case of the MSABh to XI.4 in which the eight-fold definition of 'Vinaya' given in XI.4 is elaborated by the author of the Bhāṣya.⁷ Number four of the eight is 'disengagement' or atonement (niḥarṭi) of the transgression and the fifth of the seven cases of atonement mentions change of sex, utilizing the terminology of fundamental transformation (āśrayaparivṛttir bhikṣu-bhikṣuṇyoh strīpuruṣavyavāñjanaparivartanāt).⁸

The essential concern here is the use of the terms fundament (āśraya) and its transformation (parivṛtti / parivartana). We have already seen that the term āśraya was widely used to denote the physical form. Outside of this one case, though, it does not appear to have been applied to

the sexual organ (atrīndriya / puruṣendriya). Transformation (vparivṛt), though, was the verb or verbal noun which almost always used to denote the change of sex (vyañjana-parivṛtti) when such a verb was needed. The author of the Bhāṣya, then, either amalgamated these two standard usages or drew from a source which was not widely known to amalgamate them. In any event, I know of no other case in which the term āśrayapariṇivṛtti is applied to sex change, either before or after the composition of the MSABh.

* * *

Having disposed of the Vinaya as the source of fundamental transformation, we can turn to the problem of its canonical source. Two early canonical sources are referenced by the Yogācāra masters: that of the Saṃd, a soteriological reference to be discussed in Part IV, and that of the *Revatasūtra.⁹ In fact the quotation we have from the *Revatasūtra does not refer to āśrayapariṇivṛtti, but to the purification of the basis (āśrayapariśuddhi). The relationship of the statements found in the *Revatasūtra to fundamental transformation is complex but certain and is furthermore indicative of the impact that this sūtra has had on the doctrines of the Yogācāra.

The *Revatasūtra is quoted in extenso in the ŚrBh, as the canonical reference for its doctrine of 'perfection of that which is to be accomplished' (kārya-pariniṣpatti), perhaps better paraphrased as 'perfection of the effect'. To understand its importance, we will first consider the use of this doctrine in the ŚrBh. The second Yogasthāna of the ŚrBh is divided into seventeen topics, the third of which is 'support' (ālambana) or 'object', depending on context. Ālambana is further divided into four, the first of which concerns us--the 'support to be pervaded' (vyāpyālamana), the first three of which are objects of meditation, both relative and absolute, while the last is the perfection of the effect:

What is this perfection of the effect? When there is for the yogin the mental application (manaskāra) supported by an image (pratibimba), and that application is directed towards calming and insight (śamathavipaśyanā); because of service towards, cultivation of, and frequent use of that mental application, then it is perfected. Having perfected that application, the yogin's fundament is transformed, and all forms of hindrance (daṣṭhulya) are entirely cleansed. And from this fundamental transformation, [the yogin] having transcended the image, towards just that object of cognition (jñeye vastuni), nonmentational perception, the vision of gnosis, is born. It arises for those yogins towards their objects, whether they are on the level of the first contemplation (prathamadhyāna) apprehending the objects of that contemplation, or up to yogins on the level of the perception of neither conception nor nonconception (naivasaṃjñānaśaṃjñāyatana). This is called 'perfection of the effect'.¹⁰

One of the more interesting things about this particular section is that it virtually constitutes a summation of the ŚrBh, and as such we cannot but touch on

even the major facets of the systems employed here. Recognizing this limitation, we can still answer certain basic questions concerning the nature of the fundament and its transformation. In the case of the ŚrBh, as has been suggested by Schmithausen, the sense of -parivṛtti is more that of replacement than transformation, strictly speaking.¹¹ This rather peculiar usage is generated in the context of the other occurrence of transformation in the ŚrBh. The ninth topic discussed in the second yogasthāna of the ŚrBh is that of the results (karaṇīya) of yoga. Asaṅga identifies these as four: the cessation of the fundament (āśrayanirodha), the replacement (parivartta) of the fundament, the complete cognition of the objective support (ālambanaparijñāna), and the enjoyment (abhirati) of that support. These are described as sequential:

As to the cessation of the fundament: that fundament which occurs in conjunction with hindrances and which is involved in the cultivation of mental application and discipline is initially suppressed. Then the fundament which occurs in conjunction with cleanness is substituted for the other. These are the results of yoga known as the suppression of the fundament and replacement.

As to the complete cognition of the objective support and its enjoyment: there is one kind of complete cognition and enjoyment of the objective support which is preceded by the cessation and replacement of the fundament. When this kind is made the dominant consideration, and the fundament is subsequently suppressed and replaced. Then there is another kind of complete cognition and enjoyment of the objective support which is preceded by the purification (viśuddhi) of the fundament. Having made the purification of the fundament the dominant consideration, pure knowledge of the objective support occurs at the

time of the completion of the effect (kārya-parinispatti) along with the enjoyment.¹²

Certainly the first question which must be addressed is the nature of the fundament. Unfortunately, the ŚrBh is not entirely explicit on this point, but two environments indirectly define its composition--the structure of the types of hindrance (dausthulya) and cleanness (praśrabdhi), and the relationship of purity of the fundament (āśrayapariśuddhi) with other types of purity.

While Edgerton, followed by Conze, has identified the meaning of dausthulya in the canonical environment as "wickedness" or "depravity," within the texts under discussion, such definitions are misleading.¹³ The context of dausthulya is that of physical and mental latent difficulties (kāyacittadausthulya) which impair the yogin's ability to obtain his goal. These hindrances are overcome in one of two ways: for the very intelligent (tīkṣṇendriya) they may be overcome naturally (prakṛtyā); for others the hindrances can be overcome through effort accumulated over a long time. Some examples are given in the ŚrBh.¹⁴ One who is exhausted and emaciated, for instance, experiences various difficulties of body and mind. For these to be cleansed or overcome, he must change his behavior by resting, eating better, and so forth. Another might develop physical and mental afflictions through obsessive thinking and reflecting on something. In this case his mind would become healthy again through either the application of

'passification' (śamatha) or naturally. Finally, physical and mental afflictions might arise in the form of obscuration or drowsiness caused by mental agitation or depression. This could be countered by higher insight (adhiprajñā), generated through the examination of the elements of existence or by clear mental application towards the meditative object.

As is obvious from the above description, the hindrances are defilements which are psycho-physical in nature (kleśapakṣyaṃ kāvacittadauṣṭhulyaṃ). It is not clear, though, exactly what their nature is from the various descriptions in the ŚrBh, so we must turn to the VinSg to obtain a more accurate appraisal of their form and function. The definition (lakṣaṇa) there is that of 'nonworkability' (akarmānyatā), a term which denotes a lack of felicity or pliability in something.¹⁵ The lack of workability is furthermore subdivided into five characteristics: it is heavy (gurutva), solid (kāthiṇya), obscured (āvaraṇa), depressed (avaśāda), and insufferable since it lacks self-determination (avaśavartana-akṣamatva).

Having determined the various characteristics of these hindrances, we must now address their relationship to the more normative structures of the defilements (kleśa), their forms as seeds (bīja), etc. This task is not so easy; particularly it appears that the understanding of these various terms changed over time. The YoBh utilizes a three-

fold structure of general difficulties (saṃkleśa)--those which occur in the form of defilements (kleśasaṃkleśa), those which occur in the form of activity (karmasaṃkleśa), and those which occur in the form of birth (janma-saṃkleśa).¹⁶ The term kleśasaṃkleśa, which corresponds to the general usage of kleśa or saṃyojana in other Buddhist literature, is further divided by Asaṅga into potential (anuśaya) and kinetic (parvavasthāna) states, thus demonstrating his connection with the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma.¹⁷ The former is the case when the seeds (bīja) of the defilements have not been removed or overcome while the latter is the actual occurrence of defilement before the mind of the individual (kleśasamudācārasaṃmukhībhāva). This potential state of the defilements is also referred to as hindrance (dausthulya).

Are we therefore to assume that the denotation of the potential state (anuśaya) or bīja is precisely that of hindrance? While this is evident in later literature, apparently Asaṅga had a different set of values for the various terms. His definitions occur in the context of those factors eliminated by the Tathāgata which are not eliminated by the Arhat. The question is asked: are there varieties of hindrances which are eliminated by one and not the other, and what are these?¹⁸ Asaṅga responds by dividing hindrances into two varieties, those which are involved with defilements (kleśapakṣyadausthulya) and those which are involved with neutral maturation (vipākapakṣya-

dausthulya). The first is eliminated by both categories of Ārya, while only the Tathāgata eliminates the second. These two categories are redefined later in the VinSq:

Now 'hindrance' may be summarized into two aspects: those which are 'effluent' (āśravadausthulya) and those which are associated with 'effluence' (sāśravadausthulya). Because the former category consists of those defilements which are to be eliminated by cultivation (bhāvanāhevakleśa), the Arhats have entirely eliminated them. These are in fact the kind of unworkable misplacement (akarmānyatāyogena duḥsthititā) which occur in the body and consciousness afflicted with defiled potentialities (anuśaya). On the other hand, the hindrances associated with 'effluence' (āśrava-dausthulya) are those previously generated and permeated by the effluence, even though the potentialities (anuśaya) have been eliminated. They are the unworkable misplacement and dislocation which are naturally denser and more subtle. These are referred to as the 'traces of the defilements' (kleśavāsanā), and are only eliminated by the Buddha but not by the Śrāvakas or the Pratyekabuddhas. This ability is called the unique quality of the Buddha (buddhāvenīka-dharma).¹⁹

Those hindrances which are defiled (kleśāpakaya = āśrava-dausthulya), as well as their potentialities (anuśaya), are different from the compounded dharmas (samskāras) because, argues Asaṅga, the Arhats have cut off the defiled hindrances while the streams of compounded dharmas have not been totally eliminated.²⁰

Furthermore, there are enumerated in the VinSq eighteen types (ākāra) of hindrances: 1. the naturally occurring hindrance of maturation (prakṛtyā vipākadausthulya), 2. the naturally occurring hindrance of defilement (prakṛtyā kleśa-dausthulya), 3. the naturally occurring hindrance of

activity (prakṛtyā karmadausthulya), 4. the hindrance of the obscuration of defilement (kleśāvaraṇa-), 5. the hindrance of the obscuration of activity (karmāvaraṇa-), 6. the hindrance of the obscuration of maturation (vipākāvaraṇa-), 7. the hindrance of obscuration (nivaraṇa-), 8. the hindrance not thoroughly comprehended (*asupratividdha-), 9. the hindrance of nirvana (nirvāṇa-), 10. the hindrance of fear (bhaya-), 11. the hindrance of exhaustion (pariśrama-), 12. the hindrance of food (āhāra-), 13. the hindrance of sleep (svapna-), 14. the hindrance of sexual intercourse (maithuna-), 15. the hindrance of disease (viśamadhātu-), 16. the hindrance of the departure of youth (vayahpariṇāma-), 17. the hindrance of death (maraṇa-), and 18. the universal hindrance (sarvatraṇadausthulya).²¹

The elimination of these forms of hindrance generates the element 'cleanness' (praśrabdhi), and in fact the verbal form, [pratilpraśrabhyate], is utilized to denote the manner of this elimination. In the earlier systems, which found their way into the Yogācāra literature, the term praśrabdhi is joined with six other items in a standard list of the seven 'limbs of enlightenment' (saptabodhyaṅga).²² Its environment, though, in this earlier list is slightly different from that found in the destruction of the defilements, and the older environment is delineated in the definition of praśrabdhi found in the ŚrBh:

'Cleanness' is that joy, elation, and mental happiness which is preceded by faith and

vigilance and which, by degrees, cleanses the hindrances of the degraded and unwholesome dharmas.²³

We note that the above definition is not a meditative definition, whereas the primary technical environment of praśrabdhi in the ŚrBh, as in other parts of the YoBh, is involved with the terminology associated with the practice of meditation. The following material, for example, delineates the means whereby there is the generation of praśrabdhi within the entire context of contemplative practice:

Now concerning this, however much there is teaching which is conducive to insight, to that same degree there should be the practice of insight. However much there is the practice of insight, there should be the practice of pacification. Moreover, the practice of insight should be understood to be endless since cognizable objects are endless. The means of entering into the multiple aspects and divisions of the six objects is through three specific ways. In the manner that the insight of one practicing well moves towards extension, growth, and expansiveness--since he has made his primary orientation the power of purification of effort--so too extension, growth, and expansiveness should be understood as occurring in a yogin generating cleanness of body and mind, which pertains to the practice of pacification. Just as his body and mind become cleansed, so the one-pointedness of his mind towards the objective support become expansive. As his one-pointedness of mind expands, so his body and mind become cleansed. Thus, these two dharmas are mutually reliant and dependent: one-pointedness of mind and cleanness. The final goal of these two is fundamental transformation. If the fundament is transformed, then there arises perceptual gnosis towards the object of cognition.²⁴

As we can see from the initial discussion of fundamental transformation above, the development of both

cleanness and gnosis is directly related to the generation of mental application (manaskāra/manasikāra). So important, in fact, is mental application to the Yogācāra tradition at large, that several texts maintain that only two elements are absolutely necessary for realization: hearing the teaching from another (parato ghoṣa) and mental application.²⁵ Shortly after the above section, the ŚrBh comes back to the problem of the generation of praśrabdhi and gnosis, this time directly in the context of mental application. There are four varieties of mental application listed: 1. that which agitates the mind towards those dharmas which are in need of agitation (cittasamtāpano manaskāra), 2. that which propels the mind towards the pleasing dharmas (cittābhiśyandano manaskāra), 3. that which generates cleanness (praśrabdhiśanako manaskāra), and 4. that which cleanses the vision of gnosis (jñānadarśana-viśodhanano manaskāra).²⁶ These four are basically seen as being practiced in sequence and their sequence reinforces one of the curious aspects of the generation of fundamental transformation in the early Yogācāra--the implication that transformation is achieved before the advent of gnosis (jñāna). In part three we will see that gnosis is defined in the DhDhV to be the basis of fundamental transformation and the means by which such a transformation can take place. We will furthermore examine it in the context of complete knowledge (parijñāna), but here we should just mention that for this occurrence in the ŚrBh, gnosis and higher insight

(adhiprajñā) are cognitive synonyms.²⁷ The history of the combinations and permutations of the usages of these two terms is entirely outside the scope of this study, but we will call attention to relevant materials when they occur.

The other element in establishing the nature of the fundament and its transformation--or 'replacement'--is the definitions surrounding the four-fold purification (pariśuddhi) found within the *Revatasūtra and given by Asaṅga in the ŚrBh as the canonical source for fundamental transformation. There the question is posed concerning the manner of a yoqācāra becoming one practicing unobstructed meditation (anirākr̥tadhyāyī). The answer is that a yoqācāra who practices diligently the correct meditative activity will obtain, touch, and come face to face with a) the purity of fundament (āśrayapariśuddhi) from the cleansing of all hindrances (sarvadauṣṭhulyānāṃ pratipraśrabdher), with b) the purity of objective support (ālambanapariśuddhi) through the inspection of the objects of knowledge (jñeyavastu-pratyavekṣatayā), with c) the purity of mind (citta-pariśuddhi) through the elimination of desire (rāqavirāqāt), and with d) the purity of gnosis (jñānapariśuddhi) through the elimination of ignorance (avidyāvirāqāt).²⁸

Of these four forms of purity, only a) purity of fundament (āśrayapariśuddhi) and c) purity of mind (citta-pariśuddhi) concern us. The explicit differentiation between these two demonstrate that the term āśraya in the

YoBh most often indicated the entire psycho-physical entity (ātmabhāva). This is especially true in that the term is coupled with the terminology of hindrance, which, as we have seen, concerns both the body as well as the mind. Later elaborations of these four varieties of purity make the connection more explicit. The BoBh, for example, begins its final chapter with a discussion of these four.²⁹ There, purity of fundamēt is defined as the total elimination of all the defilement-related hindrances (sarvakleśapakṣya-dausthulya) together with their traces (śavāsanā), and the power over death and rebirth with respect to one's own psycho-physical entity (ātmabhāva). Purity of mind is limited to the elimination of those hindrances which are mental in nature. Definitions substantially agreeing with these occur in the ASam and are also accepted by the author of the MSABh, but the emphasis on the ability to choose the circumstances of death and rebirth becomes more important in the latter two cases.³⁰

While the above cases are most concerned with the combination of psycho-physical hindrances (kāyacitta-dausthulya) and their cleanness (kāyacittaprasārabdhī), the obvious possibility of extending the terminology of the entity (ātmabhāva) into other Abhidharma models must have occurred to Asaṅga. In a lengthy section of the final chapter in the VinSg, treated in extravagant detail by Schmithausen, Asaṅga has applied the doctrines of fundamental transformation to the six internal bases of

sensation/cognition (āyatana). I have summarized the pertinent material in the following two paragraphs:³¹

The section begins with the objection that if the senses (saḍāyatana) of the Arhat remain unsuppressed and unchanged from the way they were before his enlightenment, just what is this āśrayaparivṛtti whereby there is no alteration in the basic pattern of sensation? And if there is no āśrayaparivṛtti, then how does he possess the ability to turn back the defilements and enter the path when the states of 'before' and 'after' enlightenment are the same? Asaṅga responds that it is impossible to state definitely whether or not āśrayaparivṛtti is the same or different from the senses. His reasons are that āśrayaparivṛtti is constituted by the purity of thusness (tathatāviśuddhi-prabhāvitā); it is possessed of the lineage (gotra) of thusness; it has the seed (bīja) of thusness; finally, it has come into being from thusness. Since it is impossible to definitely state whether thusness (tathatā) is the same as or different from the senses, these conditions also apply to āśrayaparivṛtti. For example, suppose a butcher should kill a cow. Then, having taken out all the entrails, meat, bones, and ligaments, he should chop, beat, and slice them up. Finally, he wears the hide of the unfortunate beast as a garment. Now it should be understood that the cow is neither possessed nor nonpossessed of his hide. In the same way, the Arhat whose fundamēt has been transformed (parivṛttāśraya) has cut down all the fetters (samyojana),

the bonds (bandhana), the potential defilements (anuśaya), the proximate defilements (upakleśa), and the kinetic defilements (parvavasthāna), with the sword of insight (prajñāśāstra). He cannot be said to have possession or nonpossession of the six senses which are like the hide of the cow for him.

Now the fundamental transformation which is associated with embodied nirvāṇa (sopadhiśeṣa) is connected with the six senses, while that associated with disembodied nirvāṇa (nirupadhiśeṣa) is disconnected from the senses. How is the latter possible? Since it is not developed from the causal nexus of the six senses but is generated through the cultivation on the path which has its objective support in thusness (tathatālabhanamārgabhāvanāhetuka), it does not require either the presence or the absence of the senses. It cannot further transform or be spoiled. It should be understood to be existent (sat), having the characteristics of nonexpression (niṣprepañcalakṣaṇa) and the purity of the elemental realm (dharmaadhātusuviśuddhilakṣaṇa). Furthermore, both kinds of fundamental transformation can be said to exist because of its unshakableness (akṣobhyadharmaatā), and based on that unshakableness there cannot be postulated either priority or posteriority. Certainly this dharma is not born, arisen, or stabilized. Like water it is clarity; like gold it is goodness; like the sky it is separated from clouds and haze; thus it may be said to exist. It is permanent since it is constituted by the purity of thusness

(tathatāviśuddhiprabhāvitatvāt). It is blissful but only by means of the bliss of the absolute (paramārthikam sukham), not the bliss of feeling (vedanāsukha), since it is entirely separated from the defilements (kleśa) and their resultant suffering.

The above passages are further indications of the shifts of exegesis between the earlier sections of the YoBh and the VinSq. Instead of the very basic understanding of the connection of fundamental transformation with the body/mind, a formulation similar to the early usages of nāma/rūpa, the VinSq aligns āśrayaparivṛtti with the sensory model, which is more complex. Furthermore, the system is called on to alternate between the forms of nirvāṇa utilizing the sensory model and those devoid of it (sopadhiśeṣa/nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa). This tension has lead Aśaṅga to simultaneously hypostatize and transcendentalize the function of hindrance displacement. Certainly his impetus in this was the role of the two nirvāṇa elements in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma, and in particular the nirvāṇa generated through individual inspection (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha).³² Pratisaṃkhyānirodha, though, has not been merely recreated in the Yogācāra system, but the function of this uncompounded dharma has been transferred to fundamental transformation, which in turn is infused with the absolute (tathatā). Thus, while the earlier formulation of transformation found in the ŚrBh was coupled with nirodha and merely indicated the subsequent replacement of the

psycho-physical basis, in the VinSq it is the āśrayaparivṛtti which guarantees hindrance elimination and supplants the function of nirodha in the older text.

Finally, we should note the peculiar position of thusness (tathatā) and the lineage (gotra) in relation to āśrayaparivṛtti in the VinSq. Fundamental transformation is seen as constituted by the purity of thusness, possessed of the gotra of thusness, possessing the seed of thusness, and coming into being from thusness. It has the characteristic (lakṣaṇa), moreover, of the purity of the elemental realm (dharmadhātusuvisuddhi). Such statements foreshadow the utilization of both tathatā and gotra as the fundament itself. These conclusions, though, have not been yet drawn, and Aśaṅga is flirting with the ultimate absolutization of fundamental transformation.

It is not surprising that the function of transformation should alter when the model is altered. The development of different models of reality usually involves a corresponding development in the associated manipulations of those models. In the case of āśrayaparivṛtti, the six senses was not to be the final psycho-physical model of the fundament. This position of honor was to be held by the five aggregates, certainly one of the most durable and influential of the Buddhist models of reality. It was not, however, until the advent of the MSam that fundamental transformation was applied to the five aggregates, and then

it required the assistance of multiple other terms, the primary one being the dharmakāya, the absolute body of the Buddha. Fundamental transformation's association with the dharmakāya had begun right at the beginning in the Saṃd, and this will be explored in detail in Part IV. But in the MSaṃ, āśrayaparāvṛtti also became associated with the highly developed gnoseology of the MSA, the ideas of sovereignty also found in the MSA, and the five aggregates as the fundaments to be transformed.³³

X.5 Now by how many sovereignties is the dharmakāya sovereignty obtained? In summary it is obtained by five varieties:

- a. By means of the transformation of the aggregate of form (rūpaskandhaparāvṛtti), [the Bodhisattva] obtains sovereignty over the field (kṣetra), the body (ātmabhāva), the marks (lakṣaṇa), the characteristics (anuvyañjana), the endless sounds (anantaśvara), and the invisible coronal marks (adṛṣṭamūrdhalakṣaṇa).
- b. By means of the transformation of the aggregate of feeling (vedanāskandhaparāvṛtti), he obtains sovereignty over the realms of bliss, expansive, immeasurable, and irreproachable (anavadyapramānavistarasaṃkṣāra).
- c. By means of the transformation of the aggregate of perception (samjñāskandhaparāvṛtti), he obtains sovereignty over the teaching through the classes of words (nāmakāya), phrases (padakāya), and phonemes (vyañjanakāya).
- d. By means of the transformation of the aggregate of formations (samskāraśālistha-parāvṛtti), he obtains sovereignty over manifestation (nirmāṇa), alteration (pariṇāma), bringing together the assembly (pariśatasaṃgraha), and the accumulation of the virtuous elements (śūkhadharmasaṃgraha).
- e. By means of the transformation of the aggregate of consciousness, he obtains sovereignty over the mirror-like gnosis (ādarśajñāna), the gnosis of equality (śāntājñāna), the gnosis of

specific inspection (pratyavekṣaṇāñāna), and the effective gnosis (krtyānuṣṭhāṇāñāna).³⁴

Thus we see a progression from a simple doctrine of replacement of the defiled psycho-physical structure with a cleansed psycho-physical structure to the final form where replacement of anything is entirely out of the question. In the MSam, certainly the Bodhisattva must keep the use of his aggregates throughout time since he has vowed not to enter nirvāṇa. Therefore the aggregates must be considered to have become transformed rather than strictly replaced with either the dharmakāya or some form of sovereignty.

Niḥsvabhāva, in his MSamU, offers the following simile: The Śrāvaka is afraid of suffering and cuts off the stream of his aggregates like a leper who commits suicide. The Bodhisattva, on the other hand, having at his command the sublime method, transforms his aggregates into the state of irreproachability (anavadyatā) like the skillful leper who relies on special medicinal treatment (rasāyana).³⁵

Niḥsvabhāva's image is that of a ill person becoming well rather than that of the displacement of the entire structure of illness.

As the model of āśraya changes, then, so too does the significance of the verbal member, parivṛtti/parāvṛtti. As time went on, the complexity of the psycho-physical models increased and required greater complexity from the terminological environment. The significance of fundamental transformation continued its movement towards the

transcendent as the phenomena transformed became less easily manipulated by a strictly existent entity. The definitions of āśraya also continued their development away from the psycho-physical, moving into the realm of the purely psychological. It is this model which we will consider next.

Notes to Part II: Chapter Three

1. Étienne Lamotte, L'Enseignement de Vimalakirti, Bibliothèque du Muséon Vol. 51, Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1962, pp. 280-81 n.
2. P.L.Vaidya, Divyāvadāna, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 20, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1959, p. 309.13; Sitaram Roy, Suvarṇavarṇāvadāna, Historical Research Series Vol. VII, Patna: K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, 1971, pp. 263-4, sections 161-166; Dutt, Saddharmapūṇḍarīka, p. 173.18-24; N. Dutt, Gilgit Manuscripts (Aṭṭasāsenavyākaraṇa), Srinagar, 1941, vol. 1, p. 131.3; Lamotte, L'Enseignement, pp. 280-81, n. 37; women were seen as incapable of holding five positions in Buddhist mythology: the positions of Brahma, of Indra, of a great king, of a universal ruler (cakravartin), and of a Bodhisattva who is not liable to fall back (avaivartikabodhisattva)--Dutt, Saddharmapūṇḍarīka, p. 173.11-13; see also Dutt, BoBh, pp. 66.8-11 for Asaṅga's statements about the position of women as incapable of enlightenment.
3. AMV, T.1545.27.583; KośaBh to IV.55ab, p. 662.1-5, KośaVy, p. 662.15-17; La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. 3, p. 121.
4. P.V.Bapat and V.V.Gokhale, Vinaya-Sūtra and Auto-Commentary on the Same, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series No. XXII, Patna: K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, 1982, pp. xli, 54, sūtras 616-17; note that the Pravrajyāvastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-Vinaya only goes as far as the cases contained in sūtra 148 of the published text of the Vinaya-Sūtras, even though the remaining sūtras cover specific cases which should fall in the category of ordination; see Vinaya-Sūtra pp. xxx & 24-25, and cf. Nalinaksa Dutt, Gilgit Manuscripts, vol. 3:4, p. 68.
5. Bapat and Gokhale, Vinaya-Sūtra, pp. 54 & 59, sūtras 618 & 644-45; cf. KośaBh to IV.14c, Shastri, pp. 606.16-607.2, KośaVy, pp. 606.25-607.17; La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. 3, pp. 44-45; cf. the case of a parricide or matricide whose parent has changed sex, KośaBh to IV.103c, p. 730.8-13, KośaVy pp. 730.27-731.21; La Vallée Poussin, vol. 3, p. 213.
6. KośaBh to 55ab, see note 3 above.
7. Lamotte, L'Enseignement, p. 281, n.

āśrayaparivartah | yogakaraṇīyam | tatrāḷambanaparijñānam
 āḷambanābhiratiś ca | aaty āḷambanaparijñānam
 āḷambanābhiratiḥ | āśrayanirodhaparivarttapūrvanḡamam |
 yadā cāḷambanaparijñānam āḷambanābhiratim adhipatiḡ kṛtvā
 āśrayo nirudhyate | parivarttate ca | aaty
 āḷambanaparijñānam āḷambanābhiratiḥ |
 āśrayaviśuddhipūrvanḡamaḥ | āśrayaviśuddhim adhipatiḡ kṛtvā
 suviśuddham āḷambanajñānam | kāryapariniṣpattikāle
 pravartate | abhiratiś ca |. Cf. sDe-dge sams-tsam dzi,
 fols. 104b7-105a5; T. 1579.30.439a16-29.

13. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, Delhi:
 Motilal Banarsidass, 1972, p. 272b; Edward Conze, Materials
 for a Dictionary of the Prajnaparamita Literature, Tokyo:
 Suzuki Research Foundation, 1973, p. 207.

14. The following is taken from Shukla, pp. 271.13-272.6;
 again the Skt. text is very faulty and must be supplemented
 by the Tib. sDe-dge, dzi, fol. 100b1-5.

15. This definition and its subdivisions are from VinSq,
 sDe-dge, zhi, fol. 195a3-5; this definition has been quoted
 and translated by Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa, p. 155; the Skt
 equivalents are partly from his text.

16. Bhattacharya, YoBh, pp. 160.10-228.4.

17. Cf. Kośa, Ch. V.41, pp. 836 ff.; this and the following
 material from sDe-dge, zhi, fol. 113a5-7.

18. sDe-dge, zhi, fol. 103b5-7; translated and edited
 Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa, pp. 156-7.

19. sDe-dge, zhi, fol. 119b3-7; trans. and ed. Schmithausen,
Der Nirvāṇa, pp. 157-8: de la gnas ngan len ni mdor bsdu na
 rnam pa gnyis te | zag pa'i gnas ngan len dang zag pa dang
 bcas pa'i gnas ngan len to | de la dgra bcom pa la ni zag
 pa'i gnas ngan len gang yin pa de bagom pas apang par bya
 ba's nyon monge pa spangs pa's phyir thams cad kyi thams cad
 du bral ba yin no || de yang bag la nyal dang bcas pa'i lua
 rnam par shes pa dang bcas pa la las su mi rung ba'i tshul
 gyis ngan par rnam par gnas pa nyid gang yin pa'o || zag pa
 dang bcas pa'i gnas ngan len ni bag la nyal spangs kyang
 angon zag pas bakyed cing zag pas yongs su bagos pa ste |
 de dang 'dra ba'i las su mi rung ba'i tshul gyis rang bzhin
 gyis ngan par gnas pa dang ngan par zhugs pa ches arab pa
 dang ches chung ba gang yin pa'o | zag pa dang bcas pa'i
 gnas ngan len gang yin pa de ni nyon monge pa'i bag chags
 zhes bya ste | de yang dgra bcom pa dang rang sangs rgyas
 kyi ni ma spangs kyi | de bzhin gshegs pa nyag cig gis
 spang pa yin te | de'i bag chags yang dag par bcom pa gang
 yin pa de ni sangs rgyas kyi chos ma 'dres pa zhes bya'o |.

20. sDe-dge zhi, fol. 124a5-7.

21. sDe-dge zhi, fol. 124a7-b3; T.1579.30.627b13-24; cf. the list of twenty-four found in Pradhan, ASam, p. 76.14-19, and commented on in Tatia, ASamBh, pp. 92.4-93.

22. The full list includes 1. mindfulness (smṛti), 2. investigation into dharma (dharmaṇvīcaya), 3. vigor (vīrya), 4. elation (prīti), 5. cleanness (praśrabdhī), 6. concentration (saṁādhi), and 7. equanimity (upekṣā).

23. Shukla, ŚrBh, p. 320.3-5; sDe-dge dzi, fol. 117a4-5: tatra praśrabdhīḥ | yac chradhāpramādapūrvāṅgamam prāmodyam prītiḥ prīṭamanasā cānupūrvā pāpakākūśāladharma-pakṣaṣya dauṣṭhulyaṣya pratipraśrabdhīḥ |.

24. Shukla, ŚrBh, p. 402.7-20, is horribly corrupt; based on the Tib, reinforced by Ch, the text should read as follows: tatra yāvad deśanābāhulyaṁ vipaśyanānūlomikaṁ tāvad vipaśyanābāhulyaṁ | yāvad vipaśyanābāhulyaṁ <tāvac chamathabāhulyaṁ ca | vipaśyanā ca jñeyānantād> anantā veditavyā | yad uta ebhir eva tribhir mukhaiḥ ṣaṇṇām vastūnām ekaikākāraprabhedān praveśanayena | yathā ca yathā vipaśyanā saṃyakprayuktaṣya pṛthuvṛddhivaipulyatāṁ gacchaty abhyāsa-pariśuddhibalaṁ adhipatiṁ kṛtvā | tathā tathā śamathapakṣaṣyāpi kāyacittapraśrabdhījanakaṣya pṛthuvṛddhivaipulyatā veditavyā | tasya yathā yathā kāyaḥ praśrabhyate cittaṁ ca tathā tathālembanacittaikāgratā vivarddhyate | yathā <yathā> cittaikāgratā vivardhate tathā tathā kāyaḥ praśrabhyate cittaṁ ca | ity etau dvau dharmāv anyonyaṁ <saṃśritāu> anyonyaṁ pratibaddhau | yad uta cittaikāgratā <praśrabdhidharmaś ca | sa tayoṛ antaḥ | yad uta āśrayaparivṛttiḥ | tadāśrayaḥ parivartate jñeyavaastūnām> pratyakṣajñānotpattiḥ |. The sections in brackets <> are retranslated from the Tib; in the latter section the Tib reads: 'di lta ste sems rtse gcig pa nyid dang | shin tu sbyangs pa'i chos de gnyis kyi mtha' ni 'di yin te | 'di lta ste gnas yongs su gyur pa yin no | de yongs su gyur pa na shes bya'i dngos po la mgon sum gyi shes pa sbye'o |; sDe-dge dzi, fols. 147b6-148a4; cf. T. 1579.30.458a10-11; compare also BoBh, Dutt, p. 77.18-25.

25. Eg., Lamotte, MSam I.44, vol. 1, p. 18, vol. 2, p. 65, translated below in Ch. 4 of this part.

26. Shukla, ŚrBh, pp. 406-407; Wayman, Analaysa, p. 121; sDe-dge dzi, fols. 149a4-150a3. Wayman has followed the Tibetan translator in understanding jñānadarśana as a dvandva compound, but we will consider the meaning of the compound in part four where it acquires significance in the context of the vimuktikāya.

27. Shukla, ŚrBh, p. 407.6-7.

28. Shukla, ŚrBh, p. 200.2-15; aDe-dge sems-tsam dzi, fol. 78a5-b1.

29. BoBh, Dutt p. 265.2-12, Woghihara 384.1-17; noted by Schmithausen, Der Nirvāna, p. 93.

30. Pradhan, ASam, p. 97.18-24; Tatia, ASamBh, p. 129.5-14 and comments 134.16-19; Lévi, MSABh to MSA XX-XXI.50, p. 186.1.

31. The summary is based on the Tibetan text as edited by Schmithausen, Der Nirvāna, pp. 42-52, and I have relied on his excellent renderings of the Tib. into Skt. The sections summarized are I.3.A-B.4, I.5.a.B.3-I.8.

32. Cf. Kośa I.6ab, KośaBh to I.55, Shastri pp. 20-22, 320-327 and Yaśomitra's comments.

33. The association of fundamental transformation with sovereignty is found in MSA IX.38-48 while the gnoseology found in MSam X.5.e, translated below, is first detailed in MSA IX.67-76; both of these sections will be discussed in Part III.

34. Lamotte, MSam, vol. 1, p. 85-6, vol. 2, p. 276-9, *50:
 X.5. yang dbang 'byor pa rnam pa dus chos kyi sku dbang
 'byor pa thob ce na | ador badu na rnam pa lngas 'thob ste |
 a. gzugs kyi phung po gyur pa'i phyir zhing dang | lus dang
 | mtahan dang | dpe byad bzang po dang | dbyangs mtha' yas
 pa dang | spyi gtsug bltar mi mthong ba la dbang 'byor pa
 dang |
 b. tshor ba'i phung po gyur pa'i phyir kha na ma tho ba med
 cing tshad med la rgya che ba'i bde bar gnas pa la dbang
 'byor pa dang |
 c. 'du shes kyi phung po gyur pa'i phyir ming gi tshogs dang
 | tshig gi tshogs dang | yi ge'i tshogs thams cad kyi bstan
 pa la dbang 'byor pa dang |
 d. 'du byed kyi phung po gyur pa'i phyir | sprul pa dang |
 bsgyur ba dang | 'khor bsdu ba dang | dkar po'i chos bsdu ba
 la dbang 'byor pa dang |
 e. rnam par shes pa'i phung po gnas su gyur pa'i phyir | me
 long lta bu dang | anyam pa nyid dang | bya ba agrub pa'i ye
 shes la dbang 'byor pas dbang 'byor pa thob po |.

35. Peking, sems-tsam li, fols. 335b8-336a1; a comparison of the Tib. translation of the MSamU with Hsüan-tsang's translation (Lamotte, MSam, pp. 276-9; T.1598.31.437c18-438a26) shows that the latter has entered into his translation much material which was not in the original. That this has been his tendency in other translations may be noted from Hsüan-tsang's translation of the Kośa which La Vallée Poussin relied so heavily upon and which introduces material from the subcommentaries. While his further glosses are useful in many of the translations, it

misconstrues the doctrinal development involved, a fact which Lamotte overlooked. In this section, Hsüan-tsang introduced doctrinal material from commentaries on other Yogācāra texts, in particular the doctrines of kliṣṭamāṇas-parāvṛtti, ālayaviññānaparāvṛtti, and pravṛttiviññāna-parāvṛtti into his translation of MSamU on X.5.e, viññānaparāvṛtti.

CHAPTER FOUR:

Psychological Transformation

Having discussed some of the doctrines of psycho-physical transformation among the Yogācāra, we must now address the major development from this basis--that of the transformation of the psychological fundament. Such a development, of course, is a natural outgrowth of the heavily mentalistic slant of Buddhist doctrines right from the beginning, as we see in the case of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma, whose elements of reality (dharma) included mostly psychological factors (caittasika). Indeed, the intellectual world in which Asaṅga was operating was largely that of the Abhidharma but became more and more influenced by the Mahāyāna as time went on. It is in this context of development that we wish to examine the development of psychological transformation from an ancillary concern in the wider environment of psycho-physical transformation to the position of being the transformed fundament, par excellence.

To do this we must briefly introduce the cast of characters which play their parts in the Yogācāras' analysis of mental operation: the underlying consciousness (ālaya-viññāna), the defiled intellect (kliṣṭa-manas), the intellectual consciousness (manoviññāna), and the five

'operating' or sensory consciousnesses (pravṛttiviññāna). The importance of these elements to Asaṅga's system is effectively displayed by his ordering of the material in the YoBh; the first two chapters (bhūmi) of that work are dedicated to the discussion of the varieties of consciousness (viññāna) and the first part of the VinSq also takes up the subject. We have not intention of composing here an exhaustive analysis of the various functions of consciousness according to Asaṅga; rather we will merely outline the basic statements concerning these as a backdrop for the doctrines of transformation.

Certainly the primum inter pares among these elements was the underlying consciousness (ālayaviññāna). In the YoBh, it is introduced as the place of residence of all the seeds of the mental and physical events (sarvabīja); as such it is constituted by the maturation and apprehension of the basis (āśrayopādātrvipākasaṃgrhīta), in this case the physical form.¹ The maturation is in turn based on the prior condition of the desire for development (pūrvakam prapañcaratīhetum upādāya).² The underlying consciousness is also defined as mind (citta) and, in addition to the other functions, it obtains the condition of fundament, specifically as the place of residence of the seeds.³ Thus the primary function of the underlying consciousness is to store and bring to fruition the seeds of the entire psycho-physical entity, as well as apprehend the 'basis' which constitutes that entity at the times of death, sleep, etc.

The stream of these seeds is further defined as beginning-less and, by extension, the ālayaviññāna is also beginning-less.⁴

The other forms of consciousness work in accord with the ālayaviññāna and may operate simultaneously with it, a description of consciousness which was developed by the Yogācāra. The intellect (manas) is of two varieties, and this stems from the historical development of the Yogācāra from the Sarvāstivāda-Abhidharma. In the earlier system, the intellect was the internal basis (indriya) for the subsequent rise of the intellectual consciousness. The rise of a sense consciousness required that the consciousness be formed from its contact with the object (ālambana) and the sense (indriya). Among the Vaibhāṣikas, the manas was declared to be whatever consciousness had immediately preceded the rise of the intellectual consciousness. This function was taken over by the Yogācāra in their description of manas as the 'basis which is immediately precedent' (samanantarāśraya), one of the three requisite 'bases' for the rise of a sense consciousness, the other two being the underlying consciousness and the sense organ.⁵ This variety of manas cannot be realistically described as the intellect, since it merely functions as the prior moment of consciousness and should be understood as such. The intellectual function is supplied by the other variety of manas, the 'defiled intellect' (kliṣṭa-manas). In that capacity it is always accompanied by four defilements:

ignorance (avidyā), the view of self-existence (ātma-dr̥ṣṭi), self-pride (asmimāna), and 'thirst' (tr̥ṣṇā).⁶ The intellect is accompanied with these as long as it exists, namely, all the time except during those times of realization on the path (mārgasammukhībhāva), final emancipation (śāikṣa-bhūmi), and during periods of unconsciousness (asamjñi-samāpatti / nirodhasamāpatti).⁷

As opposed to the intellect, intellectual consciousness (manovijñāna) is more discriminative and less personal. It works in succession with the five sense consciousnesses (pravṛttivijñāna), and whatever is their object and basic discrimination also becomes the object and discrimination of the intellectual consciousness, which merely augments these.⁸ In the final section of the first chapter of the YoBh, Aśaṅga has given an all-too-short description of the manner of the interaction of the varieties of consciousness during perception:

When the visual consciousness is arisen, three specific moments of mind are obtained: in succession there are the suddenly occurring, the investigative, and the determinate. The first of these is the visual consciousness itself; the second is the intellectual consciousness. Following the determinate consciousness, there is defilement and purification. Then, the visual consciousness which develops along the same lines as either of these operates either as wholesome or unwholesome but not through the power of its own mentation. Both the visual and the intellectual consciousnesses will remain wholesome or defiled as long as the intellect does not become distracted to something else. All the other forms of sense consciousness up to tactile consciousness follow the same form as visual consciousness. In this way, the basis is like a vehicle for one setting out for another place; the mental events

occurring in the five sense consciousnesses are like his companions; the object of cognition is like his job; the activity of consciousness is like his own capability in performing that job. There is another simile. The basis is like the house of the householder; the object of cognition is like his enjoyment; the male and female servants are like the accompanying mental events; the activity of consciousness is like his business.⁹

Unfortunately, I can find no discussion of this series anywhere in the rest of Asaṅga's writings. One would expect that such an important contribution to the psychology of perception would be granted a little more space, but this does not seem to have been the case. While the trio of sense perception-investigation-determination, followed by its soteriological value, has intrinsic interest, our focus will be upon the interaction between the underlying consciousness and the intellect (manas), particularly in the defiled form of the latter. The above descriptions of the varieties of consciousness must remain the relatively uninvestigated backdrop for the soteriological process.

As part and parcel of the psycho-physical continuum, the underlying consciousness certainly must partake of the transformation accorded to the entire organization, as envisioned by Asaṅga. It is in this capacity that we first meet with the doctrines of the transformation of this consciousness. In the Manobhūmi of the YoBh, after a lengthy discussion of the process of the intermediate state (antarābhava), taking rebirth, the development of the foetus

in the womb, and the nature of seeds in general, he first broaches the topic of fundamental transformation:

Moreover, at the time of final enlightenment, the fundament of the seeds of all the defiled dharmas is transformed for those pure yogins whose fundament is transformed. They obtain separation from the conditions which bring about the fruition of seeds of all the wholesome and indeterminate dharmas and obtain power over the internal conditions.¹⁰

The context leaves us no doubt that the underlying consciousness in its function as the residence of all seeds (sarvabījakam) is what is being considered here. Interestingly enough, the context is that of the development of the individual from the moment of birth through the time of final enlightenment. Asaṅga does not answer the immediate question concerning the way those yogins whose fundaments are already transformed can again undergo the experience, but if we assume that the circumstance being discussed is first the embodied nirvāṇa so that the subsequent transformation is disembodied nirvāṇa, then the passage could be comprehensible. Perhaps this is suggested by the introduction to the passage by the phrase 'at the time of final nirvāṇa' (parinirvāṇakāle), but it is not explicit and the Sanskrit is supported by the translations into Tibetan and Chinese.

More explicit about the relationship between the underlying consciousness and fundamental transformation is a lengthy passage in the VinSū which defines Asaṅga's view on the relationship between the two and their interaction:

It may be asked: what is the establishment of the reversal of the general defilements (samkleśa-vyāvṛttivyavasthāna)? Briefly, the underlying consciousness is the root of all of these defilements. In this way it is the root of the accomplishment of beings' conditioned existence since it generates the sensory organs, their physical bases, and the sensory consciousnesses. It is also the root of the accomplishment of the physical world (bhājanaloka) since it generates that world...In that way, because the underlying consciousness is the support of all seeds (sarva-bījaka), in the present it has the nature of the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatyalakṣaṇa); it generates the truth of suffering in the future and the truth of the origin of suffering (samudaya-satya) in the present...Thus it is the root of all the general difficulties (sarvasamkleśamūla).

Now that underlying consciousness which has seized the seeds of the roots of goodness conducive to liberation and to penetration (mokṣabhāgiya-nirvedhabhāgiya-kuśalamūla) is not the cause of the origin of suffering. The reason is that those roots of goodness which are conducive to liberation, and so forth, are entirely antithetical to the operation in existence. When these arise, the worldly roots of goodness, which are different from them, for the most part become clear light (prabhāvara). Thus, those who have grasped their own seeds become powerful, while those who have become accomplished through nurturing their seeds (bījaparibr̥mhana) become mighty. From those seeds, those wholesome dharmas become accomplished as clear light and later, for the most part, from them, what is dear and desired will be accomplished. Now the Buddha, with reference to this underlying consciousness, the residence of all the seeds, has maintained that it includes all the elements (dhātu), from the visual (cakṣuḥ) to form (rūpa) to visual consciousness (cakṣurviññāna), up through the intellect, the mental objects (dharma), and the intellectual consciousness (manoviññāna). The reason is that all the elements (viśvadhātu) exist within the underlying consciousness...Now the underlying consciousness, which in that way is the root of all the general defilements, should be understood to be turned around (vyāvṛtti) by cultivating the wholesome qualities (kuśaladharmabhāvanā). Practice, for the sake of stabilizing the mind of the ordinary being or for the cultivation of the wholesome dharmas, is by means of mental application which focuses on the sensory

consciousnesses (pravṛttiviññānāmbana-
manasikāra). First one cultivates that for the
sake of entering into the comprehension of the
truths (satyābhisamaya). If one does not obtain
the eye which focuses on the truths which have not
yet been seen, then he will be unable to compre-
hend (adhiṣama) the underlying consciousness which
is the residence of all seeds. Resting in that
comprehension is to rest in the faultless perfec-
tion of the Śrāvaka; or it is to rest in the
faultless perfection of the Bodhisattva. To
comprehend the elemental realm of all elements
(sarvadharmadharmadhātu) is to comprehend also the
underlying consciousness. All the various
defilements are to be seen as collected in there.
One comprehends that the individual bondage inside
of everyone is by the bonds of external images
(bāhyanimitta) and the internal hindrances
(adhyātmikadauṣṭhilya).

Since the underlying consciousness is the
sphere for all that brings together the
manifestations of the various formations
(*samskāraprapañcasaṅgraha), having collected,
piled, amassed, and accumulated all of these into
the underlying consciousness, because of service
and meditation through the gnosis which focuses on
thusness, [the yogin] transforms the fundament.
Immediately after this fundamental transformation,
it is said that the underlying consciousness is
eliminated (*prahīnālayaviññāna). Because it is
eliminated, all the general defilements are also
said to be eliminated. The fundament of that
underlying consciousness is understood as changed
by the antidotes (pratipakṣa) and the enemies
(*śatru).

The underlying consciousness is impermanent
and appropriating (ādāna). Fundamental trans-
formation is permanent and nonappropriating, since
it has been changed by the path focusing on
thusness (tathatāmbanamārga). The underlying
consciousness is endowed with hindrances while
fundamental transformation is permanently
separated from them. The underlying consciousness
is the cause for the operation of the defilements
and not the cause for the operation of the path;
fundamental transformation is the opposite of
these and is the cause of stability (sthiti) but
not of arising (janma). Underlying consciousness
has power over neither the wholesome or indeter-
minate dharmas while fundamental transformation
has power over both.

Now immediately after the characteristic of eliminating the underlying consciousness, there is the elimination of both forms of appropriation (ādānadvayaprahāṇa) and [the attainment of] the ability to place the body anywhere like a magical form (*na māṇikavat). Since the cause of the arising of future suffering has been eliminated, there is the elimination of the appropriation [of a further body] arising in the future. Since there has been the elimination of all the general difficulties (saṃkleśa) in this life, there is the elimination of all the subtle hindrances of the general defilements in this life. There being separation from all of these hindrances, there only remains those which are the conditions of life.¹¹

This extraordinarily important section of the VinSg delineates in full--as no where else in the YoBh corpus--the interaction between the ālayavijñāna and its transformation. Several topics are worthy of discussion and the first of these is the nature of the ālayavijñāna which is transformed. It is apparent that Asaṅga is flirting with idealism here, but only that. The nature of the underlying consciousness is to store the seeds of the external world so that this consciousness acts as the origin of suffering for the future, not the present. In the usage of the Yogācāras, the origin of suffering is defined as the reality of dependent origination. To describe the underlying consciousness as the origin of suffering for the future means that the world system is generated by means of the seeds of karma--and their related virtues or vices--stored in this consciousness. These seeds of the 'general difficulties' (saṃkleśa) cover just about all of phenomenal life. In the YoBh, the term saṃkleśa is broken down into

three varieties: the psychological defilements (kleśa-saṃkleśa), the moral/ethical defilements (karmasaṃkleśa), and the simple difficulties associated with birth (janma-saṃkleśa = pratītyasamutpāda).¹² Thus, when Asaṅga mentions that the unnamed sūtra is referring to the underlying consciousness when it mentions the eighteen 'elements' (dhātu), he is not indicating that the entire world system is made up of the ālayavijñāna--which is the doctrine of the later Vijñānavāda authors--but that the seeds of these are entirely stored in the underlying consciousness. This is indicated in the statement that the Buddha was indentifying the ālayavijñāna in its capacity as the 'residence of all seeds' (sarvabhīṣaka). Asaṅga is furthermore relying on the well-recognized cognitive synonymy between the terms 'seed' and 'element', noted before in the second chapter (Mano-bhūmi) of the YoBh as well as in the MAV.¹³ Thus, for Asaṅga, the underlying consciousness generates the physical world, but does not constitute it.¹⁴ Instead, the ālayavijñāna operates as a convenient bridge between the physical and mental realities, between the immoral act and unwholesome mentality, and finally, between the present action of the psycho-physical complex and the future consequences of that action.

Transformation of that consciousness is consequently necessary if one wishes to reverse (vyāvṛtti) the course of the unwholesome life.¹⁵ In this case the fundament is transformed when the ālayavijñāna is eliminated. First, we

must assume, in the accordance with the dictates of the Abhidharma, that all forms of psycho-physical being are momentary and thus are being replaced in flux over and over again. The job, then, is to halt the incessant momentum of phenomenal life which keeps the underlying consciousness going. It is this momentum which is termed sankleśa in the Yogācāra texts and defines the ālayavijñāna totally. Without the momentum, there is the lapse of the underlying consciousness. To find out what replaces this, we must follow Asaṅga's four-point (catuskoṭi) postulation of when the various forms of consciousness operate:

There are those for whom the underlying consciousness operates, but not the sensory consciousnesses: those who are in the unconscious state of sleep (middha), those who have lost consciousness having taken rebirth (murcchita), those who reside in the concentration of conceptionlessness (asamjñisamāpatti), those who reside in the concentration of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti), and those who are born in the realms where there is no conceptualization (āsamjñika-sattva).¹⁶ There are those for whom the sensory consciousness operates but not the underlying consciousness: those periods when the Arhats, Pratyekabuddhas, the Bodhisattvas who are not subject to regression (avaivartika), and the Tathāgatas maintain consciousness. Those who are possessed of both forms of consciousness are those who are different from the above two categories and have some form of consciousness. Those who possess neither are Arhats, Pratyekabuddhas, Avaivartika-Bodhisattvas, and the Tathāgatas when they are in the concentration of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti) or in the sphere of disembodied nirvāṇa (nirupadhiśesanirvāṇadhātu).¹⁷

In many ways this is a development of the shorter statement in the Acittakābhūmi that there are certain situations where the sensory consciousnesses come to cessation, while the

ālayavijñāna comes to cessation in the realm of disembodied nirvāṇa.¹⁸ The real problem arises when we consider what the Arhat, or others of the four above, do when asleep or taking rebirth? Are we to assume that there is no form of consciousness whatsoever and that the psycho-physical entity is without vijñānaskandha, so that there are mental events (? samjñā / vedanā / cetanā) without the mind, a circumstance which would violate all the normative structures of the Abhidharma?

The answer to this question is embodied in a section of the VinSg which elucidates Asaṅga's special doctrine of a purity of consciousness (vijñānaviśuddhi).¹⁹ He maintains that when the consciousness associated with the potential defilements (anuśaya) has been cut off, the consciousness which remains is no longer based (āśrita) on the dharmas of form etc., since the consciousness of the antidotes (pratipakṣa) is pure (viśuddha). Because the cause has ceased, there will be no further appropriation of the physical body. Thus, it will no longer develop (*abhiṅvṛdh-) from the cause. Since there has been meditation on emptiness as the means to liberation (śūnyatāvimokṣamukha), the consciousness is uncompounded (asamskrta); since there has been meditation on desirelessness as the means to liberation (apraṇihitavimokṣamukha), the consciousness is well satisfied (santusta); since there has been meditation on signlessness as the means to liberation (ānimittavimokṣamukha), the consciousness is stable (*sthita). Because of

these qualities it is entirely liberated (ativimukta). Even if there should be association with form, it will not become agitated (*anudvigna). It will not be delighted with birth or death and is dissociated from feeling (vedanā), and so forth, which are like the shadow of a tree; thus it is without any shadow (niśchāya). Through the liberation on the path of learning (śaikṣamārga) it is peaceful (śānta); through the liberation on the path of no more learning it is cool (śītībhūta); because of the cessation of the aggregates, it has become pure (*brahmabhūta). This consciousness is not naturally associated with the general defilements (*prakṛtyā 'sankliṣṭa). In this regard, the Bhagavān has declared that consciousness is, in terms of self nature, only clear light (avabhāvena prabhāsvara). Thus, in the mere cognition of form, and so forth, just as it is (yathābhūta), there is no thirst (trṣṇā). In this regard, the Bhagavān has declared there to be several kinds of consciousness: associated and dissociated with desire, anger, and so forth, the last one being the liberated mind (vimuktacitta).

Asaṅga's material finally comes down to the ramifications of the old statements found in the Aṅguttara Nikāya--mind is nothing more or less than clear light and the defilements are not natural to its being.²⁰ Dissociated from them, consciousness reverts to its natural form, an uncompounded cognition of some variety. Freed from the tyranny of the other aggregates and no longer impelled by

the momentum of the defilements and karma and life, the mind is no longer restricted to the functions associated with the underlying consciousness or any other form of consciousness.

In this form, the statements of the transformation, or indeed liberation, of the mind shows the early tradition's disregard for the potential complications of trying to define one element as both compounded and uncompounded. The meditative environment is paramount; liberation from the hindrances is enough. Those gleanings to be obtained from the diffuse statements scattered throughout the YoBh may be obscure and partially contradictory, but the author is less concerned about such problems than he apparently would be about problems with the voluminous and complex statements concerning the practice of meditation. Evidently, for Asaṅga, the theory of liberation is of less urgent importance than the practice.

That a great meditator (Yogācāra) should leave much unsaid is not particularly surprising; less surprising still is that the commentators following him should attempt to clean up the loose ends. Such is certainly the case with the author of the MAVBh and the MSABh. This individual, whom I take to be Vasubandhu I, the younger brother of Asaṅga, had a definite interest in introducing the model of the ālayavijñāna into his exegesis of the MAV and the MSA. In the former case, because the MAV does not mention fundamental transformation in any capacity, Vasubandhu I is

content to identify the term 'conditional consciousness' (pratyayaviññāna) in MAV I.9 and the term 'cause' (hetu) in MAV III.22 with the underlying consciousness. He also utilizes other elements in these two verses with the sensory consciousnesses (pravṛttiviññāna), introducing the intellect in his commentary to III.22 by some hermeneutical gymnastics. None of these three terms are utilized in any verse of the MAV. It will ultimately rest with Sthiramati to introduce fundamental transformation into the hermeneutical environment. The author to MSam I.26 has also included MAV I.9 into his discussion of the underlying consciousness, and this is evidence of the possibility that the MAVBh and the MSam are by the same individual.

Vasubandhu I's introduction of ālayaviññāna into the MSABh is equally unwarranted. The term is unknown to the author of the kārikās, who primarily introduces and manipulates the gotra, trisvabhāva, and tathatā models in his exposition of the Mahāyāna. In XI.44, the author, among many other places, discusses transformation, this time utilizing in XI44c the term bījaparāvṛtti, transformation of the seed.²¹ This comes about in the middle of a lengthy exegesis of the doctrines of the three natures, the second of which (paratantra) the author of the MSA has identified with the mind (citta) or the mental element (cittadhātu). The use of the term element, as we have noticed, is often in parallel with the term seed (bīja) and in the text of the MSA they are virtually synonymous.²² The thrust of the

entire series of discussions of fundamental transformation found around these series of verses in the MSA is the metamorphosis of the paratantrasvabhāva, and in this capacity the section will be discussed in the next chapter.

Certainly part of the reason that the underlying consciousness came to be considered the fundament to be transformed or replaced is that three extremely influential texts eventually made this identification: the MSam, the TrimBh, and the Lañk. While the ninth chapter of the MSam is dedicated to the elaboration of fundamental transformation, the term is scattered through the text in different environments. The primary discussion of the relationship between the underlying consciousness and fundamental transformation in fact occurs in the first chapter, which delineates and justifies the ālayaviññāna. In some ways an elaboration of the reasons for the postulation of the underlying consciousness, MSam I.29 lists two items which would be unjustified (ayukta) if there were no ālayaviññāna: difficulties (saṃkleśa) and their purification (vyavadāna). The former is broken down into its normal composition of defilement (kleśasaṃkleśa), action (karmasaṃkleśa), and birth (janmasaṃkleśa), while purification is divided into mundane (laukika) and supermundane (lokottara). Since fundamental transformation falls into the latter category, its contribution to liberation is considered in conjunction with the justification of underlying consciousness as necessary to bring about the supermundane. In this section,

the MSam also presents a well-considered outline of the process of realization, different from but similar to that we found in the SrBh in the previous chapter:

I.44 Likewise, if the maturative consciousness (vipākaviññāna), which is the residence of all seeds (sarvabījaka), does not exist, then the supermundane purification (lokottaravyavadāna) would be unjustified (ayukta). How is that?

The Bhagavān has stated, "Correct perspective (samyagdr̥ṣṭi) arises from the cause of other's explanations (parato ghosa) and correct individual mental application (pratyātmayoniśomanasikāra).²³ If we examine how other's explanations and correct mental application will develop (bhāvavīṣy-) traces (vāsanā) within auditory consciousness, intellectual consciousness, or both of these, then [it is evident] that when one applies correct mental application on dharma, there is no arising of auditory consciousness [that is, intellectual consciousness is primary]. However, that intellectual consciousness may be interrupted by other distracted forms of consciousness (vikṣiptaviññāna). Now when there arise correct mental application and its associated mental events (caitta), at that time the intellectual consciousness is also associated with traces since auditory traces have been infused in it. [When interrupted, however,] because the [prior] impression-laden intellectual consciousness no longer remains and has passed away, then from what will the auditorily seed-laden correct mental application and its associated mental events again arise?

It certainly is not the case that correct mental application and its associated mundane mentality (laukikacitta) arise and pass away simultaneously with correct perspective (samyagdr̥ṣṭi) and its associated supermundane mentality (lokottaracitta). Therefore the latter event is not developed (bhāvita) by the former. Because the latter is not developed, the former cannot be its seed. Therefore, if maturational consciousness (vipākaviññāna) does not exist, it is incorrect to assume supermundane purification since it would be unjustified that its seed is generated solely by auditory traces (śrutavāsanā).

45. Now if the maturational consciousness, the residence of all the seeds, is the cause of difficult conditions (samkleśa), how is it justified that there is [in it] the seed of

supermundane mentality? Supermundane mentality is unfamiliar [to the maturational consciousness] and therefore its traces do not exist [in it]. But if its traces do not [naturally] exist in it, then we must delineate from what seed the supermundane mentality will arise. Supermundane mentality will arise from the seed of the traces of listening to the natural outflow of the very pure elemental realm (*suvisuddhadharmadhātuniśyanda).²⁴

46. Are these auditory traces the nature (svabhāva) of the underlying consciousness or not? If they are the nature of the underlying consciousness, then how is it that the trace is the seed of this consciousness's antidote (tatpratipakṣabhīja)? If it is not the nature of the underlying consciousness, then just what is the basis (āśraya) of that seed of auditory traces (śrutavāsanābhīja)?

That which has become the auditory trace based on the enlightenment of the Buddha, and that which is the place of operation, the maturational consciousness, occur together in the manner of simultaneous operation (*aśaḥappravṛttinaya), like milk and water. But that seed of the auditory trace is not the underlying consciousness, since it is the seed of its antidote.

47. Based on a slight trace (mrduvāsanā), there develops a middling trace (madhyamavāsanā). Based on this middling trace there develops a great impression (adhimātravāsanā). This occurs because it is endowed with the action (kriyā) of listening, thinking, and contemplating many times.

48. With reference to that, the slight, middling, and great seeds of auditory traces are regarded as the seed of the dharmakāya. Because it is the antidote to the underlying consciousness, it is not the nature of the underlying consciousness. Although it is mundane (laukika), because it is the natural outflow of the very pure elemental realm, it has become the seed of the supermundane mentality. Now even before this supermundane mentality has arisen, the seed of the auditory traces is the antidote to the arising of the defilements (*kleśaparyavasthānapratipakṣa), to the lower realms, and the antidote destroying all evil activity. It is conducive to meeting Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Even though the mentality of the beginning Bodhisattvas is mundane, it is to be understood as constituted (samgrhīta) by the dharmakāya, and that mentality of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas is constituted by the

vimuktikāya.²⁵ Because it is not the underlying consciousness, it is constituted by one of these two bodies.

In the same manner [as the seed of auditory traces] by degrees increases from slight to middling to great, in that way the maturational consciousness decreases and fundamentally transforms. When the fundament is in all aspects (sarvākāra) transformed, the maturational consciousness, the residence of all seeds, becomes entirely devoid of seeds (abījībhūta) and is in all aspects (sarvākāreṇa) eliminated (prahīyate).

49. Now how is it that the underlying consciousness, existing simultaneously (sahaja) with that which is not the underlying consciousness, like milk and water, will be eliminated (*apakṛata) in all aspects?

Just as the gōḥa (haṃsa) is able to drink milk and leave the water, if it is separated from mundane desire, the trace of the level of nonconcentration (asamāhitabhūmivāsanā) will be eliminated (√apakṛa-) and the trace of the level of concentration will increase (√vṛdh-); this is fundamental transformation.²⁶

The most interesting part about this section of the MSam is the juxtaposition and simultaneity of both a problematic constituent of being, the underlying consciousness, and its antidote, the seed of auditory traces (śrutavāsanā-bīja).²⁷ This latter, as is obvious from the section, is foreign to the ālayaviññāna, making the realization of the dharma-kāya/vimuktikāya complex a matter of rigorous effort, rather than an eventual necessity. In Chapter XI of the MSam, the author utilizes the doctrine of the trivabhāva to identify the shift between the level of nonconcentration and the level of concentration, but here he has not given himself this option. In fact, the statements given here, the simile of the milk and water, the total transcendence of the seed of the dharma-kāya, all seem to speak of the radical

displacement (-parāvṛtti) of one base of cognition by another. In that sense, it exhibits much in common with the earlier ŚrBh statements purused in the previous chapter.

To some degree, the statements found in the TrimBh follow suit. Sthiramati utilizes verses 29-30 of the Trim to elucidate his understanding of fundamental transformation. In verse 29, Vasubandhu II has defined nonreferentiality (anupalambha) as nonmental (acitta), supermundane gnosis (lokottaraññāna), and fundamental transformation through the elimination of the two varieties of hindrance. In verse thirty, this is further described as the incorruptable element (anāsravadhātu), inconceivable (acintya), good (kuśala), stable (dhruva), bliss (sukha), and the two bodies met with before--the body of liberation (vimuktikāya) and the body of the dharma (dhamakāya).

In his commentary, Sthiramati delineates an interesting difference between the underlying consciousness and supermundane gnosis. He maintains that there is a replacement (parāvṛtti) of the underlying consciousness with the supreme gnosis. When there is the cessation (nivṛtti) of the conditions of the traces developed through the two kinds of hindrance, then there is the replacement with the conditions of nondual gnosis, the dhamakāya, and suppleness (karmāyatā).²⁸ Sthiramati's description of the gnosis, however, is slightly different from that in the Trim; the major disparity is the designation of gnosis by the term

'contiguous fundament' (anantarāśraya), connecting this term with parāvṛtti so that the reader understands the lower fundament is replaced with the more exalted one. The manner of the replacement, though, is gradual, as was observed in the case of the MSam. This replacement begins on the path of vision and proceeds through the other various levels. But we anticipate ourself; the various doctrines about the onset and development of fundamental transformation will be examined in Part IV. Suffice to say that as the hindrances are gradually eliminated, there is the augmentation of the 'contiguous fundament'.

There are three pairs of hindrances that could describe the phrase "from the elimination of the two forms of hindrance" in Trim 29, and Sthiramati offers the two options which most closely accord with the psychological interpretation that he pursues: First, there is the pair of defiled hindrance (kleśapakṣyadauṣṭhulya) and maturative hindrance (vipākapakṣyadauṣṭhulya) which we have seen in the previous chapter. Second, there is a pair which is not so often associated with the term hindrance--the dual obscuration of defilements and the knowable (kleśaṇṇeyāvaraṇa). This latter pair occurs frequently in Mahāyāna literature, but, prior to Sthiramati's commentary, was not commonly associated with the environment of fundamental transformation, although it was concerned with the disparity of fruit between the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Buddhas which the terms vimuktikāya and dharmakāya indicate. The pair of

hindrances which Sthiramati does not offer us is that of the body and mind (kāyacittadauṣṭhulya), certainly the earliest environment of hindrance and the one most often given in the ŚrBh, as we have seen. Thus 'hindrance' as a term became transferred from the psycho-physical sphere to the more psychological sphere as the hermeneutics of the burgeoning idealism required.

While the use of fundamental transformation with the underlying consciousness will occur in other texts, these will be considered under the various syncretic systems to arise. In one sense this division is slightly misleading, since texts such as the MSam and the ASam will also be considered under that heading in the next part, but the value for observing the manipulation of the individual model makes each model's examination a desideratum.

Notes to Part II: Chapter Four

1. Bhattacharya, YoBh, p. 4.7; note in the context of viññāna, we have three 'fundaments', the ālayaviññāna as bījāśraya, the manas as samanantara āśraya, and the organ as the sahabhūr āśraya.
2. Bhattacharya, YoBh, p. 4.11-12.
3. Bhattacharya, YoBh, p. 11.4-5; it appears that Asaṅga is utilizing the hermeneutical etymology of citta as based on the root √ci, to collect, to pile up, to arrange, rather than the root √cit, to think, understand, reflect; this hermeneutical usage is found extensively within the later literature, eg. ASamBh, Tatia, p. 11.12-13.
4. Bhattacharya, YoBh, p. 25.20: bījasantānaprabandho 'nādikālikah.
5. Bhattacharya, YoBh p. 4.6-7, 4.9-10, 11.6-7; Pradhan, ASam p. 12.2-6; Tatia, ASamBh pp. 13.21-14.2.
6. Bhattacharya, YoBh p. 11.6-7; cf. Pradhan, ASam p. 12.3-4 where ātmasneha is given in place of trāṇā.
7. Pradhan, ASam p. 12.5.
8. Bhattacharya, YoBh pp. 5.8-10, 6.19-7.2, 7.16-18, 8.8-10, 9.5-7; VinSq, sDe-dge sams-tsam zhi, fol. 6b4.
9. Bhattacharya, YoBh p. 10.2-12; sDe-dge sams-tsam tahi, fol. 5a4-b2; T. 1579.30.280a22-b2: tatra cakṣurviññāna utpanne trīṇi cittāny upalabhyante | yathākramam aupanipatikam paryeṣakam niścitam ca | tatra cādyam cakṣurviññānam eva | dve manoviññāne | tatra niścitāc cittāt param saṃkleśo vyavadānam ca draṣṭavyam | tatas tannaīṣyandikam cakṣurviññānam api kuśalākuśalam pravarttate | no tu svavikalpavaśena | tāvac ca dvayor manoviññāna-cakṣurviññānayoh kuśalatvam vā kliṣṭatvam yāvat tanmano nānyatra vikṣipyate || yathā cakṣurviññāna utpanna evam yāvat kāyaviññānam veditavyam || tatra deśāntara-prasthitasyeṣa yānam āśrayo draṣṭavyaḥ | pañcānām viññānakāyānām sahāyārthikavat sahāyāḥ | karaṇīyavad ālambanam | svasāktivāt tat karma | aparāḥ paryāyāḥ | grhaṣṭhasya grhavad eṣām āśrayo draṣṭavyaḥ | bhogavad ālambanam | dāsīdāsādivāt sahāyāḥ | vyavasāyavat karma ||.
10. Bhattacharya, YoBh, p. 27.1-3; sDe-dge sams-tsam tshi, fols. 13b7-14a2; T.1579.30.284c14-17; Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa, p. 99, n.u, has noticed that the Skt. text needs some emendation: parinirvāṇakale punar viśuddhānām yoginām

parivṛttāśrayānāṃ sarvakliṣṭadharmabījāśrayaḥ parivartate ।
 sarvakuśalāvyākṛtadharmabījēṣu ca pratyayān vikalīkaroti ।
 adhyātmapratyayaśaitāṃ ca pratilabhate ॥

11. VinSq, sDe-dge zhi, fols. 7a1-8b2; T. 1579.30.581a25-c22; translated from the Tibetan with the occasional deletion of nonpertinent or redundant information [fols. 7a3-5, 7a6-7, 7b4-5]: kun nas nyon mongs pa ldog pa rnam par gzhas pa gang zhe na kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni । mdor na kun nas nyon mongs pa thams cad kyi rtsa ba yin no । 'di ltar de ni sems can gyi 'jig rten 'grub pa'i rtsa ba yin te । dbang po rten dang bcas pa rnam dang । 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa rnam dkyed par byed pa yin pa'i phyir ro । anod kyi 'jig rten 'grub pa'i rtsa ba yang yin । anod kyi 'jig rten skyed par byed pa yin pa'i phyir ro । ... । de ltar na kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de nyid ni sa bon thams cad pa yin pa'i phyir da ltar gyi dus na sdug bsngal gyi bden pa'i rang bzhin dang । ma 'ongs pa'i dus na sdug bsngal gyi bden bskyed par byed pa dang । da ltar gyi dus nyid ni kun 'byung ba'i bden pa skyed par byed pa'ang yin no । ... kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni kun nas nyon mongs pa thams cad kyi rtsa ba yin par blta bar bya'o । kun gzhi rnam par shes pa thar pa'i ca dang mthun pa dang । nges par 'byed pa'i cha dang mthun pa'i [fol. 7b] dge ba'i rtsa ba rnam kyi sa bon yongs su 'dzin pa gang yin pa de ni kun 'byung ba bden pa'i rgyu ma yin te । thar pa la sogs pa'i cha dang mthun pa'i dge ba'i rtsa ba rnam ni 'jug pa dang 'gal ba nyid yin pa'i phyir ro । de byung na de las gzhan pa 'jig rten pa'i dge ba'i rtsa ba rnam ni ches 'od gsal bar 'gyur zhing । dea na de dag rang gi sa bon yongs su bzung ba la ches mthu dang ldan pa dang sa bon yongs su brtas pas bagrub pa la ches stobs dang ldan par 'gyur ro । sa bon de las dge ba'i chos de dag kyang ches 'od gsal bar 'grub pa dang । phyi ma la yang rnam par amin pa chea sdug pa dang । ches 'dod pa 'grub par 'gyur ro । bcom ldan 'das kyi kyang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa sa bon thams ca pa 'di la dgongs nas mig gi khams dang । gzugs kyi khams dang । mig gi rnam par shes pa'i khams dang । yid yi khams dang । chos kyi khams dang । yid kyi rnam par shes pa'i khams kyi bar du gaungs te । kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la khams ana tshogs yod pa'i phyir ro । ... । de ltar na kun nas nyon mongs pa'i rtsa ba kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de ni 'di ltar dge ba'i chos bsngoms pas rnam par ldog par rig par bya'o । dge ba'i chos bsngom pa de yang so so'i skye bo sems gnas par bya ba'i phyir 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa la dmigs pa'i yid la byed pas brtson par byed pa ni । de'i dang por bden pa mngon par rtogs pa la 'jug (for sde-dge 'dzug) par bya ba'i phyir bsngom ste । bden pa ma mthong ba bden pa rnam la mig ma thob pas ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa sa bon thams cad pa yang rtogs par mi nua pa'i phyir ro । de de ltar zhugs shing nyan thos kyi yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la zhugs sam । byang chub sems dpa'i yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la zhugs te chos thams cad kyi chos kyi dbying rtogs par byed pa na । kun gzhi [fol. 8a] rnam par shes pa yang rtogs

par byed de | der kun nas nyon mongs pa thams cad la yang dag par 'dus par blta zhing | de nang gi so so'i bdag nyid la phyi rol gyi mtshan ma'i 'ching ba dang | nang gi gnas ngan len gyi 'ching baas bdang nyid bcings pa rtogs par byed do | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni 'du byed kyi rnam par apros par badus pa de dag thams cad kyi khams pa yin pa'i phyir | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la gcig tu sdud pa dang | gcig tu spungs pa dang | gcig tu sogs par byed de | gcig tu bsags nas de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i shes pas kun tu brten cing goms par byas pa'i rgyus gnas 'gyur bar byed do | gnas 'gyur ma thag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa spangs par brjod par bya ste | de spang pa'i phyir kun nas nyon mongs pa thams cad kyang spangs par brjod par bya'o | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de'i gnas ni | gnyen po dang | dgra bos bsgyur bar rig par bya'o | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni mi rtag pa dang | len pa dang bcas pa yin la | gnas gyur pa ni rtag pa dang len pa med pa yin te | de gzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i lam gyis bagyur ba'i phyir ro | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni gnas ngan len dang ldan pa yin la gnas gyur pa ni gnas ngan len thams cad dang gtan bral ba yin no | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni nyon mongs pa rnams kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu dang lam gyi 'jug pa'i rgyu ma yin la | gnas gyur pa ni nyon mongs pa rnams kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu ma yin pa dang | lam du 'jug pa'i rgyu yin te | gnas pa'i rgyu nyid yin pa dang | skyed pa'i rgyu nyid ma yin pa'i phyir ro | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni dge ba dang lung du ma batan pa'i chos rnams la dbang mi byed la | gnas gyur pa ni dge ba dang lung du ma batan pa'i chos thams cad la dbang byed pa'o | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de'i spangs pa'i mtshan nyid ni de spangs ma thag tu len pa rnam pa gnyis spongs ba dang | sprul pa lta bu'i lus kun tu gnas pa [fol. 8b] ste | phyi ma la adug bangal yang 'byung bar byed pa'i rgyu spangs pa'i phyir | phyi ma la yang 'byung bar byed pa'i len pa spong ba dang | tahe 'di la kun nas nyon mongs pa'i rgyu thams cad spangs pa'i phyir tshe 'di'i kun nas nyon mongs pa'i gnas ngan len thams cad spong ba dang | gnas ngan len thams cad dang bral zhing arog gi rkyen du gyur pa tsam kun du gnas so |.

12. Bhattacharya, YoBh, pp. 160.10 ff.

13. Bhattacharya, YoBh, p. 26.18; MAV III.17cd, Nagao, p. 45, and cf. Sthiramati's comments, MAVT, Pandey, p. 109; the reason behind this identification in the MAV is, however, in the name of idealism, not as a bridge between psycho-physical reality as in Asaṅga's system.

14. See also Asaṅga's remarks VinSq, sDe-dge zhi, fols. 9a3-b3.

15. Vyāvṛtti will be utilized also in the MSABh and the Lañk to describe the action of āśrayaparāvṛtti on forms of consciousness which need elimination or replacement. See Part III, Ch. One and Appendix.

16. For the period surrounding the loss of consciousness at rebirth see Bhattacharya, YoBh p. 24.6 f.

17. VinSq, sDe-dge zhi, fols. 8b7-9a3; T. 1579.30.582a4-12: kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang ldan pa la 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa dang mi ldan pa ni gnyid log pa sema med pa dang | brgyal bar gyur pa sema med pa dang | 'du shes med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa dang | 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa la snyom par zhugs [fol. 9a] pa dang | 'du shes med pa'i sema can rnama kyi nang du skyee pa'o | 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa dang ldan la | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang mi ldan pa ni sema yod pa'i gnas skabs na dgra bcom pa dang | rang sangs rgyas dang | phyir mi ldog pa'i byang chub sema dpa' dang | de bzhin gahega pa'o | gnyi ga dang ldan pa ni sema yod pa'i gnas skabs de las gzhan pa dag na'o | gnyi ga dang mi ldan pa ni dgra bcom pa dang | rang sangs rgyas dang | phyir mi ldog pa'i byang chub sema dpa' dang | de bzhin gahega pa 'gog pa la snyoms par zhugs pa dang | phung po'i lhag ma med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa'i dbyings na'o |.

18. Alex Wayman, "The Sācittikā and Acittikā Bhūmi and the Pratyekabuddhabhūmi," Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 8 (1960): 379-375, esp. p. 377.16-23: tatra paramārtha-vyavasthānato nirupadhiśeṣo nirvāṇadhātur acittikā bhūmiḥ | tat kaśya hetoḥ | tathā hy ālayavijñānaṃ niruddhaṃ bhavati | tadanyāsv avasthāsu pravṛttivijñānaṃ niruddhaṃ bhavati |; see also corroborating statements in the VinSq material edited and translated by Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa, pp. 46-49, section 4.A.1.

19. The following has been summarized from the Tibetan with an eye to the Chinese: VinSq, sDe-dge zhi, fols. 43b3-44b1; T. 1579.30.595b16-c15.

20. R. Morris and E. Hardy, eds., Aṅguttara-Nikāya, London: H. Frowde for the Pali Text Society, 1885-1910, vol. 1, p. 10: pabbassaraṃ idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ | taṃ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ | taṃ assutavā puthujjano yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti | tasmā assutavato puthujjanassa cittabhāvanā natthī ti vadāmi ti | pabbassaraṃ idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ | taṃ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi vipṇamuttam | taṃ sutvā ariyasāvakasā yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti | tasmā sutavato ariyasāvakasā cittabhāvanā atthī ti vadāmi ti |; For an extensive discussion of this doctrine in relation to the Vijñānavāda, see Ruegg, La Théorie, pp. 411-430.

21. This material will be discussed in the following chapter.

22. This fact has been well established by Ruegg, La Théorie, pp. 85-86, where he discusses MSA XI.44 but does not draw attention to the fact that the primary thrust of

this entire section in MSA is that of the trisvabhāva. Vasubandhu I has also in the MSABh to XIX.49 identified bīja with ālayavijñāna, in XIX.76 identified citta with ālayavijñāna, and in XI.32 identified avadhātu (= cittadhātu) with the underlying consciousness.

23. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 65, has found a similar quote within the Āṅguttara-nikāya, I.87.

24. Niayandadharmā is defined in MSABh to XI.42, Lévi, p. 65.17-18.

25. The differentiation between dharma-kāya and vimuktikāya will be explored in Part IV, Chapter Three.

26. Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 18-20:

44. | de bzhin du 'jig rten las 'das pa'i rnam par byang ba yang sa bon thams cad pa rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa med na mi rung ste | ji ltar na 'jig rten las 'das pa'i rnam par byang ba mi rung zhe na |

gzhan gyi sgra dang so so rang gi tshul bzhin yid la byed pa la brten nas | de'i rgyu las yang dag pa'i lta ba 'byung ngo zhes bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa na | gzhan gyi sgra dang <tshul bzhin> yid la byed pa des rna ba'i rnam par shes pa'am | yid kyi rnam par shes pa'am | de gnyi ga la bag chags su bagos par 'gyur grang na | de la chos de dag tshul bzhin yid la byed pa na rna ba'i rnam par shes pa ni re zhig mi 'byung ngo || yid kyi rnam par shes pa yang de las gzhan pa'i rnam par shes pa rnam par g.yeng baas bar du chod la | gang gi tshe tshul gzhan yid la byed pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i sems byung ba de'i tshe | yid kyi rnam par shes pa thos pa'i bag chags bagos pa de ni bag chags dang bcas te | 'gags shing 'das nas yun ring du lon te | med na phyis de'i sa bon can tshul bzhin yid la byed pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i sems gang las 'byung bar 'gyur |

gang yang tshul bzhing yid la byed pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa 'jig rten pa'i sems de ni | yang dag pa'i lta ba dang mtshungs par ldan pa 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems dang nam yang lhan cig tu skyes pa dang 'gags pa med de | de'i phyir des bagos pa ma yin no || ma bagos pa'i phyir de sa bon du mi rung ste | de lta baas na 'jig rten las 'das pa'i rnam par byang ba yang sa bon thams ca pa rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa med na mi rung ste | de la thos pa'i bag chags kyis ni de'i sa bon yongs su 'dzin par mi rigs pa'i phyir ro |

45. | sa bon thams cad pa rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa ni kun nas nyon mongs pa'i rgyu yin na de'i gnyen po 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems kyi sa bon du ji ltar rung | 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems ni ma 'driś pa ste | de baas na de'i bag chags ni med pa nyid do || bag chags de med na sa bon gang las 'byung ba brjod dgos so zhe na |

chos kyi dbyings aching tu rnam par dag pa'i rgyu mthun pa thos pa'i bag chags <kyi> sa bon las de 'byung ngo |

46. | thos pa'i bag chags gang yin pa de yang ci kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid yin nam | <'on te ma yin> | gal te kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid yin na ni | ji ltar de'i gnyen po'i sa bon du rung | ji ltar de'i ngo bo nyid ma yin na ni des thos pa'i bag chags kyi sa bon de'i gnas ci zhig yin par blta zhe na |

sangs rgyas rnam kyi byang chub la brten nas thos pa'i bag chags 'jug par 'gyur gang yin pa gnas gang la 'jug pa de lhan cig 'jug pa'i tahul gyis rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa la 'jug ste | 'o ma dang chu bzhin no | de ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ma yin te | de'i gnyen po'i sa bon nyid yin pa'i phyir ro |

47. | bag chags chung ngu la brten nas bag chags 'bring por 'gyur ro || bag chags 'bring po la brten nas bag chags chen po 'gyur te | thos pa dang bsam pa dang | bsgom pa lan mang du bya ba dang ldan pa'i phyir ro |

48. | de la thos pa'i bag chags kyi sa bon chung ngu dang 'bring dang chen po yang chos kyi sku'i sa bon du lta ste | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i gnyen po yin pas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid ma yin pa dang | 'jig rten pa yin yang 'jig rten las 'das pa chos kyi dbyingsa shin tu rnam par dag pa'i rgyu mthun pa yin pas 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems kyi sa bon du gyur pa'o | de ni 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems ma byung du zin kyang | nyon mongs pa'i kun nas dkris pa'i gnyen po dang | ngan song du 'gro ba'i gnyen po dang | nyes par byas pa thams cad dengs par byed pa'i gnyen po yin no | sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dpa' dang phrad pa'i rjes su mthun pa'o |

byang chub sems dpa' las dang po pa rnama kyi 'jig rten pa yin yang chos kyi skur bsdus pa dang | nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas rnama kyi rnam par grol ba'i lus su bsdus par yang blta'o || de ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ma yin gyi | chos kyi sku dang rnam par grol ba'i lus su bsdus pa ste |

chung ngu dang 'bring dang chen po ji lta ji lta bur rim gyis 'phel ba de lta de lta bur rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa yang 'bri zhing gnas kyang 'gyur ro || gnas rnam pa thams cad du gyur na rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa sa bon thams cad pa yang sa bon med par gyur pa dang rnam pa thams cad du spangs pa yang yin no |

49. | yang ji ltar na kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ma yin pa chu dang 'o ma gzhi du lhan cig gnas pa rnam pa thams cad du 'grib par 'gyur zhe na |

ngang pas chu las 'o ma 'thungs pa lta bu dang | 'jig rten pa'i 'dod chags dang bral ba na | mnyam par bzhag pa ma yin pa'i sa'i bag chags 'grib ste | mnyam par bzhag pa'i sa'i bag chags 'phel nas gnas gyur pa bzhin no |.

27. Nihavabhāva maintains that the simultaneous relationship between the ālayavijñāna and the śrutavāsanābīja is delineated in the *Amalapratiṣṭhāna-sūtra (Ye shes dri ma med cing thogs pa med pa mdo), a sūtra which I have not yet been able to trace; MSamU, Peking sems-tsam vol. 11, 262a1-2.

28. Sylvain Lévi, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-1re Partie, Texte, Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, vol. 245, Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1925, p. 44: tasya jñānasyānantarāśrayasya parāvṛttir bhavitīti jñāpārtham āha | āśrayasya parāvṛttir iti | āśrayo 'tra sarvabījakam ālayavijñānam | tasya parāvṛttir yā dauṣṭhulyavipākadvaya-vāsanābhāvena nivṛttau satyāṃ karmaṇyatādharma-kāyādvaya-jñānabhāvena parāvṛtṭiḥ |.

CHAPTER FIVE:

Psycho-Ontological Transformation

As we have noticed in the previous discussions on the doctrines of the 'three natures', descriptions of these have undergone extensive alterations over the course of time. In particular, the early forms of the doctrines show no recourse to the thorough-going idealism which was to characterize the next stage in their elaboration. The Sand, wherein we find perhaps the initial delineation of the three natures, does not set up the complex arrangements between the psychology of perception and the ontological object which follow in later literature. For the Sand, the doctrines of the three natures consist primarily of another way to address the problems associated with the conceptual and verbal elaboration of reality, which cannot be conceived in that manner--an early way to approach the difficulties of word against object, inspired by the doctrines of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras. The Sand, though, has made no use of the manipulation of the three natures by fundamental transformation, although this latter is mentioned in other capacities. The author of the MAV, too, refrained from utilizing this manipulation, leaving the authors of the MAVBh and the MAVT to slip it in the hermeneutical door.¹

Asaṅga, in his VinSg, has quoted from and closely followed the discussions of the Samd in his extensive elaboration of the ramifications of these doctrines.² He keeps closely to the utilization of the three natures as the bases for the delineation of the three varieties of selflessness (niḥsvabhāva), and maintains throughout his treatise that the primary element of error is the fixation (abhiniveśa) on words (nāma) and objects (artha). He continues to ignore or not accept any form of absolute denial of the external world.³ On the contrary, he finishes his short treatise with the requirement that, to know fully the dependent nature, one must comprehend all the various aspects of the dependent nature--the compounded and uncompounded dharmas, the aggregates, the elements, the doors of perception, etc.

I have located only one place in the work of Asaṅga where he shows himself interested in applying fundamental transformation to the model of the three natures, and he does it in a relatively predictable manner. In *Vikhy VII.19-21 and its Bhāṣya, Asaṅga defines the three natures in a manner similar to that in the VinSg, but with the addition of their transformation:

Question: From the elimination of what is clarity (vyavadāna) obtained? The verse replies:

19. [From] fascination (abhiniveśa) towards the initial [nature] in the dependent nature, there is the suffusion (*paribhāvitatva) as defilement (kleśa). Without fascination, there is the perfected nature, the suffusion as clarity.⁴

20. Defilement is possessed of effluence (āsrava) while clarity is without it (anāsrava). Fundamental transformation is to be known as inconceivable (acintya) and of two kinds.⁵

Commentary: There is fascination within the dependent nature because there is the initial nature (= parikalpitasvabhāva),⁶ and this gives rise to suffusion (*paribhāvitatva) in the form of defilement. Because the perfected nature is to be known as without the fascination [towards the initial nature in the dependent nature], it gives rise to the suffusion in the form of clarity (vyavadāna). Defilement is thus possessed of effluence (āsrava) while clarity is without it. This condition of being without effluence should be understood as the characteristic of fundamental transformation. Furthermore, this fundamental transformation is inconceivable and of two varieties. Just what is this inconceivability?

21. Thatness and nature, pacific and quality; it is altogether inconceivable and to be known through four accomplishments.⁷

Commentary: Thus is fundamental transformation inconceivable for these four reasons: Thatness (tattva) refers to its permanence; nature (svabhāva) indicates that it is possessed of neither form nor formlessness; pacific indicates that it pertains to the level of peace (śāntavihāra); and quality means that it has majesty (*tejas).⁸

This very short application of transformation to the three natures is definitely ad hoc. In VII.19, Asaṅga has given a definition taken almost directly from Samd VI.10 and again shows his interest in that particular passage, as he has in the VinSq.⁹ The major difference between the statements found here and the earlier material we have seen above is that the process of absolutization is now complete; fundamental transformation is now absolute reality (tattva) and is entirely inconceivable. There is, however, very little real differentiation of material between these

doctrines and the prior ones. Asaṅga once again demonstrates his conservative orientation, not to step beyond the bounds of his scriptural base; his application of transformation to the three natures is largely circumstantial, giving no offense to orthodox propriety.

Vyavadātasamaya, the author of the MSA, exhibits no such compunction. Not only has he extended the psycho-perceptual critique to the ontological sphere, he has introduced into the discussion a wide range of soteriological consequences. Following him, the author of the MSam, in the chapter dedicated to fundamental transformation (Ch. IX) has defined all fundamental transformation along the lines of the three natures, even if he has chosen to ignore his own imperative in his rather idiomatic and syncretic elaboration of the material. These two texts, then, the MSA and the MSam, proved to be the meeting place of ontological criticism, perceptual idealism, and soteriological delineation.

The association of fundamental transformation with the three natures is really outlined twice in the MSA, and both of these occur in the eleventh chapter of that work, entitled "the Investigation of the Dharma" (dharmaparyvesthi); we should recall that the chapter divisions and headings are apparently the work of the author of the MSABh since many chapters, and especially this one, contain heterogenous material. Thus it is of no great surprise that

there should be two slightly dissimilar approaches to the problem of their interactions.

Verses 15-19 of Chapter XI contain the initial statements:

15. Incorrect conceptualization is explained to be like illusion; the error of duality is explained to be like that which is created through illusion.

16. In the way that there is no existence in that [error]--that is how the absolute truth is accepted; but in the way that there is its apprehension--that is how the provisional truth is accepted.

17. As the clear appearance of the cause of that [error] is apprehended when the [error] no longer exists, so too, when there is fundamental transformation, there is the apprehension of incorrect conceptualization.

18. Just as the world could do whatever it wanted if it were without error towards the cause of its [illusion], so too, when there is transformation, [the saint] becomes lordly, unmistakable, and able to do whatever he wishes.¹⁰

These four verses are concerned with describing the functioning of the three natures through the heuristic model of the process of illusion. In this, the author has sadly neglected to describe entirely the various elements necessary to the production of the illusion, a need which the commentators are only too glad to fulfill.¹¹ Sthiramati, of course, gives the fullest account. One could imagine that there might be a powerful magician. By means of his power--which is augmented with the effects of mantras and special medicinal substances--he causes ordinary objects to appear differently. Items such as rocks and pieces of

wood might be made to appear similar to horses, elephants, or gold. Or a rope might appear as a snake. None of these items, though--the stone, the piece of wood, or the rope--possess the essential nature of things like horses, elephants, or snakes. In that same way, the imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) is the error appearing as the duality of internal and external realities, like the elephant or the horse. The dependent nature is that which is actually the basis of appearance, like the stone or piece of wood.

Now the lack of existence of that product of illusion, that is, its lack of any abiding essential nature (svabhāva) is the absolute truth. On the other hand, the perception of the underlying incorrect conceptualization (abhūtaparikalpa) as elements such as the elephant, etc., is the provisional truth. The clear perception of the underlying element does not occur until fundamental transformation is brought into being; when this occurs, the dependent nature of reality is seen just as it is. When there is fundamental transformation, the yogin becomes a saint (ārya) and free (svatantra). He no longer must be careful towards the products of illusion since he is un mistaken towards the basis of illusion.

Obviously this is a heuristic simile since many of the elements can only be pushed so far. Sthiramati, while introducing the person of the magician with his spells and

drugs, does not incorporate any of these latter elements into the trivabhāva material. Indeed, the entire problem with the illusion simile is that the creator and means of illusion are generally undefined, as they must be in a nontheistic system. The Buddhists simply did not have recourse to the 'magic of God' which sustained the orthodox Indian systems.

Perhaps in an effort to proceed in another direction, Vyavadātasamaya introduces in MSA XI.36 an entirely different approach to the three natures--the celebrated distinctions between the object of definition (lakṣya), the definition (lakṣaṇa), and the means of definition (lakṣaṇā). The first of these is identified in the MSABh as the five categories of elements basic to the Sarvāstivāda-Abhidharma: the elements of form, mind, mental events, formations dissociated from mind and form (viprayukta), and the uncompound elements.¹² On the other hand, the category of definition is broken down into the three natures, which are supposed to define all of the above dharmas. At this point new definitions of the three natures are offered:

39. The appearance of name and object as name and object, and their condition as the object referent of incorrect cognition, that is the definition of the imaginary.¹³

40. Incorrect cognition, whose characteristic is subject and object each appearing to be threefold, is the definition of the dependent.

41. The condition of inexistence, the sameness between existence and nonexistence, the pacification of that which was not pacified, and

the lack of conceptualization, that is the definition of the perfected.¹⁴

Verses thirty-nine and forty are certainly the more interesting. The former incorporates both the name and its external object, although it is fair to say that the Yogācāras had a difficult time in dissociating sense (artha) from reference (artha), as did many Indian traditions. Still, the MSA was obviously including both the object and its designation as members of the imaginary nature, as opposed to the Saṃd which concentrated on the designation.¹⁵ The exegesis of verse forty is a little more difficult. The author maintains that the internal and external appear in a manifold form, with three parts to each. In the MSABh, the external parts are the external field or condition (pada), the object (artha), and the physical body (deha). Sthiramati understands these to indicate the physical world (bhājanaloka), the six sense objects (ālambana), and the six sense organs (caṣṣurindriyādi).¹⁶ As the internal elements, the Bhāṣyakāra identifies three very interesting components of personality which are nonstandard: the intellect, the apprehension, and the conceptualization (manaudgraha-vikalpa). This is a series which we will again consider below, but the author of the MSABh, in accord with his proclivity for mainstreaming all nonstandard terminology, has identified these three respectively with the defiled intellect (kliṣṭamaṇas), the five sensory consciousnesses (pañca viññānakāya), and the intellectual consciousness

(nanoviññāna).¹⁷ The definition of the perfected nature given in verse forty-one is relatively standard. These three definitions, like so many descriptions of the three natures, are exceedingly clear about the relationship between the first two, but are anything but lucid concerning the relationship of the dependent nature to the perfected nature.

This lack of clarity, perhaps, requires the final topic, the various means of definition (lakṣaṇā). These means, which lead into the verses on fundamental transformation, are defined in two verses:

42. Supported by the naturally occurring teaching, there is mental application, and the positioning of the mind in its own element as well as the perception of veridical and nonveridical objects.

43. Proceeding towards sameness in the undefiled saints' lineage; equal, yet elevated, neither growing nor shrinking--thus is considered the means of definition.¹⁸

The MSABh identifies the components mentioned in XI.42 as the group of five levels of involvement (yogabhūmi): the basis (ādhāra), the engagement (ādhāna), the mirror (ādarśa), the light (āloka), and the fundament (āśraya).¹⁹ These five levels denote, respectively, listening to the dharma, mental application, concentration of the mind in its own element (avadhātu), transcendental insight (lokottarā prajñā), and fundamental transformation. This group of five was already delineated in the ASam, and the definitions of each of the members given in the ASam is fairly close to

that of the MSABh, although there may have been a yet earlier prototype.²⁰ Sthiramati further elaborates the entire series as representing each of the five paths (pañcamārqa) of the Śrāvaka.²¹ Thus, the "basis" indicates the path of accumulation (sambhāramārqa), the engagement indicates the path of application (prayogamārqa), and thus through the paths of vision (darśana) and cultivation (bhāvanā), so that the fundament, and by extension fundamental transformation, indicates the final path (niṣṭhāmārqa).²²

The stage is now set for our consideration of the two very difficult verses on fundamental transformation. They follow the above verses directly and are at the beginning of what the Bhāṣyakāra calls the six ślokaś investigating liberation (vimuktiparyeṣṭau ṣaṭ ślokāḥ):

44. The transformation of the appearance of the condition, the object, and the physical body (padārthadehanirbhāṣaparāvṛtti) is the undefiled realm (anāśrava dhātuh); and from the transformation of the seed (bījaparāvṛtter) it is the all-pervading basis (sarvatraqāśraya).

45. From the transformation of the intellect, the appropriation, and the conceptualization (manaudgrahavikalpa), dominion is four-fold: over nonconceptualization, over the pure field, over gnosis, and over activity (avikalpakṣetrañānakarma).²³

These two verses discuss the transformation of the external and internal components of the dependent nature, and we must rely on the MSABh to XI.40 above in its statements that they are in fact the items alluded to in that verse. Even

assuming this to be the case, much remains unclear. Verse forty-four speaks of the transformation of the three external elements and the transformation of some sort of seed. The Bhāṣya identifies the transformation as occurring with respect to the consciousness of these external elements. Perhaps he is correct, but the standard formulation of the ridding of the object component of the imaginary nature is the 'nonapprehension' (anupalambha) of it, possible since it is devoid of self-existence (svabhāva).²⁴ If this is the case, then the nondefiled realm consists of the nonapprehension of the 'external' objects of cognition, these latter including the physical body. Moreover, this strange realm becomes the 'universal' or 'all penetrating' basis (sarvatraśāśraya) when there is the transformation of the seed (bījaparāvṛtti). This latter part of the verse is very difficult to assess. The MSABh maintains that the term 'universal' indicates nothing more than the presence of this basis in all the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. More likely is that it refers to the four kinds of 'universality' found in MSA II.3. This verse maintains that the Buddha, because he can liberate all beings from existence, because he has skill (kauśalya) towards all the vehicles and forms of gnosis, and because he has 'one taste' towards existence and nirvāṇa, he is 'all-pervading' or 'universal'.²⁵ Thus, the transformation of the as-yet-undetermined seed turns the nondefiled realm into the basis for these kinds of accomplishments, all of which

are most likely psychic rather than localized in time and space. The seed, then, in this instance must refer to that component of the dependent nature which is the basis for the appearance of the external yet, when transformed, is the basis for universal penetration.

It would seem obvious that this is merely the mind (citta), as mentioned in verses XI.34-35, which maintain that the mind is that in which there occurs the appearance of duality. However, to establish this we must assume that the three internal items (manas, udgraha, vikalpa) mentioned as transformed in XI.45 are subcomponents of the mind and are not directly involved in external perception, since appearance and perception in idealism must be identical. These three may be internal reflective forms of mentation which are involved with cognition at the intellectual, subliminal, and emotional levels (though not necessarily just these), rather than the purely perceptual. The problem with such an interpretation is that the term apprehension (udgraha) does occur elsewhere in the MSA (IX.43) in conjunction with the object of cognition (artha) understood as the field of the Buddha (ksetra), and we find this association carried over into our current verse (XI.45) with the dominion over the pure field of the Buddha. We will return to these three terms in the next part when we consider the other verses, but it appears that the author has either forgotten his idealism for the moment or is drawing on older strata which he is unwilling to modify.

The commentators, certainly, continue to show their interest in establishing the entire meaning of these two verses on the model of the ālayaviññāna and its accompanying elements.²⁶ Thus, according to the MSABh, the transformation of the three kinds of external appearance is performed through the transformation of the sensory consciousness (pravṛttiviññāna). The transformation of the seed is really the transformation of the underlying consciousness (ālayaviññāna). Following his previous equivalence of intellect with defiled intellect (manas = kliṣṭamanas), appropriation with sensory consciousness (udgraha = pañcaviññānakāya), and conceptualization with the intellectual consciousness (vikalpa = manoviññāna), the Bhāṣyakāra maintains that their respective transformations lead to the four kinds of dominions. Thus the Bhāṣyakāra has maintained that the sensory consciousness is transformed in two ways, that which is stated in XI.44 with respect to the exterior and that which is stated in XI.45 with respect to the interior.

Sthiramati shows his orthodox exegetical skills in delineating the process in the case of XI.45.²⁷ Through the transformation of the defiled intellect, there is dominion over nonconceptualization (avikalpavāsītā). This occurs because when there is the purification of the apprehension of the underlying consciousness, all that is left is the apprehension of nonconceptual gnosis (avikalpaññāna). Through the transformation of the sensory consciousness,

there is dominion over the pure land (kṣetravaśitā). The reason is that there occurs the perception of the buddha-field as the color of crystal or cat's-eye, just as one likes. Finally, through the transformation of the intellectual consciousness there is dominion over both gnosis and enlightened activity. This occurs because one obtains dominion over gnosis through the four forms of individual awareness (catuḥpratisaṃvid), and one obtains dominion over activity through the five forms of higher cognition (pañcābhijñā).²⁸

Following this utilization of fundamental transformation in the MSA, other texts employed our doctrine to describe the kinds of alterations to the dependent nature which were ostensibly attendant on the soteriological path. Perhaps the most notable of these was the MSaṃ where the process of transformation was the simple alteration of the dependent nature from the condition of defiled to that of purified. But this material will be explored in Part III since it, like the statements found in the Laṅkā, represents the synthesis of various models with the three natures, much as we have seen in the case of the MSABh.

Now that we have explored the approaches of the MSA, it is pertinent to ask why there was basically no follow-up on the interaction between the doctrines of fundamental transformation and the three natures? Whereas we have the continuing elaboration of the connections between ālaya-

viññāna and āśrayaparāvṛtti, this is not the case for the trisvabhāva. In order to answer this question we must note certain directions the exegesis of the Yogācāra took. We have mentioned more than once that the MAVBh and the MSABh have defined the other models of reality in terms of the underlying consciousness. This bias towards the underlying consciousness, particularly in its form of the maturative consciousness (vipākaviññāna), was also carried on by the author of the MSam and the MSamBh. Thus Vasubandhu I and the literature with which he was concerned turned the Buddhist systems of reality in favor of the psychological. To a certain extent this is also true for Vasubandhu II. For example, this latter figure, in his defense of the doctrines of 'mere perception' (viññaptimātratā-siddhi) wrote to the relative exculsion of the three natures, only including this material in five (vv. 20-24) of the verses of the Trim. Perhaps in compensation for this one-sided nature of things, the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa was composed, and while it had its own five verses (vv. 6-7, 9, 29-30) on the connections with the underlying consciousness, the position of fundamental transformation was not explored, as it was in the Trim. Thus, within the verse text of the two fundamental texts delineating the doctrines of the three natures--the MAV and the TSN--their relation to the object of our investigation is not specified. Furthermore, while the Trim enjoyed the attention of multiple commentators, each presumably with his own interpretation of āśraya-

parāvr̥tti, we have no record of any commentary on the TSN, and only one subcommentary on the MAV; even in this latter, Sthiramati mentions transformation infrequently in passing. Thus the association of the trisvabhāva with āśrayaparivrtti demonstrates the rather unique position of finding its fullest expression in the first example of its expression, the MSA. Almost all other examples of their union are but weak echoes of the above statements in Ch. XI.

Notes to Part II: Chapter Five

1. MAVBh to MAV II.9, Nagao, p. 32.1; Pandey, MAVT, pp. 40.22, 65.23, 66.21, 93.14-15, 96.10, 102.6, 152.20, 159.27.
2. VinSq, sDe-dge sems-tsam zi, fols. 18b1-27a7.
3. The only place I have noted wherein Asaṅga could be construed to acknowledge idealism is in ASam, Pradhan, p. 82.20-23, where he quotes a verse from a sūtra which maintains the nonexistence of the external and internal worlds. Asaṅga, though, apparently takes the term sabhāva to signify niḥavabhāva and merely describes this verse as intending to discuss his idea of nonperception of the external and internal (grāhyaqrāhakānupalabdhi).
4. *Vikhy VII.19 is extremely difficult, but I take it to be Hsüan-tsang's rendering of Asaṅga's continuing fascination with Samd VI.10, Lamotte, p. 63; Hsüan-tsang's trans., T.696.16.693b20-25.
5. The two kinds of fundamental transformation mentioned are those of the Śrāvaka and Bodhisattva; this is addressed in *Vikhy and *VikhyBh VII.22-24; T.1602.31.560a7ff; Asaṅga's division strictly follows Samd X.1-2, Lamotte, pp. 149, 257, which will be discussed below, Part IV, Chapter Three.
6. For the initial nature as parikalpitaavabhāva, see Paramārtha's cy. the Triniḥavabhāvaśāstra, T.1617.31.874b29.
7. The four accomplishments (*pratipatti) are extensively given in the Bhāṣya (T.1602.31.559c22 ff.) and exhaustively developed in Paramārtha's commentary (T.1617.31.875a2 ff.). The four are perfect accomplishment (*samyakpratipatti), investigation (*śaṣṇā), gnosis (*jñāna), and range (*viśaya), all of which are further divided into four and then broken down again by Paramārtha. I have not translated all of these for reasons of space.
8. Translated from *VikhyBh of Hsüan-tsang; T.1602.31.559c7-22. I would like to thank Ken Eastman for assistance in reading this material and Paramārtha's commentary.
9. Cf. VinSq, sDe-dge sems-tsam zi, fol. 22b3-7, Samd VI.10, Lamotte, pp. 6, 190.
10. Lévi, MSA, p. 59.3-19:
yathā māyā tathābhūtaparikalpo nirucyate |
yathā māyākṛtaṃ tadvat dvayabhrāntir nirucyate ||
yathā tasmin na tadbhāvaḥ paramārthas tathēsyate |

yathā tasyōpalabdhis tu tathā samvṛtisatyatā ||
 tadabhāve yathā vyaktis tannimittasya labhyate |
 tathāśrayaparāvṛttāv asatkalpasya labhyate ||
 tannimitte yathā loko hy abhrāntaḥ kāmataḥ caret |
 parāvṛttāv aparyastaḥ kāmācārī tathā patiḥ ||

11. In MSA XI.25, 29-30, the image of illusion is also mentioned, but in slightly different ways; nowhere are the requisite heuristic additions of the commentators completed in the verse text; cf. Lévi, MSABh, p. 59.5-21; SAVBh, sDe-dge sems-tsam, mi, fols. 175a6-176b1; in the following material I have utilized the above two commentaries rather indiscriminately; cf. also Niḥsvabhāva's rather inconsequential commentarial material on these verses, MSAT, sDe-dge sems-tsam, vol. bi, fols. 85a6-87a6.

12. Lévi, MSABh to XI.37, p. 64.10-12.

13. Cf. MVBh III.13, Nagao, pp. 42-43.

14. Lévi, MSA, pp. 64.21-65.13; SAVBh, sDe-dge sems-tsam, mi, fols. 187a1-188b1:

yathānāmārtham arthasya nāmaḥ prakhyānatā ca yā |
 asaṃkalpanimittam hi parikalpita lakṣaṇam || 39
 trividhatrividhābhāso grāhyagrāhaka lakṣaṇaḥ |
 abhūtaparikalpo hi paratantrasya lakṣaṇam || 40
 abhāvabhāvatā ya ca bhāvābhāvasamānatā |
 asāntasāntā 'kalpā ca pariniṣpannalakṣaṇam || 41

15. See above, Part I, Chapter Three.c, for a consideration of this problem.

16. SAVBh, fol. 187b2-3.

17. Lévi, MSABh, p. 65.1-5; SAVBh, fol. 187b4-6. These are also introduced in MAVBh to III.22, Nagao, p. 48.10-14.

18. Lévi, MSA, p. 65.14-22; SAVBh, sems-tsam mi, fol. 188b1-190a7:

niṣyandadharmam ālambya yoniśo manasikriyā |
 cittasya dhātau sthānam ca sadasattārthapaśyanā || 42
 samatāgamaṇaṁ tasminn āryagotraṁ hi nirmalaṁ |
 samaṁ viśiṣṭam anyūnānadhikaṁ lakṣaṇā matā || 43

19. Lévi, MSABh, p. 65.16-20.

20. Cf. Pradhan, ASam, pp. 82.14-83.1; ASam-Tib, Peking sems-tsam li, fol. 123a3-8; Tatia, ASamBh, p. 100.5-24.

21. SAVBh, sem-tsam mi, fol. 189a2-4.

22. These paths will be covered in Part IV.

23. Lévi, MSA, p. 66.3-9; SAVBh, fols. 190a7-191a6:
 padārthadehanirbhāsaparāvṛttir anāsravaḥ |
 dhātur bījaparāvṛtteḥ sa ca sarvatragāśrayaḥ || 44
 caturdhā vaśītāvṛtter manasaś cōdgrahaśya ca |
 vikalpasyâvikalpe hi kṣetre jñāne 'tha karmaṇi || 45
24. Cf. MSA XI.47, IX.78-81, XIX.48; MAV I.6-7; Pradhan,
ASam, p. 82.18.
25. Lévi, MSA, p. 9.10-13; SAVBh, fols. 32b7-33b1.
26. Lévi, MSABh, p. 66.5 f.
27. SAVBh fol. 191a2-6.
28. Cf. Kośa VII.37, 42 for these two lists and note that
 the Kośa lists six abhiññā.

CHAPTER SIX:

Absolutistic Transformation

Unlike the previously discussed models of reality, the model employing suchness or thusness (tathatā) is not a theoretically self-contained system. The reason for this state of affairs is that thusness represents a model of the absolute and can be, and was, used in conjunction with various systems describing phenomena. Above, in Part I, we have seen that the matrix of generation for the model of the absolute was the general formula of the doctrine of dependent origination, and thus the doctrinal environment of thusness has much in common with the environment of the three natures, which shares the same origin. When utilized in conjunction with the doctrine of the three natures, indeed, thusness was most often identified as a cognitive synonym of the perfected nature and emptiness.¹

While this usage reflects the common origin of the two, it must be emphasized that, unlike the standard definitions of the perfected nature which emphasize its transcendence, thusness was also employed as an immanent construct. So, in opposition to some of its cognitive synonyms, thusness enjoyed a wide variety of speculations concerning the number and function of the kinds of thusness.² In this capacity, it shares some qualities of the kinds of uncompounded

elements (asamakṛtadharma) which the early Abhidharma traditions identified, and we in fact find that it is under the rubric of an uncompounded element that thusness initially makes its entrance into the scholastic Abhidharma of the Mahīśāśakas.³ Unlike the utilization of the uncompounded dharmas, though, thusness in the Mahāyāna systems tended to enter into relatively close association with phenomena.⁴ The famous formulation in the Samd of the seven varieties of thusness, so influential in the Yogācāra tradition, elegantly exhibits the utilization of thusness in a variety of philosophical and soteriological environments.⁵ While these seven were redefined by the author of the MAV as referencing thatness, the subcommentary of Sthiramati on this section of the MAV most succinctly defines the range of these seven:

a. pravṛttitathatā. Operational thatness is the beginninglessness and endlessness of existence, and is also referred to as operational thusness since there is never juncture with the end of existence.

b. lakṣaṇatathatā. Definitive thatness is the selflessness of beings and elements. Because it possesses the quality of not being otherwise, it is also referred to as the fourfold definitive thusness.⁶

c. viññaptitathatā. Apparent thatness is the quality of the mere appearance of dharmas. Others say that nonconceptual gnosis is the apparent thatness, since it exists as the basis of appearance. Since there is the lack of the quality of not being otherwise for apparent thatness, it is also called apparent thusness.

d. samnviveśatathatā. Attaching thatness is the truth of suffering, since there is the attachment of suffering to the compounded dharmas. Having

been considered, "Always just thus," it is also called thusness.

e. mithyāpratipattitathatā. The thatness of deluded accomplishment is the truth of the origin of suffering. Moreover, it is that which functions through seeing qualities in the compounded elements.

f. viāuddhitathatā. The thatness of purity is the purification of the two obacurations of defilements and the knowable. Moreover, it is thusness and the truth of the cessation of suffering. Others maintain that, having the essence of fundamental transformation and the essence of cessation, it is just the truth of cessation.⁷

g. samyakpratipattitathatā. The thatness of correct accomplishment is the truth of the path. Now, apparent thatness may also be correct application, so others maintain that both the thatness of correct accomplishment and apparent thatness constitute the truth of the path. These latter three forms of thatness, being always thus, are also referred to as thusness.⁸

The explicit connection of fundamental transformation with the purified form of thusness is telling and indicative of how the relationship between these two developed. Fundamental transformation primarily occurs in relation with thusness in its capacity as the undefiled absolute object. The formula, first described in the MSA, is that of the disappearance of the incorrect or unreal object and its replacement with the appearance of the correct or real object. This transformation comes under the aegis of gnosis and is described in four verses in MSA XIX:

51. The wise consider that gnosis has thusness as its object, is devoid of grasping after duality, and observes the entire corpus of hindrances, since it occurs for the sake of their elimination.

52. Indeed, that gnosis, its object thusness, is concerned with nondifferentiation; observing objects both real and unreal, it is called the master of conceptualization.

53. But the naive have obscured thatness--for them nonthatness appears in all ways; Bodhisattvas, though, have discarded nonthatness--for them thatness appears in all ways.

54. Now the disappearance of the unreal object and the appearance of the real object is to be known as the transformation of the fundament; it is liberation and the ability to do just as one likes.⁹

Certainly one of the most interesting facets of these verses is that vv. 51-2 acknowledge that thusness occurs at all levels of reality. The cognition of that fact takes into account both real (sat) and unreal (asat) objects. On the other hand, the soteriological fact is that the disappearance of the unreal and the appearance of the real (asadarthasadarthayor akhyānakhyānatā) identifies the actual advancement along the path to enlightenment. As was already indicated by Sthiramati's statement in connection with the thusness of purity, fundamental transformation is involved with the appearance of the real, despite the fact that the real may inhere in some way within the unreal.

In his commentary to MAV I.16, Sthiramati translates this process into the language of one of the other cognitive synonyms for the absolute: emptiness.¹⁰ The verse describes emptiness in terms of impure (samalā) and pure (nirmalā). Sthiramati maintains that this distinction is based on whether there is the transformation of the fundament or not

(āśrayaparāvṛttvaparāvṛttvapekayā). Really the essential difference, according to our commentator, is that emptiness cannot appear within the mental stream of those who are unaware and defiled with the fixation on subject and object. So this unappearing emptiness is called 'impure'. Conversely, the emptiness which appears to the saints is called pure. Now the question is raised: If emptiness moves (vikāra) from the position of impure to the position of pure, how can it be exempt from impermanence? The answer is that there is no movement. These defilements are entirely adventitious (āgantuka). Three similes are offered in MAV I.16cd. Like water, gold, or the sky, emptiness may partake of impurities which do not affect the basic nature of the substance. These impurities are eliminated without the transmutation of the entity but by the transformation of the environment surrounding the entity. Therefore, the absolute must be considered the locus of transformation rather than the subject of transformation.

This formulation of the disappearance of the unreal object and the appearance of the real was destined to occur again in the DhDhV and the MSa. However, it is one of the historical ironies that, when a synthesis of this variety of fundamental transformation occurred with the psychological and gnosecological varieties under the direction of the Nālandā school of Vijñānavāda, the verses chosen from the MSA to explicate the transformation were not the ones given above. Instead verses from the ninth chapter, to be

discussed in Part III, became the vehicle for the elaboration of this doctrine, and the language of disappearance and revelation was relegated to the textual backwater.

Notes to Part II: Chapter Six

1. MAV I.14, Nagao, p. 23:
tathatā bhūtakotīś cānimittam paramārthatā |
cārmadhātus ca paryāyāḥ śūnyatāyāḥ samāsataḥ ||
2. The terms tattva and śūnyatā were particularly susceptible to extensive elaboration; for śūnyatā cf. Lamotte, Le Traité, vol. 4, pp. 1995-2151; for tattva cf. Ch. III of the MAV, Nagao, pp. 37-49.
3. Masuda, "Origin and Doctrines," p. 61; Bareau, Les Sectes, p. 185.
4. It is, of course, entirely outside of the scope of this work to provide a history of the doctrines of the absolute or even a brief history of thusness or thatness (tattva), or any of their cognitive synonyms. For a good summary of the varieties of the earlier materials on the absolute, see André Bareau, L'Absolu en Philosophie Bouddhique: Evolution de la Notion d'Asaṃskṛta, Paris: Centre de Documentation universitaire, 1951.
5. Lamotte, Samd VIII.20.2, pp. 99-100, 219, where the seven are presented as the object of specific awareness of the object just as it is (yathābhāvikatārthapratisaṃvid); cf. MSA XIX.44 and commentary.
6. These four are most likely the imputation and denegation of existence and nonexistence in the cases of beings and elements (pudgaladharmavācā bhāvābhāvāsamāropāpavāda) described in MAV III.4, Nagao, p. 38.
7. I am a little unclear about Sthiramati's point. Is it that the unnamed others do not accept that klesajñeyāvaranaviśuddhi or tathatā as nirodhasatya?
8. Pandey, MAVT to MAV III.14, pp. 101.25-102.9 reading with Yamaguchi's edition in note 5:
tatra pravṛttitattvam yā saṃsārānavarāgratā saiva ca
pravṛttitathatā yasmān na jātu tasyāgratāyogo bhavati |
lakṣaṇatattvaṃ pudgaladharmānirātmyam | ananyathātvāc
caturvidhalakṣaṇatathatā | vijñaptitattvaṃ vijñaptimātratā
dharmāṇām | nirvikalpaṃ jñānaṃ vijñaptyaśrayabhāvād
vijñaptitattvam ity apare | ananyathābhāvatvād
vijñaptitattvasya vijñaptitathatocyate | saṃniveśatattvaṃ
duḥkhasatyaṃ saṃakārāṇāṃ duḥkhasaṃniviṣṭatvāt | saiva ca
tathatā nityam tathāivēti kṛtvā | mithyāpratipattitattvaṃ
samudayasatyaṃ | sā punar yā teṣu saṃakāreṣu guṇadarśanena
pravṛttih | viśuddhitattvaṃ klesajñeyavaranaśuddhiḥ | sa
punas tathatā nirodhasatyaṃ ca | āśrayaparāvṛtṭyātmatā

nirodhātmatā nirodhasatyam evêty apare | sanyakpratipatti-
tattvaṃ mārgasatyam | vijñaptitattvaṃ yoniśaḥ prayogaḥ |
sanyakpratipattitattvaṃ vijñaptitattvaṃ ca mārgasatyam evêty
anye | etāny api trīṇi tattvāni nityaṃ tathaiivêti tathatā-
vacanaṃ bhavati |. Cf. the descriptions of the seven
tathata given in SAVBh, sDe-dge sams-tsam, vol. ci, fols.
204a1-205a5; Josho Nozawa, ed., Āryamaitreya-Kevala-
Parivarta-Bhāṣyam Saṃdhiniraocana-sūtre, Kyoto: Hozokan,
1957, pp. 49.6-53.6.

9. Lévi, MSA XIX.51-54, p. 169.18-170.10; SAVBh, vol. ci,
fols. 210b7-214a4:

tathatālembanaṃ jñānaṃ dvayagrāhavivarjitaṃ |
dauṣṭhulyakāyapratyakṣaṃ tatksaye dhīmatāṃ mataṃ || 51
tathatālembanaṃ jñānaṃ anānākārabhāvitāṃ |
sadasattārthe pratyakṣaṃ vikalpavibhu cōcyate || 52
tattvaṃ saṃchādya bālānāṃ atattvaṃ khyāti sarvataḥ |
tattvaṃ tu bodhisattvānāṃ sarvataḥ khyāty apāsya tat || 53
akhyānakhyānatā jñeyā asadarthasadarthayoḥ |
āśrayasya parāvrttir mokṣo 'sau kāmācārataḥ || 54

10. The following material taken from MAVT to I.16, Pandey,
p. 40.22 f.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

Embryo of the Tathāgata

In approaching the statements of fundamental transformation surrounding the tathāgatagarbha model, we must be careful to understand the circumstances of model development and fusion. While early texts, such as the Śrīmālādevīsīmhanādesūtra or the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, discuss the system as an autonomous model, the actual employment of the terminological environment of fundamental transformation only came about with the amalgamation of the doctrine of the embryo of the Tathāgata with other models.¹ Certainly, the putative scriptural basis for this model-- that of the beginningless element (anādikālikadhātu) described in the famous verse of the MābS--delineates the transformation of that element, being the basis for cyclic existence and the obtainment of nirvāṇa. Yet the actual employment of 'fundamental transformation' to define this alteration in state was the product of the synthetic statements found primarily in two texts: the RGVV and the Laṅk. Because the former follows closely the model of thusness we will discuss it in this chapter.² The Laṅk doctrines, much more varied and syncretic, will be examined in Part III.

While the term fundamental transformation (āśraya-parāvṛtti) is mentioned in the RGV in one of the appended verses in Chapter Five, its formal discussion is limited to the RGVV.³ The principal statements are to be found in the commentary to the second chapter of the RGV, which discusses, according to the RGVV, the undefiled thusness (nirmalā tathatā). Within this chapter, the RGVV defines the embryo of the Tathāgata in terms of being defiled thusness (śamalā tathatā). Indeed, the tathāgatagarbha is the element which is enveloped within the sheath of as yet unreleased defilements (yo 'sau dhātur avinirmuktakleśakośas tathāgatagarbha ity ukto).⁴ Its ultimate purity is the basis for the definition of fundamental transformation (tad-viśuddhir āśrayaparivṛtteḥ avabhāvo veditavyaḥ).⁵ This purification is of two varieties--that which is natural (prakṛtīviśuddhi) and that which is purificatory (vaimalyā):

That which is called purity is the nature of fundamental transformation. Briefly, this purity is twofold: natural purity and purificatory purity. The natural purity is liberation but it is not dissociated. This occurs because the natural clear light of the mind is not dissociated from the adventitious defilements. The purificatory purity is both liberation and dissociation. This happens because there is the dissociation of the natural clear light of the mind from the adventitious defilements without exception, just as there is natural clarity of water, etc., when separated from mud, etc.⁶

This act of the destruction of the various stains or defilements may be liken to the purification of gold; when cleansed of its impurities, both gold and the mind become lustrous.⁷

Stainless thusness, on the other hand, is defined in at least two ways in the RGVV. It may be considered to be just that fundamental transformation, since for the Buddhas there is the total dispersal of defilements within the undefiled realm (nirmalā tathatā yāsu buddhānāṃ bhagavantāṃ anāśravadhātau sarvākāramalavigamād āśravaparivṛttir vyavasthāpyate).⁸ Alternatively, it may be considered the dharma-kāya of the Tathāgatas at the level of the Buddhas, since this body has the characteristic of fundamental transformation (nirmalā tathatā sa eva buddhabhūmāv āśravaparivṛttīlakṣaṇo yas tathāgatadharmakāya ity ucyate).⁹ For these reasons the dharma-kāya is said to be free from doubt (niskāṅkṣa).¹⁰ The cause for fundamental transformation, and consequently for stainless thusness, is the combination of mundane and supermundane gnosis (laukikalokottarajñānaṃ āśravaparivṛttihetuḥ), otherwise known as the gnosis which is free from mentation (avikalpa) and that which is obtained following the former (tatprasthā-labdha).¹¹ Since gnosis is termed the cause of fundamental transformation, the latter in turn is identified as the result which is dissociated from the defilements (visamyogaphalasaṃjñita).¹²

The above descriptions of the function of fundamental transformation in the movement from the condition of the embryo of the Tathāgata to the condition of stainless thusness are interesting from their soteriological and gnoseological perspectives. As we have seen, the prior

utilizations of thusness identified it as the object of cognition (tathatālabana) and the locus of transformation. In the case of its utilization in the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine, though, it is embedded within the subject. Ridding oneself of defilements is not strictly a case of the nonapprehension of the incorrect object and apprehension of the correct one. Instead, the subjective component is emphasized, and dissociation (visaṃyoqa), the old Sarvāstivāda term for 'cessation through insight' (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), is the goal. This dissociation is the purificatory purity (vaimalyaviśuddhi) by which the stains are removed and the fundement is transformed into the stainless thusness. With the emphasis on the subjective component came the emphasis on necessity, which is inherent in the terminological environment of 'the embryo of the Tathāgata'. Thus the individual in his bound state, not some theoretical entity such as 'incorrect conceptualization', became the primary concern of the author of the RGVV. This subjectivization of thusness will ultimately bear fruit in the Laṅkā in the identification of tathāgatagarbha with the underlying consciousness (ālayavijñāna), as we shall see in the following section.

Notes to Part II: Chapter Seven

1. For the early textual history of the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha, see Part I, Ch 3.d and note 76.
2. This material has been already examined thoroughly by Ruegg, La Théorie, pp. 269, 421-22.
3. E.H. Johnston, The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāvānottaratantra-śāstra, Patna: Bihar Research Society Museum Buildings, 1950, p. 116.6-7, v. V.7:
 āśraye tatparāvṛttau tadguṇeṣv arthasādhane |
 caturvidhe jinajñānaviśaye asmin yathôdite || 7
 Johnston has suggested (p. 116, n.2) that the original reading was parivṛttau in 7a. For the structure of the RGV and RGVV see Takasaki, A Study on the RGV, pp. 10-19.
4. Johnston, RGVV, pp. 21.8, 79.10.
5. Johnston, RGVV, p. 79.10-11.
6. Johnston, RGVV, p. 80.15-19:
 yad ukta āśrayaparivṛtteḥ avabhāvo viśuddhir iti tatra
 viśuddhiḥ samāśato dvidvidha | prakṛtiviśuddhir
 vaimalyaviśuddhiś ca | tatra prakṛtiviśuddhir yā vimuktir
 na ca viśaṃyogaḥ prabhāśavarāyāś cittaaprakṛter
 āgantukanalaviśaṃyogāt | vaimalyaviśuddhir vimuktir
 viśaṃyogaś ca vāryādīnām iva rajojalādibhyaḥ prabhāśavarāyāś
 cittaaprakṛter anavaśeṣaṃ āgantukanalebhyo viśaṃyogāt ||
7. Johnston, RGVV, pp. 38.17-39.1: āśrayaparivṛtter
 āśravakṣayasya varṇasādarmyaṃ tasyātyantavimalaviśuddha-
 prabhāśavaralakṣaṇatvāt |.
8. Johnston, RGVV, p. 79.2-3.
9. Johnston, RGVV, p. 21.9-11.
10. Johnston, RGVV, p. 79.11-12.
11. Johnston, RGVV, p. 79.13-14.
12. Johnston, RGVV, p. 82.5-6.

PART III:**SYNTHESIS IN TRANSFORMATION**

CHAPTER ONE:

Systems Synthesis and the Mahāvānasūtrāṅkāra

In the previous part we have seen that the terminology of āśraya-parivṛtti was identified with the manipulation of various models within select chapters of works associated, for the most part, with the Yogācāra milieu. At the beginning of that part we established a caveat that most of the works under discussion included more than one system in their views on reality and that examining the metamorphosis of these systems out of context could be misleading were no warning issued. While such admonitions are perhaps superfluous in the case of the YoBh, which rarely imputes cognitive synonymy between the systems it discusses, awareness of the synthetic nature of other texts is paramount.

There is no better example of this than the MSA. It is certainly the earliest syncretic Yogācāra text which is at our disposal, although it may in fact take its lead from the MabS, no longer preserved. We have already seen in Part I that MSA XI brings together the various topics of mere cognition (viñaptimātra), the three natures (trisvabhāva), incorrect conceptualization (abhūtaparikalpa), and a doctrine of illusion (māyāvāda) to form the first explicit statement of thorough-going idealism. Extensively developed are also ideas of the absolute, whether in the guise of thusness (tathatā), thatness (tattva), the realm of the

dharmā (dharmadhātu), and so forth. Moreover, the presence of this element within the individual--realized or not--has been considered in detail in many forms, as the lineage (gotra), the embryo of the Tathāgata (tathāgatagarbha), 'buddhity' (buddhatva), and mentality (cittadhātu). Indeed, the primary difficulty in comprehending the material found in the MSA is its disparate nature, so that every few verses new terminological environments are introduced to the confusion of the reader.

Into this hothouse of cenobitic lore have also been placed the sprouts of fundamental transformation, so that in the several terminological milieux there occurs a floressence of this topic. We have already seen the occurrence of this in the case of the discussion of the three natures, found in the eleventh chapter of the MSA, the chapter devoted to the investigation of the dharmā. Two other prime locations require our attention, both of them being found in the chapter dedicated to the discussion of enlightenment (bodhi) and its circumstances.¹ The present chapter will be devoted to an examination of the specific verses, their commentaries, and their implications.

The chapter opens with a discussion of the principal topic: 'buddhity' (buddhatva, buddhatā), the quality of awakening.² It is the obtaining of omniscience (sarvākāra-ṇātāpti), free from all obscurations (āvaraṇa) through their destruction.³ It is described as similar to a basket of

jewels (ratnapetā) which is uncovered. Because it is the cause of the jewel of the dharma, it is like a gem mine. Because it is the cause of the fruitful crop of virtue, it is like a rain-laden cloud. It is the best of protectors from such difficulties as the defilements, bad conduct, birth and death, the perverse views which lead to wrong paths, and so forth. Therefore, 'buddhity' is the highest of refuges (saranottama).

In the description of 'buddhity' as the best of refuges, one anustubh verse is given with three commentarial verses:

IX.11 As long as there remains the world of sentient beings, 'buddhity' will be considered the great refuge for the turning back (vyāvṛtti) of all difficulties (vyasana) and the generation of all welfare.

12. The seed of the obacuations, defilement and the knowable, which has always followed along for such a long time, becomes destroyed in 'buddhity' by all the well-extended varieties of elimination; this 'buddhity' is the transformation (anyathāpti) of the fundamēt, being endowed with the best qualities of the bright characteristics; its acquisition is through the path of gnosis, nonconceptual, very pure, and great in its range.

13. The Tathāgata is established in that [buddhity], looking out over the world like one standing atop the lord of mountains; he is compassionate even towards those who delight in peacefulness; how much more shall we say of his feelings towards those others who delight in conditioned existence?

14. Operation, ascendance, nonoperation, the fundamēt, abandonment, entrance, dual and nondual, equivalent yet superior, and all-embracing; thus the transformation of the Tathāgatas is understood.⁴

Concerning this section, we should first say that Vasubandhu I has misunderstood the arrangement of the verses in this specific section. He includes IX.11 in the verses which explain the supremacy of refuge (śaraṇānuttarya) and discusses IX.12 as the first of six verses discussion fundamental transformation (IX.12-17) while in reality vv. IX.15-17 belong to the following section--why 'buddhity' is all-embracing, but not apparent. The reason for his misunderstanding is his lack of recognition of the importance of the anuṣṭubh verses and how they are explained, and sometimes introduced, by the others.

This said, we must note that the terminology of transformation given in these verses utilizes verbal nouns which are often equivalents to -parivṛtti.⁵ The above verses constitute a virtual list of these verbal nouns and show the wide range of variation of meaning which -parivṛtti must carry, although some of them are nonstandard. The lead-in term in all of this was, of course, 'turning back' (vyāvṛtti) of all difficulties (vyasana) in IX.11. Sthiramati glosses this latter term by 'sufferings' (duḥkha) such as birth, old age, sickness, and death, etc.⁶ 'Turning back', though, is commonly utilized with the defilements and is often synonymous with -parivṛtti/-parāvṛtti, as is verified by its use in MSA IX.47.⁷ Both are, moreover, relatively equivalent to 'abandonment' (nivṛtti), which we have seen used in the TrimBh.⁸

In IX.12, the term given is 'obtaining another condition within the fundament' (āśrayasya-anyathāpti). It is obvious from the context that this indicates ridding the 'buddhity' of the seed of the dual obscuration, a circumstance which plays on the basic model of the absolute. Indeed, this 'buddhity' is referred to as thusness in IX.22, and we are left with little doubt that it also indicates its cognitive synonym, the stainless realm (anāśravadhātu), as given in IX.20.

Besides the standard terms of 'abandonment', 'turning about', etc., a more positive, active element is implied in some of the equivalents given in IX.14, particularly 'operation' (pravṛtti), 'ascendancy' (udvṛtti), and 'entrance' (āvṛtti). The Bhāṣya explains the first of these as the activity of the Tathāgatas for the sake of others (parārthavṛttir iti pravṛttiḥ).⁹ Because fundamental transformation is superior to all other qualities, it is the higher function of ascendancy (utkr̥ṣṭā vṛttir iti udvṛttiḥ). Finally, since fundamental transformation is unlimited, it has an extended function, entrance (āyatā vṛttir iti āvṛttiḥ). Over and above these positive qualities, the fundamental transformation of the Tathāgatas is similar (samā) to that of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, since it is liberation (vimukti). It is clearly superior (viśiṣṭā), though, since it embraces all the special attributes of the Buddha (āveṇikadharmā), the powers, the forms of fearlessness (vaiśāradya), and so forth.

It is just this positive application of the doctrines of transformation which leads into the discussion of sovereignty (vibhutva/vibhutā) as its fruit. The exposition begins with IX.38-40, three verses which classify sovereignty on a scale of dominance: the sovereignty of the Śrāvakas over that of ordinary beings, that of the Pratyekabuddhas over the Śrāvakas, and up through the Bodhisattvas, whose sovereignty cannot approach even a fraction of the sovereignty of the Tathāgatas. Indeed, the sovereignty of the Buddhas is immeasurable and inconceivable, functioning in whatever time and space, for whoever and however desired. The specific qualities of their sovereignty, though, is connected with the specific kinds of fundamental transformation which they have accomplished:

IX.41 When there is the transformation of the five senses, there is obtained highest sovereignty over the functioning of the objects and over the arising of the 1200 qualities of all [the senses].¹⁰

42. When there is also the transformation of the intellect (manas), there is obtained highest sovereignty over the stainless, nonconceptual gnosis which attends sovereignty.

43. When there is the transformation of appropriation together with the object (aārthodgraha), there is obtained highest sovereignty over the purity of the field, for the display of enjoyments just as one desires.

44. When there is the transformation of conceptualization, there is obtained highest sovereignty over the unimpedance of all action and knowledge through all time.¹¹

Again here we have met with the discussion of the transformation of the senses and the forms of mental functioning which somehow address the internal and external cognition.¹² The difference is that, in opposition to the discussion found in MSA XI, the exposition is not applied to the model of the three natures. On the contrary, it is obvious that this is the remnant of a psycho-physical system which was brought into play as a model amenable to the idealistic interpretation. Such an interpretation, though, is not directly offered here. Indeed, the straightforward usage of the senses, objects, etc., would tend to mitigate against this application.

Be that as it may, Sthiramati does not shy away from taking the exegetical bull by the horns but directly asks the pertinent question: If the external world is nonexistent like the horns of a hare, how is it that the senses--physical entities (rūpaprāsāda) in the Buddhist scholastic usage--are to be transformed? The answer he gives, though, is not so satisfactory and merely restates the pat answer of the Vijñānavādins: the maturation of existent seeds within the underlying consciousness cause the appearance of subject and object. The six forms of sensory consciousness are to be understood as the six 'internal senses' (adyātmikāndriya) and the first five of these are the topic of MSA IX.41.¹³ While such an answer may be hermeneutically valid in the context of the idealism of the MSA--which does not utilize any doctrine of the underlying

consciousness--it still leaves us in the dark as to why the author would make the distinction between the senses and the sense objects, instead of merely transforming the consciousness alone. The reasonable reply is that the idealism of the MSA is not well thought out. Vyavadātasamaya has not remembered to apply it to all his categories and, so we have vestigial statements of prior systems which are obscure because they have been superceded.

Moving on to the internal forms of cognition in verses 42-44--intellect (manas), appropriation (udgraha), and conceptualization (vikalpa)--we see that, while they have become the subject of transformation, the fruit of their manipulation is sovereignty (vibhūṭva). Later on, as we shall see in Chapter Four of this part, the fruit of the transformation of the various forms of consciousness will be strictly described in terms of gnosis by the scholastic authors. In this text, though, that process has yet to take place. Still, IX.42 definitely represents a beginning in that direction. The transformation of the intellect gives one power over gnosis, and gnosis is furthermore described as attendant on sovereignty so that one hand washes the other. Here again, we find that, to some extent, gnosis is the result rather than the cause of fundamental transformation. The difficult term 'appropriation' (udgraha) is also encountered, and we see that it must be some form of directed consciousness, not the mere apprehension of the sense object. If we recollect that sensory consciousness

may be accompanied by positive qualities (kuśāla) or defilements (kliṣṭa) in the YoBh, then perhaps 'udgraha' is a term representing a latter moment of that form of consciousness.¹⁴ The pure land is, nevertheless, the object of the transformation of this faculty, and sovereignty over the form of the Buddha-field is the result. Sthiramati notes that, with this power, one can cause the ground of that peculiar country to appear in the color of cat's-eye, crystal, gold, or whatever one wishes. Finally, the transformation of conceptualization (vikalpa) means that time and space have no boundaries for the Tathāgata. His is the power to know and act (jñānakarma) whenever and wherever he wishes. The implication is that the realities of time and space are mental acts; to change one's conceptual conduct is to escape the parameters of existence.

The author follows the above forms of transformation with more general varieties:

45. When there is the transformation of locale, there is obtained the highest sovereignty over nonlocalized nirvāṇa, the immovable state of the Buddhas.

46. When there is the transformation of copulation, there is obtained the highest sovereignty over the blissful residence of the Buddhas and over the vision of women without the arising of passion.

47. When there is the transformation of spacial ideation, there is obtained the highest sovereignty both over the accomplishment of whatever object is conceived and over the manifestation in any form within any realm of existence.

48. And thus when there is this immeasurable transformation, it is considered the immeasurable sovereignty over the pure fundament of the Buddhas, because of the accomplishment of inconceivable activity.¹⁵

These verses are relatively self-explanatory. Sthiramati feels once again called on to explain that the 'locale' mentioned in verse 45 is in fact the underlying consciousness, which performs yeoman's service in his commentary.¹⁶ While a more detailed explanation of nirvāṇa must await the soteriological discussion in Part IV, we should just mention that 'nonlocalized' (apratisthita) indicates that the Tathāgata is not positioned either in samsāra or nirvāṇa because he is not bound to one or the other, as in the case of the worldly beings and the Arhats. The transformation of copulation in IX.46 follows from the monastic environment and verses 47-48 merely expand on the powers of the Tathāgata to effect all that has been implied already in IX.44.¹⁷

While the collective verses of the MSA concerning fundamental transformation total fewer than twenty, they have had a disproportionate impact on the continued fascination with this topic. Later exegetes, when explicating the process of transformation according to their own systems, have had recourse to the verses of the MSA. This was particularly noticeable in the case of the MSam, and found also among the scholars of Tibet.¹⁸

Notes to Part III: Chapter One

1. We should, of course, understand that this chapter title, like all the chapter titles of the MSA, has been given by the author of the MSABh. The verses of the MSA speak principally of 'buddhity' (buddhatva), although bodhi is discussed in vv. IX.27,50,51,& 80.

2. Since I am attempting to coin an odd-looking word in English, I should justify it to some degree. English has in fact two noun suffixes to indicate a quality or instance of a quality, -ity and -ness. The latter is derived from the OE -nea(s), -nia(s), and related to OHG -nessi, -nessi, -nissi. -ity, on the other hand, is a Latin suffix, derived from -tās, -tātem, and related to the Sanskrit -tā, -tva both of which are attested as suffixes to Buddha (MSA IX.2,3, etc.: buddhatva, buddhatā). The Latin noun suffix -ismus, denoting action or the activity related to the noun, has already been joined to the term Buddha in the form of Buddhism as early as 1801, and lead to the secondary formations of buddhist, buddhistic, buddhistical, all demonstrating their conjunction with the weak stem buddh-. While 'Buddhity' appears strange, both Sylvain Lévi and D.S.Ruegg have already utilized the French form of the noun 'Bouddhaté' (Lévi, Mahāvāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra, Tome II, Traduction, pp. 68 ff; Ruegg, La Théorie, pp. 247, 362). Cf. Oxford English Dictionary, London: Oxford University Press, 1971, under buddhism, -ity, -ness.

3. The following material is drawn from MSA IX.1-10.

4. Lévi, MSA, pp. 35.14-36.10:

ā lokāt sarvasattvānāṃ buddhatvaṃ śaraṇaṃ mahat |
 sarvavyasanasaṃpattivyāvṛtṭyabhyudaye matam || 11
 kleśajñeyāvṛtṭināṃ satatam anugataṃ bījaṃ utkrāṣṭakālaṃ
 yasminn astam prayātam bhavati suvipulahi sarvahānīprakāraiḥ
 buddhatvaṃ śūkladharmapravaragunayutā āśrayasyānyathāptis
 tatprāptir nirvikalpād viśayasamahato jñānamārgāt suśuddhāt |
 12.

sthitaś ca tasmin sa tathāgato jagan
 mahācalendrasaṭha ivābhyudīkṣate |
 śamābhirāmaṃ karuṇāyate janaṃ
 bhavābhirāme 'nyajane tu kā kathā || 13.
 pravṛttir udvṛttir avṛttir āśrayo
 nivṛttir avṛttir atho dvayādvayā |
 samā viśiṣṭā api sarvagātmikā
 tathāgatānāṃ parivṛttir iṣyate || 14.

5. Note here that the anustubh verses of the MSA utilize the term -parāvṛtti while IX.14 has introduced -parivṛtti into the text.

6. SAVBh, vol. mī, fol. 113a7.

7. See, for example, its use in the Laṅkā, Bunyiu Nanjio, ed., The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Bibliotheca Otaniensis vol. One, Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1956, pp. 64.3, 111.17, 121.9, 126.11, 127.7, 153.14, 163.4, 164.9, 165.5, 172.10, 173.17, 180.16, 185.6, 194.17, 200.2, 201.14, 212.7, 238.2, 325.14, 338.11.

8. See above, Part II, Ch. Four; Lévi, TriṃBh, p. 44.7-8: tasya parāvṛttir yā dauṣṭhulyavipākadvayavāsanābhāvena nivṛttau satyāṃ karmāṇyatādharma-kāyādvayajñānabhāvena parāvṛtṭiḥ ।.

9. The following material drawn from Lévi, MSABh, p. 36.11-18.

10. These 1200 qualities are not explained in the SAVBh, which merely applies them to each sense, and refers the reader to an *Ārya-dhāraṇī-maheśvara-rāja and the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra for details; SAVBh, vol. mī, fol. 126a5.

11. Lévi, MSA, p. 41.3-17:

pañcendriyaparāvṛttau vibhutvaṃ labhyate paraṃ ।
sarvārthavṛttau sarveṣāṃ guṇadvādaśaśatodaye ॥ 41
manaso 'pi parāvṛttau vibhutvaṃ labhyate paraṃ ।
vibhutvānucare jñāne nirvakalpe sunirmale ॥ 42
sārthodgrahaparāvṛttau vibhutvaṃ labhyate paraṃ ।
kṣetraśuddhau yathākāmaṃ bhogaśaṃdarśanāya hi ॥ 43
vikalpaśya parāvṛttau vibhutvaṃ labhyate paraṃ ।
avyāghāte sadākālaṃ sarveṣāṃ jñānakarmaṇāṃ ॥ 44

SAVBh, vol. mī, fols. 125a1-128a3.

12. Cf. the translation and discussion in Part II, Chapter Five above.

13. SAVBh, vol. mī, fol. 126a5-b1.

14. The term udgrahana is used in the MSABh to XVIII.25-26 to represent the cognition of something heard, very like the manoviññāna, with which Vasubandhu I identifies udgraha; Lévi, MSA, p. 136.27 and see MSABh to IV.7 where it appears equivalent to cintana, Lévi, p. 15.4.

15. Lévi, MSA, pp. 41.19-42.7:

pratiṣṭhāyāḥ parāvṛttau vibhutvaṃ labhyate paraṃ ।
apratīṣṭhītanirvāṇaṃ buddhānāṃ aśale pade ॥ 45
maithunasya parāvṛttau vibhutvaṃ labhyate paraṃ ।
buddhasaukhyavihāre 'tha dārśaṃkleśadarśane ॥ 46
ākāśasaṃjñāvyāvṛttau vibhutvaṃ labhyate paraṃ ।

cintitārthasamṛddhau ca gati rūpavibhāvane || 47
 ity ameyaparāvṛttāv ameyavibhutā matā |
 acintyakṛtyānuṣṭhānād buddhānām amalāśraye || 48
SAVBh, vol. mi, fols. 128a3-129a5; note that here I have
 read with Sthiramati and the Chinese translation in IX.45d
 instead of amale pade of the Tibetan translation (Nagao,
Index of MSA, p. xiii). I have also put apratisthitānirvāṇa
 in the locative to agree with acale pade as the Tibetan
 exhibits agreement between these, and the parallel
 construction appears to require it: mi gnas pa yi mya ngan
 'das | aangs rgyas rnama kyi mi g.yo gnas ||; SAVBh, vol.
 mi, fol. 128a7.

16. SAVBh, fol. 128a3-b1.

17. We cannot mention MSA IX.46 without noting Sylvain
 Lévi's attempt to incorporate Vajrayāna sexual practices
 into the interpretation of this verse (Lévi, MSA Traduction,
 p. 81, n.) and was followed and expanded on by Prabodha
 Candra Bagchi in "A Note on the word Parāvṛtti" in his
Studies in the Tantras Part I, Calcutta: University of
 Calcutta, 1939, pp. 87-92. This view was quite adequately
 refuted by M. Winternitz in "Notes on the Guhya-Samāja
 Tantra and the Age of the Tantras," Indian Historical
Quarterly IX (1933):1-10. Having some experience in the
 arcane realm of Vajrayāna textual studies, I can say without
 fear of contradiction that reading Vajrayāna doctrines into
MSA IX.46 is a hopeless proposal. I have not encountered a
 single tradition which has attempted to justify or explain
 these practices based on this verse. There are also no
 indications that the Yogācāra Asaṅga had any connection with
 any Guhyamantra tradition. In the face of such a wealth of
 materials, this argumentum ex silencio is in fact
 significant.

18. See, the following chapter on the use of the MSA in the
 ninth chapter of the MSam. Among the Tibetan authors, see,
 for example, the commentary of Kong-sprul blo-gros mtha'-yas
 on the rNam par shes pa dang ye shes 'byed pa'i bstan bcos
 of Rang-byung rdo-rje, his rNam par shes pa dang ye shes
'byed pa'i bstan bcos kyi tshiq don go qsal du 'grel pa rang
byung dqong pa'i rgyan, Gangtok edition, n.d., in which
 twenty-two references to the MSA are given; fols. 27a1,
 28a5, 28b2, 28b4, 28b6, 30a1, 31a1, 31a3, 31a5, 31b2, 31b3,
 32a3, 32a6, 32b2, 32b6, 34a4, 34b4, 35a2, 35b3, 36a3, 37a2,
 37b3; the next most frequently quote text in this commentary
 is the MSam, which is given three quotes, fols. 26a4, 29a1,
 36a5.

CHAPTER TWO:

The Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Mahāyānasamgraha

While the MSA is concerned with fundamental transformation primarily in the elucidation of certain models, its major expositions of the path mention our topic in passing.¹ Both the ASam and the MSam, on the other hand, offer their major syncretic statements of transformation in the context of the path. Although a fuller discussion of the varieties of the Yogācāra path doctrines must await the next section, the materials presented by these two texts in the environment of those doctrines should be elucidated here.

The ASam makes its major statement at the end of the chapter on the truth of the path (mārga). There the final path (niṣṭhāmārga) is identified and defined:

What is the final path? It is the lightning-like concentration, obtained from the cleansing of all the hindrances, the elimination of all the attachments, and the realization of all the dissociations. Immediately following that [concentration] there is the contiguous fundamental transformation, the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements, the knowledge of their no longer arising, and the ten qualities of no more learning.²

Later this 'contiguous fundamental transformation' is identified by Asaṅga: it consists of three forms of fundamental transformation for one on the path of no more

learning--the fundamental transformation of the mind (cittāśrayaparivṛtti), of the path (mārgāśrayaparivṛtti), and of the hindrances (dausthulyāśrayaparivṛtti).³ As Asaṅga did not define any of these in the ASam, Jinaputra's commentary attempts to shed some light on these categories:

'Fundamental transformation of the mind' indicates 'elementality', being the transformation of the mind, which is naturally light, through the passing away of all its adventitious proximate defilements. The meaning is that of the transformation of thusness. 'The fundamental transformation of the path' means that the mundane path, at the time of realization, is transformed into the supermundane and called 'involves learning', since something is still to be done. When, though, all the obstacles are eliminated out of dispassion towards the entire triple world, then the transformation of the fundamēt, which is essentially the path, is fulfilled and established. 'Fundamental transformation of the hindrances' should be understood as the transformation of the underlying consciousness through the passing away of all the potential states of the defilements.⁴

Our translation is dissatisfactory with respect to the second of these because of the cryptic nature of the Sanskrit. Jinaputra is trying to establish that the fundamēt of mārgāśrayaparivṛtti is just the path itself, and the completion of the path is the fulfillment of its transformation.

It is fairly clear that the commentator is attempting to clarify the issues through the utilization of models which may not exactly correspond to Asaṅga's other textual trends. The tension between the terms citta-āśrayaparivṛtti and dausthulya-āśrayaparivṛtti appear similar to those we

have met earlier in the question of the four kinds of purity (pariśuddhi).⁵ There we determined that cittapariśuddhi actually indicates the cleansing of those hindrances (dausthulya) which are mental. The fundamental purity (āśrayapariśuddhi), though, indicates the cleansing of both physical and mental hindrances (kāyacittedausthulya). It certainly appears that Asaṅga's idiomatic use in the ASam of these three forms of transformation is modeled on the earlier kinds of purity which draw their source from the *Revata-sūtra. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Asaṅga maintains his doctrine of the essential purity of the mind, and perhaps the application of this to the 'fundamental transformation of the mind' is merely good exegesis. While it seems that Asaṅga developed these three varieties exclusively for the ASam, they became popular with the scholastics, particularly in the case of the commentators on certain verses in the MSa and the BuBh, and we will meet these varieties again later.⁶

It is perhaps significant to the question of authorship that the MSam utilizes none of the language concerning fundamental transformation which is employed in the ASam. Even the terminology is different, -parivṛtti being used in every text of Asaṅga's surviving in Sanskrit, while -parāvṛtti (gzhan du gyur) is indicated in the MSam. Earlier we observed the MSam's manipulation of the five aggregates in service of transformation. The major

statement, however, comes in the ninth chapter of the MSam which is entirely dedicated to the doctrine. Previous to this chapter the author delineates his theory of higher insight (adhiprajñā), which he describes as being essentially nonconceptual gnosis (avikalpajñāna).⁷ Following gnosis with the chapter on elimination completes the pair of attributes ascribed to the fully enlightened; they possess the most excellent elimination (pravaraprahāṇa) and most excellent gnosis (pravarajñāna):⁸

X.1 In that way the specifics of the higher insight (adhiprajñā) have been explained. How are the specifics of elimination (prahāṇa) to be viewed?

The Bodhisattva's elimination is nonlocalized nirvāṇa. Its characteristic is the fundamental transformation (āśrayaparāvṛtti) which is endowed with the rejection of defilements (kleśa) but which operates as the basis for the nonrejection of samsāra.

- a. Now samsāra is the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva) and is included in the part of this nature which contains difficulties (samkleśabhāga).
- b. Nirvāṇa, on the other hand, is included in the part which is purification (vyavadānabhāga).
- c. The fundament (āśraya) is included in both parts (ubhayabhāga), being the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva).
- d. Transformation is that wherein there is the birth of the antidotes (pratipakṣa), turning the dependent nature from its defiled part into its purified part.

2. If we summarize this transformation, it has six aspects:

1. durbalīkeraṇavardhanaparāvṛtti.⁹ The transformation through weakening and augmentation consists of the condition of very little or no arising (samudācāra) of the defilements by means

of intense interest (adhimuktibalena) while in the presence of the auditory traces (śrutavāsanā) [of the dharma] together with contrition.

ii. adhiḡama-parāvṛtti. The transformation by realization is the transformation which is acquired by the Bodhisattva entering the levels (bhūmi-pravīṣṭa). This lasts until the sixth level since there is the manifestation of the appearance of thatness or nonthatness (tattvātattvākhyāna).¹⁰

iii. bhāvanā-parāvṛtti. The transformation by means of cultivation is that of [Bodhisattvas] still possessed of obscurations [of the knowable] (jñeyāvaraṇa). This lasts until the tenth level since there is the non-appearance of all objects of cognition (sarvanimittākhyāna) and the appearance of thatness (tattvākhyāna).

iv. phalaparipūrī-parāvṛtti. The transformation of those who are entirely without either obscuration, since there is the non-appearance of all objects of cognition (sarvanimittākhyānāt), the appearance of the very pure reality (suviśuddhatattvākhyānāt), and the obtaining of sovereignty over all the objects of cognition (sarvanimittavibhūtvaprāptatvāt).

v. hīna-parāvṛtti. The lesser transformation is that of the Śrāvakas, and so forth. Their realization only penetrates personal selflessness (pudgalanairātmya), and, having turned their backs on samsāra, they entirely abandon it.

vi. viśāla-parāvṛtti. The extensive transformation is that of the Bodhisattvas. Realizing the selflessness of dharmas (dharmanairātmya), they view samsāra as peaceful (śānta). They thus eliminate the defilements while not rejecting samsāra.

Now what problems (ādīnava) would occur if the Bodhisattvas obtain the lesser transformation? Because they would not consider the interest of sentient beings, they would transgress the quality proper to the Bodhisattvas (bodhisattvadharmatām atikrāṃanti) and incur the problem of being in accord with the liberation (vimokṣa) of those of the lesser vehicle.

So what benefit (anuśaṃsa) is there to the great, extensive transformation of the Bodhisattvas? Because based on one's own fundamental transformation, the Bodhisattva obtains

sovereignty over all the elements of existence (samsāradharma). By demonstrating the various physical bodies of the beings in all the different realms of existence, the Bodhisattva utilizes the manifold skills of conversion to influence and establish the receptive within the advantages and within the triple vehicle (triyāna)--such are the benefits.

3. We have some verses:

a. The naive have obscured thatness--for them nonthatness appears in all ways; Bodhisattvas, though, have discarded nonthatness--for them thatness appears in all ways. [=MSA XIX.53]

b. Now the disappearance of the unreal object and the appearance of the real object is to be known as the transformation of the fundement; it is liberation and the ability to do just as one likes. [=MSA XIX.54]

c. When there is the gnosis of the equivalence (samatāñāna) of samsāra and nirvāṇa, then samsāra becomes nirvāṇa.

d. Thus there is to be neither rejection nor nonrejection of samsāra; thus there is to be neither obtainment nor nonobtainment of nirvāṇa.¹¹

While there is little here which is entirely new, the amalgamation of the various elements--the incorporation of the trivabhāva, the appearance of thatness, and the incorporation of all of this into a well-oiled path structure--certainly demonstrates much closer affinities with the manner of exposition of the MSA than of any other work. This affinity is conclusively demonstrated by the direct appropriation of MSA XIX.53-54 for the first two of the four summary verses at the end. It is certainly instructive to juxtapose the structure of MSam IX to the three varieties of fundamental transformation which we saw in the ASam. There is little evidence of affinity between

these two, either doctrinal, terminological, or with reference to the systems employed. The ASam has efficiently summarized the systemic environments wherein the YoBh has employed the terminology of āśraya-parivṛtti. Conversely, the MSam has elaborated extensively on the material presented in the MSA and, to a lesser extent, in the MAV. The ASam is concerned with the old categories of systems' structuring: the aggregates, the five 'bases' (pañcavastuka), the truths, and so forth. The MSam is exclusively concerned with the new systems and their synthesis in service of the path of the Bodhisattva.

In this latter capacity, we must especially note the one relatively radical alteration in doctrine found connected to fundamental transformation for the first time in the MSam: the observation of Saṃsāra as 'peaceful' (śānta). MSam IX.2.vi above, identifies this observation as the fruit of the 'extensive transformation' (viśālaparāvṛtti). It is said to come from the realization of the selfless of the particular elements of being (dharmanairātmya). Of course, this realization is part and parcel of the Mahāyāna and constitutes the standard definition of the difference between the Śrāvaka and the Bodhisattva, the former only realizing the selflessness of the individual (pudgala). It is perhaps a new contribution of the MSam to identify the Bodhisattva's observation of mundane existence as peaceful. Certainly this view is not shared with the earlier Yogācāra literature, and the MSABh

explicitly continues the earlier formula that 'nirvāṇa is peaceful' (nirvāṇam [eva] śāntam).¹² Early texts associated with Asaṅga, such as the ŚrBh, include 'peaceful' as one of the standard attributes of the truth of cessation, being the cessation of the mental stream.¹³ The ASam, too, naturally includes the characteristic of peacefulness within the truth of cessation because there is the dissociation from suffering.¹⁴ Nonself, though, is included in the truth of suffering, since it is the characteristic of all dharmas along with impermanence, suffering, and emptiness.¹⁵

Clearly there is at work here a mechanism which brings together the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of the first (duḥkha) and third (nirodha) of the four holy truths. The crossover is accomplished by the utilization of the three natures. In the ASam, Asaṅga mentions that the perception of the emptiness of the various dharmas leads to the knowledge of their nature (yathābhūtaṁjñāna).¹⁶ He then divides emptiness into three varieties: the emptiness of the essential nature (svabhāvaśūnyatā), the emptiness which is the nonexistence of its manner (tathābhāvaśūnyatā), and the natural emptiness (prakṛtiśūnyatā). These three are equated with, respectively, the imaginary nature, the dependent nature, and the perfected nature.

Later, in the section on the investigation of dharma, Asaṅga follows the statement general to the Mahāyāna and specific to the Samd, that all dharmas are without essential

nature (niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmāḥ).¹⁷ The lack of self (ātmabhāva) of the dharmas leads to the three varieties of selflessness which are established with respect to the three natures: selflessness of characteristic (lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā) relating to the imaginary nature, selflessness of arising (utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā) relating to the dependent nature, and the absolute selflessness (paramārthanīḥsvabhāvatā) relating to the perfected nature.¹⁸ Based on these he argues that dharmas are unborn (anutpanna); based on that they are undestroyed (aniruddha); based on that they are originally peaceful (ādiśānta); based on that they are naturally liberated in the state of nirvāṇa (prakṛti-parinirvṛtta).¹⁹

The establishment of all dharmas as initially peaceful, not an astonishing doctrine in and of itself, was thus wedded to the identification of all dharmas with the three natures. The last of these, the perfected nature, is often itself identified with nirvāṇa. Thus the conceptual and terminological framework which was initially applied to samsāra via the truth of suffering became applied to nirvāṇa (nirvāṇa = śūnyatā). Moreover, the framework of nirvāṇa became applied to the elements of reality (sarvadharmā ādiśāntāḥ). The jump made by the author of the MSam was to identify all elements with phenomenal reality and extend the terminological framework of nirvāṇa to conditioned existence itself, not just the members of existence. This perception was then made the fruit of the path and accessible to the

Bodhisattvas. In some sense this extension of absolute terminology was necessary to justify the Bodhisattvas' continued presence within existence to save beings and yet to be apart from suffering themselves. Still, we must remark how strange it is that the early doctrines of only nirvāṇa as peaceful could be reinterpreted to accept saṃsāra as peaceful in the Mahāyāna.²⁰

Notes to Part III: Chapter Two

1. MSA XIV.29,45, to be discussed in Part IV; āśraya-parāvṛtti is ignored in the bhūmi discussions found in MSA XX-XXI.
2. Pradhan, ASam, p. 76.9-11; T.1605.31.685b28-c2; Peking, sems-tsam 11, fol. 118b2-4:
 niṣṭhāmārgaḥ katamaḥ | vajropamaḥ samādhiḥ sarva-
 dauṣṭhulyānām pratipraśrabdheḥ sarvasaṃyogānām prahāṇāt
 sarvavisaṃyogānām adhigamāc ca | tadanantaram
 nirantarāśrayaparivṛttiḥ (Pradhan:-pravṛttiḥ prāpta-)
 kṣayañānam anutpādañānam daśāśaikṣā dharmāḥ |; Pradhan
 writes -pravṛtti for -parivṛtti throughout the ASam, and has
 included prāpta- on the basis of the Ch. translation, which,
 however, makes it a distributive verb, eg. prāpyante; the
 Tib. translation has read niravaśeṣāśrayaparivṛtti (gnas ma
 lus par gyur pa) for nirantara, while the latter is verified
 by both the commentary (ASamBh, Tatia, p. 93.15) and the Ch.
3. Pradhan, ASam, p. 77; T.1605.31.685c20-22; Peking, 11,
 fol. 109a6-7.
4. Tathia, ASamBh, p. 93.15-21:
 cittāśrayaparivṛttir dharmatā cittasya prakṛti-
 prabhāsavaraśāśeṣāgantukopakleśāpagamād yā parivṛttiḥ
 tathatāparivṛttir ity arthaḥ | mārgāśrayaparivṛttiḥ pūrvam
 laukiko mārgo 'bhīsamayakāle lokottaratvena parivṛttaḥ
 śaikṣāś cōcyate sāvaśeṣakaraṇīyatvāt | yadā tu
 nirhatāśeṣavipakṣo bhavati traidhātukavairāgyāt tadāśya
 mārgasvabhāvasyāśrayasya paripūrṇā parivṛttir vyavasthāpyate
 | dauṣṭhulyāśrayaparivṛttir ālayaviññānasya
 sarvakleśānuśayāpagamena parivṛttir veditavyā ||.
5. See above, Part II, Chapter Three.
6. See below, Chapter Four.
7. MSam VIII.1.1, Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, pp. 74-81, vol.
 2, pp. 232-258. This is an interesting description; the
 chapter arrangement of the MSam is bizarre. Ch. 8 is the
 chapter of higher insight, which describes gnosis. Ch. 10
 is the chapter of gnosis, but which describes the
dharmakāya. Between these two is the chapter on fundamental
 transformation.
8. See, for example, SAVBh, sDe-dge sems-tsam, m1, fol.
 106b6 f.

9. Lamotte, MSam, vol. 2, p. 261, has upabrāhmana for vardhana, which term is more commonly used for the Tib. rgyas par gyur pa.

10. Lamotte, MSam, vol. 2, p. 262 wishes to read tattvātattvākhyānākhyāna adding ākhyāna on analogy with MSA XIX.54; while we shall see a similar phrase occur in the DhDhV in the following chapter, the MSamU of Niḥsvabhāva does not bear out this reading, Peking, sams-tsam, li, fol. 332a1-2; Niḥsvabhāva clarifies that at this stage, there is sometimes the appearance of thatness, sometimes the appearance of nonthatness. Context, too, appears to preclude Lamotte's reading.

11. Lamotte, MSam, vol. 1, pp. 81-3, vol. 2, 259-265; MSamU, Peking sams-tsam, li, fols. 331a5-332b8:

1. de ltar lhag pa'i shea rab kyi khyad par batan to ||
spong ba'i khyad par ji ltar zhe na | byang chub sams dpa'i
rnama kyi spong ba ni mi gnas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa gang
yin pa'o || de'i mtshan nyid ni gang nyon mongs pa yongs su
btang ba dang bcas pa | 'khor ba yonga su mi gtong ba'i
gnas te gnas gyur pa'o |

a. de la 'khor ba ni gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid de kun
nas nyon mongs pa'i char gtogs pa'o |

b. mya ngan 'das pa ni de nyid rnam par byang ba'i char
gtogs pa'o |

c. gnas ni de nyid gnyi char gtogs pa ste | gzhan gyi
dbang gi ngo bo nyid do |

d. gzhan gyur pa ni gang gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid de
nyid kyi gnyen po skyes na gang kun nas nyon mongs pa'i cha
ldog cing rnam par byang ba'i char gyur pa'o |

2. gyur pa da yang mdor bsdu na | rnam pa drug ste |

i. nyam chung bar byed cing rgyas par gyur pa ni mos pa'i
dbang gis thos pa'i bag chags gnas pa dang | 'dzem pa dang
bcas pa la nyon mongs pa chung ngu tsam kun tu 'byung ba'am
| kun tu mi 'byung ba'i phyir ro |

ii. rtogs nas gyur pa ni sar chud pa'i byang chub sams dpa'
rnams kyi ste sa drug pa'i bar du de kho na dang de kho na
ma yin pa anang ba nye bar gnas pa'i phyir ro |

iii. bsgom pas gyur pa ni sgrib pa dang bcas pa rnams kyi
ste | sa bcu'i bar du mtshan ma thams cad mi anang ba dang
| de kho na anang ba'i phyir ro |

iv. 'bras bu yonga su rdzogs pa'i gyur pa ni sgrib pa med
pa rnams kyi ste | mtshan ma thams cad mi anang ba dang |
shin tu rnam par dag pa'i de kho na anang ba dang | mtshan
ma thams ca la dbang 'byor pa thob pa'i phyir ro |

v. gyur pa dman pa ni nyan thos rnams kyi ste | gang zag
la bdag med par rtogs pa dang | 'khor ba la shin tu rgyab
kyis phyogs par gyur pas 'khor ba shin tu yonga su gtong
ba'i phyir ro |

vi. gyur pa rgya che ba ni byang chub sams dpa'i rnams kyi
ste | chos la bdag med par rtogs pa dang | de nyid la zhi
bar mthong bar kun nas nyon mongs pa spong zhing yonga su mi
gtong ba'i phyir ro |

gyur pa dman pa byang chub sems dpa'i rname kyī yin na |
 nyes dmigs ci yod ce na | sems can gyi don la mi lta bas
 byang chub sems dpa'i chos nyid las shin tu 'das te | theg
 pa dman pa pa rname dang rnam par thar pa mtshungs pa'i nyes
 dmigs su 'gyur ro |

byang chub sems dpa'i rname kyī gyur pa [Lamotte:bsgyur ba]
 rgya chen po la phan yon ci yod ce na | rang gi gnas gyur
 pa'i gzhis 'khor ba'i chos thams cad la dbang 'byor pa thob
 pa'i phyir te | 'gro ba thams cad du sems can thams cad kyī
 lus ston pas 'dul ba'i thabs la mkhas pa ane tahogs kyis
 mngon par mtho ba dang | theg pa gsum po dag la 'dul zhing
 'dod pa ni | phan yon no |

3. 'dir tshigs su bcad pa |

a. byis pa rname la yang dag bagribs |

yang dag ma yin kun du snang |

de bsal yang dag thams cad du |

byang chub sems dpa' rname la snang ||

[tattvaṃ saṃ-chādyā bālānāṃ atattvaṃ khyāti sarvataḥ |

tattvaṃ tu bodhisattvānāṃ sarvataḥ khyāty apāśya tat ||]

b. don med pa dang don yod pa |

mi snang snang ba shes par bya |

gnas ni gzhan du gyur pa de |

'dod dgur rgyu phyir thar pa yin ||

[akhyānakhyānatā jneyā āśādarthasādarthayoḥ |

āśrayasya parāvṛttir mokṣo 'sau kāmācārataḥ ||]

c. 'khor ba dang ni mya ngan 'das |

mtshungs par shes pa nam sbye ba |

de tahe de phyir de la ni |

'khor nyid mya ngan 'das par 'gyur ||

d. de yi phyir na 'khor ba ni |

gtong ba ma yin mi gtong min |

de phyir mya ngan 'das pa yang |

thob pa ma yin mi thob min |.

12. Lévi, MSABh to MSA XVIII.80-18, p. 149.2-11.

13. Shukla, SrBh, p. 499.3: asya api cittasantater (Shukla:
 -santeter) yo nirodhaḥ so 'pi śāntaḥ |.

14. Pradhan, ASam, p. 65.7: kim upādāya śāntalakṣaṇam |
 duḥkhaviśeṣyogetāṃ upādāya |.

15. Pradhan, ASam, pp. 38.10-41.13.

16. Pradhan, ASam, p. 40.10-18; Peking, sams-tsam li, fol.
 90b1-8; Tatia, ASamBh, pp. 51.20-52.5; cf. the cursory
 treatment in SrBh, p. 492.13-16.

17. Pradhan, ASam, p. 84.11-19; Peking sams-tsam li, fol.
 124b2-6; Tatia, ASamBh, p. 114.14-26.

18. For the locus classicus of these three see Lamotte, Samd
 VII.3-10, pp. 67-71, 193-196.

19. This list actually comes from the Saṃd VII.1, pp. 66, 193; cf. MSA XI.51, and the Ratnameghasūtra verse cited in the Prasannapadā, Louis de la Vallée Poussin, ed., Madhyamakavṛtti, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, St Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1903-13, p. 225:

ādiśāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva ca nirvṛtāḥ |
dharmās te vivṛtā nātha dharmacakrapravartane ||.

20. Nāgārjuna, of course, anticipated this identification in Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā XXV.19-20, but it is doubtful that he would have attempted to establish the proposition that samsāra is seen as śānta by the Bodhisattva.

CHAPTER THREE:

The Dharmadharmatāvibhāga

One of the more interesting ironies in the intellectual history of Indian Buddhism is that the work most dedicated to the elucidation of fundamental transformation has had the least impact on subsequent conceptions of system manipulation. We are of course speaking of the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga, the text which is ascribed to Maitreya but to which there are virtually no other references in Indian Buddhist literature outside of its Vṛtti.

The text begins by dividing all of reality into the elements and elementality (dharmadharmatā), the former being identical with samsāra and the latter with nirvāṇa. The elements are characterized by the terminology of the first, two of the three natures: they are imaginary and incorrect conceptualization; their nature is the appearance of the unreal (asatkhyāti), and thus they are erroneous (bhrānti), being the cause of difficulty (samkleśa). However, the elements and elementality are neither the same nor different. The understanding of elementality (dharmatābhyupagama) is actually the perfection of fundamental transformation. Following this the remainder of the text, about 60% of its total, is dedicated to the

delineation of the penetration of fundamental transformation

(āśrayaparivṛttipraveśa):¹

IX. The penetration of fundamental transformation becomes supreme through ten modes:² penetration with respect to 1. essential nature (avabhāva), 2. object (vastu), 3. individual (pudgala), 4. distinction (viśeṣa), 5. orientation (prayojana), 6. basis (āśraya), 7. mental application (manasikāra), 8. application (prayoga), 9. difficulty (ādīnava), and 10. benefits (anuśaṃsa).

1. avabhāvapraveśa. The penetration of the essential nature is the purity of thusness in the disappearance of adventitious defilements and the appearance of thusness.³

2. vastupraveśa. The penetration of the object is three-fold: a. the transformation [i.e. appearance] of thusness in the sense data of the common physical world (sādhāraṇabhājanaviññaptitathatāparivṛtti), b. the transformation of thusness of the dharmadhātu of the scriptures (sūtrāntadharmadhātutathatāparivṛtti), and c. the transformation of thusness relating to the uncommon realm of beings (asādhāraṇasattvadhātuviññaptitathatāparivṛtti).

3. pudgalapraveśa. The penetration according to the individual means that the former two varieties of transformation of thusness [nos. 2.a and 2.b] belong only to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. The latter variety [2.c] is also extended to the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.

4. viśeṣapraveśa. The penetration of their distinction means that the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas have a. the distinction of purity of the field of the Awakened (buddhakṣetrapariśuddhi); they also obtain the dharmakāya, the sambhogakāya, and the nirmāṇakāya because of the distinctions of b. vision (darśana), c. teaching (deśanā), and d. sovereignty (vitattva).⁴

5. prayojanapraveśa. The penetration of orientation is through a. the distinction of prior aspiration, b. the distinction of having the teaching of the Mahayana as one's objective support, and c. the distinction of energetic application towards the ten levels of the Bodhisattva.⁵

6. āśrayapraveśa. The penetration of basis is by means of the six-fold entrance into nonconceptual gnosis: a. through the objective support, b. through the elimination of cognitive objects, c. through correct application, d. through the characteristics, e. through the benefits, and f. through total comprehension.

a. ālambana. Penetration of the objective support is through four means: i. through the instruction in the Mahayana, ii. through developing intense interest in it, iii. through developing certainty towards it, and iv. through fulfillment of the [two] accumulations.

b. nimittaparivarjana. Penetration of the elimination of the cognitive object is four-fold: through the elimination of the cognitive objects of i. the obstacles (vipakṣa), ii. their antidotes (pratipakṣa), iii. thusness, and iv. realization.⁶ Respectively these consist of the elimination of gross, middling, subtle, and far-reaching cognitive objects.

c. samyakprayoga. Penetration of correct application is also four-fold: through correct application towards i. apprehension, ii. nonapprehension, iii. the nonapprehension of apprehension, and iv. the apprehension of nonapprehension.⁷

d. lakṣaṇa. Penetration of the characteristics is three-fold: i. because of its establishment in elementality (dharmaṭā) since it (nirvikalpejñāna) is grounded in the nondual inexpressible characteristic; ii. because it does not appear, since there is the nonappearance of it as organ, object, sense data, the physical world, or other expressions of duality;⁸ iii. because it appears, since there is the perception (darśana) of all dharmas as if in the circle of space and since there is the perception of all compounded dharmas as if an illusion.⁹

e. anuśaṅga. Penetration of the benefits is four-fold: through the complete acquisition of i. the dharmakōya, ii. the residence of highest bliss (*āgrasukhavihāra), iii. sovereignty over vision (*darśanavibhūṭva), and iv. sovereignty over the doctrine (*avavāḍavibhūṭva).¹⁰

f. parijñāna. Penetration of complete comprehension is also four-fold: through the complete comprehension of i. antidotes

(pratipakṣa), ii. characteristics (lakṣaṇa), iii. distinctions (viśeṣa), and iv. activity (karmaparijñāna).¹¹

i. pratipakṣaparijñāna. The complete comprehension of antidotes is nonconceptual gnosis, since it is the antidote for the fivefold grasping after the nonexistent (*asadrāha)--dharma, individual being (pudgala), change (parināma), differentiation (prthaktva), and denegation (apavāda).

ii. lakṣaṇaparijñāna. The complete comprehension of characteristics is by means of [nonconceptual gnosis'] essential characteristic (avalakṣaṇa) which eliminates five modes of knowledge: mental nonapplication (amanasikāra), the excessively transcendent (samatikrānta), the pacific (upasānta), that which restricts itself to the essential object (avabhāvārtha), and the development of a sign (cihnakāra or citrīkāra).¹²

iii. viśeṣaparijñāna. The complete comprehension of [gnosis'] distinction is through the five modes of nonmentation (avikalpa), nonrestrictedness (apradeśikatva), nonlocalization (apratisthitatva), endless continuity (ātyantikatva), and supremacy (anuttaratva).

iv. karmaparijñāna. The complete comprehension of [gnosis'] activity is through the following five forms of activity: the removal of conceptualization (vikalpadūrīkaraṇa), the accomplishment of supreme bliss (anuttārasukhasādhana), the separation from the obscurations of defilements and the knowable (*kleśajñeyāvaranaviyojana), the entrance into all the knowable (sarvajñeyapraveśa) by means of the gnosis subsequent to nonconceptual gnosis (tatprastālabdhajñānena), and [the triple activity of] purifying the field of the awakened (buddhakṣetrapariśodhana), maturing beings (saṭtvaparipācana), and bestowing upon them the knowledge of all modes (sarvākārañātā-utsarga).¹³

7. manasikārapraveśa. The penetration of mental application is performed in this way by a Bodhisattva wishing to penetrate nonconceptual gnosis: "Out of beginningless nonawareness of suchness, there is the residence of all seeds (sarvabīja) through incorrect conceptualization (abhūtaparikalpena). While this [repository of seeds] is the cause of the appearance of unreal duality (asaddvayakhyātihetu), that which is based in it [i.e., the sensory consciousnesses] is

different from it. Thus, although the cause with its result does appear, they are not existent. When that cause does appear, elementality (dharmatā) does not appear." Correctly applying his mind in this way, the Bodhisattva obtains penetration into nonconceptual gnosis. From that variety of apprehension (upalambha), he enters into the apprehension of mere sensory data (viññaptimātratā-upalambha). From the apprehension of mere sensory data, he enters into the nonapprehension of all objects. From the nonapprehension of all objects he enters into the nonapprehension of mere sensory data (viññaptimātra-anupalambha). From that nonapprehension he enters into the nonapprehension of the distinction of duality. And that nonapprehension of duality is nonconceptual gnosis. There being no referent (viśaya), it is nonapprehension, since it is demonstrated by the nonapprehension of all cognitive objects (nimitta).

8. prayogapraveśa. The penetration of application is also four-fold: a. [fundamental transformation] occurs on the level of interested practice (adhimukticaryābhūmi) since there is application out of interest, this being the stage of ingress (nirvedhāvasthā); b. it occurs on the first level (prathamā bhūmi) because there is the application of special knowledge (pratisamvit-prayoga), this being the stage of contact (sparśāvasthā); c. it occurs on both the impure six levels (sadavisaṁuddhabhūmayah) and the three pure levels (trivisaṁuddhabhūmayah) because there is application of meditation (bhāvanā), this being the state of recollection (anusmrtiyavasthā); finally, d. by means of the final application (nisthāprayoga) it occurs on the level of the Buddha (buddhabhūmi), since there occurs spontaneously (anābhogatas) the uninterrupted stream of the Buddha's activity, this being the stage of the realization of its essence (tadātmaikatvābhyupagamanāvasthā).

9. ādīnavapraveśa. Penetration of the difficulties means that there are four difficulties if there were no fundamental transformation: a. there would be the problem of the lack of a basis for the future nonentrance of defilements; b. there would be the difficulty of the lack of a basis for the entrance into the path; c. there would be the difficulty of the lack of a basis for designating an individual who has obtained disembodied nirvāṇa (nirupadiśesa-

nirvāṇa); and d. there would be the difficulty of the lack of a basis for the designation (prajñapti) of the differences between the three types of awakening (*ākāratrayabodhi).

10. anuśaṃsapraveśa. Penetration into the benefits means that based on the converse of the difficulties, there are four benefits if there is fundamental transformation.

These are to be known as the ten ways of penetration into fundamental transformation.

X. upamā. The appearance of inexistent dharmas (*asaddharmakhyāti) is similar to magic or a dream, etc.; the similes for fundamental transformation are the sky, gold, water, and so forth.¹⁴

While much is worthy of comment in this fascinating passage, we must restrict ourselves to the major thrust of the material. Although the syncretic nature of the DhDhV is exhibited by the amalgamation of incorrect conceptualization (abhūtaparikalpa) and the underlying consciousness (sarvabīja), nonetheless, the dominant focus of the DhDhV is the realization of thusness. To this end three forms of transformation towards three specific objects have been identified in IX.2: the transformation of the perception of the physical world (bhājanaviññaptitathatāparivṛtti), the ideational world relating to the absolute (aūtrāntadharma-dhātutathatāparivṛtti), and the mental world (sattvadhātu-viññaptitathatāparivṛtti). It seems clear to me that the first and third of these follow in the tradition of the ascertainment of selflessness of elements and individuals (pudgaladharmanairātmya), while the second identifies the teachings of the Mahāyāna as a further factor about which

conceptual reification can arise and hinder further development.

The manner of going about the transformation is what is so very interesting in this text and is an extension of earlier materials, but with an interesting twist. The statements which concern us are IX.1 (svabhāvapraveśa), IX.6.b (nimittaparivarjanapraveśa), IX.6.c (samyakprayoga-praveśa), and IX.7 (manasikārapraveśa). The first of these outlines the basic system: the same disappearance of adventitious defilements in the perception of these three objects and the appearance of the proper object, thusness. This is accomplished by the proper application of the mind towards the objects of contemplation, summarized in IX.6.c and explained in more detail in IX.7.

Basically, there are detailed four stages in the development of realization. First, there is the apprehension (upalambha) of the basic principles of the Yogācāra form of awareness: all of reality consists of elements or their absolute--the perception of the one excludes the perception of the other. Thus, the yogin comes to understand that the mental identification of the elements of reality as they occur in their particular, affective state (yāvadbhāvikatā) precludes the apprehension of them in their nonaffective, general condition (yathāyāvadbhāvikatā). Their real condition is the apprehension of their being mere sensory data (viññaptimātra). Because he has understood

that objects of the senses are merely raw data, the yogin no longer apprehends (anupalambha) these as objects of cognition. Not sensing the object of consciousness, the yogin then does not apprehend even the condition 'mere sense data' (viññaptimātrānupalambha = upalambhānupalambha). This stage appears to represent the elimination of the subject, and the Vṛtti mentions that when there is no object which could operate in the capacity of sense data, there could be no one aware of this data.¹⁵ The final stage is the apprehension of nonduality and the nonapprehension of duality. Subject and object have both been removed from the act of awareness. In this process, IX.6.b.iii-iv maintains that even conceptual constructions (nimitta) of thusness and realization are obstacles.

Some of the background of this process is pertinent. The source of the doctrine of nonapprehension is in fact the earliest of the Mahāyāna-sūtras, such as the Aṣṭa. In the chapter on thusness (tathatāparivarta), the nonapprehension of all dharmas is part and parcel of the discussion, which ultimately moves towards the problem of nonconceptual gnosis.¹⁶ Another of the very early Mahāyāna-sūtras, the Kāśyapaparivarta, utilizes nonapprehension of three items: objects of perception, the individual doer, and the lineage of the Tathāgata, this latter being an absolute in that text.¹⁷ Following in the footsteps of these, other Mahāyāna texts, such as the Pañcaviṃśati and the Suvikrāntavikrāmi-

pariprecchā, employed the terminology of nonapprehension of sensory or cognitive objects.¹⁸

Both the MSA and the MAV also have developed the doctrines of nonapprehension, but provided it in the structure of a graded series of realizations, as we also see here in the DhDhV. For example, MSA IX.78 defines apprehension in terms of existential apprehension:

That which is nonbeing is just the highest being;
and the nonapprehension in all ways [of the
imaginary nature] is considered the highest
apprehension.¹⁹

MSABh to XI.12, moreover, discusses a systematization of mental application (prāyogikamanaskāra), the fifth of which is the application which involves the nonapprehension of the object (arthānupalambha) and the nonapprehension of apprehension (upalambhānupalambha).²⁰ MSABh to XI.5 makes it clear that the nonapprehension of the duality (dvayor anupalambha) of subject and object results in the obtainment of thushness.²¹ These statements do not, though, incorporate all the various combinations in a grand scheme.

Perhaps the MAV was the first to do so, although its antecedents were clearly in the Yogācāra doctrines which finally went to make up the YoBh, and particularly the ŚrBh.²² The clearest statement, very similar to the DhDhV, is found in MAV I.6-7:

I.6 Based on apprehension, nonapprehension
occurs; based on nonapprehension, nonapprehension
occurs.

I.7 Thus the nature of nonapprehension is demonstrated from apprehension; and therefore the equivalence between apprehension and nonapprehension should be understood.²³

We have seen the importance of MAV I.6 in its quotation in full as V.4 in the MadHr of Bhavaviveka. The definitions given in both the MAVBh and the MAVT concur with the DhDhV and the DhDhVV.²⁴ The most important single proposition to come out of these explanations is the doctrine that, during the course of meditative progress, even the apprehension of the world as mere sensory data is to be abandoned. This idea also finds favor in the MSam which approves of the destruction of the idea of mere sensory data (viññaptimātra-samjñāvidhvamsa) in the obtainment of the last stage of the path of application.²⁵ All of these statements have a similar thrust: the perception of phenomenal reality as 'merely sensation' can also become an obstacle to the path. There is apparently the paradox--entrance into the absolute under the guise of the realm of mere sensory experience (viññaptimātratā) requires the abandonment of any perception of 'mere sensation'. Perhaps, too, there is some looseness in this literature which we do not find in the scholastic works such as the Vim and the Trim; these earlier texts are not dedicated to the terminology as propositions of reality but are instead concerned with the business of realization. One gets the sense that this variety of formulation, in which 'mere sensation' is also abandoned would find little favor with the author of the Trim.

DhDhV IX.9-10 must also be considered, as this is the only place where the raison d'être of postulating fundamental transformation is considered. We immediately notice the difference between the formulation here under 'problems to be incurred' (ādīnava) from the 'problems to be incurred' in the MSam IX.2.vi. examined in the previous chapter. The MSam primarily considers the Bodhisattva who has gone off the path and become concerned with the lesser transformation of the Śrāvaka. In the DhDhV, though, the entire tenor of the language is that of a philosophical description of the necessity of postulating the structure of transformation. In that regard, it is similar to the reasons we have seen given for the underlying consciousness, the three natures, etc., in Part I, above. Ādīnava is not precisely identical with the standard terms given in those discussions--ayukti, doṣa--but its normal interpretation of moral fault, which is its use in other texts, is unlikely at best.

Both the Vṛtti and the indigenous Tibetan commentary of Mi-pham 'Jam-dbyangs rnam-rgyal rgya-mtsho (1846-1912) spend some time elaborating the factors of these four difficulties, Mi-pham being much longer in his description as he maintains that he has found no adequate description of the difficulties in earlier literature on the subject.²⁶ The four difficulties may in reality be considered as two larger problems. The first is that identified under IX.9.a-b, concerning the problem of identifying the basis or guaranty

of defilement transformation. As has been mentioned above, the Vaibhāṣikas' solution to the problem involved the postulation of an uncompounded element called the cessation through enumeration (pratīsaṃkhyānirodha) which in turn automatically involved the converse of this, the dharma of cessation without enumeration (apratīsaṃkhyānirodha).²⁷ This pair, though, was intimately tied to the Vaibhāṣika's principal solution to the problems of personality and soteriology: the existence of all the elements of reality throughout the three times. The Yogācāra tradition, as we have mentioned, directly refuted this doctrine and instead applied their own solution to the problem of the stream of being and its modifications. Yet, because the primary component of being--whether in the form of the underlying consciousness or the dependent nature--remained unavailable for inspection, a theoretical postulate of transformation of this stream needed to be identified. At the same time, that structure needed to be a permanent transformation. Ever since the initial questions concerning the possibility of an Arhat's downfall were framed, the problem of the total elimination of defilements and backsliding on the path were vexing issues to the Buddhist doctors. When it was realized that the initial elimination of certain negative manifestations (pariyavasthāna/samudācāra) did not necessarily eliminate latent traits or their affects, then the problem became acute, especially for a tradition so immersed in psychological investigation. The Sautrāntikas,

to their credit, postulated a basis (āśraya) formed whereby there would be no further arising of affective states or seeds.²⁸ The Yogācāra tradition went one better and identified the transformation of their several systems of reality as a reified element, and this hypostatization is at the bottom of all the four arguments in DhDhV IX.9-10.

Mi-pham, in his commentary to this section, offers an extremely perspicacious objection.²⁹ If the seed of an affective state is overcome and nullified, like the seed of a plant burned by fire, then the mere nonarising of that state in the future would be enough.³⁰ What problem would be encountered if there were not postulated an item such as 'fundamental transformation'? His own answer is that it is not enough merely to postulate that there has been a removal of the seeds of defilement from a certain stream of being, but there must also be something entered into that stream. So if there is generated, in that stream, the gnosis of the antidotes of the defilements, then it can be said that this stream's effluence is destroyed (kṣīṇāsrava). However, if there is no description of that type of condition, while the seeds of defilement may have been overcome, there remains a lack of cognition as to the manner of their elimination.

Mi-pham's objection and answer are tailored to the environment of the DhDhV, which emphasizes the function of gnosis and its role in the development of transformation.

In a broader sense, though, his statements are cogent; if the cognitive environment of a human's stream of personality remains unaware of the pure fact of its alteration, then how has that alteration been ascertained? But that awareness is paradoxical; it arises simultaneously with the event which leaves a lasting impression on the individual, yet must remain after the event to inform the individual. It is this event and its impression which this tradition have designated āśrayāparivṛtti at the risk, in this case fulfilled, of its concretization.

Finally, we must note the conjunction in DhDhV X. of the similes of the sky, gold, and water with the mechanism of transformation. Fundamental transformation is like the clearing of clouds from the sky, the purification of impurities from gold, and the cleansing of mud from water. These images are also employed in MSA XI.13, but the usage here most closely resembles that of MAV I.16 where the movement of emptiness from the condition of defiled to that of pure is possible without a change in the emptiness because the natural purity of emptiness is like that of water, gold, or the sky. In fact, this is the way that the DhDhVV explains the images, and it is apparent that these similes have been grafted onto the process of transformation since their primary referent is that of the locus of transformation rather than the mechanism itself. It seems that the Indian Buddhist proclivity for dealing with concrete things rather than processes has rendered it

reticent to develop special images for this most important of processes. The most convincing simile is that used by Niḥsvabhāva in describing the mechanism of transformation as similar to a sick man taking recourse to medicine and becoming well, an image which is very old indeed.³¹ The other major simile, drawn from Indian mythology, is that we have seen above in MSam I.49, of the goose (hamsa) which can drink the milk and leave the water from a mixture of these.³² These images, though, are commonly used in India, and no special metaphor of transformation has been generated in the literature.

Notes to Part III: Chapter Three

1. All references to the DhDhV will be to Nozawa's edition, Josho Nozawa, "The Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga and the Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga-vṛtti," in Gadjin M. Nagao and Josho Nozawa, eds., Studies in Indology and Buddhism [Susumu Yamaguchi Festschrift], Kyoto: Hozokan, 1955, pp. 9-49; the text presented there are the entire version of the DhDhV translated by Śāntibhadra and Tshul-khrims rgyal-ba, the DhDhVV of Mahājana and bLo-ldan shes-rab, and the Sanskrit fragments first published by Lévi in the Appendix to the MSA (pp. 190-91) and identified and critically edited by Susumu Yamaguchi, "Hohosho-funbetsu-ron no Bonbun Dampen," (A Sanskrit Fragment from Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga) Otani Gakuho XVII (1936); there is another versified translation of the DhDhV in Tibetan which the editor has not included, the translation of Mahājana and Zha-ma Seng-ge rgya-mtshan (To. 4023); there is also a Sanskrit manuscript, hopefully complete, in the possession of K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, which was photographed in sPos-khang by Rahula Saṅkṛtyāyana on his fourth trip to Tibet in 1938; see Rahula Saṅkṛtyāyana, "Search for Sanskrit Mss. in Tibet," Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24 (1938): 137-163, esp. p. 163. This ms. has not yet been exploited.

2. I have used 'penetration' as the translation of praveśa (entrance, ingress) on the basis of the Tib. translation of Tshul-khrims rgyal-ba who gives rtoqs-pa, normally used as an equivalent for adhiḡama(na); Nozawa, DhDhV, p. 14.1; also under IX.1, the DhDhVV glosses--yat pariḡñānam ayam ucyate avabhāva-praveśo niruttara iti.

3. Cf. the previous chapter's discussion of MSam IX.2.11 and the exposition in Part II, Chapter Six of MSA XIX.51-54.

4. Cf. the varieties of sovereignty discussed in Chapter One of this part and in MAVT to MAV V.3, Pandey, pp. 151-154.

5. See Samd VIII.13 for the importance of the Mahāyānadharma as the meditative object for the fundamental transformation of the Bodhisattva; Lamotte, Samd, pp. 94, 215.

6. Mi-pham, in his commentary to the DhDhV, the Chos dang chos nyid rnam par 'byed pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa Ye shes snang ba rnam 'byed, (hereafter Ye-shes snang-ba rnam-'byed), Varanasi: Tarthang Tulku, 1967, p. 23.5, gives the scriptural reference for these as the Avikalpapraveśa-dhāraṇī. Unfortunately, this statement can be taken only on a general basis since the entire problem of nimittapari-

varjāna is discussed in detail in the Avikalpapraveśa, but only broadly along the lines of these four; see the Ārya-Avikalpapraveśa-nāma-dhāraṇī, Peking 810, vol. 32.229.1.1-232.5.8, mdo nu, fols. 1a1-6b8, esp. fols. 2b6-3b2.

7. Cf. MAV I.6-7, Pandey, pp. 19.25-24.2; MSA IX.78 and MSABh to XI.47; see our discussion below.

8. Mi-pham, Ye-sheṣ anang-ba rnam-'byed, p. 25.2-3 has correctly identified these as coming from Kāśyapaparivarta 57, Von Staël-Holstein, p. 87; they also occur in Avikalpapraveśa, p. 231.4.7-8, fol. 3b7-8.

9. The 'circle of space' (nam-mkha'i dkyil) is difficult; it is attested as gaganatāla in the Tib. of Bodhicaryāvatāra X.11, ākāśatāla in Mahāvvyutpatti 6882, and the Suvarṇaprabhāsa (ed. Noble) p. 178.20 has nebhaatāla. The DhDhVV to IX.6.d, though, says nam-mkha'i dkyil-'khor (p. 35.18), which is almost certainly ākāśamaṇḍala.

10. Avavāda is explained in detail in ŚrBh, Shukla, pp. 288.14-261.7; see also Pradhan, ASam p. 104.14-15, Dutt, BoBh p. 78.1-26.

11. Parīṇāna is a complex topic and has been treated in detail in many Yogācāra works: see MAV II.2d-3c, Pandey pp. 54.3-57.24; MSam III.7, Lamotte, pp. 51-2, 161-62; MSamU, Peking 113.27.1.6-3.3, sems-tsam li fol. 297b6-298b3; Pradhan, ASam, p. 82.6-13; Tatia, ASamBh, pp. 99.17-100.4; Dutt, BoBh, pp. 36.20-37.20, 200.1-4; VinSq, sDe-dge, sems-tsam zhi, fols. 277b5-278a2; Kośa V.64-68, Sastri, pp. 861-866.

12. This final term is uncertain; Śāntibhadra's text apparently read citrikāra (bkra-bar 'dzin-pa) while Mahājāna's read cihnakāra (mngon-rtaḡa su byed-pa), the latter probably being correct. We should not eliminate the first out of hand, though, since Mahāvvyutpatti 7563 defines citrikāra as mtshan-mar 'dzin-pa, 'taking as a sign/object', noticed by Edgerton, BHSD p. 230b, which lead him to surmise that there was a use of taking for a sign or taking for variegated. Nozawa's attempt to assign abhilakṣaṇa (p. 37, n.214) is unattested and not really acceptable.

13. We cannot help but notice that there are in fact seven kinds of activity, but apparently the last three have been grouped together, as they have been in the DhDhVV, p. 39.3-13. Mi-pham, p. 31.1, mentions that these three are counted as one because they are the fruit of the maturation of previous activity.

14. The Sanskrit for DhDhV IX-IX.6.d may be read in the Vṛtti and extracted from it with the help of the Tibetan translations; the Skt. to the end of IX.6.d to the end of

IX.6.d is given below followed by the Tib. translation for the rest of the DhDhV from the text of Śāntibhadra and Tshul-khrims rgyal-mtshan, Nozawa, DhDhV & DhDhVV, pp. 46-49, 15.16-18.7:

IX. dasābhir ākārair āśrayaparivṛttipraveśo niruttarah ।
svabhāvavastupudgalaviśeṣaprayojanāśrayamanasikāra-
prayogādīnavānuṣaṃsaiḥ ।

1. avabhāva-praveśas tathatāvaimalyam āgantukamala-
tathatāprakhyānaprakhyānāya ।

2. vaatupraveśaśh sādharāṇabhājanavijñaptitathatāparivṛttiḥ
sūtrāntadharmadhātutathatāparivṛttir asādharāṇasattvadhātu-
vijñaptitathatāparivṛttiś ca ।

3. pudgalapraveśo dve adye tathatāparivṛtti buddhabodhi-
sattvānām nānyeṣām asādhāraṇatvāt । paścimā śrāvaka-
pratyekabuddhānām api ।

4. viśeṣapraveśo buddhabodhisattvānām buddhakṣetrapari-
śuddhivēśeṣaḥ । dharmakāyasāmbhogikanairmāṇikakāyapra-
tilambhaś ca darśanadeśanāvittatvapratilambhaviśeṣāt ।

5. prajñāpāramitāyāṃ pūrvapranidhānaviśeṣāt | mahāyāna-
dēśanālambanaviśeṣāt | dāśabhūmiḥ prayogaviśeṣāc ca |

6. āśrayapraveśāo śaḍākāranirvikalpaññānapraveśāt ।
 ālambanato nimittaparivarjanataḥ samyakprayojanato lakṣaṇato
 'nuśamsataḥ pariññānataś ca ।

a. caturbhir ākāśair ālambanapraveśaḥ | mahāyānadeśanā-
tadadhimuktiniścayasambhāraperipūribhiḥ |

b. caturbhir ākāraiḥ nimittaparivarjanapraveśaḥ |
vipakṣapratipakṣatathatādhigama<dharma>nimittaparivarjanataḥ |
audārikamedhyasūkamadūrānugatanimittaparivarjanam
yathāsaṃkhyam anenôdbhāvitam [Tib. as if anena saṃ-
darśitam: yang dag par batan pa] bhavati |

c. saṃyakprayogapraveśaś <ca> caturbhir ākāraiḥ |
upalambhaprayogataḥ | anupalambhaprayogataḥ |
upalambhānupalambhaprayogataḥ | nopalambhopalambha-
prayogataś ca |

d. lakṣaṇapraveśas tribhīr ākāraiḥ | dharmatā-
pratiṣṭhānato 'dvayanirabhilāpyadharmatā-[Nozawa:-lakṣaṇa-
for -dharmatā-]pratiṣṭhānāt | aśaṃprakhyānato
dvayayathābhilāpendriyaviśayavijñaptibhājanalokasaṃ-
prakhyānāt | tad anenārūpy [Tib: etair arūpy] anidarśanam
apraṭiṣṭham anābhāsam avijñaptikam anikṣtam iti
nirvikalpasya jñānasya yathāśūtram lakṣaṇam abhidyotitaṃ
bhavati | (end of Skt. fragment) snang ba'i phyir ni nam
mkha'i dkyil ltar chos thams cad mthong ba'i phyir dang |
sgyu ma la sogs pa ltar 'du byed thams cad mthong ba'i phyir
ro |

e. phan yon rtogs pa ni rnam pa bzhi ste | chos kyi sku
rdzogs par rab tu thob pa'i phyir dang | gong na med pa'i
bde ba'i gnas pa rab tu thob pa'i phyir dang | mthong ba'i
'byor pa rab tu thob pa'i phyir dang | ston pa'i 'byor pa
rab tu thob pa'i phyir ro |

f. yongs su shes pa las rtogs pa yang rnam pa bzhi ste !
 gnyen po yongs su shes pa'i phyir dang ! mtshan nyid yongs
 su shes pa'i phyir dang ! khyad par yongs su shes pa'i
 phyir dang ! las yongs su shes pa'i phyir ro !

1. de la gnyen po yonga su shea pa ni rnam par mi rtogs pa'i ye shes te | chos dang | gang zag dang | gyur pa dang | tha dad pa dang | akur pa lnga mi bden pa'i ngo bo la zhen pa'i gnyen po'o |
- ii. mtshan nyid yonga su shea pa ni | yid la byed pa med pa dang | yang dag par 'das pa dang | nye bar zhi ba dang | ngo bo'i don dang | bkra bar 'dzin pa lnga spanga pa ni rang gi mtshan nyid do |
- iii. khyad par yonga su shea pa ni rtog pa med dang | phyogs gcig pa ma yin pa nyid dang | gnas pa med pa nyid dang | gtan du ba nyid dang | gong na med pa rnam pa lnga'i khyad par gyi phyir ro |
- iv. las yonga su shea pa ni | rnam par rtog par ring du byed pa dang | bla na med pa'i bde ba sbyin pa dang | nyon mongs pa dang | shea bya'i agrib pa dang bral bar sbyor ba dang | de'i rjes las thob pa'i ye shes kyis shes bya'i rnam pa thams cad la 'jug pa dang | sangs rgyas kyi zhing yonga su dag pa dang | sems can yongs su smin pa dang | rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid ster par byed pa'i rnam pa lnga ni las kyi khyad par ro |
7. yid la byed pa rtogs pa ni | ji akad du | byang chub sems dpa'i rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes de rtogs pa 'dod pa de 'di ltar yid la byed pa | de bzhin nyid mi shea pa thog ma med pa'i dus can las te | yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu rtog pas sa bon thams cad pa ste | mi bden pa gnyis su snang ba'i rgyu dang | de la brten pa tha dad pa yang yin te | de la rgyu dang 'bras bur bcas pa snang du zin kyang mi bden pa yin no | de ltar snang bas kyang de'i chos nyid ni snang ba med la | de snang ba med pa las kyang chos nyid snang ba yin no | zhes tshul bzhin yid la byed pa na | byang chub sems dpa' rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes rtogs pa yin no | de ltar nye bar dmigs pa las rnam par rig pa tsam la nye bar dmigs pa rtogs par byed do | rnam par rig pa tsam la nye bar dmigs pa las don thams cad dmigs pa med par rtogs par byed do | don thams cad dmigs pa med pa las rnam par rig pa tsam yang mi dmigs par rtogs par byed do | de mi dmigs pa las gnyi ga khyad par dmigs pa rtogs par byed pa yin no | der gang yang gnyis dmigs pa med pa de ni | rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes te | yul med cing | dmigs pa med pa yin te | mtshan ma thams cad mi dmigs pas nye bar mtshon pa nyid kyi phyir ro |
8. sbyor ba rtogs pa ni rnam pa bzhi ste | mos pas spyod pa'i sa la mos pas sbyor ba'i phyir dang | de nyid nges par 'byed pa'i gnas skabs so | de nyid sa dang po la so sor rig par sbyor ba'i phyir dang | de nyid ni reg pa'i skabs so | rnam par ma dag pa'i sa drug la agom pa la rab tu sbyor ba'i phyir dang | yongs su dag pa gsum po la yang ngo | de nyid ni rjes su dran pa'i gnas skabs so | sangs rgyas kyi sa la mthar byin pa la sbyor ba'i yang phyir te | lhun gyis grub par sangs rgyas kyi mdzad pa rgyun mi 'chad pa'i phyir ro | de nyid ni de'i bdag nyid tu nye bar 'gro ba'i gnas skabs so |
9. nyes dmigs rtogs pa ni | gnas yongs su gyur pa med na'o | nyes dmigs rnam pa bzhi ste | nyon mongs pa mi 'jug

pa'i rten med pa'i nyes dmigs dang | lam 'jug pa'i rten med
pa'i nyes dmigs dang | gang zag mya ngan las 'das par tha
anyad bzhag pa'i rten med pa'i nyes dmigs dang | byang chub
rnam pa gsum gyi khyad par gyi tha anyad bzhag pa'i rten med
pa'i nyes dmigs so |

10. de dag las bzlog pa la brten nas gnas yongs su gyur pa
yod pa la | phan yon rnam pa bzhi nyid du rig par bya'o |
de dag nyid ni gnas gyur pa ji lta bar rtogs pa rnam pa bcur
rig par bya'o ||

X. med pa'i choa anang ba ni | dper na agyu ma dang rmi
lam la sogs pa zhin no | gnas gyur pa'i dpe ni | nam mkha'
dang gaer dang chu la sogs pa bzhin no ||.

15. Nozawa, DhDhVV, p. 40.18: rnam par rig par bya ba'i don
med na rnam par rig pa pa mi rigs pa'i phyir ro |.

16. Vaidya, Aṣṭa, pp. 153-160; note, though, that the
corresponding chapter of the Ratnagunasañcayagāthā does not
employ this term, Akira Yuyama, Prañā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-
sañcaya-gāthā (Sanskrit Recension A), Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976, pp. 61-63.

17. Von Staël Holstein, Kācāyapaparivarta 104, 137, 147, pp.
152, 198, 213.

18. Cf. Conze's references, Materials for a Dictionary of
the Prañāpāramitā Literature, pp. 35-36; Ryusho Hikata,
Suvikrāntavikrāmi-Pariprcchā Prañāpāramitā-Sūtra, Fukuoka:
Kyushu University, 1958, p. 28.5.

19. Lévi, MSA, p. 48.13-14:
ya 'vidyamānatā saiva paramā vidyamānatā |
sarvathā 'nupalambhaś ca upalambhaḥ paro mataḥ || 78

20. Lévi, MSABh, p. 58.2-10.

21. Lévi, MSABh, p. 55.17-18.

22. Particularly the statements concerning nirvikalpa-
pratibimba, and the nine-fold stability of mind which
constitute 'pacification' (śamatha), Shukla, ŚrBh, pp. 194-
5, 391.15-398.10.

23. Pandey, MAVT, pp. 19.27-24.2:
upalabdhiḥ samāśritya nopalabdhiḥ prajāyate |
nopalabdhiḥ samāśritya nopalabdhiḥ prajāyate || I.6
upalabdhes tataḥ siddhā nopalabdhisvabhāvatā |
taamāc ca samatā jñeyā nopalambhopalambhayoḥ || I.7

24. Cf. Pandey, MAVT, pp. 20.1-2, 22.5-9; Nozawa, DhDhVV,
pp. 35.2-3, 40.17-18.

25. Lamotte, MSam III.13.4, pp. 54, 170.

26. Mi-pham, Ye shes ananq ba rnam 'byed, p. 36.3.

27. Kośa I.6, II.36, II.55; Sastri pp. 18-25, 211-218, 317-327.

28. Sastri, KośaBh to II.55d, p.326.4-5: pratipakṣalābhena kleśapunarbhāvotpādātyantaviruddhāśrayalābhāt prāptam nirvāṇam ity ucyate !; see also the discussion in Part II, Chapter Two above.

29. Mi-pham, Ye-shes ananq-ba rnam-'byed, p. 34.3-5.

30. Mi-pham may have drawn this image for his objection from the Sautrāntika position in the KośaBh, where the fundament transformed is described as like rice burned by fire (agnidaḡdhevrīhivad); Sastri, p. 215.6, and see our discussion, Part II, Chapter Two, above.

31. MSamU to MSam I.48, Peking 5552, vol. 113.13.2.2, sams-tsam 11, fol. 263a2; cf. Saddharmapundarika V.53-61.

32. See Part II, Chapter Three above.

CHAPTER FOUR:

The Scholastics

Having investigated the approach of the various basic texts of the Yogācāras, we must now turn our attention to the true 'schools' of the tradition. The scholastic authors largely belong to the sixth century of the Christian era and were primarily located in two of the great monastic colleges of Buddhist India: Nālandā in the east, in the present state of Bihār, and Valabhī in the west, in what is now known as Gujarat. These were not the only scholastic centers of Yogācāra India, but the literature and technical treatises of these two have superceded their rivals, particular through their survival in translation. The Nālandā school was to have the greatest effect on the Yogācāra literature of China, Korea, and Japan, while the Valabhī textual manuals attained prominence among the translations made into Tibetan. Thus the dearth of information about the other scholastic centers, largely known through their citations in the texts of the two schools, restricts our field of investigation to the most popular of the centers. The two monasteries were most at variance on their epistemological theories, Nālandā following the lead of Dignāga while Valabhī being more conservative.¹ This aspect of their rivalry, though, lies outside the scope of this

investigation, which is concerned only with their soteriological and gnoseological contributions.

While we have spent some time on the textual corpus which was to become the basis for interpretation in both camps, we have not addressed one of the principal scriptures used in the scholastic period--the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra (BuBh). This sūtra was first known through the SAVBh of Sthiramati (ca. 510-570) and its reference also occurs in the MSA commentary of Niḥsvabhāva (late 6th, early 7th cen.). Hsüan-tsang translated it into Chinese in 645 A.D.; five years later a commentary ascribed to Bandhuprabha 'and others', the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa (BuBhU), was also translated.² Approximately a century and a half later, the sūtra was translated into Tibetan by a committee of three Paṇḍitas--Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi, and Prajñāvarman --together with one of the preeminent Lo-tsā-bas of the Royal Dynastic period, Ye-shes-sde.³ Also translated into Tibetan was the commentary, the Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna (BuBhVy), of Hsüan-tsang's teacher at Nālandā, Śīlabhadra.⁴ It is not clear when the BuBhVy was rendered into Tibetan, but it may also have been done by the translators of the BuBh; the colophon of the latter mentions that it was 'translated in conformity with the Ṭīkā'.⁵

The BuBh arranges itself around the 'five dharmas which constitute the level of the Buddha', an expansion on the content of several of the verses from the ninth chapter,

bodhi, of the MSA. Since the soteriological theories of the scholastics are principally concerned with these 'five dharmas', we will consider them in order, giving the source verses from the MSA and summarizing their elaboration in the BuBh, a process primarily accomplished by the use of similes.

a. dharmadhātuvīśuddhi. The MSA treats the purity of the realm, or element, of the dharma in four verses:

IX.56 [The realm of the dharma has] the characteristic of the purity of thusness of all dharmas--[purified from] the two obscurations; it has the characteristic of nonexhaustion in its dominion over the gnosis of the object and reference to that.⁶

57. Complete cultivation of the gnosis of thusness is comprehension; complete nonexhaustion of bringing forth the pair for all beings is the fruit.⁷

58. It performs, through skill in application, the manifestation of the body, speech, and mind; it is endowed with unlimited varieties of the means of both concentration and mental support.⁸

59. Its activity is diversified into those of the essential, the enjoyable, and the manifest; this is said to be the pure element of the dharma of the Buddhas.⁹

These four verses are quoted verbatim at the end of the BuBh and, along with IX.82-85, constitute the most obvious borrowing from the MSA on the part of the author of the BuBh. After we have considered the basic material of the five dharmas, we will return to the more detailed consideration of the first of these four verses since it is the focus of the BuBhVy's contributions to fundamental

transformation. For now, though, let us consider the augmentation to the doctrine of the dharmadhātu which the BuBh added to this series.

The primary image used by the BuBh in this section is the relationship between space (ākāśa) and form (rūpa). i) In the manner that space appears in diverse forms but cannot be diverse because of its unified taste (ekarasa), so, too, the element of the dharma appears in all knowable elements, but cannot be diverse because of its unified taste.¹⁰ ii) In the manner that space exists in all form but is not stained by its faults, so, too, the element of the dharma exists in all beings but does not partake of their faults.¹¹ iii) In the same way that space makes space for all kinds of activity, though it is spontaneous (anābhoga) and without formative activity (anābhisaṃskārika), so, too, the element of the dharma makes space for gnosis, manifestation, and the benefit of beings, though it is also spontaneous and without formative activity.¹² iv) There is the arising and passing away of form without affecting space; there is the arising and passing away of gnosis, etc., without affecting the dharmadhātu.¹³ v) There is the augmentation and the obscuration of form without affecting space; there is the augmentation and obscuration of the essence of the Tathāgata's dispensation without affecting the dharma-dhātu.¹⁴ vi) Form is limitless in all directions because space is limitless, yet there is no movement of space; the happiness and benefit of beings is limitless because the

dharmadhātu is limitless, yet there is no movement of the dharmadhātu.¹⁵ vii) There is destruction and reformation of the universe, but space is not affected; there is enlightenment and final nirvāṇa, but the dharmadhātu is not affected.¹⁶ viii) There are changes and alterations of specific forms, but space is not affected; there are misdeeds contrary to discipline, but the dharmadhātu is not affected.¹⁷ ix) Fire, mountains, and the like inhabit space, but it has not their characteristics; the five pure aggregates inhabit the dharmadhātu, but it has not their characteristics.¹⁸ x) Universes dependent on causes and conditions appear, but space is spontaneous and without formative activity; excellent congregations (paṇḍita) appear around Buddhas, but the dharmadhātu is spontaneous and without formative activity.¹⁹

b. ādarśajñāna. There is a break of seven anuṣṭubh verses between the discussion of dharmadhātuviśuddhi in the MSA and the beginning of the section on the various kinds of gnosis. These seven verses are dedicated to the elaboration of the three bodies of the Buddha, which were seen as an extension of the dharmadhātu.²⁰ This connection is emphasized in IX.59, the last of the MSA dharmadhātuviśuddhi verses, but is entirely neglected in the BuBh. Indeed, some of the scholastics instead connected the three bodies with the four types of gnosis. That relationship, however, is implied in some of the MSA verses concerning the kinds of gnosis.

The verses begin with a summary of the four kinds and then discuss each one separately:

IX.67. The mirror-like gnosis is immovable; three kinds of gnosis are based on it--equivalence, specific inspection, and the effective.²¹

68. The mirror-like gnosis is impersonal, uninterrupted, continually present, without neascience towards any knowable object, but never specifically addresses any of them.

69. It is like a great mine of gnosis, because it is the cause of all forms of gnosis, and because in it arises the images of the Sambhogabuddha and his gnosis.²²

The difference between these few verses on the mirror-like gnosis (ādarśajñāna) and the extensive treatment in the BuBh is indicative of the importance which this form of cognition was to gain. The mirror-like gnosis was also subject to ten similes, although the commentators identify them as eleven, since they counted the mirror itself being the first. All of them are based on the mirror as the object of comparison and are similar to the treatment given the purity of the element of the dharmas.

An unshakable mirror might be hung up by a virtuous man where people congregate so that they might preen themselves (i-ii).²³ If bright and clean, the mirror is the cause of images based on the objects, but in it these images do not exist; it is neither possessed nor nonpossessed of them; it may reflect all the directions but the mirror does not partake of the size of its images (iii-viii).²⁴ The mirror cannot reflect images of things obscured by other things, things

placed in a dark environment, or things which are set at a distance (ix-xi).²⁵ Likewise, the mirror-like gnosis of the Tathāgatas is set up in the purity of the dharmadhātu so that beings might overcome defilement and develop purification (i-ii). Cleansed of defilements and bright in the benefit of beings, based on the temporality of their needs this gnosis becomes the cause for the arising of gnostic images which do not exist in it; it is neither possessed nor nonpossessed of them; it is the cause for the reflected images of the three vehicles, but cannot be measured according to whatever images occur in it, whether they are the path to the level of the Buddha or mundane and supermundane elements (iii-viii). The mirror-like gnosis cannot reflect gnostic images for those obscured by bad friends and other doctrines, darkened by the ignorance of joy in unwholesome acts, or distanced by dissociation from the path and the lack of desire for release (ix-xi).

c. śaṅṭāṇāna. Following the description of ādarśaṇāna in the MSA, two verses are dedicated to the gnosis of equality:

IX.70 The gnosis of equality among beings is stainless because of the purity of cultivation; the gnosis of equality is accepted to be established in nonlocalized nirvāṇa.

71 It is always accompanied with great loving kindness and compassion and displays the image of the Buddha to beings according to their interest.²⁶

As opposed to its treatment of the other forms of gnosis, the BuBh does not provide similes for the gnosis of equality, but seeks to establish its knowledge through a curious series of ten types of perfectedness (daśa-pariniṣpannākāra/-pariniṣpattiyākāra). In the first five of these, the gnosis of equality is to be known through perfected realization (*avabodha) of the equality: i) of marks, overlord, and happiness; ii) of the experience of dependent origination; iii) of the lack of characteristics in the isolation of characteristics; iv) of the great protective loving kindness; and v) of compassion which is not apathetic.²⁷ In the second five, the gnosis of equality is to be known through the perfection of equality: vi) in displaying the formal body (rūpakāya) just according to the interest of beings; vii) in expressions (pada) adapted to beings; viii) in the unitary flavor (ekarasa) of both the phenomenal universe and its pacification (upaśānta); ix) in the unitary flavor of both the joy and grief of mundane items; and x) in the generation of qualities.²⁸

d. pratyaवेकाṇekaṁjñāna. The gnosis of specific inspection is addressed in the following two verses of the MSA:

IX.72 The gnosis of specific inspection is always unimpeded towards knowable objects; it is just like a treasure of mental supports and concentrations.

73 Demonstrating every psychic power in the circle of disciples, it cuts off all doubts and sends down the rain of the great instruction.²⁹

The ten similes which the BuBh employs to elucidate this form of gnosis concern the relation between the world and the beings living in it. This world, the abode of beings, is the cause of the simultaneous arising of their various kinds of sensory awareness (nānākāravijñapti) in the shape of gardens, groves, continents, celestial bodies, heavenly realms, and so forth (i-iv).³⁰ It is the great enjoyment of beings and appears in manner of the five realms of existence throughout the three levels of desire, form, and formlessness (v-vii).³¹ In it appear great bejeweled mountains, unshakable oceans, and encircling crags (viii-x).³² Likewise, the gnosis of specific inspection--the abode of all the Buddhadharmas, concentrations, mental supports, etc.--is the cause for the simultaneous entrance into the various kinds of gnostic awareness unimpeded towards all knowable objects in the shape of mundane and supermundane elements, up to the special (āvenika) dharmas of the Buddha (i-iv). It is the great enjoyment of the dharma, and in it there is the appearance of the unlimited discrimination of cause and effect in the five realms and the three levels of existence (v-vii). In it appear great teachers--powerful Buddhas and Bodhisattvas--teaching the unshakable dharma, while it is encircled by nonobscuration towards all the universal and particular aspects of all dharmas (viii-x).

e. kryānuṣṭhānañāna. Finally, the effective gnosis is described in two verses in the MSA:

IX.74 The effective gnosis works for the benefit of all beings in all levels of existence by means of various, immeasurable, inconceivable manifestations.

75 The manifestation of the Buddha is to be known as always, entirely inconceivable in terms of number, field of activity, kind, and accomplishment of purpose.³³

Again the BuBh offers ten similes, comparing the physical, vocal, mental activity (kāyavakcittakarma) of ordinary beings with that of the Tathāgata. Beings engage in occupations--such as agriculture, commerce, and royal service--behaving in a certain manner in a certain place and experiencing the fruits of their occupation for good or ill (i-iii).³⁴ Beings come together in speech and are glad--disparaging error and encouraging veracity--their speech making intelligible the unknown through expressing poetry and technical treatises (iv-vi).³⁵ With their minds (manaskarma), beings consider what is to be done and not done, they form opinions (samudācāra) concerning action, they establish some activity, and they experience the joy or grief which follows (vii-x).³⁶ Likewise, the Tathāgatas guide, ripen, and liberate beings through practicing skillful means, engaging in behavior appropriate to the realm of existence, and experiencing the fruit of all the difficult practices, as is explained in the Itivṛttaka, Jātaka, etc. (i-iii). They guide, ripen, and liberate the world through their skill in speech; making their home in correct learning, the Tathāgatas praise decorum, establishing the paths of faith (śraddhēnusārin) and of doctrine

(dharmānusārin) and cutting off the doubts of beings (iv-vi). They guide, ripen, and liberate the world through their skill in considering forms of beings' mental behavior, in forming the proper antidotes to the incorrect while encouraging the correct; the Tathāgatas then frame these antidotes in correct words, phrases, and phonemes, finally experiencing the result in responding in four ways to the four kinds of questions (vii-x).³⁷

Now that we have considered the basic material the scholastics used, we must emphasize that nowhere in the MSA or the BuBh are these 'five dharmas of the level of the Buddha' connected with fundamental transformation. Yet it is equally obvious that they are intimately related to the soteriological process. This lack of scriptural guidance provided a wonderful forum for individual theories to arise concerning the combinations and permutations of the various forms of gnosis, their relation to the purity of the realm of the dharma, and their collective connection to unpurified psycho-physical elements.

Among the four verses, MSA IX.56-59, utilized in the BuBh as its concluding verses to elucidate the purity of the dharmadhātu, the first, IX.56, was explained as delineating the three categories of fundamental transformation found in the ASam.³⁸ All the scholastic authors who discuss this verse--Sthiramati, Śīlabhadra, Bandhuprabha, and Niḥsva-

bhāva--maintain that IX.56ab indicates the transformation of thusness (tathatāśrayaparivṛtti), since it defines the purity of the dharmadhātu in terms of the purity of thusness.³⁹ They also explain the phrase 'gnosis of the object' (vastuñāna) in IX.56c as the category of 'transformation of hindrances' (dausthulyāśrayaparivṛtti), identifying the vastu as the underlying consciousness, and in some cases as the dependent nature.⁴⁰ Finally, the phrase 'having inexhaustable dominion over the reference to that' in IX.56cd was taken by most to indicate the transformation of the path (mārgāśrayaparivṛtti).⁴¹

While the above authors also identify fundamental transformation with the forms of gnosis in their elucidation of IX.56, there is little doubt that these were associated before the scholastics. Probably the first text to associate these kinds of gnosis with the transformation of specific phenomena was the MSaṃ, perhaps in the late fourth or early fifth century. We have seen that it maintains a doctrine of the transformation of the five aggregates (skandha). With each transformation, the MSaṃ identifies the fruit with a type of sovereignty. In the case of the transformation of the aggregate of consciousness, though, the sovereignty is over the above four varieties of gnosis, which are listed by name.⁴² This identification must have been an organic development from MSA IX.42 and 44, which, as we have seen, discuss the fruits of the transformation of both intellect (manas) and conceptualization (vikalpa) in

terms of sovereignty over nonconceptual gnosis and over the unimpedance of gnosis.⁴³ While the intellect and conceptualization do not exhaust the possibilities of the aggregate of consciousness, the author of the MSam evidently made the cognitive jump of identifying them with the aggregate and matching gnosis with the four varieties.⁴⁴

The next step was eminently logical; the scholastics were well aware that consciousness is broken down into various kinds, as it is an aggregate. Since the MSam had already identified more than one variety of gnosis with the transformation of consciousness, the job only remained to find which consciousness transformation corresponded to which variety of gnosis. By the time Sthiramati (ca. 510-570 A.D.) wrote his commentary on the MSA, probably his latest work, there were two principal theories which had gained currency in India. In his introduction to MSA IX.12-18, he briefly discusses āśrayaparāvṛtti:

Now concerning this compound, the 'fundament' means the five aggregates from form up to consciousness. Having eliminated the two obscurations of defilements and the knowable, they become the extreme purity of the realm of the dharma and nonconceptual gnosis; this is the meaning of 'transformation'. (i) From among them, the aggregates of form, feeling, ideation, and formations, along with the forms of consciousness from visual to the defiled intellect, if all of these are purified they are transformed into the extreme purity of the realm of the dharma. If the underlying consciousness is purified, it is transformed into the nonconceptual gnosis. (ii) Alternatively, if emptiness (śūnyatā) existent in all the five aggregates, including the eight forms of consciousness, becomes purified (buddha), that emptiness is transformed into the extremely pure realm of the dharma. From among the eight forms

of consciousness, when there is the purification of the underlying consciousness, it is transformed into the mirror-like gnosis. If there is the purification of the defiled intellect, it is transformed into the gnosis of equality. If there is the purification of the intellectual consciousness, it is transformed into the gnosis of specific inspection. If there is the purification of the five forms of consciousness, from visual to physical, they become transformed into the effective gnosis. When there is the obtainment of these five, the four forms of gnosis and the pure realm of the dharma, then these are known as the five fundamental transformations.⁴⁵

It is not clear just who originated the above two formulations of fundamental transformation. Elsewhere, in his commentary to MSA IX.41-48, Sthiramati has occasion to utilize parts of both systems, and in both sections he appears to give the precedence to (ii) above.⁴⁶ This particular theory of transformation may have originated in the Nālandā school of exegesis; in any event it found favor with the doctors of that school and occurs to some degree in all three of the technical treatises representative of their system: the BuBhVy of Śīlabhadra, the BuBhU of Bandhuprabha, and the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi ascribed to Dharmapāla.⁴⁷

Almost equally obscure is the relationship between the specific consciousness and the gnosis which is the result of its transformation. There is evidently some form of similarity. For example, we have seen that the mirror-like gnosis (ādarśajñāna) is considered to reflect the images of all phenomena. In its sources, the Nālandā school is depicted as also postulating that the undefiled seeds (anāśravabīja) reside in the mirror-like gnosis.⁴⁸ These

functions are quite similar to those ascribed to the underlying consciousness from the MSam on: carrying the images of the object and the seeds of latent personality characteristics. The gnosis of equality is, according to MSA IX.71, always accompanied by loving kindness (maitrī) and compassion (kṛpā/karunā). And it is considered the transformation of the defiled intellect which is always accompanied by the affective defilements of ignorance, the perception of self, pride in oneself, and thirst for existence.⁴⁹ Again, the gnosis of specific inspection is largely concerned with the cognitive processes, such as the determination of the particular and universal characteristics (svasāmānyalakṣaṇa). It replaces the intellectual consciousness, but is said to have a component of conceptualization (vikalpa) in its awareness of cause and effect, unlike the mirror-like gnosis which is entirely nonconceptual.⁵⁰ Finally, the effective gnosis endeavors to skillful activity in working with beings at large. Its similarity of function to the five sensory consciousnesses, which in an idealist system means the entire cosmos, is on broader terms than the other three, but no less identifiable.

If we have slightly emphasized the similarities between the forms of consciousness and the forms of gnosis contiguous to them, it is because their similar functions are apparent. The description of their transformation as movement from a defiled state (sāsrava) to an undefiled one

(anāsrava) is explicit in some of the statements. Certainly, the doctrines of momentariness equally require that momentum (sabhāga) be a property of systems, and it appears that in some sense it was applied to soteriology and gnoseology by the scholastic authors. This description of the passing beyond the functions of consciousness to the functions of gnosis was perhaps the scholastics' greatest contribution since it identified the mechanism of liberation in a way that was unavailable to the earlier authors.

The similarity of conscious and gnostic functions must have caused quite a stir in the world of the scholastics. There is retained in the Siddhi a controversy on the precise relationship between consciousness and gnosis during the process of the path.⁵¹ The first opinion is that gnosis takes consciousness as its lord, and gnosis is the servant; the jñāna requires the transformation of the viññāna and is therefore dependent on it. The second opinion, approved in the Siddhi, is that in the effluent (sāsrava) condition, gnosis is weak while consciousness is strong. In the noneffluent (anāsrava) state, the reverse is true. The first opinion appears to maintain that the relationship between gnosis and consciousness is that of a mental event (caitta) to the mind (citta). This position relegates gnosis to the awkward position of being like a compounded element (samskr̥tadharma), clearly not the case with the mirror-like gnosis, which is identified with the dharmakāya.⁵² The second position is not much more

satisfactory since it seems to largely follow the old Buddhist injunction to have recourse to gnosis and not to consciousness (viññānapratīṣāraṇaṃ na tu viññānapratīṣāraṇaṃ).⁵³

Finally, some of the sources of the Nālandā school demonstrate a desire to establish the development of gnosis along the same lines as the development of the lineage (gotra).⁵⁴ The seeds of the four varieties of gnosis were seen to inhabit the stream of being from beginningless time (anādikālika). For them to develop, however, they need to be 'influenced' (√vāsayā-), presumably by the standard two devices of listening to the teaching and practicing subsequent mental application. Once fully developed, though, the forms of gnosis themselves are no longer subject to influence. The rise of this sort of doctrine is indicative of the difficulty Indian Buddhism had in dealing with the extreme alteration of function. The tendency, when confronted with such a crux, was to relegate it to a beginningless time and thus disclaim responsibility for its solution. Until this gotra-modeled doctrine was developed, Buddhist masters had recognized that cognitive functions of an entirely different variety could come about, even if they had difficulty in explaining their manifestation. With their relegation to beginningless time, new circumstances of development were effectively denied.⁵⁵

The problem of the relationship between jñāna and viññāna is still laden with difficulties, if only because the succession or suppression of one cognitive state by another different cognition has always given the Buddhists problems, as we have seen in the postulation of the underlying consciousness, and in some sense also with thusness.⁵⁶ Yet it is a critical point, and its continued obscurity was to have great consequences with the adoption of this complex gnoseology by the Vajrācāryas during the rise of the Mantrayāna after the seventh century.⁵⁷ Unfortunately, the elaboration of the Vajrayāna position is far beyond the scope of this study, yet an investigation of its employment of the process of fundamental transformation must be noted as a urgent desideratum.⁵⁸

Notes to Part III: Chapter Four

1. See Yoshifumi Ueda, "Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogacara Philosophy," Philosophy East and West 17: 155-166; Erich Frauwallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic," WZKSO 5 (1961): 125-148; Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhavaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla," WZKSO 12-13 (1968/69): 193-203; D. Shimaji and Paul Demiéville, "Historique du système Viññaptimātra," in Sylvain Lévi, Materiaux pour l'Étude du Système Viññaptimātra, Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études vol. 260, Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1932, pp. 15-42.

2. Respectively, T. 680 and T. 1530.

3. To. 275; all references to the BuBh and the BuBhVy will be to Kyoo Nishio's edition, The Buddhābhūmi-Sūtra and the Buddhābhūmi-Vyākhyāna of Śīlabhadra, Part I, rept. Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1982.

4. To. 3997; Peking 5498.

5. Nishio, BuBh, p. 24.8: ti ka dang sbyar ste gsar du bagyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa ||.

6. Lévi, MSABh, p. 44.10 identifies dvayāvara as the two obscurations of defilements and the knowable (kleśa-jñeyāvaraṇa).

7. Lévi, MSABh, p. 44.16 identifies 'the pair' as benefit and happiness (hitasukhadvayādhāna).

8. 'Mental support', dhāraṇī, is described as four varieties in Dutt, BoBh, pp. 185.5-186.9: dharmadhāraṇī, artha-, mantra-, and bodhisattvakaṇṭhīlābhāya dhāraṇī.

9. Lévi, MSA IX.56-59, p. 8-23; SAVBh, sDe-dge sems-tsam mi, fols. 133a7-135b5:

savadharmadvayāvaratathatāśuddhilakṣaṇaḥ |
vastujñānatadālam bavaśitākṣaya lakṣaṇaḥ || 56
saratas tathatājñānabhāvanā samudāgamaḥ |
sarvasattvadvayādhānasarvathākṣayatā phalaṃ || 57
kāyavākciṭṭanirmāṇaprayogopāyakarmakaḥ |
samādhidhāraṇīdvāradvayāmeayasamānvitaḥ || 58
avabhāvadharmaśāmbhoganirmāṇair bhinnavṛttikaḥ |
dharmadhātur viśuddho 'yam buddhānām samudāhṛtaḥ || 59

I have emended IX.57d from -sarvathā 'kṣayatā phalaṃ on the basis of SAVBh, sDe-dge sems-tsam mi, fol. 134b3-5.

10. Nishio, BuBh II.2.1, p. 4, BuBhVy III.6.1.1, pp. 61-64. John P. Keenan has studied the BuBhU of Bandhuprabha, rendering an English translation of both the BuBh and the BuBhU in the process--A Study of the Buddhābhūmyupadeśa: The doctrinal Development of the Notion of Wisdom in Yogācāra Thought, Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1980; the commentary on BuBh II.2.1 is covered pp. 594-601. Keenan, A Study, pp. 342-353, believes that the pūrvapakṣa set up in the BuBhU to be ostensibly answered in the BuBh are real objections to certain verses in the MSA IX. The early chapters in particular of this dissertation are unfortunately hampered by the author's uncritical reliance on the superficial perspective of certain Japanese authors; strange phrases such as 'paratantric consciousness' and 'Yogācāra thinking' abound. I have cited his translation of the BuBhU without necessarily agreeing with his translation of it or the BuBh. For the Sarvāstivādin objectification of space which underlies most of these arguments, see Shastri, Kośa I.5, p. 19, KośaBh to II.36, p. 212, KośaBh to II.55, p. 321; La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. I, p. 8 n.3.
11. Nishio, BuBh II.2.2, p. 5; BuBhVy III.6.1.2, pp. 64-67; Keenan, A Study, pp. 601-610.
12. Nishio, BuBh II.2.3, p. 5; BuBhVy III.6.1.3, pp. 68-70; Keenan, A Study, pp. 610-618.
13. Nishio, BuBh II.2.4; BuBhVy III.6.1.4, p. 71; Keenan, A Study, pp. 618-620.
14. Nishio, BuBh II.2.5, pp. 5-6; BuBhVy III.6.1.5, p. 72; Keenan, A Study, pp. 620-622.
15. Nishio, BuBh II.2.6, p. 6; BuBhVy III.6.1.6, pp. 72-74; Keenan, A Study, pp. 623-626.
16. Nishio, BuBh II.2.7, pp. 6-7; BuBhVy III.6.1.7, pp. 74-76; Keenan, A Study, pp. 627-631.
17. Nishio, BuBh II.2.8, p. 7; BuBhVy III.6.1.8, pp. 76-78; Keenan, A Study, pp. 631-636.
18. Nishio, BuBh II.2.9, p. 7; BuBhVy III.6.1.9, pp. 78-79; Keenan, A Study, pp. 636-640; the five pure aggregates are śīla, saṃādhi, prajñā, vimukti, vimuktiḥkāṇadarśana--these will be examined in Part IV, Chapter Three with the vimuktikāya.
19. Nishio, BuBh II.2.10, pp. 7-8; BuBhVy III.6.1.10, pp. 79-81; Keenan, A Study, pp. 640-644.
20. See SAVBh, sams-tsam mi, fol. 138b4.

21. Lévi, MSABh, p. 46.19: the three other forms of gnosis are 'moving' (cala) in opposition to the ādarśajñāna which is here 'unmoving' (acala). Cf. IX.76 which describes the arising of the four kinds of gnosis:

dhāraṇāt samacittāc ca saṃyagdharmaprakāśanāt |
krtyānuṣṭhānataś caiva caturjñānasamudbhavaḥ ||
SAVBh, sams-tsam mi, fols. 142b4-143a2.

22. Lévi, MSA IX.67-69, p. 46.16-25; SAVBh, sams-tsam mi, fols. 138b2-140a7:

ādarśajñānam acalam trayajñānaṃ tadāśritaṃ |
samatāpratyavekṣāyāṃ krtyānuṣṭhāna eva ca || 67
ādarśajñānam amamāpericchinnam sadānugaṃ |
sarvajñeṣv asammudham na ca teṣv amukham sadā || 68
sarvajñānanimittatvān mahājñānākaropamaṃ |
saṃbhogabuddhatājñānapratibimbodayāc ca tat || 69

23. Images i-ii and their corresponding doctrines occur in Nishio, BuBh II.3.1-2, p. 8; BuBhVy III.6.2.1-2, pp. 82-86; Keenan, A Study, pp. 645-664.

24. Images iii-viii and their corresponding doctrines occur in Nishio, BuBh II.3.3-8, pp. 9-11; BuBhVy III.6.2.3-8, pp. 86-93; Keenan, A Study, pp. 664-687.

25. Images ix-xi and their corresponding doctrines occur in Nishio, BuBh II.3.9-11, pp. 11-12; BuBhVy III.6.2.9-11, pp. 94-95; Keenan, A Study, pp. 687-693.

26. Lévi, MSA, p. 47.3-8; SAVBh, sams-tsam mi, fols. 140a7-141a4:

sattveṣu samatājñānaṃ bhāvanāśuddhito 'malaṃ |
apratisthasamāviṣṭam samatājñānam iṣyate || 70
mahāmaitrikrpābhyām ca sarvakālānugaṃ matam |
yathādhimokṣam sattvānām buddhabimbanidarśakam || 71

27. Nishio, BuBh II.4.1-5, p. 12; BuBhVy III.6.3.1-5, pp. 95-100; Keenan, A Study, pp. 694-708.

28. Nishio, BuBh II.4.6-10, pp. 12-13; BuBhVy III.6.3.6-10, pp. 100-102; Keenan, A Study, pp. 708-716.

29. Lévi, MSA, p. 47.11-14; SAVBh, sams-tsam mi, fols. 141a4-142a3:

prayavekṣaṇakam jñānaṃ jñeṣv avyāhataṃ sadā |
dhāraṇīnām samādhīnām nidhānopamaṃ eva ca || 72
pariṣaṇmaṇḍale sarvavibhūtinām nidarśakam |
sarvasaṃśayavicchedi mahādharmapravaṛṣakam || 73

30. Similes i-iv and associated doctrines found in Nishio, BuBh II.5.1-4, pp. 13-14; BuBhVy III.6.4.1-4, pp. 102-104; Keenan, A Study, pp. 717-732.

31. Similes v-vii and associated doctrines found in Nishio, BuBh II.5.5-7, pp. 14-15; BuBhVy III.6.4.5-7, pp. 104-105; Keenan, A Study, pp. 732-743.

32. Similes viii-x and associated doctrines found in Nishio, BuBh II.5.8-10, p. 15; BuBhVy III.6.4.8-10, pp. 105-106; Keenan, A Study, pp. 743-753.

33. Lévi, MSA, p. 47.16-21; SAVBh, sams-tsam mi, fol. 142a3-b4:

kr̥tyānuṣṭhānatājñānaṃ nirmāṇaiḥ sarvadhātuṣu |
citrāprameyācintyais ca sarvasattvārthakāraṇaṃ || 74
kr̥tyanīṣpattibhir bhedaḥ saṃkhyākṣetrais ca sarvadā |
acintyaṃ buddhanirmāṇaṃ vijñeyaṃ tac ca sarvathā || 75

34. These similes and their associated doctrines occur in Nishio, BuBh II.6.1-3, pp. 15-17; BuBhVy III.6.5.1-3, pp. 106-109; Keenan, A Study, pp. 754-766.

35. These similes and their associated doctrines occur in Nishio, BuBh II.6.4-6, pp. 17-18; BuBhVy III.6.5.4-6, pp. 109-110; Keenan, A Study, pp. 766-771.

36. These similes and their associated doctrines occur in Nishio, BuBh II.6.7-10, pp. 18-19; BuBhVy III.6.5.7-10, pp. 110-112; Keenan, A Study, pp. 772-781.

37. The four kinds of questions with their four different modes of answer are treated in detail in K.N.Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1963, pp. 281 ff.

38. See above Chapter Two and Pradhan, ASan, p. 77.2-4.

39. Śīlabhadra gives tathatāśrayaparivṛtti:de bzhin nyid gnas yongs su gyur pa, Nishio, BuBhVy III.8.1, p. 11918-22; Sthiramati gives tathatāśrayaparāvṛtti:de bzhin nyid gnas gzhan du gyur pa, SAVBh, sams-tsam mi, fol. 134a2; Bandhuprabha perhaps can be rendered as *viśuddhadharmadhātu-nīṣpattyaśrayaparivṛtti:淨法界究竟轉依), BuBhU, T. 1530.26.324a9-10, Keenan, A Study, p. 823; Nīhavabhāva also gives tathatāśrayaparivṛtti:de bzhin nyid kyi gnas yongs su gyur pa, MSAT, sDe-dge sams-tsam bi, fol. 72b4-5.

40. Nishio, BuBhVy III.8.1, pp. 120.17-121.8; BuBhU, T. 1530.26.324b4-8, Keenan, A Study, p. 829; SAVBh, sams-tsam mi, fol. 134a4-5; MSAT, sams-tsam bi, fol. 72b5.

41. Nishio, BuBhVy III.8.1, p. 121.10-16; SAVBh, sams-tsam mi, fol. 134a5; MSAT, sams-tsam bi, fol. 72b6; I have not located this application in BuBhU, where the phrase -vaśītākṣayaḥ is discussed T. 1530.26.324b2-27.

42. Lamotte, MSam X.5.e, vol. 1, p. 86, vol. 2, p. 279; this section was translated in full in Part II, Chapter Three above.

43. Lévi, MSA, p. 41.7-16; translated above in Chapter One of this part.

44. Cf. SAVBh, sDe-dge sams-tsam mi, fols. 127b7-128a2 which also makes the jump in the case of gnosis listed in MSA IX.44.

45. SAVBh, sams-tsam mi, fol. 113b1-5: de la gnas zhes bya ba ni gzugs kyi phung po nas rnam par shes pa'i bar du phung po lnga la bya ste ! phung po de dag la yod pa'i nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa spang nas chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag par gyur pa dang ! rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes su gyur pa la gnas gzhan du gyur pa shes bya'o ! de la gzugs dang tshor ba dang 'du shes dang 'du byed de phung po bzhi dang ! rnam par shes pa'i phung po las mig gi rnam par shes pa nas nyon mongs pa'i yid kyi bar du dag na chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag par 'gyur ro ! kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dag na rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes su 'gyur ro ! yang na gzugs dang ! tshor ba dang ! 'du shes dang ! 'du byed dag dang ! rnam par shes pa brgyad la yod pa'i stong pa nyid dag na chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag par 'gyur ro ! rnam par shes pa brgyad las kun gzhi dag na me long lta bu'i ye shes su gyur to ! nyon mongs pa'i yid dag na mnyam pa nyid kyi ye shes su 'gyur ro ! yid kyi rnam par shes pa dag na so sor kun du rtog pa'i ye shes su 'gyur ro ! mig nas las kyi bar du rnam par shes pa lnga dag na bya ba grub pa'i ye shes su 'gyur te ! ye shes bzhi dang chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa lnga thob pa la gnas gzhan du gyur pa lnga zhes bya'o !.

46. SAVBh, sams-tsam mi, fol. 125b6-129a7.

47. The least indication is found in Nishio, BuBhVy III.5.2.1-5, pp. 60-61; BuBhU, T.1530.26.302b23-c11; Keenan, A Study, pp. 559-562; Poussin, La Siddhi, pp. 684-8.

48. La Vallée Poussin, La Siddhi, pp. 685-686; BuBhU T. 1530.26.302a15-16; Keenan, A Study, p. 554.

49. Bhattacharya, YoBh, p. 11.6-7: kliṣṭam ca mano yan nityam avidyātmadrṣṭyāsmimānatṛṣṇalakṣaṇaiś caturbhiḥ kleśaiḥ samprayuktam ||; slightly different list found Pradhan, ASam, p. 12.3-4; cf. Sthiramati's comment on this in SAVBh, sams-tsam mi, fol. 126b7-127a2.

50. Nishio, BuBhVy, p. 105.11-15.

51. La Vallée Poussin, La Siddhi, p. 684.

52. Nishio, BuBhVy III.5.1.3, p. 59.9-18.

53. Noted by La Vallée Poussin, La Siddhi, p. 684 n. 2. For the entire discussion of the four pratisāraṇa, see Étienne Lamotte, "La critique d'interprétation dans le bouddhisme," Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves XI [Mélanges Henri Gregoire] (1949): 341-361 for complete references to these four pairs; see also Ronald M. Davidson, "An Introduction to the Standards of Scriptural Authenticity in Indian Buddhism," forthcoming in Robert Buswell, ed., Buddhist Apocrypha in East Asia and Tibet, U.C. Press.

54. La Vallée Poussin, La Siddhi, p. 688; BuBuU, T. 1530.26.303c23-25; Keenan, A Study, p. 584.

55. The tradition surrounding the Hevajra Tantra was ultimately to postulate an innate gnosis (sahajajñāna) also; see the rgYud kyi anqon rtoqa rin po che'i ljon shing, in bSod-nams rgya-mtsho, ed., The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa Skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism, Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968, vol. 3, p. 28.3-4.

56. For the Abhidharma solution of dissociated cognitive succession, see P.S.Jaini, "Prañā and dr̥ṣṭi in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma," in Lewis Lancaster, ed., Prañāpāramitā and Related Systems, Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, pp. 403-415.

57. Please notice the use of this gnoseology in Ronald M. Davidson, "The Litany of Names of Mañjuśrī: Text and Translation of the Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti," in Michael Strickmann, ed., Tantric and Taoist Studies in Honour of R.A.Stein, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques XX, Brussels: Institut Belge des hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1981, vol. 1, pp. 1-69; idem, "Preliminary Studies on Hevajra's Abhisamayā and the Lam-'bras Tshogs-bshad," forthcoming in Ronald M. Davidson and Steven D. Goodman, eds., Wind Horse: Proceedings of the North American Tibetological Society, Vol. II, Asian Humanities Press.

58. See Giuseppe Tucci, Opera Minora, Rome: Rome University, 1971, vol. 1, pp.529-532; A. Zigmund Cerbu, "A Tun-Huang Version of the Āśrayaparāvṛtti," Adyar Library Bulletin 25 (1961): 40-48.

PART III--APPENDIX:

The Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra

In our discussions above of the trends in the Yogacara analysis of fundamental transformation, we have primarily focused on the authored treatises (śāstra), avoiding the scriptural materials except when they bear on specific problems, as in the case of the BuBh in the previous chapter. There are two reasons we have done this. First, the scriptural sources of our doctrine are rarely systematic; the treatises, while not exactly rigorous, pay more attention to the implications of problems than do the scriptures. Second, and most important for this section, with respect to their treatments of the systems, the scriptures are rarely synthetic in nature; the śāstras are the major source of such amalgamations. One sūtra, though, presents quite an exception to this latter rule and we must now address the problems associated with the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra. The nonsystematic nature of the text, though, inhibits the methodology which we have utilized in the other chapters, so this well-known Mahāyāna sūtra has been relegated to this Appendix.

This famous text was reputed to have been first translated between 412-433 by Dharmarakṣa, while the translation made by Guṇabhadra in 443 still exists.¹ It has

sometimes been classified as a 'Yogācāra text' since it utilizes the terminology of that tradition and manipulates the various models of the underlying consciousness, the three natures, and the embryo of the Tathāgata. In many ways, though, such a classification is misleading, and we find that none of the main Yogācāra authors before Sthiramati refer to it. On the other hand, the Mādhyamikas, in particular Candrakīrti, have made it the scriptural base for some of their polemical arguments.²

As may thus be expected, the Lañk is extremely syncretic and equally disorganized. To give a flavor of this, we may note that one part of the Lañk mentions the elimination of the underlying consciousness at the time of realization, while another part declares that such a doctrine is equivalent to falling into the nihilism (ucchedavāda) of the heretics.³ All the same, the general thrust of the Lañk is to identify the ālayaviññāna with the tathāgatagarbha material of the Śrīmālādevīsīmaṇāda-sūtra, a work alluded to in the text of the Lañk.⁴ We also find taken from that text the doctrine of the mental body (manomayakāya), which is expanded in the Lañk. The following is a summary of the most pertinent material, desirable in this case because the current text of the Lañk badly needs reediting, because the text is chaotic in any event, and because it had a minimum of effect on the subsequent developments of the doctrines of transformation in Buddhism.

Perhaps the major thrust of the Laṅkā is the elimination of ideas of existence and nonexistence, which the sūtra views in terms of superimposition upon (samāropa) and detracting from (apavāda) the nature of reality. The real source for these views is the disturbance of consciousness in the form of the seven sensory consciousnesses. As long as the underlying consciousness, also termed the embryo of the Tathāgata, remains nontransformed, there is no cessation of the sensory consciousnesses.⁵ This embryo of the Tathāgata operates as the supporting cause for these forms of consciousness in the case of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, heretics, and so forth, who have only realized subordinate material, such as the selflessness of one's own being and universal and particular distinctions. For the Bodhisattvas, the embryo of the Tathāgata moves towards quiescence (nivartate). This happens because Bodhisattvas comprehend much that is inaccessible to the others: they see the selflessness of the nature of the five dharmas; they are devoid of the view of the arising, stability, and passing away of all dharmas; most importantly, they realize the mere nonappearance of their own minds (svacittanirābhāsa-mātrāvatāra).⁶ They do this by having transformed themselves according to the path through the various levels of the Bodhisattvas (bhūmi). Others, though, are unable to establish themselves in this same way, since they have not the insight which is cultivated by the Bodhisattva.

One of the primary characteristics of the Bodhisattva's insight is that it is devoid of the view of the arising, presence, and destruction of the various elements of existence, since these have no real being to begin with.⁷ Indeed, all of the elements of existence, being like the birth of form within a dream or in an illusion, do not arise since they have no existence of their own (svabhāva), by virtue of other's existence (parabhāva), or both. Following the understanding of these being his own mind, as there is no external reality, the yogin observes the nonoperation of the various forms of consciousness. Seeing the triple world as a seamless web of conditions born of conceptualization, through the nonapprehension of the internal and external elements, he turns back presuppositions of the arising of existence and observes its selflessness. Thus he obtains the patience developed from the knowledge that the no element of reality has ever come into being (anutpattika-dharmakṣānti). Standing on the eighth level of the Bodhisattva, he obtains the 'body made of mind' through his comprehension of the transformation of the mind, the intellect, the intellectual consciousness, and every other kind of object of cognition.

Much is made of this 'body made of mind' (manomayakāya) in the Lañk, and it is often associated with the transformation and the path. Its qualities are that, like the mind, it is entirely unobstructed through mountains, walls, rivers, trees, and the like. The mind, recollecting

things extremely distant which have been seen before, is able to proceed with those images, even while its stream of consciousness is not cut off from the physical body. So, too, with the 'body made of mind'. It operates in the stream of being (nikāya) of the saint as if it were the intellect, and, remembering the previous aspirations, it operates for the sake of beings. It is adorned with the powers, the sovereignties, and the superior cognitions (balavaśitābhijñāna) by means of the concentration which is 'like magic' (māyopamasamādhi).

This 'body made of mind' is really of three kinds, respective to which stage of the path the Bodhisattva is on.⁸ The first is the mental body which functions in the contemplation of the joy of concentration (samādhisukha-samāpattimanomayakāya). It occurs in the yogin who is on the third, fourth, or fifth stages of the path of the Bodhisattva. At these levels, he has realized the nonoperation of his mind, that is, the nondisturbance of the waves of consciousness in the ocean of his mentality, through his residence in the various forms of dissociation within his mind (svacittavividhāvivekavihāreṇa). Because of his total comprehension of the nonexistence of the object, which is to be seen as his own consciousness, he obtains this particular mental body. The second is the mental body which comes from the realization of the essential nature of the elements of existence (dharmasvabhāvāvabodhamanomayakāya). This is obtained on the eighth level of the

Bodhisattva through the fundamental transformation of the mind which comes from the realization through investigation of the nonappearance of dharmas which are like illusion, and so forth (māyādidharmanirābhāsaprevicayāvabodhena). The yogin thus obtains this 'magical' concentration and the attendant mental body which approaches the assembly of disciples in all the Buddha fields, having comprehended the nature of the elements of existence. The last mental body is that which functions with the formations occurring in the stream of existence of Buddhas (nikāyasahasasamskāra-kriyā-manomayakāya) and comes from the comprehension of the characteristics of the bliss and realization of all the qualities of the Buddha.

Thus the Laṅkā defines realization in terms of the fundamental transformation of the view of existence as either real or unreal; for the saints neither of these conceptions exist.⁹ For them, the error inherent in conceptualizations of existence and in the traces of hindrances found in the various levels of consciousness is simply seen as thusness.¹⁰ Finally, the fundamental transformation of these levels of consciousness and their attendant traces is the definition of nirvāṇa within the Laṅkā.¹¹

While the importance of the mental body in the Laṅkā cannot be questioned, the significance of fundamental transformation for this doctrine is obscure. The precise

relationship between the two is not explored. Certainly the sūtra acknowledges the relatively standard elimination of the hindrances (dausthulya) within the ālayaviññāna, but it is not clear if the underlying consciousness remains or in what form. As we have noted some statements refer to the total elimination of consciousness, others, like Lañk X.832 maintain that the ālaya is the pure basis of all beings, similar to mercury which exists naturally without defilements.¹² Finally, we must remark that the relationship between the ālayaviññāna and the manomayakāya is unclear at best. Is the latter the transformed state of the former? The syncretic nature of the Lañk and its chaotic content preclude answers to these and other questions.

One gets the impressions from reading the sūtra that it is a result of eremitic visions, taking the stuff of other texts and fusing their standard statements into a mystic whole. The artificial nature of the integration of the earlier systems, the lack of continuity between one model and another, the use of 'faddish' soteriological terms, and the unabashed contradictions within the text all hinder a sober assessment of its significance.

Notes to Part III: Appendix

1. T.670; see Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1930, rept. 1968, pp. 4-37 for a discussion of the translations and their relation to the received Sanskrit text. Recently, Takasaki has made some proposals concerning the earlier strata of the Laṅk; Jikido Takasaki, "Analysis of the Laṅkāvatāra: In search of its original form," in Indianisme et Bouddhisme--Mélanges offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte, Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1980, pp. 339-352.
2. Prasannapadā, ed., La Vallée Poussin, pp. 262.2-5, 504.5-6, 528.10-11; idem, Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti, Bibliotheca Buddhica IX, St. Petersburg: L'Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1912, pp. 76.11, 131.12, 160.9, 172.17, 183.17.
3. Bunyiu Nanjio, The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Bibliotheca Otaniensis Vol. One, Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1956; cf. pp. 39.1-8 with p. 43.1 which should be read according to the note 1--parāvṛttāśraya; see Peking bKa'-gyur mdo, vol. ngu, fol. 78a6; the text of the Laṅk is still quite corrupt and the edition of Nanjio is faulty in many places, requiring assistance at least from the Tibetan translation.
4. Nanjio, Laṅk, pp. 222.19, 223.4.
5. Nanjio, Laṅk, pp. 221.12-222.10 where much of this material is extracted.
6. Nanjio, Laṅk, pp. 43.1-2, 152.6-7, 202.2-3, 338.15.16 [vv. III.98 = X.594], 80.12-81.16 [Tib. 11, fol. 96a2-3].
7. The following material is taken from Nanjio, Laṅk, pp. 80.13-81.16.
8. The following material is from Nanjio, Laṅk, pp. 136.1-137.11.
9. Nanjio, Laṅk, p. 93.2-5.
10. Nanjio, Laṅk, p. 108.9-12.
11. Nanjio, Laṅk, pp. 43.1-2, 62.1, 98.17-18, 200.6-8, 202.2-3, 338.15-16; there is much redundancy in the Laṅk.
12. Nanjio, Laṅk, p. 369.4-5; cf. X.16-17, p. 266.4-7.

PART IV:

PATHS OF TRANSFORMATION

CHAPTER ONE:

The Śrāvaka Path

In the manipulation of all of the models as well as in the various synthetic adaptations, we have seen the consistent association of fundamental transformation with the stages of two different soteriological structures: the Śrāvaka path and the Bodhisattva path. Indeed, probably the earliest mention of the doctrines of transformation occurs in the Saṃd, where the superiority of the Mahāyāna and the its fruit is structured in terms of the superiority of its fundamental transformation as opposed to the lesser one of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. Consideration of this locus classicus will be deferred until the last chapter of this study; before embarking on an investigation of the fruit of the two paths, the paths themselves must be examined.

Throughout the Yogācāra corpus of literature, varied and sometimes contradictory statements are to be found concerning the path (mārga) of the Śrāvakas, those disciples of the Muni who are primarily concerned with their personal release from the bonds of the wheel of existence. The Śrāvakamārga was important for a Mahāyāna tradition which retained a strong flavor of their earlier Abhidharma doctrines. Unlike some other Mahāyāna literature, the vehicle of the Śrāvakas is given a great deal of attention

in the Yogācāra corpus and is considered a worthwhile occupation. For example, the BoBh directly compares, point for point, the path of the Bodhisattva with that of the Śrāvaka, granting them much equality. The ASam, in addition, does not discuss in detail the levels of the Bodhisattva, only examining in depth the stages of the Śrāvakamārga.¹ In the ASam, primarily at the highest stage (niṣṭhāmārga) is the Bodhisattvamārga considered, and that to describe the superiority of its realization (abhisamaya).

Currently, the Śrāvakamārga of the Vaibhāṣikas is generally recognized, due in great measure to the fine work done on the Abhidharmakośa.² The mārga system of the Abhisamayālaṅkāra has also been studied, although some of this work is now out of date.³ Schmithausen is one of the few to undertake studies of the Śrāvakamārga as found in the Yogācāra sources.⁴ While the Yogācāra materials exhibit many similarities to that of the Vaibhāṣikas, still theirs is a formulation of the path which is in many ways unique, especially in the older strata. Primary among the sources are the ŚrBh and the VinSq.⁵ It falls, though, to one of the latest of Asaṅga's works, the ASam, to give the most detailed discussions of the stages. Our method will be to examine the Śrāvaka path according to the material in the ASam, bringing in other resources as are necessary for the clarity of this structure's general development.⁶ Following the summary of each level of the path, we will discuss the

formulation of fundamental transformation for that level.

The materials of the Yogācāra tradition, particularly in their later manifestations, follow a five-fold path (pañcamārga) system, the origins of which are not at all clear.⁷ The two earlier paths will be quite condensed since fundamental transformation is never identified with either.

a. Sambhāramārga. The path of accumulation is treated in a very cursory fashion in the ASam.⁸ Two definitions are offered: First, it is moral discipline (śīla), guarding of the senses, disciplined appetite, wakefulness in the first and last parts of the night, diligent meditation, and residence in the clarity of ordinary persons. Alternatively, it may be considered some other effective moral practice coupled with the insight (prajñā) derived from studying, reflecting on, and meditating on the teaching. This meditation allows one to obtain the condition of being a worthy vessel for the position of liberation and realization (abhisamayavimokṣa-ssthānabhājanatā).⁹

The second of these definitions reflect the influence of the four elements conducive to liberation (mokṣabhāgiya) found in the Abhidharmakośa: insight (studious and reflective) and the three functional avenues of body, speech

and mind. The fact of meditative insight included in the ASam appears to differentiate, though, the ASam from the Kośa which disallows this form of insight as a member of the nokṣabhāqīyas.¹⁰ We must note that the five-fold division of the elements conducive to liberation as found in the Abhisamayālaṅkāra is not reflected here.¹¹

b. Prayogaṃārga. The path of application consists of that which is accomplished on the path of accumulation in addition to the well-known four 'aids to penetration' (nirvedhabhāqīya).¹² The first of these four is 'heat' (ūṣmagata), which may be understood as personal experience in contemplation.¹³ It consists of the concentration, addressed towards the noble truths, which obtains light and is attended by insight. The second is 'summit' (mūrdhan) and consists of the same elements, but with the experience of light intensified (ālokavṛddha). The third is 'patience' (ksānti), again consisting of the concentration with its insight, but the concentration now follows from the partial penetration into the truths. Finally, there is the 'highest mundane concentration' (laukikāgradharmā), immediately after which follows the supermundane path of vision.¹⁴

c. Parśanaṃārga. There are four definitions of the path of vision given in the ASam:¹⁵

In summary,

i. It is the concentration and insight which are nonapprehensive (anupalambha) and which follow immediately after the highest mundane concentration.¹⁶

ii. It is also the gnosis which occurs in the equality of the object and subject of cognition.¹⁷

iii. It is also the gnosis referential to the lack of anything fulfilling the conventional usage 'being' and 'element' towards oneself and towards all objects.

In terms of divisions,

iv. It is the series of four moments of consciousness (cittaksana) towards each of the four noble truths.¹⁸

1) For example, in the case of the first truth, suffering (duhkha), there first arises patience based on the knowledge of the teaching of suffering (duhkhe dharmaññānaksāntiḥ). This patience is defined in the ASam as the noneffluent insight (anāsrava prajñā) directed towards suffering in the individual's personal stream of being and based on all the previous examinations of the various facets of the noble truths which were observed during the path of application (prayogamārga). By means of this insight, the defilements which are to be removed by the vision of suffering (duhkha-darśanaprahātavya) are removed. 2) Second, there arises the gnosis of the teaching with respect to suffering (duhkhe dharmaññānam). This gnosis is defined as the face-to-face encounter with the liberation from the defilements through this gnosis. 3) Third, there is the resultant patience of

the knowledge of suffering (duhkhe 'nvayaññānakaāntiḥ). This is defined as the stainless insight which realizes that all the noble qualities (āryadharma) will follow from the previous two insights.¹⁹ 4) Finally, there is the resultant gnosis of suffering which is the noneffluent gnosis (anāsravaṃ jñānam) that supports the previous moment. These four moments are accordingly applied to all of the four noble truths, giving sixteen moments in all. The prior two of these four deliver the realization of the application of the truths to the object (grāhyāvaśbodha), while the following two moments of each series do the same for the subject (grāhakāvaśbodha).

The primary purpose of the path of vision is to remove defilements, specifically those defilements that are removed through vision (darśanaheyaśleṣa), as opposed to those which are removed through cultivation (bhāvanāheyaśleṣa). The Yogācāras developed a complex scheme of defilements, though it may have been based on that of the Vaibhāṣikas.²⁰ Ten basic defilements were addressed by the Yogācāra authors: desire (rāga), anger (pratigha), pride (māna), nescience (avidyā), doubt (vicikitsā), and the five varieties of incorrect perspective--the assumption of self (satkāya-dṛṣṭi), of extreme views (anta-grāha-dṛṣṭi), of false ideology (mithyā-dṛṣṭi), and the addiction to opinions (dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa) and ritual (śīlavrataparāmarśa).²¹ The elements to be eliminated on the path of vision are whichever defilements and proximate defilements (upakleṣa) are

associated with or caused by incorrect views, including the possibility of transmigration to the lower realms.²² In practice, a complex but relatively loose formulation was adopted: whichever of the ten defilements are associated with the truths in the three realms for that individual are eliminated during the path of vision.²³ Thus one hundred and twelve defilements in all were destroyed by the path of vision. Forty were destroyed in the realm of desire (kāmadhātu), the ten applied in the four cases of the noble truths. Thirty-six were destroyed in each of the realms of form (rūpadhātu) and formlessness (ārūpyadhātu), making seventy-two in all for the two higher realms. This number was arrived at by having nine of the defilements destroyed towards each of the noble truths in that realm. There are only nine defilements available in the higher realms since anger (pratiḡha) does not occur under those circumstances.²⁴ In real terms, the four defilements which are entirely eliminated are doubt (vicikitsā), and three forms of incorrect perspective--the false ideology concerning moral causation (mithyādr̥ṣṭi), and the two forms of addiction, to individual views (dr̥ṣṭiparāmarśa) and ritual (śīlavrata-parāmarśa).²⁵ The subtle, congenital (sahaja) forms of the view of the self (satkāyadr̥ṣṭi) and extreme views (anta-grāhadr̥ṣṭi) are removed by the path of cultivation.²⁶

These descriptions of the path of vision are heterogenous and indicative of the difficulty with which the Yogācāra tradition addressed this path. Definition ii.

above, in fact is taken from the ŚrBh description of the path of application (prayogamārga) where it describes the cognition present through the stages of heat, and so forth.²⁷ Indeed, later on, at the juncture between the 'highest worldly concentration' (laukikāgradharma) and the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga) where we would expect to find the path of vision discussed, there is no mention of such a structure. The defilements to be eliminated by vision are present, but they are eliminated on the path of cultivation, which also contains the fruit of the path known as the 'stream-winner' (srotaāpannaphala), usually described as the fruit of the path of vision.²⁸ The path of vision is mentioned only once in passing in the ŚrBh and once in passing in the BoBh.²⁹ Elsewhere, in the VinSq, the darśanamārga is addressed several times, the most important being three extensive definitions of a path of vision which incorporates nine moments rather than the sixteen that we have seen in the ASam.³⁰ The conclusion we draw from all of this data is that the earliest stratum of the Abhidharma incorporated into the Yogācāra contained no darśanamārga per se. It proceeded directly from the prayogamārga of the nirvedhabhāgīyas to the prayogamārga of the bhāvanāmārga. This latter path encompassed both the defilements to be eliminated by vision and meditation. Later, perhaps stimulated by the Vābhāṣikas, the Yogācāras developed various versions of the path of vision, most of which have been brought together here from different sources, including

prior descriptions of the prayoḡamārga of the nirvedha-bhāgīyas and the path of cultivation.

Circumstantially, the application of fundamental transformation to the path of vision bears this out. The Sam, the earliest surviving explicit reference to the doctrine of transformation, restricts its use to the final fruit, as we will see in the final chapter of this section. Vyavadātasamaya, in the MSA, though, extends it to the path of vision of the Bodhisattva, that is, the first level.³¹ Aśaṅga, good scriptural conservative that he was, also restricts the application of transformation to the point immediately following the 'lightning-like concentration' (vaṃropamaśamādhī).³² Jinaputra, though, in his commentary to the ASam, provided for the transformation to occur on the path of vision and above, since it was from this point on that the defilements were eliminated and so the function of āśraya-parivṛtti as the guarantor of elimination was desirable. Specifically, he addresses the problem of the sixteen moments of the darśanamārga established in definition iv. above.³³ The patience in the first moment 1) eliminates the defilement peculiar to that truth in that realm of existence; with that elimination the fundament is transformed. The gnosis in the second moment 2), as it brings face-to-face the liberation from the defilement, also delivers the experience (pratyanubhavati) of fundamental transformation. By implication Jinaputra connects transformation primarily with the elimination of

defilements, which is natural, and the referent of thusness (tathatāvisaya), which is less so. Jinaputra maintains that the path of vision has two objects: thusness and correct gnosis (samyagjñāna).³⁴ The first of these is the object of moment 2) while the second is the object of moment 4). Thus moment 1) penetrates the thatness of the truth and liberates the defilements, while moment 2) brings all of this into awareness, including thusness and the fact of fundamental transformation.³⁵

d. Bhāvanāmārga. In conformity with the normative descriptions of the path of cultivation, the ASam provides for either a mundane or a supermundane path of cultivation.³⁶ We will only be concerned with the supermundane path as the mundane path does not entail fundamental transformation.

The supermundane path is identified in the ASam as the concentration on the path of cultivation which is accompanied with the varieties of gnosis and resultant gnosis--moments 2) and 4) above--directed towards the four truths. This concentration operates in the realm of desire and in the various levels of the realms of form and formlessness. The exception to this is the path's nonoperation on the level of neither ideation nor nonideation (naivasamjñānasamjñāyatana), but there appears to be a contradiction since it is extended to the 'pinnacle

of existence' (bhavāgra), which is usually identified as this level.³⁷

Like the path of vision, the path of cultivation surrounds the elimination of a certain number of defilements, but these are not enumerated in minute subdivisions as are the defilements eliminated on the prior path. They are, however, identified in varying degrees of strength. The defilements to be eliminated through cultivation number sixteen: they are the six congenital (sahaja) defilements of the view of a self (satkāyadr̥ṣṭi), of extremes (antagrāhadr̥ṣṭi), desire (rāga), anger (pratigha), pride (māna), and nescience (avidyā), in the world of desire (kāmadhātau), while five of these--minus anger--are enumerated for each of the realms of form and formlessness ($6 + 5 + 5$).³⁸ When added to the 112 defilements of the path of vision, 128 defilements in all are identified. Nine degrees of strength for the defilements to be eliminated through cultivation are given in the ASam, the basic divisions being strong, middling, and weak, while each of these is further divided into strong, middling and weak, giving nine in all.³⁹ These nine degrees of strength are eliminated by the degrees of strength of the path, the strongest defilements eliminated by the weakest path, until the weakest defilements are eliminated by the strongest path.

The actual process of elimination of the defilements is performed by a three-fold process, known as the paths of application (prayoga-mārga), of immediacy (ānantaryamārga), and of liberation (vimuktimārga).⁴⁰ The path of application is the actual practice of contemplation which eliminates the defilement--whatever its strength--on the path of cultivation. The path of immediacy is that on which the defilement is eliminated. The path of liberation is the face-to-face awareness of the liberation from the defilement. This process takes place for each of the nine degrees of defilement through the levels of desire on up to formlessness. Unlike the Vaibhāṣika authors, though, Asaṅga does not identify a series of moments whereby the eighty-one defilements (nine strengths through each of the nine levels of the realms of desire to formlessness) are eliminated.⁴¹

The four cenobitic fruits (śrāmaṇyaphala) are obtained through the elimination of various levels of defilement. We have seen that the 'stream-winner' (srotaśāpannaphala) is the fruit of the path of vision, but one obtaining this goal is not freed from the realm of desire, since those defilements which are to be eliminated through cultivation in the realm of desire have yet to be eliminated.⁴² The 'once-returner' (sakṛdāgāmin) has eliminated five of the degrees of defilement in the realm of form, residing in the level which eliminates the sixth degree (madhyamrdu) of defilement. The 'nonreturner' (anāgāmin) resides in or above the level which eliminates the weakest defilement in the realm of desire,

thus not returning to that realm ever again. Finally, the Arhat resides in the path of elimination which rids him of all defilements through the summit of existence (bhavāgra).

Again, we must notice that Aśaṅga nowhere in his ASam, or in any other discussion of the paths of which I am aware, has connected fundamental transformation with either the paths of vision or cultivation. Once again, though, Jinaputra ties them together, following much the same means which he employed in the path of vision.⁴³ The path of application (prayoga-mārga) is that by which the fundament gradually transforms through the elimination of hindrances (dausthulya). The path of immediacy (ānantaryamārga) is that on which the fundament is transformed to a condition of 'without hindrances' (nirdausthulya āśrayaḥ parivartate). Finally, the path of liberation is that through which the condition of fundamental transformation is experienced for oneself (āśrayaparivṛttiṃ pratyātman anubhavati).

e. Niṣṭhā-mārga. The final path is described in the ASam as a series of events which begins with the obtainment of the 'lightning-like concentration' (vairopamasamādhī). This lightning-like concentration is the stage immediately above the final level of the path of cultivation and is itself of two parts: the paths of application and immediacy.⁴⁴ The former consists of the cleansing of all hindrances, the ridding of all the defilements, and the

realization of all forms of dissociation, being unobscured by any negative entities.⁴⁵ Following this cleansing, there is the immediate fundamental transformation (nirantarāśraya-parivṛtti) which is of the three forms discussed above: that which pertains to mentality (cittāśrayapariṇivṛtti), that which pertains to the path (mārgāśrayapariṇivṛtti), and that which pertains to the hindrances (dausthulyāśrayapariṇivṛtti).⁴⁶ These forms of transformation are also accompanied by the two forms of gnosis which realize the utter destruction of the defilements and their incapacity to arise in the future, and by the ten elements which are beyond learning. The ten elements are merely the eight limbs of the archaic noble path (āryāṣṭāṅgikamārga) together with the liberation (vimokṣa) and correct gnosis (samyagjñāna) which belong to one who is beyond learning (aśaikṣasya).⁴⁷ All of these, from the transformations to the ten elements, represent the path of immediacy within the lightening-like concentration. This concentration is immediate (nirantara), firm (dr̥ḍha), of one taste (ekarasa) and pervasive (vyāpi).⁴⁸

In the ASam, the fruit of the Śrāvakamārga is not identified as the vimuktikāya, as it is elsewhere in Yogācāra literature, possibly because this designation is held in antithesis to the dharmakāya realized as the fruit of the Bodhisattvamārga, and the distinction is derived from Mahāyāna literature. Nonetheless, the normative identification of the Śrāvaka fruit in the bulk of the

literature with which we are concerned makes this distinction, and we will investigate this intriguing structure in the final chapter of this part.

Notes to Part IV: Chapter One

1. Pradhan, ASam, pp. 87.12-16, 92.4-11, 94.3-13; cf. MSam III.15, Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, pp. 54-55, vol. 2, pp. 171-174.
2. La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. IV passim; Erich Frauwallner, "Abhidharma-Studien," WZKSQ 15: 69-121; Étienne Lamotte, L'Histoire, pp. 677-686.
3. E. Obermiller, "The Doctrine of the Prajñā-pāramitā as exposed in the Abhisamayālaṅkāra of Maitreya," Acta Orientalia XI (1932): 1-131; Edward Conze, Abhisamayālaṅkāra, Serie Orientale Roma VI, Rome: Ia.M.E.O., 1954; idem, "Marginal Notes to the Abhisamayālaṅkāra," Sino-Indian Studies V:3/4 [Liebenthan Festschrift] (1957): 21-35. Obermiller's work, while useful, is primarily based on the speculative attempts at harmonization by dGe-lugs-pa authors.
4. Lambert Schmithausen, "Zur Struktur der erlosenden Erfahrung im indischen Buddhismus," in Gerhard Oberhammer, ed., Transzendenzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils: das Problem in indischer und christlicher Tradition, Vienna, 1978, pp. 97-119; idem, "The Darśanamārga Section of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and its Interpretation by Tibetan Commentators (With Special Reference to Bu Ston Rin Chen Grub)," in Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Tauscher, eds., Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy, Wiener Studien Zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde Heft 11, Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1983, vol. 2, pp. 259-274.
5. A very elaborate path structure found in La Vallée Poussin, La Siddhi, pp. 562-612, but primarily applies the pañcamārga to the Bodhisattva.
6. We must note the Śrāvaka path mentioned in the BoBh, Dutt, p. 244.5-16. This path, though, presents so many difficulties of interpretation that it will be virtually ignored in our study of the Śrāvakamārga; its use of the terminology of adhiśīla, adhiçitta, and adhiprajñā, though, is obviously related to the Bodhisattvamārga elaborated in the BoBh and may have presented a prototype for it.
7. In his classic article on the mārga according to the AA, "Marginal Notes," Conze appears to consider that the system, as given in his chart, reflects the occurrence of the pañcamārga system in the AA. There appears to be no

occurrence of the term 'sambhāramārga' in the AA; neither does it occur in the Kośa. All of these sources are most immediately concerned with the 'aids to penetration' (nirvedhabhāgīyaś) as is the AMV which opens with its lengthy exposition of these four dharmaś. Prayogamārga does occur in the Kośa, Sastri, p. 1012, but the context is different and appears to represent Vasubandhu's understanding of the Yogācāra breakdown of the Bhāvanāmārga, for which see below. It may well be the case that the pañcamārga system was first codified in the ASam based on older materials.

8. Pradhan, ASam, p. 65.15-18; Peking, sams-tsam li, fol. 110a.2-4; Tatia, ASamBh, p. 76.8-11.

9. The Tib. adds the requisite abstract ending (-bhājanatām pratilabhate: gnod nyid du 'gyur ro); Peking, sams-tsam li, fol. 110a4.

10. Shastri, Kośa and KośaBh to VI.24cd, p. 921.

11. Cf. AA I.12, IV.32-34; Th.Stcherbatsky and E. Obermiller, eds., Abhisamayālaṅkāra-Prajñāpāramitā-Upadeśa-Śāstra, Bibliotheca Buddhica XXIII, Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of USSR, 1929, pp. 3, 22; Conze, AA trans., p. 64-65; Vaidya, AAA (ed. with Aṣṭa), pp. 470-472. These are śradhā, vīrya, smṛti, saṁādhi, prajñā; see Obermiller, "Doctrine of the Prajñā-Pāramitā," pp. 18-20.

12. Pradhan, ASam, pp. 65.19-66.2; Peking, sams-tsam li, fol. 110a4-b1; Tatia, ASamBh, p. 76.12-18. As has been noticed before, Pradhan's readings are the 'reconstruction' of the Sanskrit based on the Bhasya, with the Tibetan and Chinese translations. The Tibetan translation remains the best witness of the original nature of the text and we will adhere closely to it. We note that the ASam maintains that the nirvedhabhāgīyaś have their origin in the kuśalamūlaś collected on the sambhāramārga: sambhāramārgopacitāni nirvedhabhāgīni kuśalamūlāni, ASam, p. 65.20; Peking, fol. 110a4-5.

13. Cf. the discussion of the four nirvedhabhāgīyaś in Shukla, ŚrBh, p. 494.20-500.15.

14. Cf. Shukla, ŚrBh, p. 499.17-500.15.

15. Lambert Schmithausen in "The Darśanamārga Section of the Abhidharmasamuccaya," has already treated this material and we will generally follow his exposition. Differences of interpretation, though, will occasionally arise.

16. Pradhan, ASam, p. 66.3-4: saṁāsato laukikāgra-dharmānantaram anupalambhaḥ saṁādhiḥ prajñā saṁnyogaś ca (Pradhan has reconstructed saṁnyogaś for saṁnyogaś; cf.

Tatia, ASamBh, p. 76.12; ASam Tib. fol. 110b1-2--mi dmigs pa'i ting nge 'dzin dang | shes rab mtshungs par ldan pa dang bcas pa ste |).

17. Pradhan, ASam, 66.4: samasamālambyālabakajñānam api tat. Schimithausen, "Darśanamārga" has noted that Pradhan's -ālabana- should be emended to -ālabaka- on the basis of parallel passages from Shukla ŚrBh, p. 499.7,14, and Lévi, TriṃBh, p. 43.18. However, we note that ASamBh has -ālabana-, p. 76.20; the Tibetan dmigs par byed pa, fol. 110b2, is the same as attested for -ālabaka- in the ŚrBh, sDe-dge sems-tsam dzi, fol. 190a2,4, and the Triṃ, Enga Teramoto, Sthiramati's Triṃcika-Bhāṣyam: A Tibetan Text, Kyoto: Association for Linguistic Study of Sacred Scriptures, 1933, p. 86.3.
18. Pradhan, ASam, pp. 66.6-67.4; Tib. fols. 110b3-111a7.
19. Pradhan's retranslated text does not convey this sense which is obtained from the Tib., fol. 111a2-4; I believe Schmithausen has passed too quickly over these final two moments, "Darśanamārga," p. 264.
20. Cf. KośaBh to V.3, Shastri, p. 765.7 f.; La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. iv, p. 9 f. has traced the basis of this system to the Jñānaprasthāna.
21. Pradhan, ASam, p. 43.17-19, 45.19-23, 7.1-19; Bhattacharya, YoBh, pp. 162.11-164.2.
22. Pradhan, ASam, p. 26.1-6.
23. Pradhan, ASam, p. 52.4-8.
24. Pradhan, ASam, p. 51.6-7.
25. Pradhan, ASam, p. 52.8-10; Bhattacharya, YoBh, p. 162.5-6.
26. Pradhan, ASam, p. 52.8-9; Tatia, ASamBh, p. 62.3-13.
27. Shukla, ŚrBh, p. 499.7,13.
28. Shukla, ŚrBh, pp. 500.16-503.4; sDe-dge sems-tsam dzi, fols. 190b4-191b4; Pradhan, ASam, p. 89.1-10.
29. Shukla, ŚrBh, p. 330.13; Dutt, BoBh, p. 270.21.
30. VinSq, sDe-dge sems-tsam zhi, fols. 68b1-70a6, 117b7-119a7, 192a5, 206b3, 256b3-258b3, and note the curiously lacking mention of the darśanamārga in 238b3, which does mention the bhāvanāmārga.

31. MSA XIV.29, Lévi, p. 94.5-6.
32. Pradhan, ASam, p. 76.10-11; it is important to understand that the section of the ASam, Pradhan p. 67.5-13, is taken from the ASamBh by both Hsüan-tsang and Pradhan and incorporated into the body of the text; this material discusses āśrayaparivṛtti on the darśanamārga and above. Cf. Tib. vol. 11, fol. 111a7, T.1605.31.683a3-12.
33. Tatia, ASamBh, pp. 77.6-8, 78.13.
34. Tatia, ASamBh, p. 77.12-13.
35. Tatia, ASamBh, p. 78.12-13.
36. Cf. Kośa VI.1, Shastri p. 871.
37. Pradhan, ASam, p. 69.14-15, 89.19-90.1.
38. Pradhan, ASam, p. 52.8-11; Pradhan has incorrectly written 60 (ṣaṣṭi) for 16 (ṣoḍaśa); see ASam Tib. Pek. sems-tsam 11, fol. 100b6; T. 1605.31.678c13-14; La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. IV, p. 21, n. 1.
39. Pradhan, ASam, p. 70.1-9.
40. Pradhan, ASam, p.70.10-16; Shukla, ŚrBh, pp. 504.21-506.5, Tib. sems-tsam dzi, fols. 192b2-193a2; Tatia, ASamBh, pp. 82.18-83.1. There is also in these same references enumerated a 'superior path' (viśeṣamārga), but it is not directly connected, in most of the descriptions, with the elimination of defilements in the same way that these three are.
41. Pradhan, ASam, pp. 52, 70, 76,89; cf. Kośa and Bhāṣya to VI.33, 51, Shastri, pp. 937-8, 979-80, La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. IV, pp. 198-200, 241-42.
42. All this fruit-related material is taken from Pradhan, ASam, pp. 89-90; Tatia, ASamBh, pp. 119-120.
43. The following is from sections 86F-86H of Tatia, ASamBh, pp. 82-83.
44. Pradhan, ASam, p. 76.19-25.
45. Pradhan, ASam, p. 76.9-10: sarvadauṣṭhulyānāṃ pratiprāśrabdheḥ sarvasaṃyogānāṃ prahāṇāt sarvaviśaṃyogānāṃ adhigamāc ca 1; Tatia, ASamBh, p. 92-3; ASam, p. 76.23-24.
46. Pradhan, ASam, pp. 76.10-11, 77.2-4; Tatia, ASamBh, p. 93.15-21; see above, Part III, Chapters Two and Four, for a discussion of these three in detail.

47. Pradhan, ASam, p. 76.11-13; Tatia, ASamBh, pp. 93.28-94.3.

48. Pradhan, ASam, p. 76.24-25; Tatia, ASamBh, p. 93.9-14.

CHAPTER TWO:

The Bodhisattva Path

While the Śrāvaka path, per se, was of theoretical and technical interest to the Yogācāra tradition, its doctors avowedly belonged among those who revered the career of the Bodhisattva. During the early Mahāyāna, though, several alternate path structures were developed for the Bodhisattva, and the Yogācāra authors felt free to accept or develop whichever they were attracted to. Three in particular were accepted, and the associated doctrines of defilement removal and fundamental transformation became utilized in all of these. This chapter will be concerned with the exposition of the outline of all the accepted forms of the Bodhisattva path, and the relation of fundamental transformation to the relevant portions of the paths.

a. Pañcamārga. The doctors of the Buddhist dispensation who were concerned with the progress of the saint were equally concerned that their program also be oriented to the progress of the Bodhisattva. We should recall that in the early period of the Abhidharma, the Bodhisattva par excellence was the individual who was to become Śākyamuni. The Ābhidharmikas found themselves in the position of needing to explain the path that Śākyamuni had taken in

terms of the path that the Arhats had also utilized. The result of these needs was the application of the 'five path' (pañcamārga) and related systems to the Bodhisattva, not just to the Śrāvaka.¹ The major difference was the factor of time, the Arhats seen as taking a relative short period by some Ābhidharmikas, while the Bodhisattvas need three immeasurable aeons. Bodhisattvas, moreover, spend most of their time on the lower levels of the path of application (prayogamārga), since entrance into the lower realms is closed by those on the level of patience (kṣānti) or higher. A Bodhisattva progresses through the various levels of enlightenment while he is seated under the tree of awakening.

These path speculations of the Ābhidharmikas were brought into the Mahāyāna in some degree, but with important changes. Its similarities were obvious: the Bodhisattva progressed through the paths of accumulation (sambhāra-mārga), application (prayogamārga), vision (darśanamārga), cultivation (bhāvanāmārga), and the final goal (nīṣṭhā-mārga), experiencing generally the same kinds of defilement (kleśāvaraṇa) elimination as his Śrāvaka counterpart. The differences were more difficult to work into the structure; the Bodhisattva was additionally supposed to eliminate the obscuration of the knowable (jñeyāvaraṇa) and, in the mature tradition of the Yogācāra, enter into the comprehension of 'mere cognition' (viññaptimātratā). While the later descriptions of the pañcamārga took these into account, the

ASam does not really do so. The probable reason for this early state of affairs is the importance which Asaṅga attached to the structure of gotra; the Bodhisattva, entering the supermundane paths with a different set of psycho-physical values, arrives at a superior result even while passing through the same stages.² In this respect, Asaṅga was following the normative assessment of the Bodhisattva's path found in the Abhidharma: the Bodhisattva arrives at the superior level of the Saṃyaksambuddha even while going through much the same process as the Arhat, the difference being the former's superior preparation. This form of progress had even been recognized in the case of some of the special disciples of the Buddha by the Abhidharma doctors. Śāriputra was seen to have taken longer to obtain Arhatship because of his innately superior wisdom; when he did obtain the goal, his sagacity in higher insight was widely acknowledged.³

Furthermore, the pañcamārga was identified with the other two major paths of the Bodhisattva recognized by the Yogācāra representatives, that recognized in the Bodhisattvabhūmi and that recognized in the Daśabhūmika. However, the special functions of the Bodhisattva path envisioned by the Vaibhāṣikas--the extensive period spent as an ordinary person in the aids to penetration, etc.--were allowed to lapse in favor of the orderly progression through the various stages (bhūmi) of realization. Indeed, following its employment in the ASam and the AA, the

pañcamārga system was relegated to a largely vestigial position among the Yogācāra. Nonetheless, the Bodhisattva's progress continued to be identified with the five-fold path right through the seventh century.⁴

b. Bodhisattvabhūmi. The thirteen residences (viḥāra) and seven levels (bhūmi) of the Bodhisattva discussed in the BoBh represent a relatively early structure which was subsequently eclipsed by the system found in the Daśabhūmika and recognized in the Samd. Even within the final chapters of the BoBh, the system in the Daśabhūmika was introduced and identified with the system of the earlier chapters. By the time Asaṅga had written the ASam, the thirteen residence system had been abandoned in favor of the alternative, except for the lower and the Tathāgata residences, which were not covered in the DaBh system.⁵ Yet it represents best the considerations and focus of much of the early stratum of Yogācāra materials.

1) Gotravihāra.⁶ A Bodhisattva in the residence of the lineage is naturally endowed with the wholesome qualities of the Bodhisattva. These cannot be obtained forceably (hatha-yogena), but the restraint of the Bodhisattva is accumulated through a series of reflections (pratisamkhyānataḥ). Likewise, the gross defilements are eliminated for one in this residence. This level is the seed of all the qualities

of the Buddha and is the unique cause of all the other levels of the Bodhisattva and the Buddha.

2) Adhimukticaryāvihāra.⁷ The residence of the activity of interest indicates the behavior of a Bodhisattva who has an impure intention but is based on his generation of the thought of enlightenment. His ability and realization are yet quite weak and unreliable, and sometimes he entirely forgets his discipline. This stage is maintained through the various levels of mundane patience, the third of the four 'aids to penetration' (nirvedhabhāṣīya).

3) Pramuditavihāra.⁸ The Bodhisattva in the residence of joy has purified his intention (śuddhādhyaśaya) and gone beyond mundane orientations. He is the son of the Tathāgatas and born in their family (kula). Devoid of the conceptions of a self, he works for beings and has formed his aspiration (praṇidhāna) to obtain awakening. More information on this residence and all those through the ultimate residence (#12, paramavihāra) is to be found in the Daśabhūmika.⁹

4) Adhiśīlavihāra.¹⁰ The Bodhisattva in the residence of superior morality is naturally ethical, having dispersed any stain of immorality. He penetrates the knowledge of cause and effect, incites others to morality; with his great compassion he sees the difficulties and suffering caused by immorality in the realm of beings.

5) Adhicittavihāra.¹¹ The Bodhisattva in the residence of superior mentality enters into the accomplishment of mental application (manaskāra). Penetrating enlightenment, he investigates the means of beings' liberation and the dharma. He resides in the mundane concentrations and purifies his roots of goodness.

6) Bodhipakṣyapratīṣamukto 'dhipraññāvihāra.¹² On this, the first of three 'residences of superior insight' (adhipraññāvihāra), the Bodhisattva practices the thirty-seven elements conducive to enlightenment and the four varieties of mindfulness. He apprehends the accomplishment of the light of the dharma and eliminates all the disturbances, such as the view of personal identity, and so forth.

7) Satyapratīṣamukto 'dhipraññāvihāra.¹³ The Bodhisattva dwelling in this residence has realized the aspects of equivalence (samatā) and penetrates the various aspects of the four noble truths. He eliminates the compounded states of mind and augments compassion, intensively reflecting on truth.

8) Pratītyasamutpādapratīṣamukto 'adhipraññāvihāra.¹⁴ The Bodhisattva dwelling in this residence contemplates the twelve-fold chain of dependent origination and the three doors of liberation: signlessness, wishlessness, and emptiness. Through these means he comes face-to-face with the perfection of insight.

9) Sābhogo nirnimittavihāra.¹⁵ The Bodhisattva dwelling in the strenuous nonreferential residence begins to comprehend a range of objects inaccessible to others, including the elemental realm of beings (sattvadharmadhātu), the incalculable contemplations of the Bodhisattvas, and the body, speech, and mind of the Tathāgata.

10) Anābhogo nirnimittavihāra.¹⁶ The Bodhisattva dwelling in the effortless nonreferential residence penetrates the gnosis of the absolute, completes his gnostic cognitions in the stream of the dharma, and enters into the knowledge of dividing his form to send elsewhere. He obtains the patience born from the knowledge of the unoriginated nature of all the elements of reality (anutpattikadharmakṣānti).

11) Pratīsamvidvihāra.¹⁷ The Bodhisattva dwelling in the residence of special knowledge understands exactly how to communicate to beings and what needs to be done to perfect the great teaching skills. To this end he has thoroughly comprehended the four special knowledges of elements (dharma), meanings (artha), hermeneutics (nirukti), and eloquence (pratibhāna).

12) Paramavihāra.¹⁸ The Bodhisattva dwelling in the highest residence has obtained the consecration (abhiṣeka) into the highest perfect enlightenment. He has experienced innumerable concentrations and completed the accumulations of the Bodhisattva. He may have one life to live or be in his final lifetime.

13) Tathāgatavihāra.¹⁹ The level of the Tathāgata is defined by the four kinds of purity (parisuddhi), the ten powers (bala), the eight forms of liberation (vimokṣa), and the other special 4000 forms of gnosis and ability which are restricted (āveṇika) to the Tathāgata.

c. Daśabhūmika. The ten levels (bhūmi) of the Bodhisattva delineated in the Daśabhūmika-sūtra became the standard for most of the Mahāyāna, and there is evidence for its popularity even within the BoBh, as Asaṅga attempts to bring the thirteen residences in line with these, the levels of joy (pramudita) and higher being identified with one another. Since the DaBh system has been treated so extensively, particularly by Har Dayal, there is little need to repeat the material here.²⁰ A list of the levels with their respective perfections is as follows:²¹

- 1) Pramuditā Bhūmi; the Bodhisattva perfects giving (dāna-pāramitā).
- 2) Vimalā Bhūmi; the Bodhisattva perfects morality (śīla-pāramitā).
- 3) Prabhākarī Bhūmi; the Bodhisattva perfects patience (kṣāntipāramitā).
- 4) Arcaṣmatī Bhūmi; the Bodhisattva perfects vigor (vīryapāramitā).

- 5) Sudurjayā Bhūmi; the Bodhisattva perfects meditation (dhyānapāramitā).
- 6) Abhimukhī Bhūmi; the Bodhisattva perfects insight (prajñāpāramitā).
- 7) Dūranṣamā Bhūmi; the Bodhisattva perfects skillful means (upāyapāramitā).
- 8) Acalā Bhūmi; the Bodhisattva perfects his aspiration (pranidhānapāramitā).
- 9) Sādhumatī Bhūmi; the Bodhisattva perfects his power (balapāramitā).
- 10) Dharmameghā Bhūmi; the Bodhisattva perfects gnosis (jñānapāramitā).

Now that we have identified the basic structures which the Yogācāra masters either postulated or accepted as the framework for the progress of the Bodhisattva, we can begin to assess the statements made by this tradition concerning the advent of fundamental transformation. We have mentioned, and will see in the next chapter, that the Saṃd postulated the level of the final fruit as the point of occurrence of transformation. The early śāstras, though, maintained a significantly different stance.

Perhaps the MSA was the first to extend this doctrine to the levels of the Bodhisattva. Vyavadātasamaya's concerns are clear in MSA XIV.28-33:

28. He [the Bodhisattva] then obtains the gnosis which is nonconceptual, undefiled, highest, supermundane, and dissociated from the grasping after duality.

29. His fundamental transformation is defined as the first level (bhūmi), and it approaches purity through immeasurable aeons.

30. Having penetrated the equality of the elemental realm, then he obtains continual perception of the equivalence of himself with others.

31. Like other Bodhisattvas, his equivalence of mind with others extends to the sameness of lack of self, of discomfort, of what is to be done for liberation, and of lack of [desire for] recompense [concerning labor done on other's behalf].

32. He sees all the compounded elements of himself and the triple world as 'incorrect conceptualization' by means of his pure gnosis, which has nonduality as its referent.

33. He has obtained the existence of the nonexistence of that [duality]--this existence being free from the defilements eliminated by vision; this condition is described as the path of vision.²²

Certainly the most interesting concern here is the outright definition of the first level of the Bodhisattva as the fundamental transformation of the yogin on this level. Again, as in the case of the Śrāvaka path, we see the elimination of vision-related defilements, but a new element has been introduced--the purification of the transformation received on this level throughout innumerable aeons. The manner of address of this transformation is strange; it is

as if it were a fourth member of the three natures. The dependent nature is not described as being purified, and that purification is the fundamental transformation. Instead, the grammar of purification is extended to fundamental transformation itself. Perhaps the author is assuming that transformation is coextensive with the absolute (tathatā), and thus the transformation is purified or revealed as the yogin progresses along the path, thereby postulating a structure similar to the absolute value of transformation that we have seen in the VinSg of Asaṅga. Whatever its referent, Vyavadātasamya has treated āśraya-parāvṛtti as an autonomous unit in this verse and no longer directly equivalent to the purification of another system.

Following in the lead of the MSA, the author of the MSam developed more clearly the onset of transformation:

III.11 In that way, a Bodhisattva enters into the definition of the knowable (jñeyalakṣaṇa) by entering into the condition of 'mere cognition' (viññaptimātratā). Having entered into that condition, he has entered into the level of joy (pranuditabhūmi); he has well realized the elemental realm (dhermadhātusvadhigata); he is born into the lineage of the Tathagata; and he has obtained an attitude of equivalence (śamatācitta) with all beings, all Bodhisattvas, and all Buddhas. This is his path of vision.

12. For what reason does he enter into the condition of mere cognition? By means of the knowledge of supermundane (lokottara) tranquility and insight (śamathavipaśyanā) which are oriented towards the synthetic teaching (māra-dharmāmbaka), and by means of the subsequently obtained knowledge (prāṭalabdha-jñāna) of the diverse kinds of cognition (viññapti), all the seeds of the underlying consciousness together with their causes are eliminated, and then the seed of contact with the elemental corpus

(dharmakāya) increases. Having become fundamentally transformed (*parāvṛttāśraya) by means of the perfect accomplishment of all the Buddhadharmas he enters [into the condition of mere cognition] for the sake of obtaining the gnosis of omniscience.

Now the subsequently obtained knowledge (prṣṭhalabdhaññāna) is born from the underlying consciousness and naturally occurs without error (aviparyāsa) by means of the perception that all the objects of cognition (aarvaviññaptinimitta) are like illusions, and so forth. The Bodhisattva remains errorless at all times in teaching that the cause with its effects are like a magician and his illusory elements (māyākṛtadharmas).²³

Thus, the author of the MSaṃ seems to identify the moment of transformation as the process of obtaining the first level of the Bodhisattva, which is his path of vision. The commentator, Niḥsvabhāva, identifies the lineage of the Tathāgata (MSaṃ III.11) as the elemental realm (dharmadhātu) and explains that three items are requisite for birth in this eminent family: the conception of the lineage, the generation of referential gnosis towards it, and the generation of a new fundament (*anyāśraya), have transformed (i.e. eliminated) his previous one.²⁴

III.12 appears to necessitate the transformation of the underlying consciousness prior to the entrance into viññaptimātratā, or at least the condition for that entrance. Niḥsvabhāva maintains that 'having become fundamentally transformed' means that entirely stainless (vimala) mind and mental events arise by the realization of thusness (tathatādhigamena) or by means of pure thusness itself (*tathatāvīśuddhyā).²⁵ As the śāstra says, it also

must be through the accomplishment of the Buddhadharmas, which Niḥsvabhāva understands to be the ten powers, the four forms of fearlessness, etc.²⁶

The strange term 'synthetic teaching' (miśradharma), found in this section of the MSam, indicates the attitude of the Yogācāra doctors towards the corpus of material which they identified as essential.²⁷ Niḥsvabhāva maintains that 'oriented towards the synthetic teaching' means that the Bodhisattva holds as his object of cognition all that is included in the teaching (anuvāsa) of the Mahāyāna, because its essential nature is thusness (*tathatā-svabhāvatvāt).²⁸ This material appears to be a development of the relationship between the synthetic teaching, fundamental transformation, and various synonyms of the final goal, found in Samd VIII.13. In response to a question concerning the respective definitions of 'nonsynthetic teaching' (amiśradharma) and synthetic teaching (miśradharma), after a nondescript definition of the former, the Bhagavan is depicted as defining the latter:

If someone takes all the teachings (dharma) of the sūtras, he might form them into one group, one summary, one lump, and one mass. Then, applying his mind to that, if he should think, "All of these dharmas which are inclined towards thusness (tathatānimna), are disposed towards thusness (tathatāpravāṇa), and are biased towards thusness (tathatāprāqbhāra), towards enlightenment (bodhi), towards nirvana, and are inclined towards fundamental transformation (āśrayaparivṛttinimna), disposed towards fundamental transformation (āśrayaparivṛttipravāṇa), and biased towards fundamental transformation (āśrayaparivṛtti-prāqbhāra)--when he decides to describe all of those dharmas with the term 'immeasurable,

innumerable, wholesome teachings (aprameyāsaṃ-
khyyeyakuśāladharma)', this is indeed the
tranquility and insight oriented towards the
synthetic teaching (miśradharmālabaka-
śamathavipaśyanā).²⁹

The author here definitely demonstrates his essentialist leanings. Since the earlier definition of 'nonsynthetic teaching' (amiśradharma) had included the normal Buddhist universals such as emptiness and so forth, 'synthetic teaching' must indicate an approach to the teaching as its own universal, separate from the standard list. Furthermore, it is in some sense perceptible, apart from the perception of the other universals. It is not clear, though, from the context or from the commentary of Jñānagarbha, the precise nature of this dharmic lump. The best information comes from the ASamBh of Jinaputra, who understands 'synthetic' to mean devoid of a multiple referent (asaṃbhinnālabana), which indicates the universal applicable to all dharmas.³⁰

However we understand the surrounding terms, still, fundamental transformation is postulated on the first level of the Bodhisattva, that of joy (pramudita), which is in turn identified with the path of vision, as we have seen in both the MSA and the MSaṃ. In this identification, the author of the MSA was followed by the authors of the DhDhVV, the TrimBh, and the SAVBh, to name a few.³¹ Yet the ambivalence remains: in order to enter the path of vision, and presumably the perception of 'mere cognition', it is

necessary to postulate transformation. If that is a prior necessity or condition, then there is a paradox with establishing it on the path of vision.

Aśaṅga evidently recognized something of this problem. While the ASaṃ makes no statement about fundamental transformation on any level other than the final path (niṣṭhāmārga), the BoBh describes the onset of this event as part of the transition from the residence of interest to that of the pure intention (= pramuditavihāra):

[The Bodhisattva] wipes from off his fundament the hindrance belonging to the defilements which lead to the lower realms. Through the elimination of this [hindrance], before long the Bodhisattva's fundament is transformed toward the total nonoperation of evil action leading to the lower realms and the total incapacity to pass into these realms. Through only this much the Bodhisattva becomes one who has surpassed all going into the lower realms. He furthermore has surpassed the level of acting through interest and has entered the level of one who has a pure intention.³²

Going even one better, the author of the DhDhV, in the section on the application of fundamental transformation (IX.8: proyoḡapraveśa), identifies the first stage of this event as occurring during the level of interest (adhimuktī-caryābhūmi) and proceeding afterwards up through the various paths. He does this because this is the level on which the aids to penetration operate, and presumably their presence indicates an alteration in the nature of the fundament or its relation to the yogin.³³

Perhaps the most difficult problem in assessing the onset of āśrayaparivṛtti in any one system is the relation between its onset and its final condition. If it is merely a matter of degree, then the manner of the degrees' increments, and with what the increments are concerned, remains lamentably obscure. Asaṅga is virtually the only author to address this problem, yet his statement is tantalizingly terse:

Thus, the Bodhisattva, his object fulfilled, has transcended the activity and level of the Bodhisattva and has entered the activity and level of the Buddha. And from the total elimination of that hindrance which is most internal (sāragata), being part of the obscuration of the knowable, his fundament is transformed. His fundamental transformation is thereby known as 'unsurpassed', whereas the fundamental transformations of the Bodhisattvas, all of which end in this highest of states, are call 'surpassable'.³⁴

Thus we are constrained to discuss the elimination of certain obscurations on the path of the Bodhisattva, much as we did on the Śrāvaka's path. It is not clear why the more positive approach of the Mahāyāna, emphasizing perfections instead of eliminations, did not develop an equally positive method of discussing the transformation whereby those perfections were finally authenticated. The identification of transformation on the Bodhisattva path remains tied to a structure of the elimination of duality (viññaptimātratā-praveśa), and there is no attempt at the postulation of completion of goals as part and parcel of the process of transformation.

Fundamental transformation in the Yogācāra śāstras continued to be identified with the elimination of problematic structures after its onset, whether that onset was at the level of joy or below. The MSABh, for example, makes special mention of the position of āśrayaparāvṛtti as the process of defilement riddance on the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga), which is usually associated with the levels and residences after the level of joy.³⁵ The author of the DhDhV also postulates the continued function of transformation during the progress on the levels.³⁶ Above we have seen, moreover, that the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra makes special mention of āśrayaparāvṛtti as the mechanism for the obtainment of the patience of the perception that elements do not arise (anutpattikadharmakṣānti), usually associated with the eighth level (acalā bhūmi) or the tenth residence (anābhogo nirnimittavihāra).³⁷ As we see, though, from the BoBh use of fundamental transformation on the level of the Tathāgata, and as we expect from the specific references in the associated literature, fundamental transformation is finally completed on the final path, and its relation with great enlightenment (mahābodhi) will be explored in the following chapter.

Notes to Part IV: Chapter Two

1. The following material was taken from Kośa and Bhāṣya II.44ab, III.41, 53cd, 85a, 94ab, 96-7, IV.106-112, VI.23c-24b, VII.28-34; Shastri, pp. 238-40, 496-500, 511-12, 535, 544-47, 550-54, 735-40, 919-20, 1083-99; La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. 1, pp. 204-07, vol. 2, pp. 125-31, 145-46, 176-77, 192-94, 196-203, vol. 3, pp. 219-233, vol. 4, pp. 174-77, vol. 5, pp. 66-85.
2. Schmithausen's inability to find a real dividing line between the darśanamārga as experienced by the Śrāvaka and the Bodhisattva appears to me a result of his not taking sufficiently into account the emphasis on gotra which is evident in Asaṅga's works; Schmithausen, "Darśanamārga," pp. 259-274.
3. Andre Migot, "Une grand disciple du Buddha: Śāriputra," BEFEO 46/2 (1954): 405-554.
4. Hsüan-tsang's Siddhi makes this identification; La Vallée Poussin, La Siddhi, pp. 562-667.
5. Pradhan, ASam, p. 92.4-11.
6. The gotravihāra is treated in Dutt, BoBh, p. 218.6-17, 20-23; Bodhisattvabhūmi-Vyākhyāna (BoBhVy) of *Sāgaramegha, Pek. sems-tsam ri, fols. 327b1-328a3, vol. 112.175.2.1-3.3. Dutt, p. 218.15, Asaṅga refers the reader to the Gotrapaṭala (= BoBh Chapter One) for further information.
7. The adhimuktīcaryāvihāra is treated in Dutt, BoBh, pp. 218.18-219.8, 220.21-222.23; BoBhVy, fols. 328a3-333a4, pp. 175.3.3-177.3.4.
8. The pramuditāvihāra is treated in Dutt, BoBh, pp. 219.9-10, 222.24-227.23; BoBhVy, fols. 333a4-346a4, pp. 177.3.4-182.4.4; Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975, pp. 278-79.
9. Dutt, BoBh, pp. 227.19, 229.3, 231.13-15, 19, 233.4, 234.21, 235.19, 236.15, 239.1, 240.24, 241.22, 242.7, 12.
10. The adhīśīlavihāra is treated in Dutt, BoBh, pp. 219.10-11, 227.24-229.5; BoBhVy, fols. 346a4-349b2, pp. 182.4.4-184.1.2; Har Dayal, Bodhisattva Doctrine, p. 279.
11. The adhicittāvihāra is treated in Dutt, BoBh, pp. 219.11-13, 229.6-231.17; BoBhVy, fols. 349b2-353a1, pp.

- 184.1.2-185.3.1; Har Dayal, Bodhisattva Doctrine, p.280.
12. The bodhipakayapratīsamukto 'dhiprajñāvihāra is treated in Dutt, BoBh, pp. 219.13-15; BoBhVy, fols. 353a1-355b7, pp. 185.3.1-186.3.7; Har Dayal, Bodhisattva Doctrine, p. 280.
13. The Satyapratīsamukto 'dhiprajñāvihāra is treated in Dutt, BoBh, pp. 219.15-16, 233.7-234.24; BoBhVy, fols. 355b7-359b7, pp. 186.3.7-188.1.7; Har Dayal, Bodhisattva Doctrine, pp. 280-81.
14. The pratītyasamutpādapratīsamukto 'adhiprajñāvihāra is treated in Dutt, BoBh, pp. 219.16-18, 234.25-236.16; BoBhVy, fols. 359b7-363a7, pp. 188.1.7-189.3.7; Har Dayal, Bodhisattva Doctrine, p. 281.
15. The sābhogo nirnimittavihāra is treated in Dutt, BoBh, pp. 219.20-22, 236.17-239.2; BoBhVy fols. 363a7-370b5, pp. 189.3.7-192.3.5; Har Dayal, Bodhisattva Doctrine, p. 281.
16. The anābhogo nirnimittavihāra is treated in Dutt, BoBh, pp. 219.24-220.2, 239.3-241.2; BoBhVy, fols. 370b6-373b8, pp. 192.3.6-193.4.8; Har Dayal, Bodhisattva Doctrine, p. 282.
17. The pratīsamvidvihāra is treated in Dutt, BoBh, pp. 220.3-5, 241.3-22; BuBhVy, fols. 373b8-375b5, pp. 193.4.8-194.3.5; Har Dayal, Bodhisattva Doctrine, p.282.
18. The paramavihāra is treated in Dutt, BoBh, pp. 220.6-9, 241.23-242.13; BoBhVy, fols. 375b6-376b2; Har Dayal, Bodhisattva Doctrine, p. 282.
19. The Tathāgatavihāra is not treated in the Vihāraspaṭala of the BoBh (see pp. 218.2, 253.10-11), but in the Pratiṣṭhāpaṭala, the chapter of the BoBh which is entirely dedicated to the treatment of this level; Dutt, BoBh, pp. 265-282; BoBhVy, fols. 392b4-422b5, pp. 201.2.4-213.2.5; Har Dayal, Bodhisattva Doctrine, pp. 282.
20. Har Dayal, Bodhisattva Doctrine, pp. 284-291; Lévi, MSA Traduction, contains a chart at the end which shows some of the qualities of these levels according to the MSA.
21. The main scriptural base for these ten is the Daśabhūmikasūtra, ed. Ryuko Kondo, passim. Following this tradition see also Lévi, MSA XX-XXI.10-38, pp. 177-183, and La Vallée Poussin, ed. Madhyamakāvatāra, passim.
22. Lévi, MSA XIV.28-33, pp. 93.28-94.22; SAVBh, sDe-dge sems-tsam mi, fols. 272b1-274a7:
 dvayagrāhaviśamuktaṃ lokottaram anuttaram |
 nirvikalpaṃ malāpetam jñānam sa labhate punaḥ || 28
 sāsyaśrayaparāvṛttiḥ prathamā bhūmir iṣyate |

ameyaisā cāyaya sa kalpaiḥ suvisuddhiṃ nigacchatī || 29
 dharmadhātōś ca samatāṃ prativīdhyā punas tadā |
 sarvasattveṣu labhate sadātmasamacittatāṃ || 30
 nirātmatāyāṃ duḥkhārthe kṛtye niḥpratīkarmaṇi |
 sattveṣu samacitto 'sau yathānye'pi jinātmajāḥ || 31
 traidhātukātmasaṃskārān abhūtaparikalpataḥ |
 jñānena suvisuddhena advayārthena paśyati || 32
 tadabhāvasya bhāvaṃ ca vimuktaṃ dṛṣṭihāyibhiḥ |
 labdhvā darśanamārgo hi tadā tena nirucyate || 33

23. MSam III.11-12; Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, pp. 53-54, vol. 2, pp. 166-169; MSamU, Pek. sams-tsam 11, fols. 300a5-301a2, vol. 113, p. 28.1.5-4.2:

11. de ltar na byang chub sams dpa' 'di rnam par rig pa tsam nyid du 'jug pas shes bya'i mtshan nyid la zhugs pa yin te | der zhugs pas sa rab tu dga' ba la zhugs pa yin te | chos kyi dbyings legs par rtogs pa yin | de bzhin gshegs pa'i riga su akyes pa yin | sams can thams cad la sams mnyam pa dang | byang chub sams dpa'i thams cad la sams mnyam pa dang | sams rgyas thams cad la sams mnyam pa thob pa yin te | de ni de'i mthong ba'i lam yin no |

12. ci'i phyir yang rnam par rig pa tsam de la 'jug ce na | 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa 'jig rten las 'das pa'i zhi gnas dang | lhag mthog gi shes pa de dang | de'i rjes la thob pa sna tshogs kyi rnam par rig pa'i shes pas | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i sa bon rgyu mtshan dang bcas pa thams cad spangs nas | chos kyi sku la reg pa'i sa bon spel te | gnas gyur nas sams rgyas kyi chos thams cad yang dag par 'grub pa'i sgo nas | thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes thob par bya ba'i phyir 'jug go |

rjes la thob pa'i ye shes de ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa <las> thams cad rab tu sgye ba dang | rnam par rig pa'i mtshan ma thams ca la agyu ma lta bu nyid la sogs par kun tu lta bas rang bzhin gyi phyin ci log pa <med par> 'byung ngo || des na byang chub sams dpa' de agyu ma byas pa'i chos rnam la sgyu ma mkhan bzhin du rgyu dang 'bras bur bcas pa ston pa la yang dus thams cad du phyin ci log med pa yin no |.

24. MSamU, Pek. 11, fol. 300a5-6, p. 28.1.5-6.

25. MSamU, Pek. 11, fol. 301a2-3, p. 28.3.2-3.

26. MSamU, Pek. 11, fol. 301a2, p. 28.3.3.

27. This is Lamotte's reconstruction in Sand VIII.13, pp. 94, 215; in La Somme, vol. 2, p. 167, he uses *samarāṣa-dharma.

28. MSamU, Pek. 11, fol. 300b5-6, p. 28.2.5-6.

29. Lamotte, Sand, pp. 94, 215; Josho Nozawa, ed., Āryamaitreya-Kevala-Parivarta-Bhāṣyam Saṃdhinirmocanasūtre, Kyoto: Kozokan, 1957, pp. 34-37: 'gal te mdo sde la sogs

pa'i chos de gcig tu bzlum pa dang | gcig tu badu ba dang |
 gcig tu brtul ba dang | phung po gcig tu byas te | chos
 'di dag thams cad ni de bzhin nyid la gzhol ba | de bzhin
 nyid la 'bab pa | de gzhin nyid la bab pa | byang chub la
 gzhol ba | byang chub la 'bab pa | byang chub la bab pa |
 mya ngan las 'das pa la gzhol ba | mya ngan las 'das pa la
 'bab pa | mya ngan las 'das pa la bab pa | gnas gyur pa la
 gzhol ba | gnas gyur pa la 'bab pa | gnas gyur pa la bab
 pa dag ste | chos 'di dag thams cad ni dge ba'i chos dpag
 tu med pa | grangs med pa dang mgon par rjod pas rjod pa
 yin no anyam du yid la byed pa de ni | 'dres pa'i chos la
 dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong yin no |.

30. Tatia, ASamBh, p. 62.22: *asambhinnālabanena
 manaskāreṇēti miśrālabanena sarvadharmasāmānya-
 lakṣaṇākāreṇēty arthaḥ* |.

31. Nozawa, ed., DhDhVV to VIII.6, pp. 31.6; TriṃBh to 29-
 30, Lévi, *Viññaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 44.1; SAVBh, sDe-dge
 aems-tsam mi, fol. 272a1-b2.

32. Dutt, BoBh, pp. 253.21-254.2: *āpāyikakleśapakṣyaṃ
 dauṣṭhulyaṃ āśrayād apakarṣati | acireṇa tasya prahāṇād
 āśrayo 'sya bodhisattvasya parivartate pāpakasyāpāyikasya
 karmaṇo 'tyantam akaraṇatāyai apāyāgamanatāyai ca | iyatā
 bodhisattvaḥ samatīkrānto 'pāyagatīḥ sarvā bhavati |
 samatīkrāntāś cādhimuktīcaryābhūmim | praviṣṭāś ca
 śuddhādhyaśāyabhūmim* |.

33. See above Part III, Ch. 3; Nozawa, DhDhV & DhDhVV, pp.
 17.14-20, 13.12-13, 41.13-15.

34. Dutt, BoBh, pp. 279.25-280.4: *tatha paripūrṇamanorathāḥ
 samatīkrānto bodhisattvacaryāṃ bodhisattvabhūmim |
 tathāgatacaryāṃ tathāgatabhūmim avakrānto bhavati |
 sārगतasya ca jñeyāvaraṇapakṣyasya dauṣṭhulyasya
 niravaśeṣaṃ prahāṇād asyāśrayaḥ parivṛtto bhavati | sa
 cāsyā niruttarā āśrayaparivṛttiḥ | anyāḥ sarvāḥ
 paramavihārāvasānā bodhisattvānāṃ āśrayaparivṛttayaḥ suttarā
 eva veditavyāḥ* |.

35. That is, *vihāras* four through twelve, or *bhūmis* two
 through ten; Lévi, MSABh to VI.6-9, XI.33, pp. 24.16-20,
 63.12-16; cf. the next chapter for a discussion of MSABh to
 XI.33.

36. Nozawa, DhDhV IX.8, pp. 17.14 f., 41.15 f.

37. Nanjio, Lañk, pp. 80.13-81.16; see the Appendix to Part
 III for more information on the special doctrines of this
sūtra.

CHAPTER THREE:

Vimuktikāya and Dharmakāya

Until now we have scrupulously avoided the earliest mention and locus classicus of āśrayaparivṛtti, the discussion of the final fruit of the path expounded in the tenth chapter of the Samd. There can be little question that the initial sense of fundamental transformation was generated to fulfill the need of discriminating between the ultimate goals of the Śrāvaka and the Bodhisattva. That discrimination was only extended to systems and prior stages on the path because it was applicable beyond its initial formulation and filled a need for the identification of the ultimate soteriological event--riddance of the barriers between the knowing mind and ultimate reality. In the early literature, though, the act of transformation yielded positive results. This chapter will explore the identity of transformation as the final goal, and in particular its hypostatization into a corpus (kāya) of freedom (vimukti) and righteousness (dharma), and their relationship to the 'great enlightenment' (mahābodhi).

Chapter Ten of the Samd opens with the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī requesting information concerning the dharmakāya of

the Buddha and its characteristics. The Bhagavan is depicted as replying:

X.1 "Mañjuśrī, the characteristic of the Tathāgatas' dharmakāya is the perfect accomplishment of the disengaging fundamental transformation (nairvāṇikāśrayaparivṛtti) cultivated from the levels and perfections (bhūmipāramitāprabhāvanā). For two reasons that [transformation] is to be known as inconceivable (acintya): because it has the qualities of nonpostulation and nonoperation (niṣprapañcānābhisaṃskāratvāt) and because beings are fascinated with postulation and operation (sattvānāṃ prapañcābhisaṃskārābhiniveśatvāt)."

2. [Mañjuśrī asks,] "Bhagavān, are the fundamental transformations of the Śrāvakas and the Pratyekabuddhas also to be called the dharmakāya?"
 "Mañjuśrī, they are not to be so called."
 "Then what should they be termed?"
 "Mañjuśrī, they are termed the vimuktikāya.
 Mañjuśrī, this vimuktikāya is the same for all the Tathāgatas, the Śrāvakas, and the Pratyekabuddhas. The dharmakāya, though, is superior. Its superiority is through the incalculability of its qualities, and these are difficult to express."¹

The identification of fundamental transformation with these two important soteriological structures is both indicative of the importance of āśrayaparivṛtti for the tradition and illustrative of the aggregate nature of that transformation. 'Kāya' is most often utilized to denote a set of elements which belong to the same general class. The exact extension of each of these two classes was to cause an intense series of doctrinal developments within the Mahāyāna.

a. Vimuktikāya.

Certainly the more obscure of these two terms is that of vimuktikāya--the corpus of liberation or freedom.

Unfortunately, none of the commentators to Samd X.1-2 have provided an extensive discussion to the problem of the vimuktikāya. There is little discussion of the nature of this structure and less indication of its development.

There is only one other place in the Samd where the dharmakāya and the vimuktikāya are distinguished.² Mañjuśrī is depicted in Samd X.10 as asking about the quality of nonoperation of the dharmakāya: how is it that there is the arising of the great light of gnosis and of innumerable images of the nirmāṇakāya for beings only from the dharmakāya and not from the vimuktikāya? The answer given is that the sunstones and moonstones (sūryacandrakānta) which make up the sun and moon naturally give great light because of the great inherent power of beings and out of the activity of beings. Other sunstones and moonstones, found on earth, do not give this great light. Likewise, special kinds of gems, when polished, give off extensive reflections, whereas others, not polished, do not. Thus the light of gnosis and the various manifestations, all of which arise from the dharmakāya, do so as a result of the needs of beings coupled with the fact that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya is well cleansed and accomplished by his cultivation of skillful means and insight, and referential towards the immeasurable elemental realm. Because the vimuktikāya of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas is not of this kind, it does not shine and manifest itself.

The aūtra here gives us two different images to distinguish the two functions occurring in the dharmakāya but not in the vimuktikāya. A basic difference between the images is that the first involves a variety of stones which is only different by placement (in the sun/moon or out of it), whereas the second identifies dissimilar classes of stones (those belonging to the maṇiratnagotra vrs. those not). It is therefore difficult to discern the position played by gotra (= cause) in terms of the effect. Indeed, the former image could be conceivably interpreted in terms of the 'unique vehicle' (ekayāna). Finally, it has told us next to nothing about the vimuktikāya, primarily being a paean to the qualities of the dharmakāya.

Perhaps the most extensive elaboration of the difference between the dharmakāya and the vimuktikāya in surviving literature is to be found in Niḥsvabhāva's comment on MSaṃ I.48. There, in the MSaṃ, the mundane mentality (laukikacitta) of Bodhisattvas is said to be constituted by the dharmakāya while that of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas is constituted by the vimuktikāya. Niḥsvabhāva elaborates:

Now as for the distinction (viśeṣa) between the dharmakāya and the vimuktikāya, the latter is completed with the mere separation from the bonds of the defilements (kleśabandhana). For example, if a townman is released from the bonds of his iron shackles, and so forth, with the reverse of his suffering, he obtains just the lack of suffering as the result. He is not, though, endowed with the distinction of an overlord (adhīśvara). The dharmakāya, on the other hand, is totally liberated from the obscurations of the

knowable and of the defilements, together with their impressions (vāsanā). It is ornamented with the wondrous qualities (āścaryaguṇa) of the powers (bala), the fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya), etc. It is the place of all prosperity (*sarvasamrddhisthāna), and because there is behavior just according to one's desire, the highest freedom is obtained. For example, immediately after a prince is liberated from his bonds, he receives coronation (abhiśeka) on the top of his head and becomes a lord (īśvara) with the highest endowments.³

There can be little doubt that the primary mechanism depicted here is that of the disparity of gotra. The townsman has nothing to look forward to following his release from prison. On the other hand, the prince, presumably because of the polity of the period, is released from prison, having been successful in his bid for the throne, and is immediately coronated. For us the significance is clear: the Śrāvakas and so forth have only their own release to look forward to while the Bodhisattvas will obtain the coronation (abhiśeka) as the crown prince (yuvarāja) in succession for the diamond seat (vajrāsana) of the Victor (Jina).

Since the literature is so unclear about the precise nature of the vimuktikāya, we must attempt to trace its antecedents in the earlier literature of Buddhist India. The term indicates a corpus (kāya), literal or figurative, which embodies liberation or freedom (vimukti). Within the realm of standard Buddhist technical terminology, there is only one compound which approximates this term: the aggregate of liberation (vimuktiskandha). Corpus (kāya) and

aggregate (skandha) are sometimes used interchangeably; the aggregate of consciousness (viññānaskandha), for example, is often referred to as the corpus of consciousness (viññānakāya) when it is a topic of discourse, such as in the first chapter of the YoBh (Viññānakāyā Bhūmi) and in the Viññānakāya, one of the seven treatises of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma.⁴ The basic sense, then, of corpus in this context is a compendium or aggregate of entities, much the same as the definition of aggregate is a mass (rāśyārtha).⁵ We shall see that this sense is carried over into many of the definitions of dharma-kāya.

The aggregate of liberation (vimuktiskandha) is one of the 'five Dharmic aggregates' (pañcadhamma-kkhandha) found in the Pāli canon:⁶

- 1) The aggregate of morality (sīlakkhandho).
- 2) The aggregate of concentration (samādhikkhandho).
- 3) The aggregate of insight (paññakkhandho).
- 4) The aggregate of liberation (vimuttikkhandho).
- 5) The aggregate of the vision of the knowledge of liberation (vimuttiñānadassanakkhandho).

These five are found throughout the Pāli Suttapitaka and in the Vinayapitaka. The Dīghanikāya lists them in the final sutta, the Dasuttarasutta, a rather late sutta, being closest to the Abhidhamma tradition and spoken to Sāriputta.⁷ Under the section of 'fives', the sutta maintains that these are the five dhammas which are to be

realized palpably (sacchikātabba). The Vinaya lists these in the Mahāvagga, in the Mahākhandhaka which treats of 'going forth' (pravrajyā) and ordination (upasampadā).⁸ If a monk is possessed of these in the capacity of 'no more learning' (asekha), then he is qualified to be a teacher (ācariya) or a preceptor (upajjhāya). But this Vinaya passage is likewise not very old and it includes a reference to Abhidhamma, although the referent does not seem to be the full-fledged system.⁹ The Samyutta also discusses the five in the Issattasutta, which lists the qualifications of an individual who, having left home, becomes the source of great recompense (mahāpphala) if given a gift.¹⁰ This individual must be devoid of five qualities--desire, ill-will, dullness, agitated remorse, and doubt--as well as endowed with the five aggregates of our list. Like the Vinaya section, the latter five are qualified as without further learning (asekha). The five aggregates also occur three times in the Aṅguttaranikāya, and like the above listings in the other parts of the canon, the group is associated with the five elements to be rejected, with the operation of a monk as a preceptor, and with the monk's ability to become a source of great merit for those offering to him.¹¹ Also like its occurrence in the other canonical works, the list in the Aṅguttara is associated with the quality of having no more learning, while the third Aṅguttara occurrence also uses the list to define the highest man (uttamapuriso).

It appears that this group of five members was derived from an earlier combination which is found in the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, a sūtra which is certainly older than any of the above citations of the five. In the section of the final view of Vaiśālī, the Buddha delivers a sermon in which he states that both he and the monks in the audience have wandered in samsāra for a long time since there was not the penetration and realization of virtue (śīla), concentration (saṁādhi), insight (prajñā), and liberation (vi-mukti).¹² A comparison with the Mūlasarvāstivāda form of the sūtra shows that the verse in the Pāli version is a reification of the act of liberation of the mind which is endowed with the first three members.¹³ This reification was also at work in the Sanskrit Āgama literature, as is evident from a quote provided in the KośaBh and KośaVy of the four-membered system.¹⁴ Thus, the most probable course of events was the identification of a fourth, and then a fifth, member for the well-known first three members through the hypostatization of the mind being liberated through the action of these three.

Our philological excursus has not yet answered the question of the precise contents of the aggregate of liberation. Since the commentaries on the canonical works do not detail this material, we must turn to the scholastic materials of the Vaibhāṣikas, particularly the Kośa and its commentaries. In KośaBh to VI.75c-76c, Vasubandhu II identifies liberation as a compounded (samskṛta) element,

but devoid of the circumstance of further learning (śaikṣā).¹⁵ He further comes to the identification of the aggregate of liberation: it consists of the liberation of the mind (cetovimukti) and the liberation through insight (prajñāvimukti). The commentarial literature does not so readily distinguish between the two, but it appears that they both refer to the liberation of the mind from desire (cetovimukti) and from ignorance (prajñāvimukti).¹⁶ The Kośakāra gives a definition of liberation as the purity of the mind when desire, etc., has been removed through the gnosis of reality (tattvajñānāpanīteṣu rāgādiau cetaso vaimalyam vimuktir iti).¹⁷ Yaśomitra adds that this purity is really the noneffluence (anāśravatva) which resides deep inside that which is untrue (anartha), like the clarity which exists inside unclarified butter (ghṛtamaṇḍasvacchātāvad).¹⁸

While the above material provides us with a great deal of circumstantial evidence for the identification of the aggregate of liberation with the corpus of liberation, there is no clear statement of equivalence. It rests with the Yogācāra literature, specifically Vasubandhu I's commentary on MSA XI.33 for a concrete connection to be made between the aggregate of liberation and fundamental transformation. Vyavadātasamaya had described the process of realization in this verse:

XI.33 Obtainment of the distinguished object is from the discipline of its placement in its own

element. Indeed, just those occur as nondual appearances, like hide and arrowshafts.

MSABh: 'Obtainment of the distinguished object' indicates the acquisition of the object of the teaching as was mentioned above. 'The discipline of its placement in its own element' means that the thusness of conceptualization is its own element. There is placement in that because of the positioning of mind in name.¹⁹ 'From the discipline' means from effort. The conceptualizations occur as nondual appearances only by means of the path of cultivation for one who has had his fundament transformed. A hide becomes supple through the elimination of its hardness [by tanning]; an arrowshaft becomes straight through heating it over a fire. In that same way, when by means of pacification and investigation there is the obtainment of mental and insightful liberation by one fundamentally transformed, his conceptualizations no longer operate as the appearance of duality.²⁰

Certainly, the contribution to fundamental transformation exhibited in this statement is circuitious; the yogin is depicted as having already established himself in the process of transformation. The model employed, though, both here and in the scriptural and technical discussions of the aggregate of liberation, show that the identical system is being manipulated. It is the mind of the yogin, covered with the adventitious defilements, which is purified. By this he becomes a source of great merit for one offering to him, much as we have seen that the Vaibhāsikas identified one fundamentally transformed as a field of merit (punya-kaetra).²¹

The model manipulated here is very similar to that explained by Asaṅga; the primary difference is that only mental events (kleśa = caitasika) are eliminated in the

canonical version while forms of consciousness (ālaya, manas) are dispensed with in Asaṅga's material.²² Nonetheless, clear similarities remain. Particularly indicative is the manner in which the defilements are removed. Butter is clarified; arrowshafts are straightened; and leather is made supple. The underlying fact or element remains; only its defects are removed. We are reminded very much of the manner of model manipulation of thushness and the embryo of the Tathāgata; gold, water, and space are all cleansed of adventitious defilements while their basic natures remain unchanged.

b. Dharmakāya.

In opposition to the vimuktikāya, the dharmakāya has enjoyed a series of previous investigations, the most significant of these being by La Vallée Poussin.²³ His results indicate that the dharmakāya may be understood as:

- 1) Pravacanakāya: the body of the teachings of the Buddha.
- 2) The five 'Dharmic aggregates' which we have seen in connection with the vimuktikāya.
- 3) The collective corpus of the eighteen special (āvenika) elements of the Buddha: his ten powers (bala), four forms of fearlessness (vaiśāradya), three bases of recollection (sarṭyupasthāna), and his great compassion

(mahākaruṇā).²⁴

- 4) The essential body (avābhāvīkākāya), roughly equivalent to the absolute.

We have seen that the earlier statements of fundamental transformation, such as that in the MSA, closely associated the metamorphosis of models with the obtainment of certain forms of dominion (vibhūtvā), very similar in operation to the powers and other elements given in 3). A more advanced formulation of the connection of power, the dharmakāya, and fundamental transformation is given in MSam X.3:

X.3 How many characteristics are there for the dharmakāya?

In summary, there are five:

- i. āśrayaparāvṛttilakṣaṇa. There is the characteristic of fundamental transformation. When the aspect of the dependent nature which is involved with defilement (saṃkleśabhāga) is turned around, it is liberated from all the obscurations. This occurs because it is transformed into the aspect of the dependent nature which is involved with purity (vyavadānabhāga) and which gains sovereignty over all the dharmas.
- ii. śukladharmalakṣaṇa. There is the characteristic of the bright qualities, because there is the obtainment of the ten dominions having completed the six perfections.
 - a. Dominion over life and mind and necessities is through the completion of the perfection of giving.
 - b. Dominion over activity and birth is through the completion of the perfection of morality.
 - c. Dominion over interest is through the completion of the perfection of patience.
 - d. Dominion over aspiration is through the completion of the perfection of strenuous exertion.
 - e. Dominion over the psychic power of the five superior knowledges is through the completion of the perfection of contemplation.
 - f. Dominion over gnosis and dharma is through the completion of the perfection of insight.

iii. advayalaksana. There is the characteristic of nonduality.

a. There is the characteristic of the nonduality of existence and nonexistence, since there is the nonexistence of any entity such as 'dharmaa' and because there is the existence of the entity whose characteristic is 'emptiness'.

b. There is the characteristic of the nonduality of compounded and uncompounded elements since there is no operation by activity or defilement and since there occurs [for the dharmaakāya] sovereignty over the demonstration of appearance as compounded.

c. There is the characteristic of the nonduality of unity and multiplicity. This occurs because the basis of all the Buddhas is not multiple while incalculable streams of beings obtain final enlightenment. Here there are two verses:

1. Since there is no postulation of a self, there is no multiplicity of basis. But because of prior inference [through perception of existence], multiplicity is assumed with respect to beings.
2. Since there is differentiation of lineage, because of inutility, through wholeness, because of beginninglessness, and because of differentiation, there is neither unity nor multiplicity of 'buddhity' in the pure fundament. (= MSA IX.77)²⁵

iv. nityalaksana. There is the characteristic of permanence because of the purity of thusness, because of the power of prior aspiration, and because of the noncompletion of what is yet to be done.

v. acintyalaksana. There is the characteristic of inconceivability because the purity of thusness is to be individually apprehended, because there is no simile (upamā) in the world [for the dharmaakāya], and because it is entirely beyond the sphere of cognition of speculative philosophy.²⁶

The precise relationship between the purified dependent nature and the dharmaakāya remains obscure, as does the relationship between the dependent and perfected natures in virtually all Yogācāra technical treatises. Yet we can see that the dharmaakāya in the MSa, unlike the Samd, includes

the characteristic of transformation but goes beyond it. The model manipulation of the three natures is merely part of the dharmakāya for the author of the MSaṃ, and though the forms of dominion may derive from this transformation, it is more the nature of a necessary condition rather than a material cause for their development.

Even so, the impact of transformation on the author of the MSaṃ has been great. In his tenth and final chapter, he utilizes the language of transformation to modify three different systems: the five aggregates, as we have seen our discussion of psycho-physical transformation; the three natures, as we have seen both here and in the elaboration of MSaṃ Chapter Nine above; and the two main distinctions of consciousness--that of the underlying consciousness (ālayavijñāna) and the operational sense consciousness (pravṛttivijñāna). MSaṃ X.35 postulates the dharmakāya, in its form of the svābhāvikakāya, as the result of the transformation of the underlying consciousness.²⁷ The sambhogakāya, by contrast, is considered the transformation of the operational consciousnesses. It appears that the reason for the postulation of this form of metamorphosis is the underlying idealism of the MSaṃ. As the world is a projection of the sense consciousnesses, if the Buddha wishes to impact other's sensory awareness, he must operate through the transformation of his own. Perhaps the greatest difficulty is that the nirmāṇakāya is not associated with this transformation while the sambhogakāya is. While they

are both members of the 'formal body' (rūpakāya) of the Buddha, it is unclear why the more abstract of the two varieties of formal body carries the sense of transformation while the more concrete--and theoretically the one most pertinent to sensory transformation--does not.

Unfortunately, this issue is not addressed by either the author or his commentators, but was later adapted extensively by the Vajrācāryas in their various treatises. Unhappily, these must await further investigation as they lie outside the scope of our inquiry.

c. Mahābodhi.

Of course the distinction given in the tenth chapter of the Saṃd between the result of the Śrāvaka path and the Bodhisattva path is indicative of a further distinction between the enlightenment of the Arhat and the great enlightenment (mahābodhi) of the Buddha.²⁸ This distinction is not lost on our commentators, and *Bodhyṛddhi (Byang-chub rdzul-'phrul) explains that the Tathāgata, characterized by the dharmakāya, is the condition of the highest enlightenment (anuttarasamyaksambodhibhāva).²⁹ He then gives an abbreviated account of enlightenment as found in the VinSg.³⁰ Asaṅga's full account is based on the summary of the Mahāyāna (mahāyānasamgraha) found in the Śrutamayī Bhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi.³¹ There he identifies five elements which constitute great enlightenment: essential nature

(svabhāva), ability (prabhāva), skillful means (upāya), operation (pravṛtti), and quiescence (nivṛtti). In his description of the first of these, Asaṅga not only describes the process of transformation but offers a series of reasoned arguments for its existence:

What is the essential nature of great enlightenment? It is that fundamental transformation which is superior to those of the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha. Moreover, this essential nature should be known through four qualities: as the basis for entrance (praveśāśraya), as the basis for nonentrance (apraveśāśraya), as the fruit of well-examining the objects of cognition (superīkṣitaḥñeyaphala), and as the characteristic of the purity of the elemental realm (dharmadhātuvīśuddhilakṣaṇa).

i. praveśāśraya. It is the basis for entrance into the supermundane path existent in the stream of being (santāna) of the Buddha. If it [transformation] is not accepted or not relied on, then there would be no arising of the path and no entrance into it. And if there were no fundamental transformation [to mark that entrance], then one would enter the supermundane path right from the beginning of one's career.

ii. apraveśāśraya. It is the basis for the nonentrance of all the defilements together with their traces (avāśanākleśa). If it is not accepted or not relied on, then even with the accumulation of the proper conditions, there would be no apprehension (upalabdhi) of the nonentrance of the defilements together with their traces.

iii. superīkṣitaḥñeyaphala. It is the fruit well-examining the objects of cognition since fundamental transformation is the result of the investigation (avakalpanā) of the thatness of objects of cognition (ñeyatattva) and the thusness of objects of cognition (ñeyatathatā). If it is not accepted, then even the essential nature of the quality of the Buddha would have to be understood, rejected, and brought to cessation.

iv. dharmadhātuvīśuddhilakṣaṇa. Its characteristic is the purity of the elemental realm since this fundamental transformation overcomes all referential signs (nimitta) and is

therefore generated (prabhāṇita) by the purity of the elemental realm. If it is not accepted, then that which is impermanent and conceivable would be explained as the same as the characteristics of permanence and inconceivability.³²

Aśaṅga's major reasoning here is more that fundamental transformation authenticates the path between defiled states and great enlightenment rather than strictly defining enlightenment itself. Āśrayapariṇṭti separates entrance from nonentrance on the path; it separates the operation of the defilements from the perception of their nonoperation; it separates ordinary cognitions from the cognition of reality; and it separates the impermanent and conceptual from the permanent and inconceivable. In short, it identifies the operation of the progress of the awakened one by a series of faults eliminated. To back away from the postulate of the process of metamorphosis means to be incapable of distinguishing conditioned existence from unconditioned purity. It means, finally, to abandon the entire edifice of the Buddhist tradition.

Certainly it is proper that our inquiry end both with the final goal and with a position close to the starting point of our doctrine's development. Āśrayapariṇṭti continued on in the scriptures and technical treatises of Vajrayāna, but it went beyond the Yogācāra tradition with this latter's eclipse in the subcontinent. The inspiration, though, of the path-related structures developed by that tradition continued to bear fruit right down to the present.

Model manipulation also continued, primarily with the models developed by the Yogācāra authors, so that the later Indian, Tibetan, and Chinese Buddhist masters found the ground work of these hermits and scholars to be indispensable.

Notes to Part IV: Chapter Three

1. Lamotte, Samd, p. 149: X.1 'jam dpal de bzhin gshegs pa rnama kyi chos kyi aku'i mtshan nyid ni sa dang pha rol tu phyin pa shin tu bagoms pa'i nges par 'byung ba'i gnas gyur pa yang dag par agrub pa yin no || de'ang rgyu gnyis kya bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i mtshan nyid du rig par bya ste | de ni aproa pa med cing mgon par 'du bya ba med pa nyid kyi phyir dang | sems can rnams ni spros pa dang mgon par 'du bya ba la mgon par zhen pa nyid kyi phyir ro |

2. bcom ldan 'das ci lags | nyan thos dang | rang sangs rgyas rnama kyi gnas gyur pa gang laga pa de'ang chos kyi sku lags par brjod par bgyi'am | 'jam dpal brjod par mi bya'o | bcom lden 'das 'on ci lags par brjod par bgyi | 'jam dpal rnam par grol ba'i lus yin te | 'jam dpal rnam par grol ba'i lus kya ni de bzhin gshegs pa rnama dang | nyan thos dang | rang sangs rgyas rnama kyang mtshungs aching mnyam mo || chos kyi sku ni khyad par du 'phags te | chos kyi sku khyad par du 'phags ni [Lamotte na] yon tan gyi khyad par dpag tu med pas kyang khyad par 'phags pa yin te | de la ni dpe bya bar yang ala ba ma yin no |.

2. This and the following material is taken from Lamotte, Samd X.10, pp. 163, 268-69; cf. SamdBh of Yüan-tse, Pek, vol. 106, pp. 346.4.3-347.2.7.

3. MSamU, Pek. sema-tsam li, fols. 262b6-263a2, vol. 113, p. 13.1.6-2.2: de la chos kyi sku dang rnam par grol ba'i lus kyi khyad par ni 'di yin te | rnam par grol ba ni nyon monga pa'i bcings pa dang bral ba tsam du zad de | dper na grong mi zhig lcags agrogs la sogs pa'i bcings pa dang bral na adug bangal de log pas 'bras bu tsam du zad kyi | de las lhag pa'i dbang phyug gi khyad par dang ldan pa ma yin lta bu'o | chos kyi sku ni bag chags dang bcas pa'i nyon monga pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa las rnam par grol ba stobs dang mi 'jigs pa la sogs pa ngo mtshar gyi yon tan du mas brgyan pa 'byor pa thams cad kyi gnas ji ltar 'dod pa bzhin du spyod pas rang dbang mchog thob pa ste | dper na rgyal po'i bu bcings pa dang bral ma thag tu spyi po nas dbang bakur ba dang | dbang phyug phun sum tshogs pa mchog dang ldan pa lta bu'o ||.

4. Junjiro Takakusu, "On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins," Journal of the Pāli Text Society 1904-05: 67-146. Bhattacharya, YoBh, pp. 1-10.

5. Kośa I.20ab; Shastri, pp. 56-62; La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. 1, pp. 35-39:

rāśyāyadvāragotrārthāḥ skandhāyatanadhātavaḥ ।

6. These are also referred to as supernundane aggregates (lokottaraskandha, Dharmasaṃgraha 23), incomparable aggregates (asamasamāḥ skandhāḥ, Mahāvvyutpatti 4), noneffluent aggregates (anāsravāḥ skandhāḥ), and the Victors' aggregates (jīṇaskandhāḥ); see La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. 4, p. 297 n. 2.
7. T.W.Rhys-Davids and J.E. Carpenter, eds., London: Pali Text Society, 1890-1911, vol. 3, p. 279. The various commentaries ascribed to Buddhaghosa universally ignore any significant elaboration of this list, they and will therefore not be utilized.
8. H. Oldenburg, Vinayapitakam, London: Williams & Norgate, 1879-83, vol. 1, pp. 62-65.
9. Oldenburg, pp. X ff., and especially p. XII n. 2; I.B. Horner, The Book of Discipline, Sacred Books of the Buddhists vol. 13, London: Oxford Univ. Press and Luzac, 1952, pp. X ff.; *idem*, "Abhidhamma Abhivinaya," Indian Historical Quarterly 12 (1941).
10. L. Feer, London: PTS, 1884-1904, vol. 1, p. 99.
11. R. Morris and E. Hardy, eds., Aṅguttaranikāya, London: PTS, 1885-1910, vol. 1, pp. 160-62, vol. 3, p. 271, vol. 5, pp. 16-17.
12. Rhys-Davids, Dīgha, vol. 2, pp. 122-23.
13. Ernst Waldschmidt, Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst Jahrgang 1950 Nr. 2, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1951, vol. 2, p. 228.
14. KośaBh and KośaVy to VI.76c; Shastri, pp. 1028-29; La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. 4, pp. 297-98; cf. Aṅguttara, vol. 2, p. 195.
15. Shastri pp. 1027-29; La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharma-kośa, vol. 4, pp. 295-98. Cf. Sthiramati's commentary on Kośa I.27: tshul khrims kyi phung po ni gzugs kyi phung pos zhes bya ba la tshul khrims ni lus dang ngag gi las kyi rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir gzugs kyi phung pos badus so | ting nges 'dzin dang shes rab dang rnam par grol ba'i ye shes athong ba'i phung po rnama ni tahor ba dang 'du shes las tha dad cing sems dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i 'du byed kyi phung po'i mtahan nyid can yin pa'i phyir 'du byed kyi phung pos bsdus so | 'dir ni rnam par grol ba'i phung po ni slob pa'i mos pa yin gyi | 'dua ma byas ni ma yin no | Pek. vol. 146, p. 233.3.8-4.2 (cy. to Bhāṣya on I.27).

16. KośaBh to VI.64ab had defined prajñāvimukti as prajñabalena kevalam kleśāvaranavimuktatvāt. Cf. Poussin's notes, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. 4, pp. 275, 297; in this latter he defines avidyāvirāgāt prajñāvimukti without stating a source.
17. Shastri, p. 1029.3; cf. Majjhimanikāya 39, Āṅguttara VII,65; cf. the discussion on these two in Hikata, Suvikrāntavikrāmi, p. x.
18. Shastri, p. 1029.21-22.
19. Lévi, MSA, p. 63.11: tatra sthānaṃ nānni sthānāc cetasah | SAVBh, sDe-dge sams-tsam mi, fol. 183a7-b1 defines 'name' here as the nāmaśāṅkhā, the four aggregates devoid of form.
20. Lévi, MSA, p. 63.8-16; SAVBh, mi, fols. 183a3-184a1:
 ālambanaviśeṣāptiḥ avadhātusthānayogataḥ |
 ta eva hy advayābhāsā vartante carmakaṇḍavat || XI.33
 ālambanaviśeṣāptir iti yo dharmālambanalābhaḥ pūrvam uktah |
 avadhātusthānayogata iti avadhātur vikalpānāṃ tathatā tatra
 sthānaṃ nānni sthānāc cetasah | yogata ity abhyāsāt |
 bhāvanāmārgena ta eva vikalpā advayābhāsā vartante
 parāvṛttāśrayasya | carmavat kaṇḍavac ca | yathā hi
 kharatvāpagamāt tad eva carma mṛdu bhavati |
 agnisantāpanayā tad eva kaṇḍam ṛju bhavati | evaṃ
 samathāvipaśyanābhāvanābhyāṃ cetahprajñāvimuktilābhe
 parāvṛttāśrayasya ta eva vikalpā na punar dvayābhāsāḥ
 pravartante | ity eva vyavadānaṃ paryeṣitavyaṃ |.
21. See above, Part II, Chapter 2.
22. See above, Part II, Chapter 4.
23. La Vallée Poussin, La Siddhi, pp. 762-813; see also Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 49*-51* and Edgerton, BHSD, p. 277a for further references.
24. We must note that there are two lists of the eighteen āveṇikadharma, that given in Kośa VII.28 and Bhāṣya, and that given in Mahāvvyutpatti 135-153, and Yaśomitra's comment on VII.28, Shastri, p. 1083, which maintains that the Kośa list is that of the Vaibhāṣikas' as opposed to 'other masters'. Cf. La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, vol. 5, pp. 66-67 n., Edgerton, BHSD, p. 108b.
25. We note here that Lamotte's text reads don med phyir, as if vaiyarthāt, rather than the avaiyarthāt of MSA IX.77. MSamU, p. 41.5.7-8, supports the reading of don med.
26. Lamotte, La Somme, vol. 1, pp. 84-85, vol. 2, pp. 268-274; MSamU, Pek, sams-tsam li, fols. 333a8-335b1, vol. 113, pp. 41.2.8-42.2.1:

3. sangs rgyas rname kyi chos kyi sku mtshan nyid ji lta bu zhe na ! mdor badu na mtshan nyid lngar rig par bya ste !

i. gnas gyur pa'i mtshan nyid ni agrib pa thams cad pa kun nas nyon mongs pa'i char gtogs pa'i gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid rnam par log na agrib pa thams cad las rnam par grol zhing chos thams cad la dbang sgyur ba nye bar gnas pa rnam par byang ba'i char gtogs pa'i gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid du gyur pa'i phyir ro !

ii. ckar po'i chos kyi rang bzhin gyi mtshan nyid ni pha rol tu phyin pa drug yonga su rdzogs nas ! dbang bcu thob pa'i phyir te !

a. de la tshe la dbang ba dang ! sems la dbang ba dang ! yo byad la dbang ba ni sbyin pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa yongs su rdzogs pa'i phyir ro !

b. las la dbang ba dang skye ba la dbang ba ni tahul khriams kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yongs su rdzogs pa'i phyir ro !

c. moa pa la dbang ba ni bzod pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa yongs su rdzogs pa'i phyir ro !

d. amon lam la dbang ba ni brtson 'grus kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yongs su rdzogs pa'i phyir ro !

e. ngon par shes pa lngas badus pa'i rdzu 'phrul la dbang ba ni bsam gtan gyi pha rol tu phyin pa yongs su rdzogs pa'i phyir ro !

f. ye shes la dbang ba dang chos la dbang ba ni shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yongs su rdzogs pa'i phyir ro !

iii. gnyis su med pa'i mtshan nyid ni

a. yod pa dang med pa gnyis su med pa'i mtshan nyid kyi chos thams cad dngos po med pa dang ! atong pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid kyi dngos po yin pa'i phyir ro !

b. 'dus byas dang ! 'dus ma byas gnyis su med pa'i mtshan nyid ni las dang nyon mongs pa rname kyi ngon par 'dus ma byas pa nyid dang ! 'dus byas su anang ba kun tu aton pa la dbang 'byor pa'i phyir ro !

c. tha dad pa dang gcig pa gnyis su med pa'i mtshan nyid ni ! de la sangs rgyas thams cad kyi gnas tha dad pa ma yin pa dang ! rgyud tshad med pa ngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa'i phyir ro ! 'dir tshigs su bmad pa !

1. bdag tu 'dzin pa med pa'i phyir !

gnas la tha dad yod ma yin !

ngon gyi rjes su 'brang bas na !

de la bdags pas tha dad byed !

2. tha dad rigs phyir don med phyir !

kun phyir thog ma med pa'i phyir !

dri ma med pa'i gnas la ni !

sangs rgyas gcig min mang po'am min !

(= MSA XI.77:

gotrabhedād avaiyarthyaṭ sākalyād apy anāditāḥ !

abhedān naikabuddhatvaṃ bahutvaṃ cāmalāśraye ||

iv. rtag pa'i mtshan nyid ni de bzhin nyid rnam par dag pa'i mtshan nyid dang ! ngon gyi smon lam gyi shugs dang ! bya ba yonga su ma rdzogs pa'i phyir ro !

v. bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i mtshan nyid ni de bzhin nyid rnam par dag pa de so so rang gis rig par bya ba dang !

'jig rten na dpe med pa dang ! rtog ge pa'i spyod yul ma

yin pa'i phyir ro l.

27. Lamotte, MSam X.35.6, La Somme, vol. 1, p. 97, vol. 2, pp. 330-331. Cf. MSamU, fol. 354a7, p. 49.4.7: kun gzhi rnam par shea pa gyur pa ni gno bo nyid do l 'jug pa'i rnam par shea pa gyur pa ni longa spyod rdzoga pa'o l.

28. Compare the association of two kinds of āśrayaparivṛtti with the enlightenment of the Śrāvaka found in *Vikhy VII.22-24 and *VikhyBh, T.1602.31.560a8-b1.

29. SamdVy, Peking ngo mtshar batan bcos, cho, 29b7, vol. 145, p. 14.1.7.

30. SamdVy, fols. 29b7-30b7, p. 14.1.7-3.7; cf. VinSq, aDe-dge zi fols. 27b6 ff., quoted in full below. Note that the SamdVy follows this section (fols. 30b7 ff., p. 14.3.7 f.) with an abbreviated account of the distinction between āśrayaparivṛtti and ālayaviññāna as found in the VinSq, which we have translated and quoted in full in Part II, Chapter Four above.

31. YoBh, aDe-dge sams-tsam tahi, fol. 162a6-7.

32. VinSq, aDe-dge sams-tsam zi, fols. 27b7-28a6:
 byang chub chen po'i ngo bo nyid gang zhe na l nyan thoa dang l rang sangs rgyas las khyad par du 'phags pa'i gnas gyur pa gang yin pa'o l de yang rnam pa bzhis rig par bya ste l 'jug pa'i gnas dang l mi 'jug pa'i gnas dang l shes bya legs par yonga su brtags pa'i 'bras bu dang l chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa'i mtshan nyid kyas so l
 i. de la 'jug pa'i gnas ni sangs rgyas kyi rgyud la mnga' ba 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam gyi 'jug pa'i gnas yin pa'i phyir te l de de lta ma yin du zin te gnas gyur pa de la ma brten par lam skye par mi 'gyur zhing 'jug par mi 'gyur ro l gal te gnas gyur pa med kyang l 'jug par gyur na ni dang po nyid nas 'jug par 'gyur ro l
 ii. de la mi 'jug pa'i gnas ni bag chags dang bcas pa'i nyon mongs pa rnam mi 'jug pa'i gnas yin pa'i phyir te l de de lta ma yin du zin te gnas gyur pa de la ma brten par rkyen tshogs kyang bag chags dang bcas pa'i nyon mongs pa rnam mi 'jigs pa dmigs par mi 'gyur ro l
 iii. de la shes bya legs par yongs su brtags pa'i 'bras bu ni shes bya'i de kho na shes bya'i de bzhin nyid legs par rtog pa'i 'bras bu ni gnas gyur pa de yin pa'i phyir te l de de lta ma yin du zin na sangs rgyas rnam kyi chos kyi ngo bo nyid kyang yongs su shes par bya ba dang l spang bar bya ba dang l dgag par bya dgos par 'gyur ro l
 iv. de la chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa'i mtshan nyid ni mtshan ma thams cad zil gyis nman pa'i phyir gnas gyur pa de ni chos kyi dbyings shin tu rnam par dag pas rab tu phye ba yin no l de de lta bu ma yin du zin na mi rtag pa dang bsam du rung bar 'gyur ba zhig na l de ni rtag pa'i mtshan nyid

dang beam gyis mi khyab pa'i mtshan nyid kyis gnyis su med
par batan pa yin no l.

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